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 “Hear the rime of the Ancient Mariner 
See his eye as he stops one of three 
Mesmerises one of the wedding guests 
Stay here and listen to the nightmares of the Sea.” 




“The ship was cheered, the harbour cleared,  
Merrily did we drop  
Below the kirk, below the hill,  
Below the lighthouse top.  
 
The Sun came up upon the left,  
Out of the sea came he!  
And he shone bright, and on the right  
Went down into the sea.” 
“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” Samuel Colerige
  
  
IN MEMORIAM  
MARÍA LUISA FRINGS KORTE 
1912-2010 
 






hen he analyzed the ways in which war should be conducted, VON CLAUSEWITZ, 
despite popular misconceptions, did not limit his advice to the complete 
destruction of the enemy. Indeed, he “did not universally endorse annihilation as 
the optimal method of warfare,” seeing it as only one of several possible strategic 
approaches to combat.*  Attempting to destroy the enemy to smithereens, to eliminate 
every segment of his forces, is an extremely costly endeavor, and so VON CLAUSEWITZ 
considered that, when possible, alternative tactics should be pursued: 
“[T]he most important method, judging from the frequency of its use, is to wear 
down the enemy. That expression is more than a label; it describes the process 
precisely, and is not so metaphorical as it may seem at first. Wearing down the 
enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual 
exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.”† 
If this book proves anything, it is that VON CLAUSEWITZ was right. Attrition, wearing down 
the enemy, works. I know this because this is how my research started.  
Back in 2010, when I was just an LL.M. student in Groningen, I heard that Professor Ten 
Wolde was maybe interested in starting a research project and supervising a doctoral 
research. After what can only be described as weeks of relentless phone calls, e-mails, 
meetings and a behavior that clearly sought to bring about his gradual exhaustion, I 
became a PhD student. The war of attrition had been won. 
Only once all the contracts had been signed did I realize that, for all intents and purposes, 
I was completely out of my depth.  Alone, as the friends I had made during my LL.M. 
studies had already returned home, and far from my family, I was slowly coming to terms 
with the fact that perhaps writing a doctoral dissertation in a completely unknown topic 
was not such a bright idea after all. The challenge ahead seemed to be well beyond my 
abilities, and the mountains of knowledge that I was somehow supposed to absorb 
seemed like an unsurmountable obstacle. 
The role that Professor ten Wolde played in preventing me from straying too far away 
from the path, so as to conduct and complete this research, cannot be overstated. Every 
meeting with him somehow filled me with a (probably unwarranted) sense of serenity 
that allowed me to continue aboard this ship. 
From the first time that we met and discussed the possibility of conducting this research 
project, and all the way until these words are being written, he has been a continuous 
                                                                  
* MALKASIAN, C., A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, 2002, Praeger, p. 19. 
† CLAUSEWITZ, C. v., On War, 2007, Oxford University Press, p. 36. 
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source of support. I am extremely thankful for the tremendous opportunity that he gave 
me by taking me in as a PhD student, and for having supported me throughout these 
years. I consider myself very fortunate to be able to call Professor ten Wolde, Mathijs, a 
very dear friend. 
The funding for my research was provided by both BBC Chartering and Briese Schiffahrts. 
This was made possible by Ed Anderson, Chief Legal Officer of BBC Chartering, who 
placed his trust in me and gave me this opportunity. He was always very supportive, and I 
cannot thank him enough for everything that he did. It is truly a privilege to have worked 
under someone as professionally and academically accomplished as he is in the maritime 
field. 
It was thanks to the vision of Svend Andersen, CEO of BBC Chartering, and Roelf Briese, 
CEO of Briese Schiffahrts, that these companies agreed to fund my project. The time that 
I spent working with them, learning the intricate details of the maritime industry, and, as 
a novice, familiarizing myself with the daily practice of maritime law, proved to be 
invaluable in my professional and academic development. Similarly, the fellow attorneys 
that I met during this time, Florian Meer, Andrei Kharchanka, Fabian Schweigel, Thomas 
Bock, and many others, were all instrumental in my ability to perfect my knowledge of the 
trade. 
I would also like to thank the assessment committee for this dissertation, Professor 
Solvang from the Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law at the University of Oslo, and 
Professors Gormley and Wezeman from the University of Groningen. Their effort and 
input has been greatly appreciated, and I am fortunate to have had such excellent 
academics review, evaluate and comment on my work. 
I owe a great deal of gratitude to my mother, without whose support this journey would 
have been impossible. The accomplishment represented by this book is a testament to her 
enormous efforts and sacrifices. I can only hope that when, and if, I have kids of my own, 
I will be able to transmit to them the love, care and trust that she has conveyed to me 
throughout my life. It is thanks to her that I learned about the unforgiving minute, and I 
sincerely hope that this book represents at least part of that distance run with which we 
are to fill its sixty fleeting seconds.   
During the many sleepless times that were required in the making of this dissertation 
(particularly as the final deadline drew closer), there were many times when I found 
myself questioning the series of poor decisions that had led me to this situation. 
Whenever I found myself doubting my skills, however, it was Ana, my partner, who was 
there to give me support. I have no doubt that if it was not for her constant pushes, and 
the unending (and, in my view, unjustifiable and disproportionate) trust in me, this book 
would have taken much, much longer or, perhaps, not even have been finished at all. This 
book, without a doubt, would not exist without her. Хвала, Ана. 
Despite having a rather small family, I have had the fortune of having several “adoptive” 
family members. María Teresa Jeria, Lutgarda Cabello and Sonia Berríos played an 
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enormous part in my life, and I am glad to report that their efforts were not in vain. 
Patricia Cotera and Luz Gómez were very supportive of my desire to continue my studies 
abroad, and were thus instrumental in cementing my decision to do so. Also, I am very 
thankful to Predrag, Marcela and Anuška Bosnić, who, together with Milka Tot, have in 
one way or another, welcomed me into their family. Хвала. 
If the saying is true, and it takes a village to raise a child, something similar can be said of 
a book. The whole department of Private International Law at the University of 
Groningen proved to be great accomplices in my never-ending quest to perfect the art of 
procrastination. I am very lucky to have had such terrific colleagues, and my hours-long 
conversations with Kirsten and Ilian, for example, will remain as one of the best parts of 
my research (even if, in reality, they had very little to do with it). I must also extend my 
gratitude to the personnel of the University of Groningen, where people like Kirsten 
Wolkotte, Karien Galli and Majolijn Both were all instrumental in achieving my academic 
objectives. 
Finally, I have an enormous debt of gratitude to my friends, Sonja Magličic, Claire Towey, 
Víctor de María, Jeremie Rousseau, Claudie Padiou, Jon Burkan, Andrew Downey, Conor 
Courtney and Bradley Barnes. Their friendship and support made it possible for me to, 
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A Note on References and Citations 
 
“If we steal thoughts from the moderns, it will be cried down as 
plagiarism; if from the ancients, it will be cried up as erudition.” 
Revered Charles Caleb Colton.3 
 
“I am reminded of the man who was asked what plagiarism was. He said: 
‘It is plagiarism when you take something out of a book and use it as your 
own. If you take it out of several books, then it is research.’” 
Ralph Foss.4 
 
“Experienced lawyers know that, whatever appears in the texts of brief 
and articles, the footnotes are where the battlelines are very often drawn 
and the participants sometimes even quartered.” 
Allan Mendelsohn.5 
 
s the few who read this work will notice, the amount of footnotes and references 
used throughout this book is, to say the least, considerable. In order to facilitate 
the already tedious and difficult reading process, we have made some stylistic 
decisions, aimed at simplifying the text. 
We have taken the liberty of eliminating all the internal citations, references and 
footnotes when a passage is being quoted verbatim. We have, accordingly, chosen not to 
add comments such as “internal footnotes omitted” in our citations. 
When it comes to citing legislation that was not originally drafted in English, we have 
attempted to use, whenever possible, official translations into the English language. With 
the exception of EU regulations, however, English translations, even when done by the 
respective official governmental body, do not have force of law, and yield in favor of the 
original language. Because of this, we have added in the footnotes the original text of the 
                                                                  
3 COLTON, C. C., Lacon:  Or, Many Things in Few Words: Addressed to Those who Think, 1820, 5th, Longman, Hurst, 
Rees, Orme, and Brown, p. 229. 
4 Ralph Foss, ‘Cooperation Between Special Libraries and Publishers’ Special Libraries, p. 281. 
5 MENDELSOHN, A. I., ‘Why the U.S. Did Not Ratify the Visby Amendments’, 1992, 23 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, no. 1, p. 30. 




A Note on References and Citations 
respective norms, so that readers, if they wish to do so, are able to compare and verify 
their meaning.  
With the goal of facilitating the understanding of the text, we have changed the font 
styles depending on the situation. Verbatim quotes can be easily identified by the use of 
quotations and italics (“example 1”). Figures of speech are written in quotes (“example 2”). 
Emphasis is done by italicizing the word or phrase (example 3). In those cases in which a 
verbatim quote is emphasized, either by us or by the original author, this will be shown 
through use of bolding (“example 4”). 
Readers will note that although this book has been written in American-English, many 
citations come from sources written in British English. In those cases, the original spelling 
has been retained. Since the English authors being cited are so numerous, we have not 
added “sic” after every different spelling (e.g. “favour” instead of the American “favor”), so 
as to not add even more padding to this already voluminous work. 
It should be noted that the final substantive edits to this book were made on October 
2016. Although special care has been taken to ensure that all the cited legislation and case 
law is up to date, reforms or decisions issued in close proximity to this date are bound to 






“At some point, the people who pay the bills will have had enough of the 
excuses for the gibberish, jargon, obfuscation, and prolixity in legal 
language. They will demand lawyers who can write in their mother 
tongue.  
That day will come. We cannot fool people forever.” 
Matthew R. Salzwedel.6 
 
“Law is the servant of Freedom. Freedom without limits is just a word.” 
Terry Pratchett.7 
1.1 Philosophical Underpinnings of the Project 
ur economic system is based on two basic ideas. First, people should be able to 
conclude binding agreements with each other; second, those people should be 
free to choose the terms of these agreements. These ideas permeate the totality 
of our liberal conception of society, as expressions of our liberty and our 
individual rights. As a free people, we are the best arbiters of our needs, and are therefore 
best suited to decide the conditions under which we want to deal with one another. The 
State has, therefore, no role to play in our individual interactions. 
At least, that is the theory. 
Outside of the fringes of politics and economics, few suggest that freedom of contract 
should be left unregulated, as there is a certain awareness of the problems that arise 
within the contractual process. As we will see, evidence shows that a significant part of 
our contracts is made up of clauses we do not know, would not understand if we knew 
them, and which, even if we knew and understood them, we would be unable to change. 
Of course, this is not surprising, since life itself would be impossible to deal with if we had 
to carefully analyze the legal details of every one of our deals. The problem, therefore, is 
not that we do not know or understand everything we contract. Instead, the issue is how 
                                                                  
6 SALZWEDEL, M. R., ‘The Lawyer's Struggle to Write’, 2015, 16 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing, p. 90. 






much power the other party possesses when the terms of those contracts are drafted, and 
how our legal system tackles the possible unfair results that can come from such an 
imbalanced relation.  
At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that freedom of contract is a manifestation 
of our civil liberties. Our ability to interact with others, to buy, sell, rent, hire, etc., are all 
demonstrations of our qualities as individuals, independent from the will of the State, 
and free from unnecessary obstructions. Here it is key, however, to note that obstructions 
are not, in and of themselves, negative. In fact, they are necessary in order to ensure a 
working society. A system in which individual freedom is unfettered, where our rights are 
not limited, is not a free society, it is anarchy. It is a system in which the strong trample 
over the weak; where might, quite simply, becomes right. 
This conception of liberty and society is not new. Already in 1819 Thomas JEFFERSON 
noted how liberty recognizes certain limits, even if these are not necessarily those created 
by the State.  
“Of liberty I would say that, in the whole plenitude of its extent, it is unobstructed 
action according to our will. But rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to 
our will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others. I do not add 
‘within the limits of the law’ because law is often but the tyrant's will, and always so 
when it violates the rights of the individual.”8 
It is from this Jeffersonian understanding of freedom, as a fundamental right that 
recognizes the rights of others as its limit, that we build our analysis.  
1.2 Freedom and the Market 
The West owes its progress and prosperity to the free market. In the struggle of the cold 
war, the clash between two competing ideologies, one placing freedom at the forefront, 
the other the enslavement to the State, it was economic freedom that allowed the West to 
win.  
“To the free market, we owe all material prosperity, all leisure time, our health and 
longevity, our huge and growing population, nearly everything we call life itself. 
Capitalism and capitalism alone has rescued the human race from degrading 
poverty, rampant sickness, and early death.”9 
                                                                  
8 JEFFERSON, T. & APPLEBY, J. et al., Jefferson: Political Writings, 1999, Cambridge University Press, p. 224. 




A fundamental part of our capitalist economy is our freedom of contract, our ability to 
create binding agreements with one another in whatever terms we might decide. This is 
what allows the market to grow, as different players are able to contract with each other, 
based on the rules of supply and demand, and develop the economy.  
While, certainly, it is thanks to the free market that our societies have been able to 
flourish and prosper, we cannot be blind to the limits that are inherent to the market. 
Left to its own devices, the market will soon transform into a Darwinian hellscape where, 
to paraphrase ORWELL, society would involve nothing but “a boot stomping on a human face 
– forever.”10 Experience shows us beyond any doubt that the operations of unfettered 
markets “tend to weaken or destroy the resources of life and freedom for the majority, to benefit 
most the small minority of society whose wealth provides them with far more […] than they 
need.”11 Because of this, the establishment of regulatory systems that prevent abuses, that 
create and police the rules of the market, is essential. 
Key among these rules are the ones devoted to the establishment of limits to our freedom 
of contract, recognizing the different power dynamics that exist within the market. 
Although in an ideal conception of capitalism we might like to believe that all parties to a 
contract arrive on equal terms, and are therefore able to negotiate the terms of their 
agreements in a fair and open manner, the reality is quite different. It is because of this 
that, despite our inherent liberty, and even though we recognize that freedom of contract 
is essential to our prosperity, we curtail that ability in order to protect not only society, 
but also the market itself.  
1.3 Limiting Commercial Parties 
When the State establishes limits to the freedom of contract, it often does so in regards to 
certain categories of contractual parties. These are the “weak” participants of the market, 
the consumers, the workers, etc., and who are deemed to require special protections in 
order to avoid being victims of the powerful. 
The problem about categorizing certain market participants as “strong” and “weak,” is 
that such categories often lack flexibility.  Mainly, this is the result of strict criteria that 
do not accommodate to the real nuances that exist in the marketplace. Such is the case of 
commercial parties, who are often left without any significant legal protections as a result 
of being “commercial,” with the law treating them as if all commercial parties, by their 
very nature, were always of a similar size and with similar power. 
                                                                  
10 ORWELL, G., Nineteen Eighty-Four, 1983, Penguin Books, New York, NY, p. 220. 
11 MCMURTRY, J., ‘The Contradictions of Free Market Doctrine: Is There a Solution?’, 16 Journal of Business Ethics, 




An interesting case study of the market dynamics between commercial parties appears in 
the case of the carriage of goods by sea. At first glance, one is tempted to believe that all 
the players in this market, the ones behind the containers, the ships, and the crews, all 
possess significant market power. And while this might be true if they are placed side by 
side with individual consumers, when the players in the maritime market are next to each 
other, the differences are enormous. 
The carriage of goods by sea is a market that, for over a century, has been characterized by 
the recognition of bargaining power disparities. Shipowners and carriers are seen by the 
regulators as possessing the vast majority of the market power, while the cargo owners 
and receivers are seen as the ones deserving special protection. The need for these 
protections is a lesson learned long ago, when contractual abuse and unfairness turned 
the maritime market into anarchy. 
1.4 The Topic of this Book 
This book is divided in two, very distinct, parts. The first is devoted to the analysis of the 
binding character of contracts, with special attention being paid to forum selection. The 
second, places its attention on the carriage of goods by sea and, especially, in the use of 
forum selection clauses in carriage contracts.  
While our attention to forum selection, particularly when it is present in maritime 
carriage, might appear whimsical, there are strong reasons for it. While issues of 
contractual fairness have been the subject of many superb academic works, it appeared to 
us that such an analysis was not often performed in regards to commercial contracts. On 
the contrary, commercial contracts have often been left behind not only in legislative 
attempts at solving contractual unfairness, but also in the literature. This was even more 
pronounced in the case of maritime contracts, where the analysis of rights and obligations 
often seemed to ignore the issues of bargaining power and contractual fairness. This was 
even more pronounced in the case of choice of court agreements in maritime contracts.  
We felt that an analysis of these topics made through the prism of the struggle between 
bargaining power disparities and freedom of contract would be an interesting and useful 
addition to the available academic literature. It represents a rather different approach to 
this topic, and we are confident that it might open new lines of discussion to further our 




1.5 Research Questions and Methods 
In our work we have tried to answer two questions: 
1. Should commercial parties, such as cargo interests in maritime contracts, benefit 
from a legal protectionism established in their favor? 
2. Should this legal protectionism extend to forum selection clauses? 
In order to answer these questions, we have adopted an eclectic research method. 
Although in several sections our use of a doctrinal methodology is obvious, as we review 
both black letter law and jurisprudence, we felt that limiting our methods to only 
doctrinal aspects would hurt our ability to find answers. Because of this, we have, at 
times, adopted an interdisciplinary approach, taking sociological and philosophical issues 
into consideration. Our research has, therefore, occasionally been not so much “in” law, 
but rather “about” the law. 
The push for maritime regulation in the late 19th Century, for example, cannot be 
understood unless it is placed in the social and historical context of the time. Similarly, 
the rise of labor and consumer law cannot be comprehended unless the sociological 
context of the industrial revolution and the rise of the individual consumer, respectively, 
are given proper attention. These are social issues that, although have increased the 
length of our work, appear to us to be a fundamental part of this research. 
Since an essential part of our research deals with the question of the legitimacy of State 
intervention in the economy, particularly when it comes to bargaining power disparities, 
we are aware of the problems that arise when tackling such monumental question. This is, 
after all, a question that is inherently related to the philosophical conceptions of society 
that a person or a State might have, covering the whole gamut of options existing from 
the Marxist far left to the Libertarian right wing. While it would be impossible to analyze 
every philosophical and economic position in regards to our questions, we have reviewed 
them accordingly when a given topic requires it. 
1.6 Researched Legal Systems 
Although we have taken great care to cover the topics being researched in the most 
thorough possible way, certain decisions had to be made in order to avoid  its extension 
becoming unmanageable. As such, and due to the fact that our analysis is, in the end, 
focused on maritime law, the bulk of our work is focused in the laws of the United States 
and England, as well as the applicable international conventions regulating maritime 
trade. The reasons for this decision are simple to understand. Due to its past as the 
greatest maritime empire, the laws of England continue to be an essential part of 
maritime trade, while English courts and arbitrators are seen as the most prepared in this 




own their future. As one of the largest trading nations, and with an increasing number of 
bills of lading selecting American courts and arbitrators as their chosen forum, paying due 
attention to American law seemed appropriate.  
Despite this narrow limit, legislation from third countries is also used for comparative 
purposes. In those cases, we have mostly referred to the laws of Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, Spain and Chile. We believe that these countries offer a good sample 
of the Civil Law tradition and, as such, can give us great insight from a comparative 
perspective. 
1.7 Structure of this Book 
Something that we noted during our research is that a book will often tackle a certain 
topic without actually covering all of its bases. In order to avoid seeing our analysis 
becoming the proverbial giant with feet of clay, we have opted to build our topic from  the  
ground up, addressing all the elements that come into play.  
In Chapters 1 and 2, we review the pacta sunt servanda principle, as well as the strength 
and extent of the freedom of contract principle. In Chapter 3, we focus our attention on 
bargaining power and how it can lead to contractual imbalances. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze 
how contractual imbalances have been addressed in both the Civil Law and the Common 
Law systems, as well as how adequate these methods have been. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
we review forum selection clauses, their implementation and acceptance under American 
and English Law and, of course, their use as a possible manifestation of bargaining power 
disparities. 
In Chapters 9 and 10 we review the contracts that make up maritime law, as well as the 
regulations that apply to them. As part of this regulatory analysis, we review some of the 
historical reasons that led to the enactment of these regulations, particularly the 
bargaining power disparities that were (and continue to be) pervasive in the trade. 
Chapter 11 then focuses our attention to freedom of contract and, in light of the 
applicable regulations, whether or not it actually exists in this field. Finally, Chapter 12 
analyses forum selection in contracts of carriage, how different international regulatory 




The Inviolability of Contracts 
 
“Universal notions of justice and humanity teach even the worst 
barbarians among human beings, that, if an agreement has been made, 
the law demands its observance.” 
Lord Russell.12 
 
“It is undoubtedly true that every man is by the law of nature bound to 
fulfil his engagements.” 
Lord Baron Skynner.13 
1.1 Introduction 
he idea that agreements must be kept and that contracts are made to be fulfilled is 
not just a fundamental value of legal practice, but a pivotal element on which all 
transactions are based. Certainly, all commerce would come to a halt if there was 
no presumption of contractual compliance. Just like sciences are based on the 
infallibility of the laws of physics, commerce is based on the idea that the parties can trust 
each other, that their agreements will be fulfilled, and that the courts will intervene in 
case of noncompliance.14 
Despite how natural and obvious they might appear, however, the fundamental elements 
that make up our understanding of contractual relations are far from static. Let us take, 
for instance, the concepts of pacta sunt servanda and of freedom of contract, the former 
referring to the inviolability of the contracts (the parties must do as they agreed), and the 
latter to the ability of the parties to negotiate and agree upon whatever terms they decide. 
The history of both concepts, together with how they were shaped as legal principles, 
                                                                  
12 Cited in WEHBERG, H., ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’, 1959, 53 The American Journal of International Law, no. 4, p. 783. 
13 Cited in HUGHES PARRY, D., The Sanctity of Contracts in English Law, 1959, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 
p. 11. 
14 SHARP, M. P., ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’, 1941, 41 Columbia Law Review, no. 5, p. 784 (“[there is a] necessity in a 
commercial civilization that sensible expectations induced by a promisor be not too often defeated. Business calculations 
assume inevitably the dependability of undertakings about future conduct”). 
Chapter 1 
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shows that their meanings are much more complex than it might appear at first, and that 
they have actually changed greatly throughout the years.15 
In order to truly understand how the law shapes itself towards contractual enforcement, 
and how certain rights and obligations can be demanded while others cannot, it is 
essential to review the history of these concepts. In this chapter we provide a cursory 
review of how contractual sanctity, the pacta sunt servanda principle, came to be, and how 
it manifests itself in different legal systems.  
1.2 Pacta Sunt Servanda as a Religious Imperative 
Although it might seem counter-intuitive, contracts, binding agreements, are a recent 
development in human history, having paid a rather small part in the earlier parts of its 
development. Within primitive societies, for example, it was “the solidarity of relatively self-
sufficient family groups and the fear of departing from accustomed ways [that would] limit 
individual initiative as well as the scope and importance of what can be achieved by deliberate 
agreements or bargains”.16 COLLINET is categorical on this issue, stating in no uncertain 
terms that: 
“In the beginning of every civilization there was no contract. The agreement of two 
or more persons never gave rise to an obligation of dare, lacere or non lacere-such 
being the definition of contract. Primitive peoples employ particular proceedings, 
quite unlike the agreement of wills, to carry out the transactions that we call 
'contracts' (sale, for instance). Comparative historical jurisprudence has made these 
two facts obvious.”17 
It was only once more advanced societies started to develop, together with their internal 
and external economies, that the idea of enforceable agreements began to take hold. This 
adoption of contracts as binding agreements was “largely an incident of commercial and 
                                                                  
15 For an analysis of freedom of contracts, as well as its evolution, See Chapter 2. 
16 COHEN, M. R., ‘The Basis of Contract’, 1933, 46 Harvard Law Review, no. 4, p. 555. Although legal repercussions 
exist, at their core, these same values continue to serve as the backbone of the sanctity of contracts; as KAHN-
FREUND noted,  “the fear of social ostracism by one's friends and neighbours is a far more powerful guarantee that 
promises will be kept than the fear of the judge or of the sheriff's officer” (KAHN-FREUND, O., ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda - A 
Principle and Its Limits: Some Thoughts Prompted by Comparative Labour Law’, 1973-1974, 48 Tulane Law 
Review, no. 4, p. 895). 
17 COLLINET, P., ‘The Evolution of Contract as Illustrating the General Evolution of Roman Law’, 1932, 48 The Law 
Quarterly Review, no. 4, p. 488. What is more, as HUGHES PARRY, citing the work of HOLLAND, has noted, there 
were stages in history where legal enforcement of contract was not only non-existent, but in which even the mere 
idea was frowned upon. This “on the ground that they [the contracts] should be entered into only with those whose 
honour can be trusted” (HUGHES PARRY, D., 1959, supra note 13, p. 5).  
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industrial enterprises that involve a greater anticipation of the future” that was previously 
thought to be necessary, and which required an increasing reliance on promises.18  
In its earliest forms, contract “law” was closely related to theological concerns, almost 
being a part of religion in and of itself. According to the ancient traditions of China, Egypt 
and Babylon, for example, the gods themselves intervened in the formation of a contract, 
acting, in a way, as its guarantors. As a result, if a party breached her obligations, she was 
expected to face the wrath of her deities.19 Similarly, in Mesopotamia, where several 
business transactions were regulated in the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1750 BC), divine 
authority was claimed to justify the regulations.20 Analogous provisions, albeit not 
necessarily equivalent, exist also in Assyrian (circa 1400 BC) and Hittite Law (circa XVI-
XV centuries BC) where religious concerns also played a role in the regulation of 
agreements.21 This quasi-religious power given to contracts, and which has even been 
referred to as a “cult of contracts”, was responsible for the development of religious 
formulas or solemnities required at the time of contracting.22  
The reasons that justify the inclusion of a mandate of divine origin urging people to 
respect their commitments are, to borrow a biblical term, legion. Social stability requires 
that people are able to trust in one another, at least in regards to their commercial 
transactions. If the members of a community cannot be relatively certain that their peers 
will respect their agreements, then the internal workings of the community will soon 
crumble. Thus, and in a similar way to what happened in regards to rules on alimentation 
and general behavior, religious creeds developed their own regulations on contracts and 
agreements, in an attempt to direct the public in what they saw as a self-preserving way.23 
                                                                  
18 COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 555. On contract law and predictability, See PHILLIPS, J., ‘Protecting 
Those in a Disadvantageous Negotiating Position: Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine’, 2010, 45 
Wake Forest Law Review, no. 3, p. 839 (“In short, contract law enables contracting parties to proceed and plan with a 
degree of confidence”). 
19 WEHBERG, H., 1959, supra note 12, p. 775. GORMLEY offers as an example, though in the realm of public 
international law, the treaty between Ramses II and Hatushili III, in which “their respective deities were held to 
guarantee the sacred obligation of the treaty” (GORMLEY, W. P., ‘Codification of Pacta Sunt Servanda by the 
International Law Commission: The Preservation of Classical Norms of Moral Force and Good Faith’, 1969-1970, 
14 Saint Louis University Law Journal, p. 373). COHEN goes even further on this point, adding that agreements 
(what we might call "proto-contracts") between nations were used to preserve the peace, with these "promises to 
the gods [...being] enforced by the community as a whole because it feared the undiscriminating effects of divine wrath" 
(COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 555). 
20 SALEH, N., ‘Origins of the Sanctity of Contracts in Islamic Law’, 1998, 13 Arab Law Quarterly, no. 3, pp. 252–
253. 
21 ibid., pp. 252–253. 
22 WEHBERG, H., 1959, supra note 12, p. 775. 
23 ibid., p. 775 (“contracts were considered as being under Divine protection. But their psychological basis then was, 
above all, the necessity of a legal regulation […]”). On the issue of religious mandates on  food and their origins, See 
SIMOONS, F. J., ‘Traditional Use and Avoidance of Foods of Animal Origin: A Culture Historical View’, 1978, 28 
BioScience, no. 3. 
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Just as the Mesopotamian laws before it, although going beyond in scope, Judaic 
tradition regulated a plethora of contracts, such as deposits (Exodus 22/7-13), loans (e.g. 
Exodus 22/25-27) and sales (e.g. Leviticus 25/14-23). Considered as divine revelation, 
Mosaic law went beyond merely setting rules in regards to specific transactions, 
establishing instead a general duty for the parties to fulfill their agreements, going as far 
as directing them to the competent courts in case a dispute arose, under penalty of 
death.24 
Talmudic law was, in general, favorable to contracts, encouraging an increasing doctrine 
of self-reliance. The Old Testament is clear on this, with the Book of Ezekiel establishing 
that: 
“The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, 
neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the 
righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.”25 
Although easy to overlook, the importance of this passage cannot be overstated. What the 
Book of Ezekiel establishes is that it is the party who breaches his obligations who must 
pay the price. The significance of these doctrines of self-reliance and self-responsibility in 
the Old Testament is that they allowed the foundations of contract law to develop. Once 
“sin” is understood as an inherently voluntary act, and for which only the “sinner” bears 
responsibility, liability for those sins comes as a natural result. Among these sins, of 
course, the failure to fulfill an agreement. As established in the Book of Numbers: 
“If a man vows a vow unto the Lord, or swears an oath to bind his soul with a bond; 
he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his 
mouth.”26 
Biblical Christianity continued with the foundations established in the Old Testament, 
placing a great emphasis in the importance of keeping one’s word.27 The Book of 
Matthew, for example, exhorts Christian believers to fulfill their obligations: 
“But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than 
these cometh of evil.”28   
Remarkably enough, the New Testament establishes an interesting exception to the idea 
of the sanctity of contracts, by apparently limiting their efficacy to contracts with “the 
faithful”: 
                                                                  
24 SALEH, N., 1998, supra note 20, p. 253. 
25 Ezekiel 18:20. King James Version. 
26 Numbers 30:2. King James Version. 
27 WEHBERG, H., 1959, supra note 12, pp. 775–776. 
28 Matthew 5:37. King James Version. 
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“Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath 
righteousness with unrighteousness? And what communion hath light with 
darkness?”29 
Taken as a rule established in regards to businesses, the above exhortation represents a 
break with the Talmudic idea of the sanctity of contracts, by conditioning their efficacy to 
the religion of the parties.30 The effect of this passage can actually be felt up to this day, 
with some Christian fundamentalist communities refusing to “yoke” with unbelievers.31 
The Islamic Qur’an also contains several provisions that, in an elaborate fashion, order 
Muslims to respect their covenants. As a matter of fact, under sharia law, “there is a much 
stronger presumption than in most legal systems for leaving the contractually formalized 
bargain undisturbed.”32 What is more, the Islamic commandment to fulfill all contracts 
comes from god, and not from a human lawgiver.33 This is best exemplified in the Arabian 
aphorism “Al-Aqud Sharia’t Al-Mua’ äqdïn”, “the contract is the Shari’a of the parties,” 
meaning that the contract is not merely law between the parties, but sacred law.34  
Islam’s favorable position towards contracts and covenants appears to be the result of 
reasons not only of sanctity, but also of pragmatism. As a merchant, Mohammed had a 
clear incentive to make sure that the regulations that he was creating would not affect 
commerce negatively, but actually encourage and strengthen it.35 As a result, Islamic 
                                                                  
29 2 Corinthians 6:14. King James Version. Although some translations of the Bible, like the King James Version, 
use the term “fellowship”, others, like the International Standard Version and the New American Standard, use 
the term “partnership”. 
30 While the meaning of this biblical passage has been debated, the idea that it separates Christians from 
unbelievers seems to be the traditional view. HUTSON, for example, a prominent American Baptist pastor of the 
early 20th Century, explained that “[f]or a Christian to be yoked up in spiritual matters with an unbeliever means a 
fellowship of righteousness with unrighteousness; it means communion of light with darkness; it means the temple of 
Gods and of idols in agreement” (in  HUTSON, C., Who is a Fundamentalist?, 1982, Sword of the Lord, pp. 18–19).  
31 The idea that Matthew 5:37 separates Christians from non-Christians in regard to contracts plays an 
important role among the Amish, where, as a result of this biblical command, “business partnerships or conjugal 
bonds with outsiders are forbidden” (HOSTETLER, J. A., ‘The Amish and the Law: A Religious Minority and its Legal 
Encounters’, 1984, 41 Washington and Lee Law Review, no. 1, p. 35). 
32 SHARMA, K. M., ‘From Sanctity to Fairness: An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts’, 1999, 18 The New 
York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, no. 2, p. 98. See also ANDERSON, J. & COULSON, N. 
J., ‘The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations’, 1958, 33 New York University Law Review, no. 7, p. 928 (“[i]t 
is abundantly clear, then, that […] Moslems are strictly bound by every lawful contract or covenant into which they may 
have entered”). 
33 WEHBERG, H., 1959, supra note 12, p. 775. 
34 HABACHY, S., ‘Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law’, 1962, 62 Columbia Law Review, no. 3, p. 465. See 
also SHARMA, K. M., 1999, supra note 32, p. 98. 
35 As SALEH explains: 
“Mohammad was a businessman, who had no reason to scorn legitimate profit [… he] introduced into 
practice a number of directives and rules with the aim of regulating commerce […] By and large, trade, the 
general concept of contracting, and contracts practised in Mecca and Medina, were regulated by the 
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tradition is full of commands regarding the fulfillment of promises and agreements, both 
between the people, as well as between them and their creator.36 Among them:37 
"O ye who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations.”38 
"Fulfil the Covenant of Allah when ye have entered into it, and break not your oaths 
after ye have confirmed them; indeed ye have made Allah your surety; for Allah 
knoweth all that ye do. And be not like a woman who breaks into untwisted strands 
the yarn which she has spun, after it has become strong. Nor take your oaths to 
practise deception between yourselves, lest one party should be more numerous than 
another: for Allah will test you by this; and on the Day of Judgment He will certainly 
make clear to you (the truth of) that wherein ye disagree."39 
"As for those who have honoured the treaty you made with them and who have not 
supported anyone against you: fulfill your agreement with them to the end of their 
term. God loves those who are righteous.”40  
"Successful indeed are the believers […and] [t]hose who faithfully observe their 
trusts and their covenants."41 
Interestingly enough, as the above passages show, Islamic tradition actually went further 
than its Christian counterpart, mandating respect for all covenants, regardless of the 
creed of the parties. This might, again, be the result of practical considerations, as a way 
ensure that commerce, even international commerce, would not be jeopardized. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
SALEH, N., 1998, supra note 20, p. 263. Driving his point home, he also refers to a tradition under which 
Mohammed was quoted as saying that “there is no harm in selling for eleven what you buy for ten and you are allowed 
to take a profit for expenses (ibid., p. 263). See also ANDERSON, J. & COULSON, N. J., 1958, supra note 32, pp. 925–
926. 
36 HABACHY, S., 1962, supra note 34, p. 467. 
37 ANDERSON, J. & COULSON, N. J., 1958, supra note 32, pp. 923–925. 
38 Surah Al-Ma’idah 5:1. Yusuf Ali Version (Saudi Rev. 1985). HABACHY makes sure to highlight the importance of 
this passage: 
“The verse expresses the rule of law Pacta sunt servanda, with which we are familiar, but with an 
important difference-in Islam the exhortation to fulfil contracts does not come from a human lawgiver. It 
is an order emanating from God Himself. To borrow […] from the language of the Muslim scholar Yusuf 
Ali: ‘This line has been justly admired for its terseness and comprehensiveness.’ While Article 1134 of the 
French Civil Code makes contracts the law of the parties to them, the corresponding rule of Muslim law 
makes them the Shari'a, the sacred law of the parties.” 
HABACHY, S., 1962, supra note 34, p. 468. 
39 Surah An-Nahl 16:91. Yusuf Ali Version (Saudi Rev. 1985). Despite the references to god, this passage has been 
understood as going beyond religious obligations, so that when it speaks of “covenant” it is applicable to all 
agreements, “for in all such the Moslem may be regarded as making God his witness” (ANDERSON, J. & COULSON, N. J., 
1958, supra note 32, pp. 923–925). 
40 Surah At-Taubah, 9:4. Wahiduddin Khan Version.  
41 Surah Al-Mu’minun, 23:1-8. Yusuf Ali version (Saudi Rev. 1985).  
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While it is undisputed that religious mandates played a fundamental role in the 
development of the western tradition of the sanctity of contracts (with the exception of 
Islam, the effects of which were felt elsewhere), god alone was not sufficient to elevate it 
to the level of a legal principle.42 As we show below, the legal origins of this idea might 
come from a different source. 
1.3 Developing Pacta Sunt Servanda as a Legal Principle 
Pacta sunt servanda has the particularity of being one of the few Latin aphorisms that, 
despite the numerous changes that have affected our legal philosophy, continues to be 
seen as a fundamental element of the law of contracts. This linguistic issue, that at first 
glance might seem of merely anecdotal importance, actually speaks to the impact that this 
aphorism, and of course its meaning, has had on our legal institutions. This is particularly 
so in the case of Civil Law systems, where pacta sunt servanda is seen not merely as a 
general rule, but rather as a moral imperative. Based on this principle, it is not an “option” 
for the contractual parties to fulfill their obligations, as they are not in a position to make 
judgments as to whether they are really bound or not. Thus, compliance with their word, 
with the terms of their agreements and covenants, is not merely an ideal, but a true moral 
necessity. 
In order to really understand the power associated with this maxim, and the effects it has 
had on our legal systems, it is perhaps useful to compare it with another famous maxim 
that uses the same grammatical construction: “Carthago delenda est”.43 Although the exact 
wording is still debated in academic circles, Carthago Delenda Est (from the alleged original 
"Censeo Carthaginem esse delendam") is reported to have been said by the Roman 
statesman Cato the Elder (234 BC – 149 BC) at the end of his speeches, during the Punic 
                                                                  
42 SHARMA is clear in regards to the importance of Islamic tradition in the modern legal world: 
"Since ‘[n]early  one-fifth people in the  world today  are Muslims, and Islamic  law is at the very core of 
their beliefs and social system’ it is pertinent not to overlook what the sharia has to say about contractual 
obligations. This is particularly so, because a large number of transnational  transactions  (for  example,  
oil and  mineral concessions, production  sharing  projects,  joint  ventures,  transfer  of technology, 
construction and operation of public utilities as well as loan  and other financing agreements),  on which 
the  economy of the Western world so vitally depends,  have  been the  subject-matter  of many 
international commercial disputes and arbitrations.  These have in turn involved  an interplay  of the 
notions of fairness with the Islamic  veneration of the stipulations voluntarily inserted by the parties, that 
is, ufu bil uqud (honor your contracts).”  
SHARMA, K. M., 1999, supra note 32, p. 99. 
43 ‘"We See by the Papers"’, 1949, 44 The Classical Journal, no. 4, p. 263 ("[the reference to the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda] may have stirred in many minds dim memories of something in the Latin grammar called the gerundive, 
which the old grammar said was used to imply ‘obligation, necessity or propriety’ -the most familiar example being the 
one about Carthage which old Cato kept insisting must be destroyed”). 
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Wars.44 His meaning was clear: If Rome was to survive, Carthage had to be destroyed. 
Using plenty of theatrical and rhetorical tools, Cato made sure to convey that the razing 
of Carthage was a vital task, a moral necessity. The conveyance of this moral imperative 
also employed linguist tools which sought to highlight this obligation. 
Indeed, just as it happens with Pacta Sunt Servanda, Cato’s (alleged) words employ a rather 
special linguistic construction, rare in Latin aphorisms and maxims. While most were 
stated in present indicative (e.g. “Contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio”; “Culpa 
lata dolo aequiparatur”; “Nemo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans”)45, both the Pacta and 
the Delenda maxims employed a gerundive.46 
In Latin, the gerundive was a verbal form used to imply a necessity, a “moral principle of 
what ought to be”.47 By using the gerundive, Cato’s words were not meant to be seen as a 
mere suggestion of something that could be done, nor as an exhortation as to something 
that should be done, but rather a dire statement related to Rome’s very survival: If Rome 
was to exist, then Carthage would have to be destroyed. From this perspective, Delenda in 
Cato’s words represented “a statement of absolute social necessity to which there can be 
literally no excuse, to which all other concerns, no matter how weighty, whether of family, of life, 
or of fortune, must necessarily yield, lest the polity itself be eradicated.”48 
In light of the above, the traditional translation of Cato’s words as “Carthage must be 
destroyed” appears incomplete, as it does not really reflect the truly imperative character 
of his words. Thus, a more appropriate translation might be that "[a]s a matter of 
imperative social necessity, Carthage must, at all costs and for all time, be totally annihilated”.49 
Following the same linguistic analysis, due to the grammatical similarities between the 
two, a correct translation of the pacta sunt servanda maxim would be: “As a matter of 
imperative social necessity, commitments must, at all costs and without exception, be completely 
                                                                  
44 In yet another parallel with the pacta sunt servanda maxim, which cannot be traced back to the Romans, Cato’s 
words might also be the product of later commentators. As LITTLE explains, the phrasing actually “represents a 
rhetorical and dramatic description of the scenes in the senate in Cato's last days from about 151 to his death in 149” 
(LITTLE, C. E., ‘The Authenticity and Form of Cato's Saying "Carthago Delenda Est"’, 1934, 29 The Classical 
Journal, no. 6, p. 434). 
45 HYLAND, R., ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation’, 1994, 34 Virginia Journal of International Law, no. 2, p. 408. 
46 Due to the absence of a similar linguistic element in the English language, the particularities of the Latin 
gerundive cannot be explained in a few words. For the purposes of this book, suffice it to say that it is a verbal 
category that allows to express that something must be done (See KRANICH, S. & BECHER, V. et al., A Tentative 
Typology of Translation-Induced Language Change, in Kranich, S. et al. (eds.), Multilingual Discourse Production, 
2011). 
47 HARRIS, J. G., ‘The "Latin Gerundive" as Autobiographical Imperative: A Reading of Mandel'shtam's Journey to 
Armenia’, 1986, 45 Slavic Review, no. 1, p. 4 Although HARRIS does have some remarks on MANDEL'SHTAM's 
words, particularly in regards to the examples he uses for the Latin gerundives, he deems his definition of the 
gerundive as correct. 
48 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, p. 411. 
49 ibid., p. 411. 
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performed", or "[t]he given word must be kept, the promise must be performed whatever it 
costs".50  
Although, in principle, drawing a parallel between such two apparently dissimilar phrases, 
considering the context in which they were used, might seem whimsical at best, and 
deceitful at worst, this is not accurate. Two reasons can be put forward for this 
comparison, and which in our eyes makes it completely warranted: First, the importance 
that words have not only in normal human communication, but specially in the legal 
profession; second, and most importantly, that the wording of the maxim is almost as 
important as its content, and has actually allowed it to survive as an aphorism throughout 
the years, despite having never been used in the Roman legal practice. 
While it might appear obvious, legal practitioners and students should always bear in 
mind that words are at the very core of our profession.51 From a mere consumer contract 
for a new appliance, to an international treaty establishing the borders of a nation or the 
terms of an armistice, the “real” meaning of the words used are often at the center of 
eventual ensuing disputes. In the words of GAVIT: 
“One thing is certain (and we should freely admit it) language is a lawyer's principle 
stock in trade […] One can only learn about ideas (which is what law is) and he can 
only deal with them through the medium of language.”52 
A similar sentiment was expressed by CHAFEE, who explained that “words are the principal 
tools of lawyers and judges, whether we like it or not. They are to us what the scalpel and insulin 
are to the doctor, or a theodolite and sliderule to the civil engineer”.53 It is clear, therefore, that 
"the effective use of words and language is an indispensable skill for success, not only in law 
school, but, more importantly, in the practice of law."54  
It is undisputed that proper comprehension of the law requires a thorough understanding 
of the language, be it English, with its “extraordinary richness, vitality, and fluidity”, 
German, Dutch, Spanish or, of course, Latin. 55 As the pacta sunt servanda maxim has 
                                                                  
50 ibid., p. 411. 
51 BENSON illustrates this importance explaining that “just as it is obvious to every school child who has ever scrawled 
a dirty word on the chalkboard that language is power, so it ought to be obvious to all of us that lawyers' language is 
power exercised by a power elite and that the stakes in it are very real and very high” (BENSON, R. W., ‘The End of 
Legalese: The Game is Over’, 1984, 13 New York University Review of Law & Social Change, no. 3, p. 520). 
52 GAVIT, B. C., ‘Where Do We Go from Here in Legal Education’, 1950, 23 Rocky Mountain Law Review, no. 1, 
pp. 28–29. 
53 Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., ‘The Disorderly Conduct of Words’, 1941, 41 Columbia Law Review, no. 3, p. 382. 
54 RE, E. D., ‘Legal Writing as Good Literature’, 1984-1985, 59 St. John's Law Review, no. 2, p. 214. The 
seriousness with which legal scholars see the proper understanding of language is, perhaps, best manifested in 
the work of MEHLER, who referred to the lack of the required linguistic skills as an “educational carcinoma” 
(MEHLER, I. M., ‘Language Mastery and Legal Training’, 1961, 6 Villanova Law Review, p. 205). 
55 RE, E. D., 1984-1985, supra note 54, p. 212. 
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passed through generations of legal practitioners, and repeated ad-nauseam to our 
students, it is important to not only remember it, but to understand how it has managed 
to survive. We argue that its original meaning, product of the already mentioned use of 
the Latin gerundive, played a fundamental role in the way in which it was originally 
adopted and implemented. 
Despite being formulated in Latin, the language of the Roman Empire, this aphorism is 
not Roman in origin, neither linguistically nor in regards to its effects. In other words, not 
only is the expression “pacta sunt servanda” not found in the documentary record of the 
time, but also the idea of “all agreements must be kept” or, “there is a social necessity to 
maintain and enforce all agreements” simply did not exist in Roman legal theory.56  
Indeed, even though there is a common belief that our modern understanding of the 
inviolability and freedom of contracts is founded, among other places, “in the age-old 
Roman adage of pacta sunt servanda ex fide bona," contemporary Roman sources do not 
seem to back this claim.57 As a matter of fact, the idea that an agreement between parties 
to give, do or abstain from something can be enforced by means of legal sanctions “was as 
alien to classical Roman law as to English law until less than 400 years ago.”58 This is quite 
interesting, as it means that a big part of what we consider the basis on which modern 
contract law was built is, to put it bluntly, nonexistent.  
Despite widespread assumptions, pacta sunt servanda is not found in the Corpus Juris 
Civilis of Justinian I. The closest reference to this rule, yet far from identical, only appears 
in Ulpian’s comments on the rules of the praetor in the Digest, stating “Pacta conventa, 
quae neque dolo malo, neque adversus leges plebiscita senatus consulta decreta edicta principum, 
neque quo fraus cui eorum fiat, facta erunt, servabo”;59 “I will enforce agreements in the form of 
a pact which have been made neither maliciously nor in contravention of a statute, plebiscite, 
decree of the senate or edict of the emperor, nor as a fraud on any of these".60 
While scholars have understood the above reference in the Digest to be the origins of our 
modern understanding of the pacta sunt servanda principle, this is not correct.61 The 
                                                                  
56 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, p. 413 (“[w]hatever the Roman jurists believed about the enforceability of 
agreements, they did not phrase their belief in terms of pacta sunt servanda. […] Even as late as the reign of Justinian, 
the Roman jurists did not conceive of the performance of promises as a matter of urgent social necessity”). 
57 SHARMA, K. M., 1999, supra note 32, p. 97. 
58 KAHN-FREUND, O., 1973-1974, supra note 16, p. 894. 
59 Digest, 2.14.7.7. 
60 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, pp. 411–412 It should be noted that HYLAND’s citation of the Digest opts for 
the spelling “conuenta” instead of the much more common, “conventa". See also SALEH, N., 1998, supra note 20, 
p. 256 (“[p]acta sunt servanda […] is an abbreviated form of a crucial rule stated in Justinian’s Code”). 
61 See, for example, GIMÉNEZ CANDELA, T., ‘La Modificación de las Condiciones del Contrato: La Cláusula “Rebus 
Sic Stantibus”’, 2009, 1 Revista Juris da Faculdade de Direito, São Paulo, p. 48 (“pacta sunt servanda [….] has its roots 
in the Edict pacta convent servabo clause[…]”) and ZARTMAN, I. W. & TOUVAL, S., International Cooperation: The 
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words in the Digest did not aim to impose a moral duty for the parties regarding 
compliance (let alone a duty responding to a moral necessity), seeking instead to state the 
practice of adjudication of the praetor; it is clear, therefore, that compliance with the 
terms of an agreement (and hence its enforceability) was up to the individual praetor. In 
other words, some agreements were enforced, while others were only available as an 
exception. “[A]s Ulpian wrote, Sed cum nulla subest causa, propter conuentionem hic constat 
non posse constitui obligationem: igitur nuda pactio obligationem non parit, sed parit 
exceptionem (But when no causa exists, it is settled that no obligation arises from the 
agreement; therefore, a naked agreement gives rise not to an obligation but to a defense).”62 
Furthermore, not only was the modern understanding of the sanctity of contracts 
unknown in Roman law, but was even expressly repudiated. Thus, for instance, Cicero 
explicitly rejected the absolute sanctity of contracts in De Officiis, arguing that some 
promises do not need to be kept if they have become too burdensome for those who made 
them (“Ergo et promissa non facienda”).63 What Cicero sought to emphasize, and which 
appears to have represented the general understanding within the Roman legal sphere, is 
that morality and justice do not demand an absolute obedience to agreements, and 
actually excuse non-compliance in certain occasions. What is more, when excusing some 
contractual breaches, Cicero did not limit himself to the traditional considerations of 
whether true “freedom” had existed when agreeing or whether all the formalities had 
been complied with, also considering cases where morality allows the breach, even if the 
law appeared to say otherwise. 
“Cicero considered the case of a lawyer who has agreed to appear for a client in court, 
and whose child then falls ill. Cicero held that the lawyer is morally permitted to 
breach the promise of representation. However we ourselves might decide this 
particular case, Cicero’s understanding is clearly correct. The law often compels the 
performance of promises that morality would excuse. The law is more rigid and 
formal than is morality. What Cicero’s reflections demonstrate is that morality does 
not require that promises always be kept.”64 
We have the canon lawyers to thank for our modern ideas regarding the sanctity of 
contracts, and even for our current wording of the maxim.65 After all, until the canonists 
                                                                                                                                                                       
traced back to the expression in Ulpian in D.14.7.7 [...] turned into a general maxim by the canon lawyers [...] thus 
making informal contractual agreements enforceable”). 
62 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, p. 412. 
63 ibid., p. 414. These ideas, together with the works of canon lawyers and naturalists, would later serve as a basis 
for the unforeseeability doctrine. See MAGOJA, E. E., ‘La Teoría de la Imprevisión: El Gobierno de la Equidad en la 
Ejecución de los Contratos’, 2012 Prudentia Iuris, no. 74. 
64 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, p. 414. 
65 As COLLINET explains, 
“It was left to canon law to take the final step of proclaiming the rule pacta sunt servanda which 
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exerted their influence, at least in Western Europe, around the year 1000 A.D., there was 
“no general principle that a promise or an exchange of promises may in itself give rise to legal 
liability.”66 As for “pacta sunt servanda”, it was in his famous Decretals, that Pope Gregory 
IX used the sentence “pacta quantumcunque nuda servanda sunt” (“pacts, however bare, 
should be observed”), and which served as the direct root of the modern maxim.67  
It is hard to overstate the role that the canonists played in the move towards 
“consensualism.” Their work represented a departure from the formalistic approach that 
was present in Roman law, moving towards a view under which mere agreements (“nuda 
pacta”) were to be considered binding and enforceable. Taken a series of sources as their 
basis, including the Justinian texts, Germanic law and, of course, the Bible and canon law, 
the canonists established consensualism as a general principle, making consensual 
obligations legally binding. On the basis of this, “the promisee had a right against the 
promisor, enforceable in an ecclesiastical court, to the performance of the promise or else to 
compensation for losses.”68 And so it was that, thanks to canon law, consent became the 
essential element of the contract (“solus consensus obligat”, “agreements alone bind”) and the 
idea of “pacta sunt servanda” became the norm.69 
The reasoning behind the canonists’ position in regards to the binding character of 
agreements is obvious, and goes back to religious considerations: “quia ius canonicum et 
divinum non facit differentiam inter simplicem promissionem et iuramentum”, “canon and 
divine law do not draw a distinction between a simple promise and one under oath”.70 Put in 
another way, the breaking of a promise is just as bad whether the promise was made 
under oath or not. Formalities are, therefore, irrelevant in regards to someone’s guilt 
before god.  While this shift was clearly based on the idea that breaking a promise is a sin, 
the fact remains that sins in and of themselves do not give rise to a liability to others, but 
only to religious penitence. Legal liability actually came as a combination of both religion 
and the changes in society that affected the European continent in the twelfth century, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
COLLINET, P., 1932, supra note 17, pp. 493–494. 
66 BERMAN, H. J., ‘The Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An Historical Perspective’, 1986, 4 Journal of 
Law and Religion, no. 1, p. 107. See also SHARP, M. P., 1941, supra note 14, p. 783 (“[t]he Church, with its large 
temporal interests and power, and its able lawyers, criticised these limits [established in Roman law regarding the 
enforceability of contracts]. It taught that Christians should keep their promises”). 
67 HARTKAMP, A. S. & BAR, C. von, Towards a European Civil Code, 2011, Kluwer Law International, p. 38 An earlier 
use of this expression appears in a Catholic consilium from AD 348, held in Carthage, referring to ecclesiastical 
issues. See VISSER, C., ‘The Principle Pacta Servanda Sunt in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law, with Specific 
Reference to Contracts in Restraint of Trade’, 1984, 101 The South African Law Journal, no. 4. 
68 BERMAN, H. J., 1986, supra note 66, p. 109. 
69 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, pp. 416–417. 
70 VISSER, C., 1984, supra note 67, p. 646. See also SOLA, P. R., Fundamenta Iuris: Terminología, Principios e 
Interpretatio, 2012, Editorial de la Universidad de Almería, p. 451. 
  
13 
The Inviolability of Contracts 
and in which economic expansion brought with it the increasing importance of 
commerce.71 
Because of its obvious convenience, a contract law based on agreements was quickly 
embraced by the merchant community, becoming part of the lex mercatoria.72 This 
phenomenon is easy to understand, as merchants are interested in maintaining a 
constant flow in their transactions, avoiding unnecessary delays; the problems inherent 
to a contract system based in cumbersome formalities certainly explain why an 
agreement-based system would have been appealing to them.73  
The canonists were thus instrumental in the shift from formalism to consensualism, 
establishing some of the basic principles that would go on to form general contract law. 
Among them:74 
“[T]hat agreements should be legally enforceable even though they were entered into 
without formalities (pacta sunt servanda), provided that their purpose (causa) was 
reasonable and equitable.” 
“[T]hat agreements entered into through the fraud of one or both parties should not 
be legally enforceable.” 
“[T]hat agreements entered into through duress should not be legally enforceable.” 
“[T]hat agreements should not be legally enforceable if one or both parties were 
mistaken concerning a circumstance material to its formation.” 
“[T]hat silence may be interpreted as giving rise to inferences concerning the 
intention of the parties in forming a contract.” 
“[T]hat the rights of third-party beneficiaries of a contract should be protected.” 
“[T]hat a contract may be subject to reformation in order to achieve justice in a 
particular case.” 
“[T]hat good faith is required in the formation of a contract, in its interpretation, 
and in its execution.” 
“[T]hat in matters of doubt rules of contract law are to be applied in favor of the 
debtor (in dubis pro debitore).” 
“[T]hat unconscionable contracts should not be enforced.” 
                                                                  
71 BERMAN, H. J., 1986, supra note 66, p. 109. See also KAHN-FREUND, O., 1973-1974, supra note 16, p. 894. 
72 VISSER, C., 1984, supra note 67, p. 647. 
73 BERGER, K. P. (ed.), European Private Law, Lex Mercatoria and Globalisation, 2011, p. 60 (“[The lex mercatoria] is 
characterized by openness, flexibility and informality”).  
74 BERMAN, H. J., 1986, supra note 66, p. 110. 
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Among the canonists who participated in this process, HOSTIENSIS (Henricus de Segusia, 
1200-1271), the Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, played a key role, allegedly even coining the 
expression pacta sunt servanda.75 HOSTIENSIS, and by extension the canonists, would 
greatly influence the development of European law, particularly through the work of 
Samuel PUFENDORF (1632-1694), who would then transform Pacta Sunt Servanda into a 
true universal principle. 
With the Thirty Year’s War in living memory, PUFENDORF’s work was greatly influenced by 
conflict, as he was aware of how unstable peace could be. He believed that the law was 
essential for maintaining the peace, with private agreements filling the gaps left by 
natural law (which he derived from theological constructions). While HOSTIENSIS might 
have coined the pacta maxim in the 16th century, it was PUFENDORF who set aside the 
skepticism that affected canonists in regards to establishing it as a legal principle, and not 
merely a moral one, elevating it to the level of a natural, moral, and legal mandate.76 
PUFENDORF had very pragmatic reasons to justify this new approach to agreements, as he 
was convinced that the deceit represented by a broken promise had the potential to create 
chaos and destruction. Coming full circle, and perhaps remembering that the Punic wars 
also came as a result of a breached treaty, a broken promise, he cited the events that lead 
to the destruction of Carthage, and the constant winds of war that polluted both the 
Romans and the Carthaginians.77 If words were kept, if agreements were respected, 
conflicts could be prevented. Never again would people be annihilated and their lands 
salted. As long as “pacta sunt servanda” reigned, “Cartago Delenda Est” would never again 
need to be uttered. 
1.4 Pacta Sunt Servanda as a Legal Norm 
Despite the increasing philosophical acceptance of the pacta sunt servanda principle, it is 
undeniable that its real success only came once it became accepted as a proper legal norm. 
After all, even though philosophical and moral arguments are valuable in legal theory, 
they will fall short of being useful in practice if they are not echoed in the legislation or 
                                                                  
75 HOGG, M., Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, p. 117. HYLAND 
seems to be skeptical of this, and credits PUFENDORF as the source, albeit under the influence of HOSTIENSIS’ work 
(HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, pp. 416–417). 
76 Canonists were wary of the possible negative consequences of mere consensus as a source of obligations, 
particularly when the manifestation of the intent of the parties doesn’t leave any sort of material evidence. They 
feared, perhaps understandably, that if the only thing required to create an obligation was to manifest consent, 
then there was a risk that there would be less reflections on the part of the promisors as to what was being agreed 
to(FORTICH, S., ‘Solus Consensus Obligat: Principio General Para el Derecho Privado de los Contratos’, 2012, 23 
Revista de Derecho Privado, pp. 185–186). 
77 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, pp. 421–422. 
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the case law. Thus, it wasn’t until this principle was expressly incorporated into the legal 
systems that a true era of consensualism (even if not absolute) began. 
The 19th Century, the Century of Individualism, was a fertile ground for the ideas 
emanating from the pacta sunt servanda principle.78 This was partly due to the influence of 
the “will theory,” based on the idea that since contracts are real agreements, and those 
agreements are the result of the union of wills, they are inherently worthy of respect.79 As 
SOTO COAGUILA explains: 
“[I]f the state has given autonomy and freedom to the people so that they themselves 
can regulate their interests, by concluding all kinds of contracts, within the 
established limits, then it follows that the state must have also given them binding 
force. Otherwise there would be no legal certainty in contracting, this being the aim 
of the rule of law. In this sense, the legislator creates rules to give people legal 
certainty, so that if tomorrow they conclude a contract, and a party does not fulfill 
her obligations, then the afflicted party will be able to demand the performance.”80 
The sanctity of contracts, the binding character of agreements, thus became part of the 
legislation, particularly in Civil Law countries.81 Indeed, for example, the Napoleon Code, 
the French Code Civil, arguably the most important Civil codification in history, echoed 
the philosophy of PUFENDORF regarding the validity of the nuda pacta as a source of 
obligations.82 It did so in Article 1108, when it establishes the requirements that an 
agreement must fulfill in order to be binding: 
“Four requisites are essential for the validity of an agreement: 
The consent of the party who binds himself; 
His capacity to contract; 
A certain object which forms the subject-matter of the undertaking; 
A lawful cause in the bond.”83 
                                                                  
78 FORTICH, S., 2012, supra note 76, p. 186. 
79 HUGHES PARRY, D., 1959, supra note 13, pp. 15–17. 
80 SOTO COAGUILA, C. A., ‘El Pacta Sunt Servanda y la Revisión del Contrato’, 2012 Revista de Derecho Privado 
(México, D.F.), no. 1, pp. 204–205. 
81 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, p. 406 (“[t]he rule ‘pacta sunt servanda’ is therefore not only a basic legal norm 
but […] a self-evident value [in Civilian systems]”). 
82 ibid., pp. 424–425. 
83 “Article 1108 
Quatre conditions sont essentielles pour la validité d'une convention : 
Le consentement de la partie qui s'oblige ; 
Sa capacité de contracter ; 
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The most important element in the cited Article 1108 is not so much what it establishes, 
but actually what it omits. This provision did not establish any formality requirements for 
an agreement to be binding. While, of course, not every agreement was seen as 
enforceable by the Code, and there were occasions in which formalities had to be followed, 
by and large the formalism that had permeated contract law since Roman times was 
severely diminished.  
Article 1134 of the Code Civil further confirmed the binding character of agreements, by 
establishing that: 
“Agreements legally formed have the force of law over those who are the makers of 
them. 
They cannot be revoked except with their mutual consent, or for causes which the 
law authorizes. 
They must be executed in good faith.”84 
With this provision, the Code established, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that once an 
agreement has been made (the majority of which are nuda pacta) then the parties are 
bound to comply. This was “pacta sunt servanda.” By adopting the Roman concept of 
“legem contractus dedit,” the idea that the contract has force of law, the Code placed the 
importance of contracts on a similar level as that of the public law.85  
The importance of the “consensual” (as opposed to “formalistic”) system being adopted in 
a legal body as influential as the Code Civil is enormous. As BLANC-JOUVAN has explained: 
 “[D]uring the XIXth century and for a number of reasons – first military conquests 
and diplomatic successes, then an objective evaluation of its merits and, later, the 
impact of colonization -, the [French] Civil Code was imposed, adopted, copied or 
imitated in a number of countries (almost anywhere indeed, except in the common 
law world). It even exerted some influence […in the United States] through David 
Dudley Field, and it was near serving as a model in New York around 1830”.86  
                                                                                                                                                                       
Une cause licite dans l'obligation.” 
84 “Article 1134 
Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. 
Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise. 
Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi.”  
It has been argued that the real source of Art. 1134 of the Code Civil was not really the freedom of choice principle 
associated with consensualism, but rather “morals and equity” (WILSON, C. P., ‘Notas Críticas Sobre el Fundamento 
de la Fuerza Obligatoria del Contrato. Fuentes e Interpretación del Artículo 1545 del Código Civil Chileno’, 2004, 
31 Revista Chilena de Derecho, no. 2, pp. 228–229). 
85 SOTO COAGUILA, C. A., 2012, supra note 80, pp. 203–204. 
86 BLANC-JOUVAN, X., Worldwide Influence of the French Civil Code of 1804, on the Occasion of its Bicentennial 
Celebration, p. 2 
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Of course, the impact of the consensualism and enforceability of contracts established in 
the Code Civil was felt in a particularly strong fashion in Civil Law countries. Thus, for 
example, the Spanish, Italian, Chilean, Colombian and Lithuanian codes, to name a few, 
included such provision in some shape or form.87  
The recognition of pacta sunt servanda as a core principle of a given legal system goes 
beyond merely establishing a moral standard, as it also brings forward a number of 
practical differences between these systems and those which were not influenced in the 
same manner. This is of particular importance when it comes to issues of noncompliance, 
where the rights of the aggrieved party, as well as the options available for the defaulting 
party, greatly differ. 
Since, based on the principle of the sanctity of contracts, compliance with contractual 
agreements is seen as a moral duty for the debtor, and a moral right for the creditor, the 
law seeks to ensure that the contract will be fulfilled. This manifests itself in the 
preference given in Civil Law systems to specific performance over money damages, which 
are only left as a secondary option.88 The reasoning behind this phenomenon is that 
systems influenced by the pacta sunt servanda maxim, where the sanctity of promises and 
the duty to perform are seen as the backbone of the law of obligations, the view is that the 
breaching party should not have “an option either to perform or to pay damages […and] 
should not be allowed to buy himself free of a contract he has violated.”89  
In stark contrast with this Civil Law position, in Common Law nations (where the 
influence of the Code Civil and the Roman legal philosophies that shaped it was 
                                                                  
87 See, for example, Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code (“Las obligaciones que nacen de los contratos tienen fuerza de ley 
entre las partes contratantes, y deben cumplirse a tenor de los mismos;” “The obligations born of contracts have the force 
of law among the parties to the contract, and must be performed according to their terms”), Art. 1372, Paragraph 1, of 
the Italian Civil Code (“Il contratto ha forza di legge tra le parti;” “A Contract has the force of law among the Parties”) 
Art. 1545 of the Chilean Civil Code, which was used verbatim in Art. 1602 of the Colombian Civil Code (“Todo 
contrato legalmente celebrado es una ley para los contratantes, y no puede ser invalidado sino por su consentimiento 
mutuo o por causas legales;” “Every legally formed contract has the force of law for the parties and can only be nullified 
by mutual agreement or by legal causes”), and Art. 6:189, numeral 1, of the Lithuanian Civil Code (“Teisėtai sudaryta 
ir galiojanti sutartis jos šalims turi įstatymo galią. Sutartis įpareigoja atlikti ne tik tai, kas tiesiogiai joje numatyta, bet ir 
visa tai, ką lema sutarties esmė arba įstatymai;” “A contract which is formed in accordance with the provisions of laws 
and is valid shall have the force of law between its parties. The contract shall bind the parties not only as to what it 
expressly provides, but also to all the consequences deriving from its nature or determined by laws”). For some other 
examples See also SOTO COAGUILA, C. A., 2012, supra note 80, pp. 201–202. 
88 A distinction should be made between the theoretical background on this topic, vis à vis what actually happens 
in practice. So, while in theory specific performance is given priority over money damages, accounts differ as to 
how common it is to actually seek (not to mention obtain) specific performance in court. On this topic, See 
LANDO, H. & ROSE, C., ‘On the Enforcement of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries’, 2004, 24 
International Review of Law and Economics, no. 4, 473–487 and Gebhardt, J. H., ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’, 1947, 10 
The Modern Law Review, no. 2, p. 162. 
89 HERMAN, S., "Pacta sunt servanda" Meets the Market: Enforcing Promises in Spanish and United States Law, in 
Espiau Espiau, S. & Vaquer i Aloy, A. (eds.), Bases de un Derecho Contractual Europeo, 2002, p. 439. 
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considerably weaker) private law and morality are considered more or less separate in 
what, to borrow a phrase from Stephen JAY GOULD, would be non-overlapping 
magisteria.90 As Justice Oliver Wendell HOLMES stated,  
“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it, - and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable 
to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a 
compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the 
difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those 
who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.”91    
As it is evident, in the Common Law there are no moral qualms in allowing the debtor to 
breach, his obligations, even if this breach was deliberate and wanton, as long as he pays 
damages. Thus, for example, while in the Civil Law tradition the extent of the damages for 
which the breaching party is liable will depend on the degree of fault exhibited by her, 
with malice or serious negligence being punished with a higher liability, the Common Law 
has traditionally rejected this differentiation, not distinguishing between the degree of 
fault that existed on the part of the defaulting party.92 
This difference between the Civil and the Common Law systems, where in the latter “the 
merchant realizes that his demand for specific performance may profit his lawyer more than 
himself,” is rooted in deeply-held philosophical convictions, resulting in a completely 
different understanding of agreements.93 Clearly, the morality that the Roman-influenced 
systems see in compliance seems absent from the Common Law systems, where contracts 
and agreements are seen by the law as inherently commercial.94  
                                                                  
90 According to HYLAND, attorneys in the Common Law are trained “to find ways of getting around or out of 
contracts, and, as lawyers, we occasionally even counsel clients to breach them. Civil lawyers, on the other hand, are 
much more committed to elaborating a legal mechanism to enforce as precisely as possible those promises that are 
actually made and intended.”HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, p. 405. 
91 HOLMES, O. W., ‘The Path of the Law’, 1997, 110 Harvard Law Review, no. 5, p. 995. HOLMES also stated this 
view in his famous 1881 book “The Common Law”: 
“The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay 
damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference 
until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.” 
HOLMES, O. W., The Common Law, 2009, Harvard University Press, p. 272. 
Some have argued that HOLMES did not have such an absolute opinion in regards to damages in case breach, as 
opposed to specific performance (See, for example, Gebhardt, J. H., 1947, supra note 88, p. 164). 
92 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, pp. 429–430. 
93 HERMAN, S., 2002, supra note 89, p. 446. 
94 GEBHARDT disagrees with this characterization, arguing that although “English positive law does not enforce the 
performance of a contract, at least in the sense that it does not furnish the promisee with a right that the promise be 
kept, it should still be recognised that the rule Pacta sunt Servanda is a part of English law if we define law as the sum of 
rules which the community consider binding upon themselves, instinctively or consciously.” 
Gebhardt, J. H., 1947, supra note 88, p. 170. 
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It is certainly hard to determine what exactly is responsible for the different way in which 
pacta sunt servanda” affected different legal systems. Although in the end the difference 
might be simply that of a language, in the words of HYLAND, “what a language it was”.95 
  
                                                                  
95 HYLAND, R., 1994, supra note 45, p. 433. 
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“The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the 




“The law of contract, in that it partakes of the wills of the parties, leans 
towards equality for the strong; in that it partakes of the will of the judge 
and of the wills of legislator and administrator, it leans towards equality 
for the weak. And with this blend of equalities, the contract institution 
leans toward liberty”. 
Clark Havighurst.97 
2.1 Introduction 
nce the parties have concluded their the contract, they are bound to comply with 
its terms. The reliable enforcement of contracts is essential.98 It is also 
fundamental for the correct working of a market economy and of international 
trade.99  
As one author has noted, “[t]he successful operation of a free market economy rests on the 
government’s willingness to deploy enough ‘terror’ to assure that commercial promises are 
kept.”100 This reliability allows people to predict the outcome of their dealings, so as to 
adequately prepare for the future, based on the understanding that they will be able to 
seek the enforcement of their contracts before a court of competent jurisdiction or, at 
least, to obtain damages for the breach. This ability to enforce contracts also works as a 
                                                                  
96 HOBBES, T., Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, 1839, John 
Bohn, London, p. 137. 
97 Cited in REITER, B. J., ‘The Control of Contract Power’, 1981, 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, no. 3, p. 374. 
98 WEHBERG, H., 1959, supra note 12, p. 786. 
99 JIANG, P., ‘Drafting the Uniform Contract Law in China’, 1996, 10 Columbia Journal of Asian Law, no. 1, p. 248.  
100 NEUBORNE, B., ‘Ending Lochner Lite’, 2015, 50 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, no. 1, p. 190. 
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safekeeping mechanism for the maintenance of peace, as it eliminates the need for private 
enforcement in case of noncompliance, by means of violence or force.101  
The above notwithstanding, however, there are times when courts will refuse to enforce a 
contract or a specific clause contained therein. Besides cases in which enforcement will be 
denied by reasons of public policy or lack of real and free assent, there are situations in 
which even a valid agreement will not be enforced. A court might find, for example, that 
one of the parties acted in an abusive manner against the other, and that the resulting 
bargain is too harsh, too unfair, to be enforced by the courts. Prima facie, this seems to go 
against one of the most basic tenets of contract law, the principle of freedom of contract, 
and which seeks to ensure, first and foremost, that the will of the parties is respected. 
The principle of freedom of contract is made up of two distinct elements. On the one 
hand, the ability to decide whether or not to enter into a specific contract (what German 
legal theory calls Abschlussfreiheit); and, on the other, the ability to co-determine (i.e. to 
negotiate) the specific terms of the contract (the Gestaltungsfreiheit).102 This principle 
rests at the very core of western legal theory, representing a fundamental value within 
our liberal conception of society.103 Based on the idea that the parties are the best arbiters 
of their own needs and abilities, the principle of freedom of contract aims to ensure that 
they themselves will be the ones deciding the exact shape and extent of their rights and 
obligations, free from external interference.104  
Beyond this basic concept, however, several issues and factors, many of which are the 
consequence of the evolution and increasing complexity of our societies, have affected the 
way in which we see and understand the principle of freedom of contract. First among 
these issues is that of bargaining power, the ability that each party possesses to impose 
their will upon the other at the time of negotiating the terms of their agreement. While in 
simple economies, where free market theories were conceived, parties were assumed to be 
meeting on an even-playing field at the time of contracting, the increasing concentration 
of market power in an ever-smaller number of players has dramatically changed this 
                                                                  
101 MALLOR, J. P., ‘Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants’, 1986, 40 Southwestern Law Journal, no. 4, 
p. 1084. 
102 LENHOFF, A., ‘Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of 
American and Foreign Law’, 1961, 36 Tulane Law Review, no. 4, p. 482. In regards to the Gestaltungsfreiheit, it is 
important to note that freedom of contract refers to the ability to co-determine the terms, and so whether or not 
this ability is exercised by one of the parties is irrelevant (WILSON, N. S., ‘Freedom of Contract and Adhesion 
Contracts’, 1965, 14 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 1, p. 181). 
103 HILL, J. et al., ‘Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory’, 1989, 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1, 
p. 106 (“[w]estern legal tradition reveals a strong commitment to certain values, such as individual liberty, freedom of 
contract, and private property […]”). See also MAXEINER, J. R., ‘Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global 
Electronic Age: European Alternatives’, 2003, 28 Yale Journal of International Law, p. 113 (“[c]ontract law in 
Western countries is based on the principle of freedom of contract”). 
104 ROSENBERG, A., ‘Contract's Meaning and the Histories of Classical Contract Law’, 2013, 59 McGill Law Journal, 
no. 1, pp. 189–190. 
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landscape. Influenced by the social theories regarding the abuses of the Herrschaft des 
Menschen über den Menschen, the rule of man over man, an increasing body of regulations, 
both in the form of statutes as well as case law, has sought to prevent these abuses by 
limiting the way in which the parties can negotiate, as well as the issues over which 
negotiation and dickering is permitted. 
Regulatory efforts on these issues have been, to say the least, controversial. On the one 
hand, there is a vested interest of those in advantageous bargaining positions to have as 
little regulation as possible, maintaining a laissez faire business environment, in 
accordance with their legitimate desire to maximize their profits and market share.  
“Neoliberal theory posits that individual freedoms are best guaranteed by 
unregulated trade practices. The cornerstone of a neoliberal political-economic order 
is privatization and deregulation. Only free market mandates should mediate 
aspects of economic, political, and social life. Competition, according to the ground 
rules of the free market, between and among individuals and institutions is the 
primary means of social and cultural interactions. Capital accumulation by 
individual actors is of primary importance and treasured within the neoliberal 
marketplace. Therefore, the paramount feature of governing rests upon the notion 
that state apparatuses exist to protect and favor individual private property. In 
theory, the goal of the emerging neoliberal state is to facilitate the appropriate 
conditions for competition and capital accumulation.”105  
On the other side of the aisle, however, so-called “weak” parties, be it individual 
consumers, workers, small businesses, etc., having often been the victims of draconian 
terms included in their contracts (which were often of adhesion) expect the government 
                                                                  
105 COCO, L., ‘Debtor's Prison in the Neoliberal State: Debtfare and the Cultural Logics of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005’, 2012, 49 California Western Law Review, no. 1, p. 13. 
As a caveat to the otherwise legitimate desire of businesses to increase their profits, it should be kept in mind 
that this goal will often clash with the social desire to be protected from the externalities that come associated 
with the economic activities in question. Indeed, it has often been the case that regulatory actions have been met 
with significant opposition from the affected industries, even when the regulations intended to prevent public 
health problems. RANKIM BOHME, et. al. painted a grim picture of these attempts, arguing that: 
“Corporations and industries use various tactics to obscure the fact that their products are dangerous or 
deadly. Their aim is to secure the least restrictive possible regulatory environment and avert legal liability 
for deaths or injuries in order to maximize profit. They work with attorneys and public relations 
professionals, using scientists, science advisory boards; front groups, industry organizations, think tanks, 
and the media to influence scientific and popular opinion of the risks of their products or processes. The 
strategy, which depends on corrupt science, profits corporations at the expense of public health.” 
RANKIN BOHME, S. et al., ‘Maximizing Profit and Endangering Health: Corporate Strategies to Avoid Litigation 
and Regulation’, 2005, 11 International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, no. 4, p. 338. 
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to prevent and curtail those abuses.106 The law of contracts thus appears as “trying to 
balance the upholding of traditional market liberalism with the need to protect those who may 
be vulnerable.”107  
Understanding the limitations imposed on freedom of contract is an essential part of the 
study of contract law. In order to properly draft an agreement, it is first necessary to 
know which the terms can be enforced in a court of law, and which ones, despite the 
otherwise valid agreement, will be rejected. Beyond individual terms and regulations, 
however, it is perhaps even more essential to understand not just what is prohibited, but 
why. It is the balancing of the relevant interests involved in the limitation of freedom of 
contract, the Reaganomics deregulatory worldview of some, vis à vis the paternalistic 
desires of others, as well as the historical and legal developments that lead to their 
regulation, that occupies this chapter.108  
2.2 A Laissez-Faire Approach to Contractual Freedom 
Classical contract theory is comprised of two elements; first, the binding character of 
contracts (pacta sunt servanda) and, second, the principle of freedom of contract.109 As we 
have already seen, the former refers to the so-called sanctity of contracts, the latter deals 
with the ability of people to decide whether to enter into an agreement at all and, if they 
do decide to be bound by one, determine its content, and to enforce it in case of 
noncompliance. 
Freedom of contract stems from the principle of freedom of choice (“l'autonomie de la 
volonté”), and according to which “the contract will be based solely on the will of the contract 
undertaker, [with] nothing being able, in principle,” to affect it.110 In other words, freedom of 
                                                                  
106 For stylistic variation, the terms “contract of adhesion”, “standard form contract”, “boilerplate contract” and 
similar terms will be used interchangeably throughout this work. Unless otherwise stated, or if the context makes 
it clear, they should be considered as equivalent to each other. 
107 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., ‘Unconscionability and the Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory’, 
2013, 2013 Michigan State Law Review, no. 1, p. 213. 
108 According to ZINAM,  
“Philosophically, Reaganomics is identified with individualism and libertarianism: Economic decisions 
must be left to individuals and enterprises since they know best what is good for them, while government 
should be limited only to those economic decisions which the former cannot make for themselves. In the 
light of this philosophy, our government is overregulating and overcontrolling the economy and thereby 
depriving the private sector of its initiative and slowing down its growth.”  
ZINAM, O., ‘A note on Reaganomics’, 1982, 10 Atlantic Economic Journal, no. 4, p. 98. 
109 AGUILAR GUTIÉRREZ, A., ‘La Evolución del Contrato’, 1955, 22 Boletín del Instituto de Derecho Comparado, no. 22, 
p. 27. 
110 GEORGE, G., ‘The Principle of Contractual Freedom’, 2010 AGORA International Journal of Juridical Sciences, 
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contract seeks to ensure that the parties will be the only ones able to control the content 
of their agreements, as they are seen as the best arbiters to determine what will and will 
not benefit them.111 
Freedom of contract, and the related principle of freedom of choice, are products of 
liberalism and of the Enlightenment, as they represent an end (even if not absolute, and 
only temporary) to the paternalistic approach of the feudal era.112 Once it was understood 
that, as postulated by the naturalists, individuals possessed inalienable rights to own 
property, it naturally followed that they also possessed the ability, and even the right, to 
“make their own arrangements to deal with that property, and hence to make contracts for 
themselves”.113 Within this philosophical framework, private parties were seen as “little 
absolute monarchs, sovereign and independent,” able to make whatever decision they deemed 
appropriate in regards to their own dealings.114 
From this perspective, the role of the law and the courts was seen as limited to merely 
enforcing the agreements reached between the parties, setting aside, at least for the most 
part, ideas of “justice” and “fairness”. This principle sees the individual will of the parties 
as virtually omnipotent, and only limited by what is strictly necessary to maintain the 
social order.  
“Under classical [contract] theory, the binding character of contracts binds both the 
parties as well as the judge. The former because they are bound to comply with their 
agreements, and to fulfill the obligations they acquired when they contracted, in the 
same manner that they are bound to obey and follow the law. The judge because he is 
not allowed to review and correct the terms of the contract […] being limited to only 
ensure their compliance in case of breach.”115 
                                                                                                                                                                       
autonomía de la voluntad” in Spanish) a more literal translation would be “the autonomy of the will.” Since this 
variation, however, is not very popular in the English-language legal scholarship, we have opted for “freedom of 
choice” as an alternative. Although other variations, such as “party autonomy”, do exist, in our choice we follow 
the European Commission, which has also used this variation in its documents, as shown, for example, in: 
Commission of the European Communities, 2003, ‘Green Paper: on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 
1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community Instrument and Its Modernisation’, 
Brussels, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0654:FIN:EN:PDF> (last visited 
29 November 2015). For an author using “autonomy of the will,” See BAUDOUIN, J.-L., ‘Oppressive and Unequal 
Contracts: The Unconscionability Problem in Louisiana and Comparative Law’, 1985, 60 Tulane Law Review, 
no. 6, p. 1119. In any case, throughout this work these terms should be considered as equivalent, unless they are 
expressly differentiated, or the context makes it clear that they are meant to be distinguished. 
111 SOTO COAGUILA, C. A., 2012, supra note 80, pp. 198–199. 
112 FORTICH, S., 2012, supra note 76, p. 187 (“[f]reedom of choice is an important element of freedom in general”).   
113 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract, 2006, OUP Oxford, p. 9. 
114 AGUILAR GUTIÉRREZ, A., 1955, supra note 109, p. 28. 
115 ibid., p. 29. 
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In what ATIYAH has called the “Classical Period” (c. 1770-1870) in the Common Law, the 
dominant philosophical schools, and which undoubtedly responded to the authoritarian 
and tyrannical regimes of old, held the virtually absolute belief that “people could be trusted 
to look after their own interests, whether in the marketplace or at the hustings”; based on this 
belief, judges “simply thought that, in nearly all cases, it was in the public interest to enforce 
private contracts”.116 The philosophy was, therefore, to allow the people to decide for 
themselves what was best for them. 
This importance given to private agreements, almost placing them beyond the regulatory 
role of the State, was best expressed by Sir George JESSEL MR of the English Court of 
Chancery. In the 1874 case of Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson, he 
unequivocally explained that: 
“If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men 
of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, 
and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held 
sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.”117 
This idea that private arrangements were to be kept unregulated (at least for the most 
part) would eventually serve as the core of capitalist economics, where State intervention 
was to be considered altogether undesirable. The logic behind this was that since, in the 
words of Ayn RAND, “in a capitalist society, all human relationships are voluntary”, whatever 
terms are decided by the parties will, by their very nature, always be just, as they reflect 
                                                                  
116 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 10. REITER explains the motivations behind the rise of 
this freedom-focused theories arguing that 
“in an effort to throw off feudal and religious shackles, to release energy and to give vent to new theories 
of social justice, a broad coalition was forged over the sixteenth through the nineteenth century. The 
coalition, including economic liberals, utilitarians, and classes rising in power politically and intellectually, 
adduced powerful arguments in support of the market. The central benefits they attributed to 
organization in this form included the following: First, the market would provide powerful incentives 
motivating individuals to work and to produce wealth in society. The resultant gain would improve the lot 
of all (or of most, depending on the economist) individuals in society. The notion of incentives could be, 
and indeed was, pushed to the point of urging the necessity of a substantial level of poverty in society and 
of starvation as a sharp stick to keep the incentive structure keen. Second, market organization offered 
promises of efficiency. The consumer would determine what society produced: the cheapest mode of 
production of the right quantities of goods and an efficient distribution network were explicit outcomes of 
the model. Third, market organization would allow for innovation.  This was a particularly critical 
attribute given the substantial barriers to innovation that had been erected by the guilds and other local 
protective arrangements. Fourth, the market meant freedom from imposition by governmental or religious 
authorities. This freedom offered a consent basis to society, a basis seen both as good in itself and as a 
legitimating force. Finally, the market promised justice. The entire notion of market rewards and failures 
could be and was linked to a personal merit principle.” 
REITER, B. J., 1981, supra note 97, p. 349. 
117  Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson [1874-1875], 19 Eq. L.R., 462, p. 465. 
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their own free will.118 This is the backbone of economic liberalism which, based on the 
idea that society will reap more benefits if private interactions are left alone, championed 
a deregulated market. 
The mindset of the time is best represented by FOUILLE’s famous adage “qui dit contractuel 
dit juste,” “anything contractual is fair”.119 This liberal economic theory is quite telling, as it 
shows a proclivity to dismiss any consideration of fairness that might come from State 
power or from the courts, based on the idea that if the parties agreed to it, then it must be 
what they really wanted and deserved. From this perspective, as long as a person is 
mentally sound, then he has a right to dispose of his property in whatever way he pleases, 
under any terms that he may freely decide. On the basis of this theory, “whether his 
bargains are wise and discreet, or profitable or unprofitable or otherwise, are considerations not 
for courts of justice but for the party himself to deliberate upon.”120 
Evidently, freedom of contract is an eminently practical principle that serves as the direct 
reflection of a free enterprise system. Since contracts, from this libertarian approach, are 
private affairs, and not social institutions, the judicial system should limit itself to 
enforce and interpret them, without trying to create contracts for the parties. “There is no 
contract without assent, but once the objective manifestations of assent are present, their 
author is bound. A person is supposed to know the contract that he makes.”121 
This libertarian approach is, if anything, a response to the overreaching power of the 
State that existed in previous years, and against which liberalism stood. “The older 
Calvinistic argument for government rested on the need of restraining the wickedness of man 
(due to the corruption of the flesh) by rules and magistrates deriving their power from God. 
Against this the deistic and bourgeois Enlightenment developed the contrary view, that men are 
inherently good and that their dark deeds have been due to the corruption and superstition 
brought about by tyrants and priests.”122 The problem was that in this attempt to avoid 
governments that become too powerful, the libertarian proponents were too overzealous, 
and forgot that people do, at least sometimes, need the protection afforded by 
governments and communities. 
Indeed, as time passed and economies grew increasingly complex, it became clear that 
proponents of the laissez-faire approach were putting forward an unworkable theory, 
                                                                  
118 RAND, A., What is Capitalism?, in Rand, A. (ed.), Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, 1986, p. 19 
119 Quoted in GEORGE, G., 2010, supra note 110. See also BAUDOUIN, J.-L., 1985, supra note 110, p. 1120 (noting 
that in the 19th century “this conception and ideology of contractual relationship remained unquestioned and 
unchallenged for a long time”). 
120 EDWARDS, C., ‘Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War 
Continues’, 2008, 77 University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, no. 3, p. 656. 
121 KESSLER, F., ‘Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’, 1943, 43 Columbia Law 
Review, no. 5, p. 630. 
122 COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 559. 
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based on an idea of society in which all parties to a contract are assumed to be negotiating 
on an equal footing.123 Of course, in such a scenario of equality, the parties are indeed 
responsible for the terms of their own contracts, and it is their responsibility to avoid 
oppressive bargains by simply shopping around, be it for better terms or for better 
contractual partners.124 As such, “within the classical law of contract, the relative bargaining 
strength of the contracting parties is not a question for any inquiry by the courts of law, as any 
superiority in bargaining power is itself a matter for the market to rectify.”125 When all parties 
are the same, the State is wrong in interfering with private covenants, punishing those 
who profit from their contracts, and unjustly protecting those who failed to act 
diligently.126  
Nowadays, situations in which the bargaining power of the parties is similar, let alone the 
same, hardly ever exist, with inequality of bargaining power being the rule rather than the 
exception. This is a fairly old problem, as already in the 19th Century “it was realised that 
although liberty and equality before the law are essential to democracy, they have not in 
themselves any necessary connection with economic justice, and may, where there is great 
economic disparity between individuals, operate as instruments of oppression. Applied to the 
field of contract this led to the recognition that freedom is only reasonable as a social ideal when 
equality of bargaining power is assumed.”127 
                                                                  
123 As BAUDOUIN notes, traditional contract law was based in a large part on the principle of liberty (the parties 
are free to enter into whatever contract they want) and the principle of equality (the parties are presumed to be 
on equal footing). Based on these two principles, as well as on the perceived benefits of ensuring contractual 
stability and certainty, traditionally there was very little relief to “people who had either not clearly realized what 
they were getting into, or had been pushed by necessity, lack of attention or education into an unfair contract” 
(BAUDOUIN, J.-L., 1985, supra note 110, p. 1122). On the issue of the naivete of presuming these principles still 
apply, See AGUILAR GUTIÉRREZ, A., 1955, supra note 109, p. 33 (“[t]oday nobody believes […] that there is equality 
between the parties”), MENSCH, B., ‘Freedom of Contract as Ideology’, 1980, 33 Stanford Law Review, no. 4, p. 754 
(“[f]reedom of contract has been conclusively labelled a naïve myth […]”) and COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, 
p. 554 (“[t]he idea that men can fix their rights and duties by agreement is in its early days an unruly, anarchical idea. If 
there is to be any law at all, contract must be taught to know its place”). See also Ocean Accident & Guarantee 
Corporation v. Industrial Accident Commission [1927], 32 Ariz., 275–286, pp. 278–279 (where the Arizona Supreme 
Court refers to society outgrowing laissez-faire theories as “the grown man has [outgrown] the swaddling clothes of 
the babe”). 
124 KESSLER, F., 1943, supra note 121, pp. 630–631 
125 ALIAS, S. A. et al., ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power and the Doctrine of Unconscionability: Towards Substantive 
Fairness in Commercial Contracts’, 2012, 6 Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, no. 11, p. 331 
126 MORANT, B. D., ‘The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small 
Businesses’, 2003, 7 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law, no. 2, p. 258 (“[i]f one sees the parties as the best 
arbiters of their own interests, then paternalistic intervention could stray from the parties' original, contractual intent, 
and lead to inefficient results”). 
127 WILSON, N. S., 1965, supra note 102, p. 174. See also PIZARRO WILSON, C., ‘La Eficacia del Control de las 
Cláusulas Abusivas en el Derecho Chileno’, 2004, 6 Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, no. 2, p. 120 (“the liberal idea 
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The increasing complexity of the market that made it impossible for the laissez-faire 
contractual theory to survive. Indeed, while a free-for-all approach to contracts in which 
the parties are always responsible for their agreements might be suitable for simple 
markets, it seems incompatible with a complex society in which different players possess 
dramatically different levels of market power and importance.128 It was this complexity 
that, in the words of DAWSON, relegated this view of freedom of contract to “a world of 
fantasy, too orderly, too neatly contrived, and too harmonious to correspond with reality.”129 
2.3 Evolution and Regulation 
As ATIYAH has explained, virtually absolute contractual freedom could not survive for 
long. By the late 19th Century there were already plenty of criticisms raised against laissez-
faire economics, stemming from the issue of externalities, specially those related to 
reduction of competition (and which proved that the effects of private contracts would 
often go beyond the parties) and, particularly, from the increasing realization that 
contractual “freedom” was not always such.  
“On the one hand, it was pointed out that the idea of freedom of contract means 
little to someone who lacks the means or talents to make contracts for food, clothing, 
shelter or employment. To say that such a person chose to not to make such contracts 
would be true only in a restricted sense. On the other hand, it was thought that the 
legal meaning of ‘free and voluntary’ provided no guarantee that the contracts that 
were made were fair or just. The main reason was that in many cases an individual 
or business had no real choice as to who to contract with.”130  
It was realized that although liberty and equality are an essential part of society, they 
alone do not necessarily ensure that there will be economic justice, particularly when 
                                                                                                                                                                       
from the economic realities, and which increasingly became no more than a fiction for the legislators of the past 
century”).  
128 AGUILAR GUTIÉRREZ, A., 1955, supra note 109, p. 30 (“[absolute] freedom of contracts was in harmony with the 
economic and social reality of the early 19th Century, that is with a regime for small businesses and industries, which 
made inequalities between the parties less noticeable”). 
129 DAWSON, J. P., ‘Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law’, 1937, 11 Tulane Law 
Review, no. 3, p. 345. 
130 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 11. As COHEN put it, the limits on the freedom of 
contract actually aimed at enhancing freedom: 
“To put no restrictions on the freedom to contract would logically lead not to a maximum of individual 
liberty but to contracts of slavery, into which, experience shows, men will ‘voluntarily’ enter under 
economic pressure - a pressure that is largely conditioned by the laws of property. Regulations, therefore, 
involving some restrictions on the freedom to contract are as necessary to real liberty as traffic restrictions 
are necessary to assure real freedom in the general use of our highways.”  
COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 587. 
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there is a notorious economic disparity between the individuals who operate in the 
market.131 This new viewpoint in regards to contracts and, most of all, fairness, was in 
stark contrast with the downright Darwinian view of previous years, when the philosophy 
seemed to be that “no man is his brother’s keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take the 
hindmost”.132 It was now clear that “freedom”, understood merely as the absence of 
restraints, was not freedom at all. As COHEN has so eloquently put it:  
“The freedom to make a million dollars is not worth a cent to one who is out of work. 
Nor is the freedom to starve, or to work for wages less than the minimum of 
subsistence, one that any rational being can prize- whatever learned courts may say 
to the contrary”.133 
Those advocating the laissez-faire contractual approach also faced a problem with the 
increased development of mass-market products and the subsequent appearance and 
increasing ubiquity of contracts of adhesion.134 This was (and remains) a situation in 
which the large majority of contracts no longer “resemble the Platonic ideal of a document of 
                                                                  
131 WILSON, N. S., 1965, supra note 102, p. 174. Similarly, See PIERS, M., ‘Good Faith in English Law - Could a Rule 
Become a Principle’, 2011, 26 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum, p. 131 (arguing that “absolute adherence to the 
idea of market-individualism and an extreme observance of the principle of freedom of contract would also be out of 
touch with economic reality"). 
132 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 648. 
133 COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 560. A similar view was expressed by KESSLER, who stated that although 
the traditional conception of freedom of contract was based on the idea that “[t]he play of the market if left to itself 
must […] maximize net satisfactions,” this idea could not last:  
“Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guarantee that all members of the community will 
be able to make use of it to the same extent. On the contrary, the law, by protecting the unequal 
distribution of property, does nothing to prevent freedom of contract from becoming a one-sided privilege. 
Society, by proclaiming freedom of contract, guarantees that it will not interfere with the exercise of 
power by contract. Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even 
more important, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of 
authoritarian forms. Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in the 
hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of 
their own making upon a vast host of vassals. This spectacle is all the more fascinating since not more 
than a hundred years ago contract ideology had been successfully used to break down the last vestiges of a 
patriarchal and benevolent feudal order in the field of master and servant […]. Thus the return back from 
contract to status which we experience today was greatly facilitated by the fact that the belief in freedom 
of contract has remained one of the firmest axioms in the whole fabric of the social philosophy of our 
culture.”  
KESSLER, F., 1943, supra note 121, pp. 640–641 (emphasis added). 
134 Speaking about the current contractual landscape, WOODWARD notes: 
“[Nowadays] it is scarcely possible to purchase anything without an attempt by the vendor to bind the 
consumer to explicit contract terms. These terms can come tucked in the box under the mail order 
computer, in the automobile’s glove box, on a warranty card, somewhere on a website, on a screen that 
blocks access to a recently-purchased product unless the viewer clicks the ‘I accept’ button, or perhaps, in 
the preparation area for undergoing a serious operation.” 
WOODWARD JR, W. J., ‘Contraps’, 2015, 66 Hastings Law Journal, no. 4, p. 918. 
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jointly negotiated terms, but rather are lists of terms presented by one party to the other on a 
pre-printed form.”135 Although the freedom to contract remained, in the sense that the 
weaker party still had the possibility to not contract, it became evident that this freedom 
was often more theoretical than real, due to the absence of any alternatives.136 Thus, 
while it is true that a person could choose to live without proper housing, lighting, 
heating, water or gas, this was not a real “choice”. This massification of á prendre ou ál 
laisser contracts, “take it or leave it” agreements, made it virtually impossible to defend 
the libertarian contractual view. 
The above problems were, of course, exacerbated by information asymmetries. The party 
offering the standardized contract (the “contract of adhesion”) understands all of its 
implications and effects, but not so the weaker party.137 This “adherent” party to the 
                                                                  
135 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 212. See also AGUILAR GUTIÉRREZ, A., 1955, supra note 
109, p. 36 and BARNETT, R. E., ‘Consenting to Form Contracts’, 2002, 71 Fordham Law Review, no. 3, p. 627 
(calling form contracts “ubiquitous,” and adding that they “are everywhere”). 
136 On the issue of the lack of alternatives, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated in 1986 that: 
"The disparity in bargaining power may arise from the defendant's monopoly of a particular field of 
service, from the generality of use of contract clauses insisting upon assumption of risk by all those 
engaged in such a field, so that the plaintiff has no alternative possibility of obtaining the service without 
the clause; or it may arise from the exigencies of the needs of the plaintiff himself, which leave him no 
reasonable alternative to the acceptance of the offered terms." 
Barnes v. NH Karting Association [1986], 128 NH, 102, p. 107. 
137 “Contracts of adhesion", as well as their essential elements, have been the subject of countless articles by legal 
scholars, as well as several attempts by legislatures and courts to establish a clear definition. Part of the reason 
why such an apparently small issue (i.e. defining the term) has created such a large body of work is that many of 
the elements that are commonly associated with contracts of adhesion are not necessarily applicable to all of 
them. For example, the use of pre-printed forms might appear, prima facie, as a tell-tale sign of a contract of 
adhesion, and yet this is not necessarily the case. As RAKOFF explained, this element is not sufficient to infer the 
existence of a contract of adhesion, since “two parties could employ standard forms as the basis for a negotiating 
session, and no one would be concerned. Another of the central factors is the presentation of demands on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. That too, considered alone, is not enough; sellers quote prices on a nonnegotiable basis in many quite 
unobjectionable contexts. It is the combination of the two elements that characterizes the problem”(RAKOFF, T. D., 
‘Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’, 1983, 96 Harvard Law Review, p. 1177). This is an important 
distinction, and which KESSLER had already raised in his seminal 1943 article on the topic: “Standard contracts are 
typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is 
frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a 
monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses.  [...] Thus, standardized contracts are 
frequently contracts of adhesion; they are á prendre ou á laisser” (KESSLER, F., 1943, supra note 121, p. 632, 
emphasis added). This combination of factors has been recognized by the courts both in Common Law countries 
as well as those of the Civil tradition; the Supreme Court of California, for example, in Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty 
Co. [1962], 58 Cal. 2d, 862, p. 882, has defined the term as:  
“[A] standardized contract prepared entirely by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the 
other; such a contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second 
party, must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, without opportunity 
for bargaining and under such conditions that the ‘adherer’ cannot obtain the desired product or service 
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contract is not only prevented from making any changes, but also, and most importantly, 
is often incapable of truly comprehending what is being put in front of him.  
“Typically where standard terms are used […] parties are asked to submit to them 
unread or, if read, not necessarily understood. Moreover, when parties do read and 
understand standard terms and object to them, the parties imposing them may 
refuse any alteration. Where standard terms are inalterable, parties asked to ‘agree’ 
to the terms in some instances will have no easy alternatives other than to submit.” 
                                                                                                                                                                       
A similar definition was adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court of British Columbia in Continental Securities v. 
McLeod [1995] CanLII, 355, which,  quoting Black’s Law Dictionary,  defined contracts of adhesion as: 
 “[Those] offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially ‘take it or leave it’ basis without 
affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer cannot 
obtain desired product or services except by acquiescing in form contract.  Distinctive feature of adhesion 
contract is that weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms.” 
The Mexican Supreme Court, in Amparo directo 1477/87. Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, S.A de C.V. 7 de diciembre 
de 1987 [1988], 1 SJF Octava Época, 794, p. 794, defined them as those in which: 
“[T]he clauses have been drafted by an authority or unilaterally by the parties, without the other party 
being able, in order to accept them, to negotiate its content”.  
A very similar definition was adopted in the Chilean Consumer Protection law (Law 19.496, Article 1, nº6) which 
defined them, in the consumer realm, as: 
“[Contracts in which] the clauses were proposed unilaterally by the provider without the consumer, in 
order to celebrate it, being able to modify their content”. 
In one of the rare cases in which the legislator has taken it upon himself to establish a general definition of this 
contractual figure, Article 1390 of the Peruvian Civil Code establishes: 
“A contract is of adhesion when one of the parties, given the alternative of accepting or rejecting the terms 
established by the other party as a whole, manifests his acceptance.” 
Perhaps more efficient than attempting a definition of contracts of adhesion, due to the many nuances 
associated with this concept, is to establish a set of characteristics that are inherent to them. This was the 
approach taken by RAKOFF, and which seems to be one the most thorough (RAKOFF, T. D., 1983, supra note 137, 
p. 1177). According to him, there are seven characteristics that define a “model” contract of adhesion:  
1. “The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that contains many terms and 
clearly purports to be a contract. 
2. The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction. 
3. The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented by the form and 
enters into these transactions as a matter of routine. 
4. The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation that, except perhaps for a few 
identified items (such as the price term), the drafting party will enter into the transaction only on 
the terms contained in the document. This representation may be explicit or may be implicit in the 
situation, but it is understood by the adherent. 
5. After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the document is signed 
by the adherent. 
6. The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented by the form - few, at least, 
in comparison with the drafting party. 
7. The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a whole is the 
payment of money.”   
MAXEINER mentions that an important element of these contracts, and which is lacking in RAKOFF’s otherwise 
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Of course, it was hardly possible to describe as “free” a situation in which a party is 
virtually forced to contract (e.g. due to a natural monopoly), without understanding the 
effects of his acquiescence.138 As a matter of fact, it was well understood that there was no 
“consent” in its traditional sense in the case of adhesion contracts, having been replaced 
instead by a construct of “implied consent,” according to which “any contractor accepting an 
instrument known to contain the terms of his contract, is conclusively bound by all of the terms 
written therein.”139 And so, although it was never proposed that it would be appropriate to 
void any agreements in which asymmetries existed, these asymmetries did prove that 
unrestricted freedom did not, in and of itself, ensure the most beneficial outcomes. 
This new understanding of contractual freedom was closely related to the development of 
the welfare state, aimed at protecting those who were seen as the “weaker elements” of 
society.140 Indeed, there was a serious concern that simply enforcing any “apparent” 
agreement, would allow “the powerful party to essentially govern over consumers and weaker 
parties.”141 It was because of this that the welfare state represented a clear break with the 
previously dominant libertarian ideas that saw the market as the best way to organize 
society. Now, the same ideas of fairness that had once been repudiated were introduced 
into the law of contracts, as a way to prevent abuses from those in positions of power. 142  
What is perhaps the best-known example of this shift in contractual philosophy is that of 
labor law. Aware of the rampant abuses that existed in the labor market, with abusive 
shifts and unfair conditions of employment, the legislature and the courts realized that 
there had to be some sort of protection for those who were exposed to the abuse. In 
England, for example, the Truck Act of 1831 “made it an offence for an employer to contract 
that wages payable to his servant should be paid otherwise than in current coin of the realm and 
                                                                  
138 D'AGOSTINO, E., Contracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics: Rethinking the Unconscionability Doctrine, 
2014, Springer, p. 19 (“[s]ince sellers draft the contract without consumers’ participation, they are obviously more 
informed about the contract clauses and may exploit this informational power in order to raise their payoffs to the 
detriment of consumers. We allow consumers to fill the informational gap by reading fine print; however, reading is 
costly and consumers have to decide whether to read or not to read by forming (rational) beliefs about what sellers might 
have included in fine print”). 
139 LENHOFF, A., 1961, supra note 102, p. 483. These problems associated with the consent (or lack thereof) that 
can be given to a contract of adhesion motivated BEN-SHAHAR, echoing RADIN, to categorically argue that “the fine 
print is not a contract. There is no agreement to it, no real consent, not even ‘blanket assent.’ It is nothing but paperwork 
and should have the legal fortune of junk mail” (BEN-SHAHAR, O., ‘Regulation through Boilerplate: An Apologia’, 
2014, 112 Michigan Law Review, no. 6, p. 883). 
140 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 14. 
141 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 212. See also NEUBORNE, B., 2015, supra note 100, 
p. 197 (“given widespread disparities in bargaining power in many settings, automatically enforcing unfairly bargained 
contracts would enable the economically powerful to use contracts of adhesion as a vehicle to impose harsh terms against 
the economically weak”). 
142 AGUILAR GUTIÉRREZ, A., 1955, supra note 109, p. 41 (“the evolution of contractual theory is characterized by the 
increasing intervention of the State in the formation and performance of contracts […] replacing the principle of freedom 
of choice, whose area of action progressively decreases”).  
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declared a contract to that effect to be illegal and void. Nor must a contract of service contain a 
provision indicating how or where the wages are to be spent”.143 A similar situation happened 
in Chile, where the practice of the saltpeter mining companies of paying their employees 
in tokens that were only redeemable in their own shops, made it necessary for the 
legislature to establish minimum working conditions.144 
Labor legislation clearly shows how and why the State sought to interfere in, and curtail 
the, freedom of contract in this domain. In most situations, a person in need of 
employment will find herself in an inferior position to that of her prospective employer; 
as a result, and particularly in cases where the applicant is in dire need of income, there is 
a clear possibility that she will accept any term imposed by the employer. This was the 
position put forward by, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court in Ocean Accident & 
Guarantee Corporation v. Industrial Accident Commission, recognizing the flaws of the 
laissez-faire approach to contracts: 
                                                                  
143 HUGHES PARRY, D., 1959, supra note 13, p. 30 
144 The history of the saltpeter mines in Chile represents a dramatic example of abuses on the part of the 
employers against their workers, and which required legal reform to restore some degree of balance to their 
contractual relation. As the miners lived within the property of the owners of the mines, the latter exercised 
arbitrary and sometimes downright tyrannical powers over their employees. As a Congressional investigation 
revealed: 
“[T]he industrialists, or at least part of them, attribute themselves prerogatives or faculties of such nature 
that they only seem to be compatible with the old regimes of slavery and servitude. So, this Commission 
has been able to verify that, within these establishments, the working population is under a strict regime 
of discipline; a regime in which the owners or their employees give themselves the right to meddle in 
anything related to the lives of their workers or their families; and a regime, in summary, where the 
fundamental laws of the Republic are neither complied with nor respected, nor the most essential 
individual rights and warranties that they establish. 
There are establishments where it is prohibited, and punishable with absolutely arbitrary penalties, not 
only the commerce by travelling salesmen, but also the establishment within the worker’s camps of the 
most meager and humble stores, set up by the families that need to increase their income, such as those in 
which food is sold. In the same manner, it is prohibited, and severely punishable, in some companies, if not 
all,  the purchase of goods in the in nearby communities or anywhere but the stores owned by the 
company.”  
MIRANDA, S. G. & M, G. et al., Hombres y mujeres de la Pampa: Tarapacá en el ciclo del salitre, 2002, LOM Ediciones, 
p. 134. 
As denounced in 1901 by Representative Gonzalo BULNES:  
“The [saltpeter] offices have the monopoly on the sale of any consumption goods for the workers, and in 
order to prevent that, for example, if any man selling cigarrettes or any woman selling tortillas actually 
comes there, they have their own police. Any salesperson who comes near the offices is considered a 
smuggler […] There in the pulperías [the stores owned by the mining companies] what is worth fifteen, 
twenty or twenty five cents, is sold for a whole peso; so the workers leave, I can attest to this, fifty percent 
of what they earn.”  
LETELIER, F. O., El Movimiento Obrero en Chile, 1891-1919, 2005, LOM Ediciones, p. 101. 
It was not until 1924 that, finally, the Chilean Code of Labor was modified so as to order that salaries could only 
be paid in legal tender, ending this abusive and tyranical practice of the mining companies. 
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“It was under the influence of these [laissez-faire] ideas that the fellow-servant rule 
and that of assumption of risk were applied to an industrial civilization for which 
they were utterly unfitted, and it was gravely insisted by bench, bar and the leaders 
of society that the individual working man, without money, friends or influence, 
must be ‘protected’ in his right to contract freely with his employer, by this time 
generally a corporation with immense resources, and no personal touch with or 
interest in its employees; which considered labor as a mere commodity to be bought 
at the cheapest possible price, used till worn out, and then scrapped like any other 
worn-out tool. Our enlightened modern thought realizes that an equality of 
bargaining power between two such unequal parties is impossible, and has 
attempted to equalize the balance through the labor unions and state regulation of 
industry; but old ideas die hard, and the pathways of progress are strewn with the 
fragments of legislation designed for this purpose but wrecked on the insistence of 
court after court that the state must not interfere with the ‘free right of contract.’ 
The eight-hour day, protection for women and children in industry, and every reform 
which has lightened the burden and brightened the life of the workman has had to 
fight its way up against this insistence on applying a philosophy which was perhaps 
just enough at one time, to a civilization which has outgrown it as the grown man 
has the swaddling clothes of the babe.”145 
In COHEN’s view, labor contracts are “contracts” in name only, since there is hardly any 
bargaining in them. As he explained: 
“There is, in fact, no real bargaining between the modern large employer […] and its 
individual employees. The working man has no real power to negotiate or confer 
with the corporation as to the terms under which he will agree to work. He either 
decides to work under the conditions and schedule of wages fixed by the employer or 
else he is out of a job. If he is asked to sign any paper he does so generally without 
any knowledge of what it contains and without any real freedom to refuse.”146  
The “emergence of the consumer as a contracting party” in the 20th Century was another nail 
in the coffin of laissez-faire economics.147 The appearance of mass market products, couple 
with the lack of proper information being given to the consumer, made it clear that it was 
necessary to drop the caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware”, approach altogether. As the 
contact between consumer and producer disappeared (e.g. through retail shopping) the 
information asymmetries became dramatic and required governmental intervention as a 
way to ensure that the consumers would be adequately informed. Improper labelling, 
withholding of vital information and, of course, downright dangerous products, 
                                                                  
145 Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation v. Industrial Accident Commission [1927], pp. 278–279. 
146 COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 569. 
147 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 13. 
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represented a threat to consumers that could not be overlooked by the State. It was 
evident that there was no real “freedom of contract” for the consumers in situations 
where not only their bargaining power, but also their ability to be informed, simply did 
not exist.   
During the first half of the 20th Century, lack of proper regulatory actions on the part of 
the State allowed widespread abuses in the market. In the case of the United States, for 
example, “most contract transactions were not subject to government regulation and [as a 
result] dishonest and greedy parties flooded the marketplace with defective merchandise and 
unfinished services”148. This represented such a clear risk for both consumers and society in 
general, that regulation became unavoidable.149  
In the Common Law, it had become evident that the philosophy behind the law of 
contracts was simply anachronistic. These rules “which rested upon nineteen century radical 
individualism, were indifferent to abuses in bargaining power that did not rise to the level of 
fraud, duress, or undue influence.”150 Furthermore, as the courts were not able to act unless 
a case was brought to their attention, it was up to the legislature to attempt to amend the 
current state of affairs.  
2.4 Balancing Justice, Freedom and Party Autonomy 
The push against the classical notions of contract was anything but peaceful. In the 
United States, for example, “the Supreme Court struck down more than two hundred state 
statuses designed to protect American workers”, arguing that such protections ran against 
the freedom of contract, as established by Article 1(10) of the United States Constitution, 
as well as the 5th and 14th Amendments.151 It is worth bearing in mind that “Jeffersonian 
democracy finds its cardinal tenet in restricting governmental activities and allowing individual 
free play,” and so the State meddling into private dealings was subjected to an 
exceptionally high level of scrutiny.152 This constitutional debate over the limitations 
                                                                  
148 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 648 
149 For an interesting and thorough commentary on some the contractual abuses that were rampant in England 
in the early 20th Century, particularly in the field of so-called “alternative medicine”, See Simpson, A. W. B., 
‘Quackery and Contract Law: The Case of the Carbolic Smoke Ball’, 1985, 14 The Journal of Legal Studies, no. 2. 
150 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 658. As HUGHES PARRY noted in 1959, reflecting on the increasing move 
against a strict understanding of the sanctity of contracts: 
“[W]e must at all times keep in mind the question whether the time is not fast approaching when the 
whole structure of contract law, with its preconceived ideas and nineteenth-century doctrines, has not 
become so rigid and static that it cannot be expected to bear on all fronts the strains and stresses of 
modern economic and social pressures.” 
HUGHES PARRY, D., 1959, supra note 13, p. 71. 
151 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 659.  
152 WILLISTON, S., ‘Freedom of Contract’, 1920, 6 The Cornell Law Quarterly, no. 4, p. 366. 
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imposed on freedom of contract is interesting because it highlights the importance that is 
attributed to this particular freedom, placed on the same level as life and property. 
Article 1(10) of the United States Constitution establishes: 
“No State shall […] pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.” 
The 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes: 
“No person shall be […] deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law […]” 
Finally, in the same fashion, the 14th Amendment establishes: 
“No State shall […] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law […]” 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 further cemented the vital role given by the American 
legislator to freedom of contract, stating in its preamble:  
“That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power […] 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property […]” 
Starting with the 1897 US Supreme Court case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, American courts 
interpreted these constitutional provisions (the “due process clauses”) as referring to not 
only physical freedom, but also to economic liberty.153 Based on this interpretation, the 
State (be it the Federal Government or the individual States of the Union) was not 
allowed to interfere in private contracts that had been freely agreed upon by the parties. 
Thus, for example, in the Allgeyer case, the Court ruled that: 
"The 'liberty' mentioned in [the Fourteenth] amendment means not only the right 
of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person […but also] 
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use 
them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any 
lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter 
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to 
a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."154  
The same principle would be further established, this time emphasizing the prohibition 
against the State to limit the parties’ ability to determine the terms of their contracts, in 
                                                                  
153 Allgeyer v. Louisiana [1897], 165 US, 578. See also HUGHES PARRY, D., 1959, supra note 13, p. 68. 
154 Allgeyer v. Louisiana [1897], p. 589. 
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the now infamous 1905 Supreme Court Case of Lochner v. New York.155 Here Joseph 
Lochner, the owner of a bakery in Utica, New York, was indicted twice, in 1899 and 1901, 
for violating the 1895 Bakershop Act, and which established that bakers could not work 
more than 10 hours per day, with a maximum of 60 hours per week. As his appeal against 
his second indictment was rejected by both the Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals, he took his case to the Supreme Court 
of the United States, arguing that his constitutional rights were being violated.156 The 
Court agreed with Mr. Lochner, striking down the statute as unconstitutional, holding 
that the State had no right to interfere with the freedom of the bakers to decide how 
much they could work: 
“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty 
of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”157 
“There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right 
of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. 
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and 
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to 
assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state, 
interfering with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in no sense 
wards of the state. Viewed in the light of a purely labor law, with no reference 
whatever to the question of health, we think that a law like the one before us 
involves neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare, of the public, and that the 
interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act. The law 
must be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to the health of the individual engaged 
in the occupation of a baker. It does not affect any other portion of the public than 
those who are engaged in that occupation. Clean and wholesome bread does not 
depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a 
week. The limitation of the hours of labor does not come within the police power on 
that ground. 
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail, -the power of the state 
to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. 
The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote degree, to the 
public health, does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a 
more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate 
and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general 
                                                                  
155 See, generally, SHAMAN, J. M., ‘On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York’, 2004, 72 Tenn. L. Rev. 
156 Lochner v. New York [April 17, 1905], 198, 45. 
157 ibid., p. 53. 
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right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation 
to his own labor.”158 
In the eyes of the Court the only people who were actually being affected by the number 
of hours worked by bakers were those same bakers. Because of this, the Court reasoned 
that the State could not legislate against the bakers’ own decisions, under the pretense of 
protecting some ethereal social value of justice, let alone of “health”.159 
Although the Supreme Court’s position in regards to state interference in private 
contracts would continue to be the norm for years, Oliver Wendell HOLMES’ dissenting 
opinion in Lochner v. New York already reflected the winds of change, rejecting the 
libertarian view of freedom of contract:  
                                                                  
158 ibid., pp. 57–58. 
159 It would take quite a bit of time before the American judicature recognized that the weaker parties in a 
contract, particularly in a labor setting, were often not in a position to say “no” to their employer’s rules. For 
instance, the Kansas Supreme Court, when reviewing a case in which an employer required his employees to sign 
away their rights to form and participate in unions, stated that it is 
“a fact of general knowledge that employees, as a rule, are not financially able to be as independent in 
making contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers in making a contract of purchase thereof.  
To many the demands for housing, food, and clothing for their families and the education of their children 
brook no interruption of wages to the bread-winner. Necessity may compel the acceptance of unreasonable 
and unjust demands.”   
State v. Coppage, 87 Kan., 8, pp. 10–11 (See  also BARNHIZER, D. D., ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’, 2005, 76 
University of Colorado Law Review, no. 1, p. 162).  
The US Supreme Court, surprisingly, reversed this decision. First the Court recognized that inequalities are a fact 
of life: 
“[I]t is self-evident that unless all things are held in common, some persons must have more property than 
others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private 
property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the 
necessary result of the exercise of those rights.”  
Coppage v. Kansas [1915], 35 S.Ct., 240, p. 245. Then, on the basis of this general idea, the Court ruled that 
contracts where unionization was prohibited (known as “yellow-dog contracts”) were fully enforceable: 
“[t]o ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation with the union while retaining a certain 
position of employment, is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is free to 
decline the employment on those terms, just as the employer may decline to offer employment on any 
other; for ‘it takes two to make a bargain.’ Having accepted employment on those terms, the man is still 
free to join the union when the period of employment expires; or, if employed at will, then at any time 
upon simply quitting the employment. And, if bound by his own agreement to refrain from joining during 
a stated period of employment, he is in no different situation from that which is necessarily incident to 
term contracts in general.” 
ibid., p. 246. Of course, the problem with the understanding of “freedom” demonstrated here by the Supreme 
Court is that it did not seem to establish any limits to the demands made by the employer. Following the Court’s 
logic, nothing would prevent the employer to, for example, require prospective female employees to agree that 




Freedom of Contract and Bargaining Power 
“This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does 
not entertain […] It is settled by various decisions of this court that state 
constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators 
might think as injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally 
with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are 
ancient examples. A more modern one is the prohibition of lotteries. The liberty of 
the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others 
to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is 
interfered with by school laws, by the Postoffice, by every state or municipal 
institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it 
or not. […] Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are 
likely to share. Some may not. But a Constitution is not intended to embody a 
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the 
citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or 
novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question 
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United 
States.”160 
The Lochner decision has gone down in history as a truly infamous moment for the 
Supreme Court of the United States.161 In fact, as SHAMAN explains: 
“Over the years, it has gained a certain eponymous infamy, as the phrase 
‘Lochnerism’ has come to signify the practice of incorporating extreme laissez-faire 
economic policy into constitutional provisions, thereby invalidating many remedial 
statutes designed to regulate wages, prices, and working conditions. Lochner, a case 
in which the Supreme Court equated constitutional proscriptions with an outmoded, 
discredited economic policy to the point of inhumanity, has hence come to symbolize 
the excesses of judicial intervention.”162 
Lochner represented what NEUBORNE has called “the disconnect between the traditional 
consent-based justification for protecting and enforcing contracts, and the reality of radical 
bargaining inequality.”163 Indeed, it dealt with (and actually overlooked) the issue that in 
                                                                  
160 Lochner v. New York [April 17, 1905], pp. 75–76 
161 See, for example, STRAUSS, D. A., ‘Why Was Lochner Wrong?’, 2003, 70 The University of Chicago Law Review, 
no. 1, p. 373 (“Lochner v New York' would probably win the prize, if there were one, for the most widely reviled decision 
of the last hundred years […] Lochner is one of the great anti-precedents of the twentieth century. You have to reject 
Lochner if you want to be in the mainstream of American constitutional law today.”) 
162 SHAMAN, J. M., 2004, supra note 155, p. 456. 
163 NEUBORNE, B., 2015, supra note 100, p. 190. Similarly, HUGHES PARRY sees decisions like the one rendered in 
Lochner as a result of the “emphasis in common law countries on the beneficent economic effects of freedom of 
contract,” and as a result of which there were many “over-statements of the degree of protection given to freedom of 
contract in the Constitution” ( HUGHES PARRY, D., 1959, supra note 13, p. 69). 
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many contracts, particularly those between employers and prospective employees, it is 
impossible to speak of a “real” consent between the parties. Under the pretense of 
protecting the freedom of the bakers, the Court harmed them by removing a protection 
aimed at preventing their exploitation.164 
Despite the blow that reformist ideas suffered at the hands of the Supreme Court in 
Lochner, and the occasional academic defending the laisse-faire approach, many scholars 
celebrated the legislative attempts to protect the weaker parties in the contract “of whom 
one is under the pressure of absolute want, while the other is not”.165 This issue of balancing 
the relation of the parties, equalizing, as much as possible, their bargaining power, thus 
became a fundamental issue in contract law. Because of this, the deregulatory movement 
arguing that a laissez faire contract law would protect people of any condition or 
background would soon lose its momentum. The problem was that this movement 
overlooked, perhaps willfully, that in order for both parties to benefit from an agreement 
there must be a certain balance allowing them to protect their respective interests.  
It was within this historical and philosophical context that in the United States, in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, there was a move to reform contract law in order to “channel 
the exercise of liberty toward cooperation and decency, and, thus, to preserve the bargain 
contract as the vehicle to facilitate the most efficient distribution of resources in the 
economy.”166 These efforts would materialize in both a shift in the case law, where the 
laissez-faire contractual philosophy lost a big part of its adherents, as well as in the 
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), adopted into law by several states in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and which contained a series of provisions aimed at ensuring 
balance. This shift showed an interest on the part of the legislator (by means of 
recognizing doctrines such as those of good faith and unconscionability) “to transform 
community norms of honesty and decency into legal obligations and to create a market climate 
that discourages irresponsible contract behavior”.167 
The move towards reform continued in the second half of the 20th Century, as ideas of 
fairness and justice continued to play an even larger role in the law of contracts, with 
                                                                  
164 Interestingly, the Lochner decision was met with a barrage of criticism from the academic, political, and legal 
circles, coming from both sides of the political spectrum. Right wing commentators decried it as an affront to 
state’s rights, while progressives saw it as an attack on the very kind of social issues that concerned them. It was 
simply a bad decision (WALL, J. F., ‘Social Darwinism and Constitutional Law with Special Reference to Lochner v. 
New York’, 1976, 33 Annals of Science, no. 5, p. 472). 
165 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 661. 
166 ibid., p. 649. Indeed, it was during this period that the so-called Lochner era came to an end, via the Supreme 
Court decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish [1937], 300 US, 379. Only then did the Supreme Court 
acknowledge that the protections granted by the due process clause of the Constitution could not be extended to 
protect an absolute freedom of contract when there is a clear inequality in the bargaining power of the parties 
(See STRAUSS, D. A., 2003, supra note 161, p. 374). 
167 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 650. 
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regulatory efforts beginning to target contracts in general, and not only specific types (as 
had been the case in previous years, particularly with consumer and labor legislation). In 
England, for example, the Unfair Contract Terms act of 1977, “in addition to the special 
protection that it gave consumers […] also gave judges a general authority to strike down 
unreasonable exemption clauses, regardless of the category of contract”.168 In a similar fashion, 
other Common Law countries, like the United States, Canada and Australia, saw the rise 
of the doctrine of unconscionability, and which allowed courts to strike down terms, or 
complete contracts, which were excessively one-sided or downright abusive.169 
This period was marked by a clear erosion of the Benthamite idea that “as happiness 
consists in a maximum of pleasure, and that as each man knows best what will please him most, 
a contract in which two parties freely express what they prefer is the best way of achieving the 
greatest good of the greatest numbers”.170 This erosion was a consequence of an increasing 
social understanding of the fact that, as COHEN notes, “men in fact do not always know what 
will turn out to their advantage, and some of them have the talent for exploiting the ignorance 
or the dire need of their neighbors to make the latter agree to almost anything”.171 Fairness and 
justice were therefore no longer seen as merely desirable social values, but rather as goals 
and objectives that had to be actively pursued by the law of contracts, so as to ensure that 
contractual agreements reflected the interest of both parties. 
The last two decades of the 20th Century, and all the way up to the present day, have seen 
a dichotomy arise within contract law.172 As the tyrannical regimes within the Soviet 
Union started to collapse, right wing economics experimented a revival in the West, with 
the governments of Ronald Reagan in the United States, Margaret Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom, and a plethora of other democracies (and dictatorships) following their 
footsteps in terms of economic policies and reforms.173 Those proposing the almost 
absolutist free market approach argued that the problems that existed in the past had not 
been because the market was free, but rather because it wasn’t free enough. Adopting a 
sort of “No True Scotsman” approach to economics, proponents of liberalization argued 
that if the market had really been free, then problems would not have arisen; hence, since 
problems arose, then it meant the market had not been free.  
                                                                  
168 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 15. 
169 See Chapter IV. 
170 COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 563. 
171 ibid., p. 563. 
172 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 16. 
173 On some of the free market reforms conducted in this period, See, generally, STEPHENS, B., ‘How Milton 
Friedman Saved Chile’, 2010 Wall Street Journal, FRAZER, W., ‘Milton Friedman and Thatcher's Monetarist 
Experience’, 1982, 16 Journal of Economic Issues, no. 2, SHLEIFER, A., ‘The Age of Milton Friedman’, 2009, 47 
Journal of Economic Literature, no. 1, CARCAMO-HUECHANTE, L. E., ‘Milton Friedman: Knowledge, Public Culture, 
and Market Economy in the Chile of Pinochet’, 2006, 18 Public Culture, no. 2. 
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Despite the occasional fallacy, it would be a mistake to simply dismiss the arguments of 
free market advocates. Indeed, their views are often completely reasonable and grounded 
on common sense. They argued, for example, that the use of standard forms and 
boilerplate contracts was not, per se, a sign of unfairness. This is a sensible position, as it 
is evident that negotiating terms individually with every partner, particularly when it 
comes to mass market products, would not only be prohibitively costly, but also 
downright impossible.174 These considerations, however, have not stopped the widely-
held belief that standardized contracts are, mostly, if not per se, a result of inequality and 
imbalance. They are seen, therefore, as somehow nefarious by nature, and not as a natural 
consequence of complex economies. This was the position put forward, for example, by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield which when, deeming 
unenforceable a pre-printed exclusion clause, ruled that: 
“The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought 
together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of 
approximate economic equality. In such a society there is no danger that freedom of 
contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole. But in present-day 
commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily by 
enterprises with strong bargaining power and position.”175 
The problem with the view expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, as well as several 
authors, is that it overlooks the fact that standardized contracts, regardless of the 
criticisms that might be made against specific terms, make commerce possible. ANGELO 
and ELLINGER, for example, were clear on this, arguing that: 
“It would be unreasonable to suggest that the use of standard form contracts is, in 
itself, objectionable or unconscionable. A large industrial entity has a genuine 
interest in defining its liability to customer and in standardizing the terms on which 
it supplies goods or furnishes services. While parties may negotiate some specific 
terms, such as the price or the date of payment, the standard form usually governs 
the general terms and conditions related to the supply of goods or to the furnishing 
                                                                  
174 As COHEN argued: 
“The notion that standardization [of contractual terms] is necessarily inimical to real freedom is a fallacy 
of the same type as the one that habits are necessarily hindrances to the achievements of our desires. 
There is doubtless the real possibility of developing bad social customs, as we develop bad individual 
habits. But in the main, customs and habits are necessary ways through which our aims can be realized. 
By standardizing contracts, the law increases that real security which is the necessary basis of initiative 
and the assumption of tolerable risks.” 
COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 588. 
175 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. [1960], 161 A. 2d, 69, p. 389. See also BAIRD, D. G., ‘The Boilerplate 
Puzzle’, 2006, 104 Michigan Law Review, no. 5, p. 940. 
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of services. Other sectors of the commercial world, such as lending institutions, 
carriers, and insurers, use the standard form in a similar manner.”176  
Indeed, a market in which sellers and buyers must individually negotiate every part of 
their agreements is downright illusory. Standardized contracts are not the problem in and 
of themselves, as they are more economically efficient (and cheaper) than individual 
contracting, reducing transactional costs. It should be noted, however, that this says 
nothing about the fact that abuses in the market do allow for unfair clauses to be inserted 
into boilerplate terms. Furthermore, as the market power concentrates into an ever-
decreasing number of players, form contracts become much more prone to be abused.177 
“The economic cause of this contractual transformation and this accumulation of 
capitals and the concentration of enterprises, which has caused a change in the 
personality of the contractual parties. Now we deal with powerful organizations 
that draft agreements in the same way that the legislator drafts the Law. Among 
those contracting parties, some colossal, some miniscule, the freedom of choice stops 
                                                                  
176 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., ‘Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Approaches in England, 
France, Germany, and the United States’, 1992, 14 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review, no. 3, pp. 457–458. 
177 As LONEGRASS put it: 
“Standard form contracts are ubiquitous, but hardly innocuous. In fact, form contracts are rife with 
potential for abuse. Their nature and universality permit drafters to impose any numbers of onerous 
terms on unwary customers, including arbitration agreements, class action waivers, liquidated damages 
provisions, warranty disclaimers, exculpatory clauses and choice-of-law provisions. […] Although essential 
to the American economy, form contracts expose consumers to a parade of one-sided, risk-and rights-
shifting provisions.”  
LONEGRASS, M., ‘Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism--The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability’, 
2012, 44 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
BAIRD does not really share this rather bleak view, since he sees the use of abusive boilerplate as a rather 
impractical way for a seller to take advantage of a buyer. In his view, abusing boilerplate requires a seller that is 
planning to stay in the market for a long time, enough to profit from, for example, draconian exclusion clauses 
buried in the fine print, something that a long-term seller cannot afford to do in order to protect his reputation. 
He even adds that “[s]ellers who use too much fine print are shunned” (BAIRD, D. G., 2006, supra note 175, p. 938). 
The problem with this argument is that it goes against the available evidence, where we see several market 
players who, despite a long trajectory, insert abusive clauses in their contracts, profit from them, and stay in the 
market. Furthermore, the large majority of contracts that people conclude every day are actually made up of 
almost nothing but fine print, with the respective sellers not really being the victims of any kind of shunning 
whatsoever. The best example of this situation is that of the American credit card market, where long, complex, 
and often abusive, terms are sent to consumers in barely readable forms, and yet millions of Americans sign up 
for new credit cards every year. As MANN explains, a typical credit card agreement “might have about eight single-
spaced pages of small (seven-point) type, including about eighty separately numbered provisions,” and “[m]any of the 
terms in the agreement are comprehensible only for cardholders with specialized knowledge” (MANN, R. J., 
‘"Contracting" for Credit’, 2006, 104 Michigan Law Review, no. 5, p. 907). 
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making sense; contractual liberty becomes unilateral because it only works in the 
benefit of the strong.”178   
The calls for regulation have changed over the years. As laissez faire proponents dwindle, 
the regulatory actions being sought are no longer based on the alleged weakness of some 
of the market participants, but rather on the fact that perfect markets simply do not 
exist, and that regulation will actually serve to improve and facilitate commerce.179 The 
proponents of regulation have accurately argued that people would be more likely to enter 
into contractual agreements if they knew that that there were few chances of 
encountering nefarious terms and unwelcome surprises in their contracts. Although this 
point might appear to be moot when it comes to monopolistic powers (since a person 
might be forced to contract anyway, regardless of the terms, due to the lack of 
alternatives) it is precisely in those situations where the issue of regulation becomes even 
more essential, as it is then when people need to be protected from being at the mercy of 
a ruthless and unethical contractual party. 
Due to its long and eventful history, it is easy to predict that the issue of regulation will 
continue to be a point of discussion for years to come. Although since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and the massive failure of absolute statism, the calls for an overbearing 
state have subsided everywhere except in the fringes of politics, the calls for absolute 
libertarian utopias have also lost a big part of their strength. The issue no longer seems to 
be about whether or not to regulate, but rather what, how much and how often should it 
be done. As REITER argued: 
“We have observed the replacement of the idea that contract alone might be the 
balance wheel of society by one suggesting that political institutions ought to 
perform this role instead. […] Ultimately, ‘the market’ turns out to have been a short 
term bridge philosophy carrying society from a period of organization in religious 
and feudal terms to the modern era of democratic political direction. A contemporary 
theory of contract must recognize these facts by rejecting ‘the market’ in favour of an 
institutionally mixed and discretionary measure of social progress.”180 
2.5 Reading the Fine Print 
Despite the occasional vitriol, it seems clear that boilerplate contracts are useful.181 They 
greatly reduce the cost of doing business, since the drafter “familiar with its products and 
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179 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, pp. 18–19. 
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services, can best determine the risks it can efficiently bear and the risks better allocated to the 
consumer. Further businesses that use standard forms do not have to bear the cost of bargaining 
over terms. Drafters can reduce prices because of these savings.”182 As KESSLER argued in his 
seminal work on contracts of adhesion, “[i]n so far as the reduction of costs of production and 
distribution thus achieved is reflected in reduced prices, society as a whole ultimately benefits 
from the use of standard contracts. And there can be no doubt that this has been the case to a 
considerable extent.”183  
RAKOFF also argues that these form contracts legitimately benefit the companies using 
them, promoting efficiency within “a complex organizational structure,” since: 
“First, the standardization of terms, and of the very forms on which they are 
recorded, facilitates coordination among departments. The costs of communicating 
special understandings rise rapidly when one department makes the sale, another 
delivers the goods, a third handles collections, and a fourth fields complaints. 
Standard terms make it possible to process transactions as a matter of routine; 
standard forms, with standard blank spaces, make it possible to locate rapidly 
whatever deal has been struck on the few customized items. Second, standardization 
makes possible the efficient use of expensive managerial and legal talent. Standard 
forms facilitate the diffusion to underlings of management's decisions regarding the 
risks the organization is prepared to bear, or make it unnecessary to explain these 
matters to subordinates at all. Third, the use of form contracts serves as an 
automatic check on the consequences of the acts of wayward sales personnel. The 
pressure to produce may tempt salesmen to make bargains into which the 
organization is unwilling to enter; the use of standard form contracts to state the 
terms of the deal obviates much of the need for, and expense of, internal control and 
discipline in this regard.”184 
Additionally, some proponents of boilerplate contracts stress that the adhering parties 
will not be victims of abuse, because they will always be able to shop for better terms 
(paying for them, of course) if they choose to do so. As the theory goes, 
 “sellers have little incentive to take advantage of the buyer because they risk 
lowering their reputation. In addition, the buyer does not incur the risk of reputation 
loss because, in a competitive market, the buyer can seek other available 
distributors. As a result, the appearance of one-sided terms may not be one-sided 
after all. The seller’s reputational considerations and disinclinations to sue 
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2006, 104 Michigan Law Review, no. 5. 
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consumers are a significant cost for the seller and, as a result, the seller behaves in 
the consumer’s best interests.”185 
The problem, as KESSLER pointed out, is that contracts of adhesion are often used by 
parties with a strong bargaining power. And so, even though these contracts “are not 
objectionable in the abstract, they do tend to be one-sided documents”.186 As a result, there is a 
very high risk that they will contain one-sided terms that negatively affect the weaker 
parties, who are in need of the goods or services provided by that strong enterprise, and 
who will “not [be] in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the 
standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same 
clauses.”187 As such, “[t]hey have become one of the many devices to build up and strengthen 
industrial empires.”188 
Boilerplate contracts are also plagued by issues related to their fine print or standard 
terms. This is particularly (but not exclusively) relevant when it comes to consumer 
contracts, where it is understood that the consumer, a person who is most likely not 
versed in “legalese” or in the technical details of what he’s acquiring, must agree to the 
terms placed in front of him.189 As SLAWSON notes, “[t]he extreme specialization of function 
                                                                  
185 RICHARDSON, M. S., ‘The Monopoly on Digital Distribution’, 2014, 27 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & 
Development Law Journal, no. 1. 
186 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, p. 458. MAXEINER mentions that parties that employ 
standard form contracts do so “in their own interests,” citing the legal counsel of a certain Fortune 500 company 
who said “[t]he purpose of form contracts is primarily to protect the needs of our [internal] clients, not to protect the 
interests of our customers” (MAXEINER, J. R., 2003, supra note 103, p. 114). 
187 KESSLER, F., 1943, supra note 121, p. 632. 
188 ibid., p. 632. 
189 Defined by Webster’s Dictionary as “the specialized language of the legal profession”, legalese has been the object 
of much debate. BECKER, for example, explains that legalese often comes as a result of some kind of “professional 
entitlement,” as some legal writers claim “that they have earned the right to use an elite jargon” (BECKER, S. M., 
‘Improve Your Written Communication Skills: Eliminate Legalese’, 1992, 7 Commercial Law Bulletin, no. 4, p. 15). 
BENSON explains that the issue with legalese is not that it is simply a different style or prose; instead, legalese “is 
strange in the extreme, off the edge of the range of normal prose styles even in a diverse society. It is so out of touch with 
ordinary language that-in the hands of a powerful, exclusive profession- it becomes at best a symbol of alienation and at 
worst a tool to intimidate and exploit the public” (BENSON, R. W., 1984, supra note 51, p. 522). 
Despite the numerous criticisms levelled against legalese, however, ARMSTRONG defends its use, suggesting that 
these criticisms often mistaken. He explains that “[t]he fact that nonlawyers fail to understand legal documents 
without interpretation and explanation is immaterial so long as their meaning is perfectly clear to other lawyers. Legal 
documents are, after all, drafted primarily for the benefit and use of other lawyers” (ARMSTRONG, W. P., ‘Point: In 
Defense of Legalese’, 1992, 3 The Scribes Journal of Legal Writing, p. 34). In his rebuttal to ARMSTRONG, JOHANSON 
suggests that lawyers should not draft documents that only lawyers can understand, since “[w]e ought to be 
drafting "workable" documents -contracts, say, that our clients can both understand and apply in everyday life. [...] [T]he 
effect of addressing one's documents primarily to some mythical judge - and not the ordinary person on the street - is that 
the meaning becomes more obscure to judges and lawyers as well as to ordinary people” (JOHANSON, S. M., 
‘Counterpoint: In Defense of Plain Language’, 1992, 3 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing, p. 39). Confirming 
JOHANSON’s words, research shows that lawyers and judges seem to prefer plain language over the often complex 
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of modern life requires that we contract with each other too frequently to take time to reach 
even a mildly complicated agreement every time we do, and the complexity of modern life and 
modern law combine to demand that even minor agreements usually be complicated.”190 What is 
more, these long and dense terms will be drafted by a vendor whose principal concern is 
protecting himself (or his clients).191 
Despite its special relevance to consumers, these issues surrounding the use of boilerplate 
are also applicable to business contracts, where one of the parties will often be in a much 
better position (both in terms of knowledge and bargaining power) compared to its 
counterpart, even if they are dealing within their own trade. Small businesses will often 
have a rather limited capacity to understand both legal and technical terms, and can thus 
also fall victim to a powerful party that dictates terms in a complex manner.192 
                                                                                                                                                                       
something that in itself seems to contradict ARMSTRONG’s assertions about addressing legal documents to 
lawyers and judges.  
In general, it seems safe to say that the phenomenon observed in contracts, as well as even in some court 
decisions, is one of “writer-centric writing”, instead of “reader-centric.” In the latter, the writer places an 
emphasis on the reader being able to understand the information being conveyed, in the former, however, the 
writer is “not writing at all; he's merely communing privately with himself - that is, he's simply putting thoughts down 
on paper” (SALZWEDEL, M. R., 2015, supra note 6, pp. 72–73). 
190 SLAWSON, W. D., ‘Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power’, 1971, 84 Harvard 
Law Review, no. 3, p. 532. BROWNE and BIKSACKY also add as a complication, closely related to that of 
specialization, the high complexity of modern merchants. As they explain:  
“[M]odern commerce is interdependent-multiple parties are all working together to buy and sell products 
and services. The result of this interdependence is that each party engages in specialization and relies on 
the information of other parties with whom they conduct business. […] That is, parties become more 
ignorant about the information required for informed transactions because they can place confidence in 
other contracting parties.” 
BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 239.  
Although these authors make this comment within a general commentary on consumer contracts, their 
reflections are fully applicable to commercial contracts. Indeed, interdependence is just as important in 
commerce as it is in consumer contracts, even if some caveats (such as a larger expectation of knowledge on the 
part of merchants) should be kept in mind. 
191 WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 918. 
192 HOFER, A., ‘Legalese to the Detriment of Small Business: Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wolters’, 
2015, 41 William Mitchell Law Review, no. 4, p. 1554 (“[f]ew contractors are trained in the complexities of contract 
interpretation and may not be aware of the broad meanings courts sometimes attach to common terms”). Defining a 
term as elastic as “small business” is a very complex task, and definitions often exclude or include more 
businesses than they should. According to MORANT, for example: 
“The prototypical small business usually consists of a locally and privately owned enterprise with a limited 
number of employees. Except for generalized size characteristics, small businesses often defy stereotype. 
They usually cater to a segment of the market not served by many other businesses. Their variant 
commercial objectives, dictated by the desire to appeal to a particular niche as defined in a coherent 
business plan, generally ensure some semblance of commercial uniqueness.” 
MORANT, B. D., 2003, supra note 126, p. 240. From this perspective, it would seem that the character of “small 
business” comes from both the size as well as the “niche” in which they work. Limiting our understanding of 
“small businesses” to niche commerce, however, seems unnecessarily strict, as it would seem to exclude small 
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Furthermore, just like consumers, small businesses will often be unable to afford to hire 
attorneys to review the contracts they sign, or to discuss the implications of contractual 
terms. This situation forces small businesses to have to rely on their own limited 
experience in order to make decisions, something that is often insufficient.193 As MORANT 
notes: 
“The competitive nature of the free market system and the usually limited resources 
of these enterprises potentially prejudice their bargaining status. Moreover, the 
formalistic starkness of contractual rules often aggravates their bargaining 
difficulties.”194 
UDELL illustrates this point by referencing the case of franchises, where the franchisor will 
be in a much more powerful situation than the individual franchisee, and so will be able to 
impose the terms. Simply expecting the small business to dicker over the terms, or to 
have the necessary skills required to understand everything in his contract is unrealistic: 
“Despite admonishments to ‘read the contract before you sign’, many franchisees 
sign agreements that are not in their best interest. As a consequence they suffer. One 
of the major reasons franchisees sign unfair contracts which contain [unfair] 
provisions […] is that they do not understand the terminology and ‘legalese’ used in 
most franchise agreements. While some franchisees do obtain legal advice, their 
lawyers are frequently ill-prepared to evaluate the franchise agreement from a 
managerial point of view. Consequently, the franchisee is poorly protected from the 
abuses of franchising.”195 
                                                                                                                                                                       
with MORANT’s reference to a specific economic niche, definitions of small businesses usually resort to an 
individual characteristic as a tell-tale sign of its “small” character. Indeed, as STREET & CAMERON note,  
“a small business is alternately defined in terms of structural characteristics such as the number of 
employees or number of functional divisions, performance characteristics such as amount of annual 
revenues or depth of the product line, or both. Definitions also vary depending on factors such as industry 
type. We also observe that small business is a relative term that often refers to a firm that has fewer 
resources (for example, employees, revenue, or assets) when compared to others in its industry”.  
STREET, C. T. & CAMERON, A.-F., ‘External Relationships and the Small Business: A Review of Small Business 
Alliance and Network Research’, 2007, 45 Journal of Small Business Management, no. 2, p. 240. In light of the 
difficulties defining the term, and once again echoing the words of STREET & CAMERON, for the purposes of our 
work, the term “small business” will be defined as “an independently owned and operated enterprise that is not 
dominant in its field or industry and which has relatively fewer resources than other companies in its market” ( ibid., 
p. 240). Although, certainly, some flaws can probably be found in this definition, it is both wide and narrow 
enough for our ends. 
193 STEVERSON, J. W., ‘I Mean What I Say, I Think: The Danger to Small Businesses of Entering into Legally 
Enforceable Agreements That May Not Reflect Their Intentions’, 2003, 7 Journal of Small and Emerging Business 
Law, p. 285. 
194 MORANT, B. D., 2003, supra note 126, pp. 236–237. 
195 UDELL, G. G., ‘Franchising: America's Last Small Business Frontier?’, 1973, 11 Journal of Small Business 
Management, no. 2, p. 34. 
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Despite these problems, and which affect virtually the majority of contracts that are 
concluded every day, adhesive terms are often treated like any other contractual clause.196 
Indeed, when it comes to the matter of readership, that is whether the parties actually 
read and understand what they sign, the standard position is rather straightforward: A 
party cannot excuse herself from the contract arguing that she did not read or understand 
the terms, as it was her duty to protect her own interests by reviewing her agreement.197 
As a US District Court Judge ruled in a 2003 case: 
“The fact that […a party] claims that he did not read the contract is irrelevant 
because absent fraud […], failure to read a contract is not a get out of jail free 
card.”198 
As WILKINSON-RYAN explains: 
“As a matter of black letter law, not knowing the terms of one’s contract does not 
excuse a party from liability. […] Non-readership is no excuse, even when the facts 
are sympathetic. In [Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co.], a party subject to a 
forum-selection clause argued that the term should be unenforceable because of the 
plaintiff’s poor eyesight; the Seventh Circuit noted that ‘it is no defense to say, ‘I did 
not read what I was signing.’’ In still another case, mortgage borrowers who 
discovered that their agreement contained an adjustable rate that they did not 
apprehend before signing were held liable; the court reasoned ‘[t]hat the plaintiffs 
did not read any of these documents does not place culpability on the defendant.’ In 
sum, whether or not a party has read the contract is usually irrelevant to the 
determination of mutual assent."199  
                                                                  
196 CHING, K. K., ‘What We Consent to When We Consent to Form Contracts: Market Price’, 2015, 84 University of 
Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, no. 1, pp. 2–3 (“[n]o one challenges this premise [that people do not read their 
contracts], but sometimes it seems to be forgotten, and form contracts are analyzed as if people did read them”). 
197 CALAMARI, J. D., ‘Duty to Read--A Changing Concept’, 1974, 43 Fordham Law Review, no. 3, pp. 341–342 (“a 
party who signs an instrument manifests assent to it and may not later complain that he did not read the instrument or 
that he did not understand its contents.  A leading case has stated that ‘one having the capacity to understand a written 
document who reads it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature.’ The feeling is 
that no one could rely on a signed document if the other party could avoid the transaction by saying that he had not read 
or did not understand the writing”). 
198 DeJohn v. The TV Corporation International [2003], 245 F. Supp. 2d, 913–926, p. 919. 
199 WILKINSON‐RYAN, T., ‘A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print’, 2014, 99 Iowa Law Review, no. 4, 
pp. 1753–1754 See also Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc [1989], 883 F. 2d, 1286. It is worth 
mentioning that even when this readership doctrine is accepted, its application is not absolute since, as BECHER 
notes, the duty to read is  
“only one of many factors to be considered and balanced when deciding whether to hold parties to the 
written terms of their agreement. The [American] Restatement [(Second) of Contracts], for example, 
still grants relief from terms that the drafting party has reason to know are unintended by the other 
party. Thus, the duty to read does not encompass all terms that might be found in print. For instance, 
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This represents a challenge for the courts, since, as CHING notes, 
“the drafters of these contracts know not only that their forms will not be read, but 
also that it is reasonable for consumers to sign them unstudied, [so] a reasonable 
drafter should have no illusion that there has been true assent to these terms. So, if 
the drafter of a form contract should know that a particular term was not read by 
the promisor, it is unreasonable to think the promisor meant to bind himself to that 
term, even if he signed the agreement, clicked ‘I agree,’ or somehow manifested his 
assent to the form.”200 
The 1934 English High Court case of L'Estrange v F. Graucob Ltd. perfectly illustrates the 
problems associated with this idea of being bound by what a party is expected to have 
read when she signed, even if in reality there was no actual reading being done.201 In this 
case, the plaintiff, the owner of a café, purchased a cigarette machine from the 
defendants. The contract signed by the plaintiff, and which she admitted she had not 
read, included a series of clauses in small print that, among others, excluded “any express 
or implied condition, statement, or warranty, statutory or otherwise” that were not contained 
in the contract.202 After the machine failed several times, the plaintiff informed the seller 
that she was forfeiting her deposit and that she wanted to terminate the transaction. 
After the defendants refused to terminate the contract, the plaintiff brought an action 
                                                                                                                                                                       
relatively hidden, such as in letterheads and in tags; or when a party misrepresents the terms. Simply 
stated, some other contract doctrines, such as unfair surprise, unconscionability, duress, and fraud, might 
trump the duty to read.”  
BECHER, S. I., ‘Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met’, 2008, 45 
American Business Law Journal, no. 4, p. 730. 
Furthermore, despite WILKINSON-RYAN’s dire words, sometimes facts can be sympathetic enough for the courts to 
consider that a party who did not read the contract can escape the bargain. In St. John’s Hospital v. McAdoo, for 
example, a New York court allowed a defendant to escape from a contract he had signed with the hospital in a 
situation of trauma and anxiety during a medical crisis. As the Court explained: 
“It is settled law that as a literate, competent adult, [a] defendant is ordinarily held legally responsible for 
his contractual obligations, once it is determined that he has signed the contract. However, there are 
circumstances under which a reasonable person might sign a contract, without reading or understanding 
it, so that requiring adherence to its terms would be grossly unfair. In such situations some courts have 
inquired behind the objective fact of the signature to the contract, into the circumstances under which it 
was signed and into the relative positions of the parties. The courts do so in recognition of the possibility 
that the contract in question may have been signed without opportunity for arm's length negotiations. 
[…] 
It is reasonable in this situation for [the] defendant to have seen himself as powerless to do anything other 
than sign the form. A hospital emergency room is certainly not a place in which any but the strongest can 
be expected to exercise calm and dispassionate judgment. The law of contracts is not intended to use 
‘superman’ as its model. If the reasonable man standard is applied here, defendant's failure to read the 
document or to give it more than the most cursory attention is understandable.” 
St. John's Hospital McAdoo [1978], 94 Misc. 2d, 967–971, pp. 969–970. 
200 CHING, K. K., 2015, supra note 196, p. 4. 
201 L’estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd. [1934], 2 KB, 394–407. 
202 ibid., p. 396. 
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against them arguing, inter alia, that there had been a breach of the implied warranty “on 
the sale of the machine that it was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was sold.”203 The 
defendants argued in response that the plaintiff had signed a contract excluding such 
warranties. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the she did not 
know the clauses that she was agreeing to, and that the defendants did not do “what was 
reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the conditions.”204 The Court of Appeal, 
however, reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. As SCRUTTON LJ 
explained in his decision:  
“In this case the plaintiff has signed a document headed ‘Sales Agreement,’ which she 
admits had to do with an intended purchase, and which contained a clause excluding 
all conditions and warranties. That being so, the plaintiff, having put her signature 
to the document and not having been induced to do so by any fraud or 
misrepresentation, cannot be heard to say that she is not bound by the terms of the 
document because she has not read them.”205 
This decision shows the inadequacy of the idea of readership as an absolute duty on the 
part of the adhering party, as it seems to be more apt for times long gone, and which were 
characterized by brief and simple agreements. The best illustration of the unsatisfactory 
character of this decision comes from the words of MAUGHAM LJ, one of the judges in this 
case, and who started his concurring decision with the words: 
“I regret the decision to which I have come, but I am bound by legal rules and cannot 
decide the case on other considerations.”206 
As this case shows, the problem with this general rule on readership is that it places itself 
outside the realms of rationality, justice and reality. If it is a known and accepted fact that 
people, for many different reasons, do not read boilerplate terms, then perhaps blindly 
                                                                  
203 ibid., p. 398. 
204 ibid., p. 400. 
205 ibid., p. 404. Although we cite a Common Law case, Civil Law decisions holding an adhering party to the terms 
of an unread contract are also quite common. In a 1970 case, for example, the Colombian Supreme Court ruled 
that 
“For a legal act that produces obligations to become a contract, it is enough that two or more people 
participate in its formation, and it is not relevant whether, at the time, one of them simply accepted the 
conditions imposed by other; by giving that [acceptance] she has contributed to the formation of the 
contract, since she has voluntarily agreed even though she could have opted not to.” 
Cited in LAGUADO GIRALDO, C. A., ‘Condiciones Generales, Cláusulas Abusivas y el Principio de Buena Fe en el 
Contrato de Seguro’, 2003, 105 Universitas, p. 234. 
206 L’estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd. [1934], p. 405. An even stronger condemnation would come later from Lord 
DENNING who, despite having represented the defendant in L’estrange v. Graucob, from his position as Master of 
the Rolls referred to this and other similar decisions as “a bleak winter for our law of contract.” See George Mitchell 
(Chesterhall) Ltd. v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. [1983] QB, 284–315, p. 297. 
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accepting their enforceability due to an abstract “duty to read” should not be done so 
quickly.  After all, as BURKE noted:  
“Courts know that parties sign or manifest assent to standard form contracts that 
they have not read, understood or negotiated.”207 
2.6 Boilerplate and the Opportunity to Read 
The problems associated with the use of fine print terms are many. First, it is widely 
believed (and empirical evidence confirms it) that people simply do not read the terms of 
the contracts they sign; second, evidence also shows that even among the very small 
minority of people who do read the terms, very few of them actually understand what 
they read.208 This poses a big challenge to the idea of contractual freedom, as it is hard to 
believe that there is freedom in an agreement on terms that were not read or understood, 
often because it is virtually impossible to do either.209 Adding to the problem is the fact 
that, as evidence suggests, simply adding more information does not necessarily affect 
the purchasing decisions of the consumers; in other words, even when the consumers 
know more about the product or about the terms of the contract, the decision of whether 
or not to purchase the item seems unaffected.210  
At this point it is important to note that the issues arising from the use of boilerplate are 
not, necessarily, a justification to do away with fine print altogether. Instead, they are 
merely a justification to tread carefully when it comes to its analysis. It is not, therefore, 
that boilerplate is negative in and of itself, but rather that it creates a somewhat 
dangerous situation for the adhering party and, as such, requires close scrutiny and 
regulation. It is an issue of consent, and about what value we can give to the “agreement” 
given to a boilerplate contract.  
                                                                  
207 BURKE, J. J. A., ‘Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach’, 1999, 24 Seton Hall Legislative Journal, no. 2, 
p. 299. 
208 For some studies on the issue of readership, See, for example, PLAUT, V. & BARTLETT [III], R. P., ‘Blind Consent? 
A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements’, 2012, 36 Law and Human 
Behavior, no. 4; BAKOS, Y. et al., ‘Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form 
Contracts’, 2014 New York University Law and Economics Working Papers; EIGEN, Z. J., ‘When and Why Individuals 
Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance’, 2012, 41 The 
Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1; and EIGEN, Z. J., ‘Experimental Evidence of the Relationship between Reading the 
Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms’, 2012, 168 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, no. 1. 
209 MANN, R. J., 2006, supra note 177, p. 903 (“the reality is that the typical consumer contract requires a level of 
literacy and reading comprehension that is far beyond the grasp of the normal American”). 
210 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., ‘Does Contract Disclosure Matter?’, 2012, 168 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics JITE, no. 1, p. 96. 
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“Form contracts present opportunities for overreaching that make it unfair to 
presume that a person's signature on a contract indicates consent. Such contracts 
might give the appearance of mutual consent, but they totally lack agreement in any 
realistic sense of the word. As a practical matter, few people read form contracts. 
Even if a person wants to read a form contract, he may not be afforded the time to 
read it. If he is permitted the time to read it, he may not have the education or 
business experience to be able to understand the language used in the contract or the 
likely legal effect of such language. If he understands the language and effect of the 
contract, he may not notice terms written in fine print or printed in unexpected 
places on the document. Even if he reads and understands the contract perfectly, he 
may not have any ability to negotiate for its terms and may enter the contract 
because he has no alternative.”211 
MARINELLI, echoing the seminal work of LLEWELLYN, concurs with this idea of a lack of real 
consent to boilerplate, arguing that: 
“Instead of thinking about 'assent' to boilerplate clauses, we can recognize that so far 
as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, 
specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and 
but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to 
any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on this form, which do 
not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print 
which has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of 
those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real expression of 
agreement, but much of it commonly belongs in."212 
                                                                  
211 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1069. WOODWARD goes as far as suggesting that boilerplate and 
contracts should be seen as completely different entities. He warns, however, that “[t]his will be hard to do and will 
be met with organized business resistance. Considering these forms to be ‘contracts’ serves vendors well, providing the 
ready explanation ‘you agreed to it’ when attempting to enforce a one-sided term to the individual’s detriment” 
(WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 935). 
212 MARINELLI, A. J., ‘Evolving Concept of Unconscionability in Modern Contract Law’, 1998, 5 Journal of Law & 
Business, p. 18. According to LLEWELYN, an analysis of form contracts requires that these are divided in two 
separate agreements: 
“One contract comprises the ‘dickered’ terms, those actually bargained for, to which the non-drafting 
party has manifested a specific assent. The other comprises the ‘supplementary boilerplate’ contract, 
based on the un discussed (and almost certainly unread) terms printed on the form. The non-drafting 
party does not manifest any specific assent to the supplementary boilerplate contract. He assents only to 
the general pattern of the transaction, and to any reasonable and decent terms which might be expected in 
such a transaction, in addition to those bargained for.” 
SPANOGLE, J. A., ‘Analyzing Unconscionability Problems’, 1969, 117 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, no. 7, 
p. 939.  
This idea of the “blanket assent”, the acceptance by the adhering party to “any not unreasonable or undecent terms” 
is “said to dominate American treatment of standard forms” (MAXEINER, J. R., 2003, supra note 103, p. 116). 
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Some case law has been sympathetic to this view of the fine print. Indeed, as Lord REID 
expressed in a 1966 case on exemption clauses included in a charterparty: 
 “Exemption clauses differ greatly in many respects. Probably the most objectionable 
are found in the complex standard conditions which are now so common. In the 
ordinary way the customer has no time to read them, and if he did read them he 
would probably not understand them. And if he did understand and object to any of 
them, he would generally be told he could take it or leave it. And if he then went to 
another supplier the result would be the same. Freedom to contract must surely 
imply some choice or room for bargaining.”213 
As some have argued, the blind acceptance of the enforceability of boilerplate terms is the 
product of a legal system that “owes its foundations to the days of the arm’s length bargain to 
trade a horse – to the notion that contract provisions come prior to the transaction and are 
known and custom designed by the parties. In that setting, of course, reading the contract is a 
simple task that is commonly done and is necessary to assure that the text reflects the terms 
agreed upon.”214 The problem is that, as it has been described above, nowadays contracts 
are very different from the simple transactions that gave rise to contract law, being more 
often than not drafted by only one party, and “negotiated” only in a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.215  
“In the world of standardized terms and contracts, the range of choice is quite 
narrow. Negotiation is typically not an option. The consumer's only substantial 
options are to accept the terms presented, continue shopping for other potential 
providers, or abandon the purchase altogether. If the document is likely to be hard to 
read and even harder to revise, a rational consumer might not expend the effort to 
review the terms.”216 
                                                                  
213 Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime S.A. v N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967], 1 AC, 361, 
p. 406. Lord REID went on to distinguish these “non-bargained” terms from “the case where parties are bargaining 
on terms of equality and a stringent exemption clause is accepted for a quid pro quo or other good reason.” 
214 BEN-SHAHAR, O., ‘The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law’, 2009, 5 European Review of Contract 
Law, no. 1, pp. 2–3. 
215 WILHELMSSON, T., Standard Form Conditions, in Hartkamp, A. S. et al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 
2011, p. 571 (“[t]raditional contract thinking is built on the ideal of individual contracting. Each part of the contract is 
thought of as expressly agreed upon by the parties. As is well known, however, probably a rather small percentage of all 
contracts is actually made in this way. Modern mass transactions require standardized conditions”). 
216 MANN, R. J., 2006, supra note 177, pp. 905–906 As KIM noted, in regards to electronic commerce: 
“It is not a viable option for the consumer to decline the terms of any particular agreement if the consumer 
wishes to engage in online activity. The party’s ‘assent’ is void of volition and merely reflects a refusal on 
the part of the consumer to resist market forces through self-deprivation that would have profound social 
and economic consequences.” 
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From this perspective, it is naive, if not downright illusory, to think that there is any real 
negotiation or bargain to speak of when dealing with a contract of adhesion.217 As 
D’AGOSTINO explained, the traditional free market view of contracts, and according to 
which  
“a free competitive market provides efficient clauses in equilibrium […] can be true 
only when consumers are perfectly informed about any relevant aspect of the 
transaction they are involved in. This is an assumption that may collapse in the 
presence of contracts of adhesion if consumers have to pay a high cost to read some 
clauses or if they are not ‘sophisticated’ enough to take into account the risk involved 
in signing without reading.”218 
The above issues have not gone unnoticed, and there is actually a rather widespread 
consensus on the fact that boilerplate terms pose a challenge to the free market and to 
meaningful assent.219 Although this consensus might not extend to exactly how to 
regulate this matter, agreement exists on the fact that some degree of regulation is 
required, as the alternative would give the dominant party a great opportunity to commit 
abuses against the weaker one.220  
“The existence of obligational asymmetric information is a serious market failure 
that can undermine the efficiency of many consumer transactions. Contracts will 
systematically increase welfare if, and only if, contracting parties have the 
                                                                  
217 WHITE has referred to this situation as one “autistic contracts,” arguing that: 
“Parties to modem form contracts sometimes interact with one another in the same way a parent of an 
autistic child interacts with that child. When a licensor offers a software license with the assertion that it 
will infer acceptance of all the license terms if the licensee removes the power cord from its plastic 
wrapper, the licensor is drawing an inference from the licensee's behavior just as doubtful as the inference 
a hopeful parent draws from an autistic child's apparently knowing response to the parent's statement.” 
WHITE, J. J., ‘Autistic Contracts’, 1999, 45 Wayne Law Review, no. 4, p. 1693. 
218 D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 3. 
219 See also COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 589 (“standardized contracts […] serve the interests of some better 
than those of others; and the question of justice thus raised demands the attention not only of legislatures but also of 
courts that have to interpret these standard forms and of administrative bodies that have to supervise their 
enforcement”). On some examples of legislative measures aimed at preventing the abuse of boilerplate, See 
HAHLO, H. R., ‘Unfair Contract Terms in Civil-Law Systems’, 1981, 98 South African Law Journal, no. 1, p. 72. 
220 See SALAZAR, D. F., ‘Theoretical Approximation and Experimental Evaluation of Market Functioning when 
Transactions are Regulated by Adhesion Contracts’, 2008 Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics 
Association (ALACDE) Annual Papers, p. 2 (“[t]he reason for State intervention was that adhesion contracts had become 
a means of increasing company advantage at the cost of adherents through the imposition of abusive clauses which were 
not completely understood by those who accepted them”) and also FAURE, M. G. & LUTH, H. A., ‘Behavioural 
Economics in Unfair Contract Terms: Cautions and Considerations’, 2011, 34 Journal of Consumer Policy, no. 3, 
p. 340 (“[i]nformation asymmetries are also often advanced as a reason to intervene in consumer markets”). LONEGRASS 
notes how the consensus regarding the need for regulation has strongly manifested itself in consumer law, where 
“legal and interdisciplinary scholarship has definitely established that meaningful, voluntary assent to standardized 
terms is an impossibility, as consumers are largely unable to understand the contracts that they sign and are virtually 
powerless to find better terms elsewhere in the market” (LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 3). 
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information necessary for an informed evaluation of all transactional aspects 
(including, of course, contract terms). Stated slightly differently, information 
inequalities belie the maxim that promisees (i.e., consumers) are the best judges of 
their own utility. Where imperfect information exists, the ability of parties to 
maximize utility via open market transactions will inevitably decrease.”221  
As a way to lessen the problems inherent to boilerplate, scholars and regulators have 
developed the doctrine of “the opportunity to read”. Based on this doctrine, the issue is 
not so much whether a party to a boilerplate contract read the terms, but rather whether 
he had the opportunity to do so. Since, practically speaking, there is no way to force 
someone to read the terms of his contract, this doctrine argues that the law should strive 
to ensure that, if he wishes to do so, he can at least be able to review those terms before 
signing. The manner in which this goal is achieved (or at least attempted) is by means of 
increasing disclosure, so as to empower the parties by giving them all the necessary 
information to give their assent. 
As the theory goes, more information means more power for the adhering party, an 
increased ability to make informed decisions and, in the long run, a more democratic 
market system.222 Additionally, even if it is accepted that many people will not read, those 
who do engage in the reading process would anyway benefit those who do not, because 
their knowledge would force businesses to adapt their terms to make them more 
competitive and attractive. This “informed minority” would thus shape the boilerplate 
terms into something friendlier for all consumers, even for those who did not bother to 
look at what they were signing. From this perspective, it would be incorrect to focus on 
whether individuals are informed, since the truly relevant factor would be whether 
competition among firms allows for the market to reach an optimal price, something that 
would be reached thanks to this minority of comparison shoppers.223 
As MAROTTA-WURGLER explains, the appeal of the “opportunity to read” is easy to 
understand: 
“In theory, disclosure is an ideal regulatory solution because it preserves consumer 
choice, does not interfere with market mechanisms, and is cheaper to implement 
than more invasive alternatives such as mandatory terms or minimum standards. 
The theorist's hope is that disclosure regulation forces sellers to compete on the 
                                                                  
221 BECHER, S. I., 2008, supra note 199, p. 734. Although BECHER mentions consumers specifically, his comments 
on boilerplate can also apply, mutatis mutandis, to commercial contracts. 
222 BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’, 2010, 159 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, no. 3, p. 650. 
223 WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, pp. 923–924. 
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information disclosed and thus represents a superior alternative to measures that 
might distort markets or reduce choice.”224 
On the basis of this theory, it has been proposed that different degrees of disclosure 
duties for businesses should be established.225 This system, akin to that established for 
foods and their “Nutritional Facts” information, would force the businesses to provide or 
make available to the adhering party the terms and conditions of their contract prior to 
its conclusion. This is the position adopted in, for example, the Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts (hereafter “PLSC”) by the American Law Institute (hereafter “ALI”), 
and in several European regulatory texts and model drafts. The premise underlying these 
regulatory texts and proposals is to allow for a more substantial opportunity to read, so as 
to increase the number of people reading the terms that they sign, allowing for a more 
meaningful assent.226 
In the realm of software contracting, the PLSC tackled this challenge by establishing a 
disclosure obligation on the software provider. In essence, this obligation establishes that 
“a transferee will be deemed to have adopted a standard form contract if […] the standard form 
is reasonably accessible electronically prior to the initiation of the transfer at issue”, even 
adding the additional requirement that the terms must be “reasonably comprehensible.”227 
The drafters of the PLSC were particularly concerned with so-called shrink-wrap 
contracts, agreements where the adhering party only becomes aware of the terms after he 
gives his acquiescence.228 Clearly, the ALI understood that that market forces alone would 
                                                                  
224 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., ‘Even More than You Wanted to Know About the Failures of Disclosure’, 2015, 11 
Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, no. 1, p. 63. 
225 We use the terms “business” or “provider” loosely, referring to the party that imposes her terms in the 
contract of adhesion. It should be noted, however, that by the use of these words we do not mean to limit the 
applicability of this discussion to a consumer setting.  
226 BEN-SHAHAR, O., 2009, supra note 214, pp. 3–4. 
227 PLSC § 2.02. 
228 The name “shrink-wrap contract” is a reference to the shrink-wrap around the box of a product, the opening of 
which was deemed as an acceptance of the terms contained inside of the box. These post-purchase terms are also 
referred to as “pizza-box contracts.”  LYNN explains the different kind of terms presented in electronic 
transactions as follows: 
“Electronic contracts of adhesion are generally categorized as clickwrap, shrinkwrap, or browsewrap. A 
clickwrap agreement involves a consumer’s assent to the terms of an Internet transaction by clicking on an 
‘I accept’ or ‘I agree’ box. Reading the terms is irrelevant. If the box is not clicked, the transaction will not 
be completed. […]  
A shrinkwrap contract is inserted into a product package, often software. The act of opening the product 
constitutes assent. This also applies to downloading software directly from the Internet where assent is 
implied by the use of the program. […] 
Browsewrap refers to terms and conditions that are posted on a website, typically accessible via a 
hyperlink at the bottom of the page. Browsewrap agreements do not require users to affirmatively 
manifest consent. The user is deemed to have consented if she continues on the website after having had 
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not be able to ensure that providers would not abuse their market power and impose 
unfair terms on the adhering party. However, since the drafters were wary of direct 
regulation of terms (e.g. prohibiting certain provisions), they opted instead for a 
procedural approach, ensuring the fairness of the contracts not by regulating their 
content, but the way in which the contracts were made. By doing this, the ALI hoped that 
disclosure would “promote the emergence of an informed minority”, while avoiding “the 
intrusive and controversial nature of direct regulation of terms.”229 
American case law shows a strong preference for disclosure of terms as a requirement for 
enforceability.230  Numerous decisions, often regarding electronic contracting, show the 
reluctance of the courts to enforce terms that were not properly disclosed to the adhering 
party. In Nguyen v. Barnes and Noble Inc., for example, the US Court of Appeals for the 9th 
Circuit refused to enforce a forum selection clause contained in a browsewrap agreement 
for lack of proper notice.231 As the Court stated: 
“[W]here a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on 
every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them 
to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the 
hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to 
give rise to constructive notice. While failure to read a contract before agreeing to its 
terms does not relieve a party of its obligations under the contract […] the onus must 
be on website owners to put users on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind 
consumers.”232 
                                                                                                                                                                       
LYNN, K., ‘Browse the Web, Enter a Contract… Arbitrate? The Enforceability of Mandatory Binding Arbitration 
Provisions in Consumer Browsewrap Contracts’, 2015, 6 JCCC Honors Journal, no. 1, p. 3.  
For a further  discussion of “shrink-wrap,” “browse-wrap,” and “click-wrap” agreements, See, generally, BLOCK, D., 
‘CAVEAT Surfer: Recent Developments in the Law Surrounding Browse-Wrap Agreements, and the Future of 
Consumer Interaction with Websites’, 2001, 14 Loyola Consumer Law Review, no. 2. 
229 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., ‘Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI's" 
Principles of the Law of Software Contracts"’, 2011 The University of Chicago Law Review, pp. 166–167. See also 
BEN-SHAHAR, O., 2009, supra note 214, pp. 3–4. 
230 WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 924 See also BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., More Than 
You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 2014, Princeton University Press, p. 3 (calling mandated 
disclosure “the most common and least successful regulatory technique in American law”). 
231 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc. [2014], 763 F. 3d, 1171. For a case outside of electronic commerce where notice 
is required for enforcement, See Tri-City Renta-Car & Leasing Corp. v. Vaillancourt [1969], 33 AD 2d, 613. 
232 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc. [2014], pp. 1178–1179. The Court based the bulk of its decision on the 2002 
case of Specht v. Netscape, where the US Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit also ruled a forum selection clause 
unenforceable due to lack of constructive notice, stating that: 
“Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of 
assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and 
credibility.” 
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In addition to the judicial preference for disclosure of terms, as well as the applicability of 
the doctrine in internet contracts, in the United States, for example, a plethora of federal 
and state regulations, municipal ordinances, administrative regulations demand elaborate 
disclosures in order to allow the agreement to exist. BEN-SHAHAR, in what is certainly not 
an exhaustive list, mentions that these go  
“from businesses that issue car, student, or other consumer loans; mortgagees; home-
equity lenders; credit card companies; banks accepting deposits; mutual funds; 
securities brokers; credit-reporting agencies; investment advisors; ATM operators; 
pawnshops; payday lenders; rent-to-own dealers; installment-sales vendors; insurers 
of property, health, life, cars or rented vehicles, self-storage facilities, and much else; 
car-towing companies; car repair shops; motor clubs; residential real estate agencies, 
developers, and landlords; time-share programs; sellers and lessors of mobile homes; 
membership camping facilities; providers of home improvements, services, and 
repairs; home-alarm installers; vocational schools; traffic schools; agents selling 
electricity; immigration consultants; dog breeders and sellers; travel services and 
travel agencies; art dealers; police; doctors; hospitals; managed care organizations; 
colleges and universities; restaurants and other food establishments; halal-food 
dealers; and endlessly more.”233 
Section §2-316 of the American Uniform Commercial Code also establishes this disclosure 
requirement in regards to warranty disclaimers. In the relevant part, this provision 
establishes that in order to “exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any 
part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be 
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a 
writing and conspicuous.” A similar (albeit much longer) provision appears in § 2302 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
In this case the Court considered that clicking the “Download” button did not communicate assent to the terms of 
Netscape’s contract, and which “only became visible if the user scrolled to the button of the page” (DAVIS, N. J., 
‘Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap’, 2007, 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, no. 1, 
pp. 585–586). 
It is important to note that that the US courts’ preference on this issue deals with whether or not the contract 
terms were informed to the other party, and whether she expressly consented to them, without much regard 
being paid to the terms’ actual content (the enforceability of which might depend on other doctrines). As a 
matter of fact, in a fairly unanimous manner, since the first clickwrap case was litigated in 1998, courts have 
considered clickwraps to be a valid manifestation of assent. As DAVIS explains: 
“Essentially, courts have settled on a mechanical approach to determining whether assent was given by 
simply testing whether the click can be proved. Over time, courts have made it clear that absent fraud or 
deception, the user's failure to read, carefully consider, or otherwise recognize the binding effect of clicking 
‘I Agree’ will not preclude the court from finding assent to the terms.” 
ibid., p. 579. 
233 BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., 2010, supra note 222, p. 650 
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Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act, which also requires a “[f]ull and conspicuous disclosure of 
terms and conditions.”234 
In the European Union, the importance given to disclosure of contractual terms manifests 
itself in both the internal rules of Member States, as well as in community regulations. A 
good example of this was a 2008 proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights.235 In 
regards to disclosure, this Proposal, which in Chapter V included a lengthy section 
devoted exclusively to “Consumer rights concerning contract terms", established:  
“Article 31 
Transparency requirements of contract terms 
1. Contract terms shall be expressed in plain, intelligible language and be legible. 
2. Contract terms shall be made available to the consumer in a manner which gives 
him a real opportunity of becoming acquainted with them before the conclusion of 
the contract, with due regard to the means of communication used.” 
It bears mentioning that the Directive on Consumer Rights which was finally adopted 
(Directive 2011/83/EU) did not contain such a general provision regarding disclosure, nor 
did it touch upon unfair contractual terms.236  
The European Draft Common Frame of Reference (hereafter “DCFR”) also took such an 
approach in regards to disclosure of the contractual terms, in light of the fact that “the 
classical [contractual] defenses were developed at a time when most contracts were of a simple 
kind that the parties could understand readily. This […] has changed, particularly with the 
development of longer-term (and therefore more complex) contracts and the use of standard 
terms.” 237 It goes on to add that, with standard terms, “there is the risk that the parties may 
not be aware of their contents or may not fully understand them”.238  
The DCFR actually goes further in regards to disclosure and information than similar 
works, extending it beyond the field of consumer contracts to which it has usually been 
                                                                  
234 See UCC §2-316 and 15 U.S. Code § 2302. 
235 COM (2008) 614/3.  
236 The general information duties included in the final text of the Directive (Art. 5) mostly deal with the 
characteristics of the product and with issues such as warranty and payment; there does not seem to be a general 
duty to make the terms available to the consumer in the way expressed in the draft. Furthermore, although the 
final version does include the requirements of intelligible language, they are only established in regards to “off -
premise” (Art. 7) and “distance” (Art. 8) contracts. The adopted Directive also did away with the “black” and 
“gray” lists of terms, allegedly to ensure the maximum level of harmonization between the individual Member 
States (MCCLAFFERTY, A., ‘Effective Protection for the E-Consumer in Light of the Consumer Rights Directive’, 
2012, 11 Hibernian Law Journal, p. 115). 
237 BAR, C. von & CLIVE, E. et al., Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR). Outline Edition, 2009, Sellier. European Law Publishers, p. 67 
238 ibid., p. 67. 
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restricted. This is due to the fact that “as the laws of many Member States recognize, the 
problem may occur also in contracts between businesses. Particularly when one party is a small 
business that lacks expertise or where the relevant term is contained in a standard form contract 
document prepared by the party seeking to rely on the term, the other party may not be aware of 
the existence or extent of the term.”239 In this manner, the DCFR extends its “disclosure 
protection” to business contracts, although in a way that is considerably more limited 
than that used in the case of consumer dealings.240 
German law also has also paid attention to this issue, with the BGB establishing 
important information duties in sections §305 to §310, including the duty of the service 
provider to grant the subscribing party the “opportunity to read” the terms (§305). This 
German approach is far from unique, particularly within European law, as in Europe “the 
opportunity to review and understand standard terms is seen as one of the fundamental ways to 
avoid unfair surprise and achieve a fair result.”241  
With this apparent widespread support for the idea of granting the adhering party an 
opportunity to become acquainted with the terms of the contract, the issue then turns 
into determining whether this approach is actually useful. Sadly, as far as the evidence 
shows, the answer is a resounding “no”.242 
2.7 Why Disclosure Does Not Matter 
In theory, increasing disclosure of contractual terms and establishing a duty to read 
would be beneficial. It would increase the number of readers, which in turn would force 
businesses to provide better terms in order to attract customers. All of this, at a relatively 
low cost. As BEN-SHAHAR and SCHNEIDER explain: 
“Mandated disclosure is alluring because it resonates with two fundamental 
American ideologies. The first is the free-market principle. Markets work best when 
buyers are informed; disclosures inform them. Buyers fear sellers’ rapacity and the 
perils of caveat emptor; disclosures protect them without distorting markets by 
specifying prices, quality, and terms. The second ideology is the autonomy principle. 
                                                                  
239 ibid., p. 67- See also GRUNDMANN, S., ‘The Structure of the DCFR – Which Approach for Today's Contract 
Law?’, 2008, 4 European Review of Contract Law, no. 3, p. 239. 
240 BOOYS, T. Q. de et al., ‘How the CFR Can Improve the Consumer Rights Directive: A Comparison between the 
Model Rules in the Draft Common Frame of Reference and the European Commission’s Proposal for a Consumer 
Rights Directive’, 2009 Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series, no. 9, p. 7. 
241 OAKLEY, R. L., ‘Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts’, 2005, 
42 Houston Law Review, p. 1078. 
242 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2015, supra note 224, p. 64. 
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People are entitled as a matter of moral right and of practical policy to make the 
decisions that shape their lives. Disclosures equip them to do so. 
Mandated disclosure is [also] alluring because it seems to regulate lightly. Direct 
regulation of economic behavior— imposing safety and quality standards or 
restricting sales of products or services— can be clumsy and costly; can reduce 
freedom, innovation, and efficiency; can inspire burden some bureaucracy and 
regulations. Mandated disclosure lets sellers sell and buyers buy, as long as buyers 
know what sellers are selling.”243 
Furthermore, mandated disclosure is supposed to create an incentive to not draft abusive 
terms, since the drafting enterprise could always be “denounced” by watchdog groups and 
suffer a reputational damage.244 Additionally, it has been argued that this 
opportunity/duty to read also encourages the adhering parties to be more diligent and 
careful in their contracting, as there would be less opportunities to claim that theirs was a 
“hollow assent” to the terms.245 
Although this theory might appear, in principle, like a good tool to protect parties and 
increase diligence, this is not the case Indeed, like the road to hell, the doctrine of the 
“opportunity to read” is made up of little more than good intentions. As evidence shows, 
it is based on a flawed understanding of human psychology and behavior. To put it 
simply, “increasing disclosure does not, and most likely cannot, increase contract readership to 
any meaningful rate.”246 It does not matter how prominent the terms are made, the 
majority of people simply will not read them.247  
“Not only does the empirical evidence show that mandated disclosure regularly fails 
in practice, but its failure is inevitable. First, mandated disclosure rests on false 
assumptions about how people live, think, and make decisions. Second, it rests on 
false assumptions about the decisions it intends to improve. Third, its success 
requires an impossibly long series of unlikely achievements by lawmakers, disclosers, 
                                                                  
243 BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., 2014, supra note 230, p. 5 
244 HILLMAN, R. A., 2006, supra note 182, p. 853. MAROTTA-WURGLER is skeptical of the reliance on consumer 
groups or independent reviews. She argues that, in fact, there is no evidence that (a) people will be motivated 
enough to even seek these third parties’ opinions; (b) those third parties will actually render useful advice in a 
way that is not affected by the same shortcomings of disclosure; and (c) the people reading will even understand 
the advice. For more on the problems associated with a reliance on watchdog groups (MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 
2015, supra note 224, p. 65). 
245 HILLMAN, R. A., 2006, supra note 182, pp. 845–846 See also WILKINSON‐RYAN, T., 2014, supra note 199, 
pp. 1756–1758. 
246 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2012, supra note 210, pp. 108–109. See also BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., 2014, 
supra note 230, pp. 6–7. 
247 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2012, supra note 210, pp. 108–109. 
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and disclosees. That is, the prerequisites of successful mandated disclosure are so 
numerous and so onerous that they are rarely met.”248 
Even before analyzing the (dubious) merits of the opportunity to read doctrine, the first 
criticism that can be leveled against it, as well as against the related enforceability of 
unread boilerplate terms, is that reading a contract can often be pointless. There is little 
to no incentive for the weaker party (be it a consumer or a business) to actually engage in 
the costly, long and boring process of reading complex legal and technical jargon that, for 
the most part, will be beyond their ability to comprehend, let alone modify.249 Since in the 
vast majority of cases the adhering party will not be in a position to modify any term that 
she does not agree with, reading will only waste valuable time. As BEN-SHAHAR gloomily 
put it, highlighting the often-pointless endeavor of reading the terms of a contract of 
adhesion:  
“And what if they [the adhering parties] did read? Surely, there is nothing they can 
do about the bad stuff they know they will find. Are they going to cross out the 
unfavorable clause? Are they going to call some semi-automatic ‘customer service 
agent’ and negotiate? Other than lose the excitement about the deal and maybe walk 
away from it (to what? A better contract?), there is not much individuals can do. 
Dedicated readers can expect only heartache, which is a very poor reward for 
engaging in such time-consuming endeavor. Apart from an exotic individual here or 
there, nobody reads.”250 
The opportunity to read doctrine is based on the economic idea of “rational choice 
theory”, and based on which “when individuals are confronted with various choices they will 
choose the option that yields them the most expected welfare. Within this model individuals are 
                                                                  
248 BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., 2010, supra note 222, p. 651. See also BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., 
2014, supra note 230, p. 12 (calling mandated disclosure “a fundamental failure that cannot be fundamentally 
fixed”). 
249 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 239 (“it is unreasonable to expect consumers to be able to 
read and comprehend the information provided in complex contracts”). To understand exactly how complex these 
terms can be, suffice it to say that a study of End User License Agreements (“EULAs”) showed that they are “on 
average around 2000 words and written in a way that requires a graduate degree to understand them (as measured by 
the Flesch-Kinkaid readability scores)” (MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2015, supra note 224, p. 66). 
250 BEN-SHAHAR, O., 2009, supra note 214, pp. 2–3. Perhaps one of the best illustrations of the failure to read the 
terms of boilerplate contracts was a prank done by the software company PC Pitstop, who added a provision in 
its EULA that awarded a monetary prize “to a limited number of authorize licensee [sic] to read this section of the 
license agreement and contact PC Pitstop.” It took 4 months, and 3,000 downloads, before a single user read the 
clause and contacted the company to claim his prize. He received a check for USD 1,000. PC Pitstop has stated 
that, in essence, they were trying to prove a point, highlighting the kind of clauses that users might (and do) 
overlook when they simply click on an “I agree” button, as well as the possible unfair terms that are often hidden. 
See Larry Magid, ‘It Pays To Read License Agreements’, <http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp> (last 
visited 26 August 2015), and AYRES, I. & SCHWARTZ, A., ‘The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law’, 
2014, 66 Stanford Law Review, no. 3, p. 547. 
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supposed to maximize their own preferences and there is little reason for an intervention by the 
legal system,” unless “so-called market failures” make an appearance.251 Here, a party to a 
contract is seen as a “homo economicus”, a rational calculator “who is aware of all his 
preferences, knows all ins and outs of the options with which he is presented and is perfectly able 
to choose the option that maximizes his own welfare.” 252 The problem is, of course, that this 
is not the way people act when concluding a contract nor, in general, in their daily lives; if 
anything, evidence shows that individuals often base their decisions on heuristics, mental 
shortcuts, and not in the rational analysis and calculation of the available information in 
regards to costs and benefits.253 Indeed, what the data seems to show in this regard is not 
that people act rationally regarding their contracts, but quite the opposite. In reality, 
people systematically deviate from what we might consider to be “rational behavior” when 
it comes to their contractual decisions.254 
When facing a boilerplate contract, the adhering party must weigh a number of factors. 
Under the opportunity (and duty) to read doctrine, once she has analyzed the main terms 
(e.g. specifics of the product or service, price, time of delivery, etc.) the adhering party 
should then go through the fine print, analyze the pros and cons of its terms, weigh them 
against those offered by competing vendors and, finally, determine whether this is a good 
bargain for her. As it is obvious, to pretend that this type of behavior is the rule, or even 
that it is done by a significant minority, is nothing but wishful thinking. 
“While there are occasional examples common sense itself calls this idea into 
question as a general proposition. […] Any lawyer would find the job of assembling 
and then deciphering the governing terms a difficult and time-consuming job. […] 
Any user knows at the outset that the terms are not negotiable, and many know that 
they will find the same or similar terms elsewhere. This will be particularly true of 
disclaimers of liability, limits on consequential or other damages, choice of forum 
                                                                  
251 FAURE, M. G. & LUTH, H. A., 2011, supra note 220, pp. 337–338. 
252 ibid., pp. 337–338. See also KOROBKIN, R. B., ‘A 'Traditional' and 'Behavioral' Law-and-Economics Analysis of 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company’, 2004, 26 University of Hawaii Law Review, p. 447 (“most version 
of [Rational Choice Theory] assume, at a minimum, that individuals will use all available information to select 
behaviors that maximize their expected utility. Or, put in other words, individuals will take actions designed to maximize 
the differential between expected benefits of their actions expected costs”) and D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, 
p. 36 (“[e]conomics usually assumes that agents are rational. Possibly not symmetrically informed about the state of the 
world or other circumstances directly affecting their utility, but at least rational”). 
253 KOROBKIN, R. B., 2004, supra note 252, p. 448. The cognitive dissonance among consumers is also highlighted 
by BARNHIZER in regards to e-commerce, where even though the majority of consumers express concern about 
how their “agreements” allow their information to be used, 65% of Internet-using adults report that they know 
what they need to do in order to protect themselves “from being taken advantage of by sellers on the web” 
(BARNHIZER, D. D., ‘Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of the Self in the Information 
Age’, 2006, 54 Cleveland State Law Review, p. 79). On other cognitive biases affecting contracting and decision-
making, See BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, pp. 233–238. 
254 CHING, K. K., 2015, supra note 196, p. 12. 
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provisions, class action waivers enveloped in arbitration provisions […] If one had 
the time or inclination to ‘comparison shop’ for terms, one would find either the 
same terms or variants across the spectrum. If the terms were the same, then one 
has to withdraw from that market or accept them. If they are similar, one needs to 
be a lawyer to determine what the differences in language, presentation, and style 
may actually mean so as to choose accordingly.”255  
Research data supports this dire conclusion, with the “best evidence” suggesting that 
“decision makers rarely consider more than five to ten factors when making market choices.”256 
This is a far cry from the ideal homo economicus that goes out of his way to not only read 
and analyze the terms, but also to compare them with those offered by other vendors.  
To make matters worse, and as we have already argued, the fact is that even a homo 
economicus would be wasting his time reading the terms. If the adhering party manages to 
understand what is being said, the time that she devoted to understanding the contract 
will have been, in the majority of cases, wasted. Some authors have gone even as far as 
calling reading the terms a downright irrational conduct, since it will rarely render any 
positive results. BEN-SHAHAR, for example, has argued that:  
“Processing the effect of contract terms is time consuming and boring. If we 
succeeded in reading the text and understanding it, we are often struck by the 
remoteness of the contingencies it covers – ones that we don’t expect to materialize, 
such that cost of figuring out and improving the terms that apply to these 
contingencies is not worth it. I believe that the most basic reason why it is irrational 
to read standard form terms is that it is too difficult to know which terms are 
desirable and which are not.”257  
Then, since it will often be impossible for the adhering party to know what terms are 
more or less desirable for her, reading them will be useless, and even senseless.  
                                                                  
255 WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 925. 
256 The homo economicus model seems to also ignore the many shortcomings of the way homo sapiens think. Not 
only are humans often incapable of considering several factors when making a decision, but they also fall under 
the weight of their own overconfidence. People are often incapable of rationally analyzing the likelihood of a 
given event, suffering from overconfidence and optimism bias, both in terms of bad things happening to them, as 
well as their chances of being prepared for it. Strangely enough, people tend to analyze risks in two sets, as either 
events that will almost never occur, or events that will almost certainly happen (See KOROBKIN, R. B., 2004, supra 
note 252, pp. 459–462, BEN-SHAHAR, O., 2009, supra note 214, pp. 13–14, and MANN, R. J., 2006, supra note 
177, p. 912). Also adding to the complexity are the human limitations regarding the comprehension of legal 
texts, usually made up of long sentences of legalese, considering that “most legal readers processing a sentence can 
keep two or three ideas aloft in their minds before the period cues that the sentence has ended and the ideas presented 
can finally be integrated” (CARTER, A. M., ‘The Reader's Limited Capacity: A Working-Memory Theory for Legal 
Writers’, 2014, 11 Legal Communications and Rhetoric: JALWD, no. 1, p. 31). 
257 BEN-SHAHAR, O., 2009, supra note 214, p. 15. 
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“Thus, reading the contract in order to find out what is in the boilerplate is senseless, 
because it is too hard to figure out whether the content of the contract, in light of the 
price paid, is good or bad. [...] As other commentators have analogized before, not 
wanting to know what’s in the contract is equivalent to not wanting to know how 
electrons reach their destined stops in a computer’s microprocessor. Now, throw into 
the mix the fact that there might be very little variation across vendors with respect 
to the legal terms that accompany the competing products. What, then, is the 
prospect for an individual who read the terms, understood them, considered their 
relative price, and decided she didn’t like this ‘bundle?’ [...] It is unlikely [...] that 
comparison shopping for legal terms would be productive. Interestingly, even if there 
is meaningful competition between makers of a certain good, providing variety and 
choice over many features including price and upgrades, there may be very little 
competition over legal terms.”258  
BEN-SHAHAR is not alone in viewing the reading process as inherently irrational. RAKOFF, 
for example, argues that not reading the terms is simply the only rational choice for the 
adhering party: 
“It is notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and broad experience 
concerning the particular transaction type, to appraise these sorts of contingencies. 
And the standard forms - because they are drafted to cover many such contingencies 
- are likely to be long and complex, even if each term is plainly stated. Once form 
documents are seen in the context of shopping (rather than bargaining) behavior, it 
is clear that the near-universal failure of adherents to read and understand the 
documents they sign cannot be dismissed as mere laziness. In the circumstances, the 
rational course is to focus on the few terms that are generally well publicized and of 
immediate concern, and to ignore the rest.”259 
Seen from this perspective, the tendency to lay blame on those who did not read the 
terms of their contract, as if this was a sign of negligence, is incorrect. More often than 
not, a party who signs an unread contract is not acting this way because of negligence, but 
                                                                  
258 ibid., p. 17. BAIRD also makes a parallel with the deliberate (and rational) action of not reading the terms with 
ignoring how a specific product works: 
“When product attributes are hidden, the buyer is flying blind with respect to them. At some cost, of 
course, she can read the fine print or disassemble the product or ask the seller to make an explicit 
representation about the warranty term or the magneto coils. But in many cases, the benefit to the buyer 
is too small to justify the expense. The costs include not only obtaining the information, but gaining 
enough expertise to make sensible judgments. 
[…] The typical buyer cannot rely on her own expertise or her ability to dicker with her seller.” 
BAIRD, D. G., 2006, supra note 175, pp. 935–936. 
259 RAKOFF, T. D., 1983, supra note 137, p. 1226. In a similar fashion, CHING argues that it is not only that those 
who do not read their contracts are not simply “lazy,” but that, in reality, “as a matter of policy, we do not want 
people to read form contracts” (CHING, K. K., 2015, supra note 196, p. 3). 
  
68 
Freedom of Contract and Bargaining Power 
rather as a result of the same homo economicus analysis that some hoped would make her 
read. She has nothing to win from reading the contract, since she will not be able to 
understand the terms anyway, nor will she be able to change them. Blindly signing at the 
bottom of the fine print might actually be the only rational course of action.260 
“The bottom line is simple: The verbal and legal obscurity of preprinted terms 
renders the cost of searching out and deliberating on these terms exceptionally high 
... Faced with preprinted terms whose effect the form taker knows he will find 
difficult or impossible to fully understand, which involves risks that probably will 
never mature, which are unlikely to be worth the costs of search and processing, and 
which probably aren’t subject to revision in any event, a rational form taker will 
typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms.”261 
What the above makes clear is that only the obsessive-compulsive demographic would 
actively engage in reading boilerplate terms, since for the rest it would be a pointless 
endeavor.262 This due to the fact that “[e]ven the fastidious few who take the time to read the 
standard form may be helpless to vary it.”263 
It should be noted that to see reading the fine print as an irrational behavior is not 
something relegated to academic discussions. Indeed, as the New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission noted in their Report Relating to Standard Form Contracts: 
“The formation of standard form contracts is not based on consent and does not 
result from bargaining. To negotiate and to read standard form contracts prior to 
their formation would be impractical and wasteful.”264 
Although it is impossible to estimate exactly how “wasteful” would it be to read all the fine 
print that people come across, the available evidence gives us some clues. A recent study, 
for example, estimated that “if consumers took the time to simply read online privacy policies, 
the time to do that would cost the economy $781 billion [American dollars] in lost 
                                                                  
260 As CHING notes: 
“It is rational not to read form contracts. Given the low probability that a dispute will arise over one of the 
unread terms, and given the low stakes involved in most form contracts, it would be ‘irrational for form-
receiving parties to spend time reading, much less understanding, the terms in the forms they sign.’ We 
don't want people to read form contracts because it would be a waste of time.” 
ibid., p. 3 
261 Cited in BECHER, S. I., 2008, supra note 199, pp. 738–739. See also WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 
134, p. 926 (“[consumers] know that their time can more productively be spent on practically anything else”). 
262 CHING, K. K., 2015, supra note 196, p. 10 (“consumers don't read form contracts. And we don't expect them to. It's 
a waste of time”). On how this also affects business contracts, See page 48 supra. 
263 SLAWSON, W. D., 1971, supra note 190, p. 530. 
264 New Jersey Law Revision Commission, Final Report Relating to Standard Form Contracts, October 1998, 
<http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/657> (last visited 17 November 
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productivity.”265 Since this study was limited exclusively to online privacy policies aimed at 
consumers, we can easily see that if all boilerplate terms were taken into consideration, 
both online and offline, in both consumer and commercial contracts, the amounts in lost 
productivity would reach astronomical proportions. Reading everything, therefore, would 
cause more harm than good. 
The irrationality of reading is further highlighted by the fact that most parties to a 
contract of adhesion know that the terms of their contract will, in all likelihood, only 
benefit the dominant party. Because of this, the adhering parties can also “rationally not 
invest the cost in reading the terms because they already know that they are likely to be bad.”266 
This, in turn, creates a “race-to-the-bottom” among the providers who, aware of the fact 
that the adhering parties are not reading the terms, “follow through with putting in bad 
terms, particularly those that concern remote contingencies that are unlikely to affect their 
general reputation because of the rarity of the contingency occurring.”267 
LONEGRASS confirms this view, actually arguing that “form contracts are designed not to be 
read”, so that failure to read them is simply “an effect of ‘rational ignorance’—the 
irrationality of reading standardized agreements when the costs of reading outweigh the risks of 
failing to do so.”268 Analyzing what lead to this situation, she argues that, at least in the 
case of consumers: 
“[They, the consumers,] are well aware that they will likely not understand the 
contracts that they sign. Thus, they are largely discouraged from expending the 
effort required to carefully review the fine print. Moreover, the futility of reading is 
underscored by consumers’ cognizance that they are generally powerless to negotiate 
standard terms. Furthermore, the contracting environment often makes reading less 
likely; already hurried consumers are rushed through the contracting process and 
made to feel as though careful review of the provisions is socially inappropriate. As a 
result, many consumers are reluctant to carefully scrutinize boilerplate contract 
language at the time of signing for fear of appearing awkward or confrontational.”269 
On the basis of the issues analyzed above, it is no wonder that, in the end, the 
opportunity to read doctrine cannot work because, first and foremost, most people will 
simply not read their contracts.270 Although estimates vary depending on the context of 
the contract, some place readership at a staggeringly low 0.2%, at least in the case of 
                                                                  
265 WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 926. 
266 CRUZ, R. T. & HINCK, J. J., ‘Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for 
Imperfect Information’, 1995, 47 Hastings Law Journal, no. 3, p. 668. 
267 ibid., p. 668. 
268 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 31. 
269 ibid., p. 31. 
270 WILKINSON‐RYAN, T., 2014, supra note 199, p. 1747 (“The proposition that most people do not read the small 
print, heed the warning labels, or review the ‘Terms and Conditions’ links, is no longer controversial”). 
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Internet contracts.271 In America, despite these staggeringly low figures, courts have not 
been moved by the problems that are caused by the adoption of this policy and, in 
general, will only seek to determine whether the manifestation of assent existed (v.gr. 
whether, in the case of Internet contracts, the adhering party clicked “I Agree”) so that, if 
consent existed, the court will simply “presume that the user assented to the terms of the 
agreement.”272 
To make matters worse, this lack of readership does not seem to change significantly as a 
result of increased disclosure or availability of terms. Indeed, as MAROTTA-WURGLER has 
shown in several studies, “an increase in contract accessibility does not result in an 
economically significant increase in readership [of electronic contracts]. Mandating assent by 
requiring consumers to agree to terms by clicking on an ‘I agree’ box next to the terms 
[presented to consumers in an electronic transaction] increases contract readership by at 
best on the order of 1 percent.”273 While it is certainly impossible to perfectly extrapolate the 
results of one type of contracts into others, it should be kept in mind that Internet 
contracting is normally done in the comfort and privacy of one’s own home, away from 
prying eyes or from the pressure of vendors, and without any time constraints affecting 
the acquisition of information. From this perspective, it might be possible to assume that 
non-electronic contracting would have an even lower readership, particularly when the 
agreement is to be concluded as soon as the terms are presented to the adhering party.274 
                                                                  
271 FAURE, M. G. & LUTH, H. A., 2011, supra note 220, p. 349. Although in the context of car rental and mortgage 
contracts, readership skyrockets to 72% and 73% respectively, these estimates correspond to “self-reported” 
readership, that is people saying that they do, indeed, read the contracts; as such, the results are to be taken with 
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A., 2014, supra note 250, pp. 546–547, and MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2015, supra note 224, p. 63. 
272 DAVIS, N. J., 2007, supra note 232, p. 582. 
273 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2011, supra note 229, p. 168. See also MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2015, supra note 224, 
p. 66 
274 MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2012, supra note 210, pp. 96–97. HILLMAN has a different opinion on this 
“comfortable setting” in which Internet contracting occurs, arguing that it is not actually as comfortable as we 
might otherwise think: 
“[I]f the Internet marketplace is comprised in large part of impulse purchasers or people who turn into 
impulse purchasers, it is obviously not the kind of environment that is conducive to reading and shopping 
for terms prior to a transaction. If consumers throw caution to the wind in the very decision to partake in 
a transaction, this suggests only a small possibility that such consumers would studiously read and shop 
for terms prior to the transaction. Ironically, the very lack of time pressure that might be thought to 
increase reading may do the opposite. Theorists of the Internet shopping process surmise that the lack of 
time pressure ironically may increase impulse purchasing as consumers get caught up in the enjoyment of 
surfing for unnecessary items.” 
HILLMAN, R. A., 2006, supra note 182, p. 854.  
In equally grim terms, albeit with a much more flowery language, BARNHIZER, with a particularly careful look 
towards data-mining practices, states that: 
“The Internet is a dangerous place for consumers, at least according to many commentators. Amoral 




Freedom of Contract and Bargaining Power 
Furthermore, “electronic standard form contracting,” as some have referred to it, has 
become extremely commonplace due to the increased availability of computers and 
internet connectivity, so its intricacies and potential problems are also especially 
relevant.275 
Since the focus of the opportunity to read doctrine has often been placed in consumer 
law, one might be tempted to dismiss its problems as relegated exclusively to consumers, 
and specially to the uneducated ones among them. This idea, however, can offer no 
consolation. As the evidence shows, failure to read the terms of one’s contracts, as well as 
the inability to understand those which are read, is something that affects all market 
participants, and not only those of a lesser economic or educational background. Indeed, 
as WILKINSON-RYAN has shown: 
“Even when investigators choose more elite population samples, they still find very 
low levels of readership. In a sample of University of Georgia undergraduates, 89% 
of respondents classified themselves as ‘non-readers’ of click-through agreements. A 
survey of law students—a group essentially hand-picked for its propensity to read 
legal documents—found that only about 4% claim to read standard online form 
contracts. All available evidence suggests that online form contracts are consistently 
unread.”276  
Limiting these problems to consumer transactions, or even to Internet commerce, is also 
mistaken. What is more, although there is “surprisingly little empirical evidence on non-
readership outside of the online context,” this might be simply the result of the fact that 
“contracts scholars regard non-readership as ‘folk knowledge’: a claim so obvious that data would 
be superfluous.”277 Furthermore, in a commercial context, evidence shows that “even 
businessmen did not read the contracts they regularly signed in the course of their commercial 
interactions, preferring to rely on their background sense of the deal and the counterparty.”278 
The reasons for this lack of readership among merchants are easy to understand since, 
“[f]orm contracts can create the very same assent and choice problems among merchants as they 
                                                                                                                                                                       
dark alleys of electronic commerce, lured by the siren call of bright and flashing neon signs promising 
selection, price and convenience. Once there, the e-producer wraps an arm around the e-consumer’s 
shoulder in a faux-friendly embrace and appears to recognize her by name, suggesting some wares for 
which his data-mining shill has indicated she’ll pay top dollar.” 
BARNHIZER, D. D., 2006, supra note 253, p. 75. 
275 DAVIS, N. J., 2007, supra note 232, p. 577. 
276 WILKINSON‐RYAN, T., 2014, supra note 199, p. 1752. See also LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 30 and 
accompanying footnotes, where the author specifically mentions the case of legal scholars and judges, all of 
whom confess not reading (and sometimes not even understanding) the contracts they sign.  
277 WILKINSON‐RYAN, T., 2014, supra note 199, p. 1752. 
278 ibid., p. 1752. See also MACAULAY, S., ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’, 1963, 28 
American Sociological Review, no. 1, p. 59. 
  
72 
Freedom of Contract and Bargaining Power 
create among consumers. To expect that all business people read form contracts any more 
frequently or understand them any better than consumers do is unrealistic.”279 
As has been pointed out, simply making the terms available does not ensure that the 
adhering party will really read the contract, let alone understand it.280 Despite this, 
however, there might be some who see disclosure as a harmless thing to do, since the 
worst-case scenario would simply leave things unchanged, with no increase in readership. 
Since in the best-case scenario there might be a marginal increase in readership, however, 
this alone would justify adopting this doctrine. The problem is that the worst-case 
scenario is not that things will remain unchanged, but rather that as a result of disclosure 
the adhering parties will have even less chances to understand the contract. As FAURE & 
LUTH note, “when the quantity of information provided is too large, individuals have difficulties 
to evaluate the information accurately”, as a result of what has been dubbed “information 
overload.”281 This is a phenomenon that is directly linked to the way the human psyche 
works (whether that of a consumer or of an experienced merchant), and which is simply 
unable to manage and properly process a virtually endless stream of new information.282  
As we can see, mandating never-ending disclosures does not improve contractual fairness. 
On the contrary, mandatory disclosures create problems for both the party being forced 
to disclose, as well as the one receiving the disclosure. 
                                                                  
279  MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1086. 
280 FAURE, M. G. & LUTH, H. A., 2011, supra note 220, pp. 337–338. 
281 ibid., p. 344 For commentary on the issue of information overload, and whether it is actually a negative factor 
for consumers, See, generally, MALHOTRA, N. K., ‘Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer 
Decision Making’, 1984, 10 Journal of Consumer Research and GRETHER, D. M. et al., ‘The Irrelevance of 
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure’, 1985, 59 Southern California Law Review, no. 2. BEN 
SHAHAR and SCHNEIDER draw a parallel with the case of medical and pharmacological products, where they also 
see a negative effect of excessive disclosure, arguing that  
“marginally useful medical mandates drive out vitally necessary unmandated information. Providers must 
tell patients about advance directives (the PSDA), privacy policies (HIPAA), treatment choices (informed 
consent), side effects (FDA law), and safety (tort law and malpractice insurance). How much attention is 
left in the patient's reservoir (or the provider's) to learn about things that are life- and health-saving, like 
how to manage a chronic illness? Compliance rates with treatment regimes are often estimated to be 
around 50%. Doctors must teach and persistently prompt patients to get medicine, ingest it in the proper 
manner, take the right dose at the right time, and continue taking it as long as necessary. But mandated 
disclosure can crowd out such strenuous teaching.”  
BEN-SHAHAR, O. & SCHNEIDER, C. E., 2010, supra note 222, p. 737. 
Similarly, D’AGOSTINO argues that  
“when consumers deal with complex decisions it seems that they react adopting a simple strategy: in our 
case, they do not read. […W]hen people are asked to choose between two alternatives each with four 
attributes, they analyze both very carefully. When attributes become 10 or 15, some of them are not taken 
into account. […] In general terms, as the number of alternatives and/or attributes increases, the 
percentage of information used to make the final choice decreases.” 
D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 34. 
282 HILLMAN, R. A., 2006, supra note 182, p. 850. 
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“Forms become so long and elaborate that disclosers have problems assembling and 
organizing the information, and disclosees do not read them and cannot understand, 
assimilate, and analyze the avalanche of information. 
The classic overload statement is Miller's ‘magical number seven’ - seven being 
roughly the number of items people can keep in short-term memory. This number is 
often thought too high, but many typical disclosures easily exceed it.”283 
To complicate matters further, research shows that even among the very small minority 
of shoppers who read the terms, whether the clauses are pro-shopper or pro-seller does 
not even play a significant role in the likelihood of concluding the contract.  
“The results [of this research] indicate that there is no positive relationship 
between favorability of terms and the probability that a product will be purchased. 
[…] Readers do not appear to react to what they read; they are undeterred by 
relatively pro-seller terms. […] While it is important to note that the sample of 
shoppers who access EULAs is not random, none of the evidence suggests that those 
few shoppers who do read license terms respond to them in the fashion that would be 
expected of an informed minority.”284 
2.8 The Informed Minority Fallacy 
Those who oppose substantive regulation of contractual terms argue that the disclosure 
duty, together with the associated duty to read, represent a more than just solution, as 
they empower buyers to make informed decisions. They argue that by removing the 
paternalistic State from the picture, buyers can enjoy a true freedom of contract, 
shopping around for the terms they like; furthermore, they add that even though most 
people will not read the terms, there will be enough buyers who do. This will create an 
“informed minority” who, by their pressure and purchasing power, will force the 
dominant party to adopt better terms in order to be competitive and appealing. Through 
this process, even those who do not read their contracts would benefit, and the market 
would be kept free of unnecessary direct State intervention.  
As the informed minority argument goes, sophisticated parties, those who shop for better 
contract terms, will avoid those vendors who offer particularly unfair contracts, choosing 
instead those who satisfy their specific contractual concerns.285 As the amount of those 
marginal parties increase in number, the benefits that the seller perceives as a result of 
the less-than-favorable terms in the contract would be lower than the losses that he may 
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suffer as a result of losing those informed parties. In other words, “the cost of losing the 
marginal consumers will outweigh the benefits of gouging the inframarginal consumers.”286 
The informed minority argument, despite its many proponents, is established on shaky 
foundations; it is a giant with feet of clay. It assumes that there is such thing as a 
customer that actively and avidly compares different contractual forms, and who also 
understands the implications of the terms he is comparing; furthermore, it assumes that 
this mythical creature is actually common enough so as to allow his demands to become 
influential. Of course, the problem is that, as we have already seen, contractual readership 
is too uncommon, so much so that the belief in the existence of an informed minority is 
the result of magical thinking.287 In the words of RAKOFF, “[t]he ideal adherent who would 
read, understand, and compare several forms is unheard of in the legal literature and, I warrant, 
in life as well.”288 It seems fairly clear that, outside of Middle Earth and Narnia, and 
perhaps not even there, an informed minority of contractual readers simply does not 
exist. 
Still, even if, for the sole sake of argument, we ignore the fact that readership is too low to 
create this informed minority, this theory still fails to convince. Considering the high 
costs of acquiring the information (i.e. the terms, their implications, etc.) we find that 
there is very little incentive (if any) for an individual customer to become informed, 
knowing that those who do read the terms will benefit him anyway. In other words, since 
the actions of an informed minority also benefit those who did not become informed, 
there is no incentive to actually be among those who engage in the costly acquisition of 
data, knowing that doing nothing will report the same benefits, at no cost. This problem 
of “free riders”, deals with the very core of human psychology and economics, as it 
demonstrates the effects of costs and benefits in our decision-making process. As a result,  
“we are left with a situation where all buyers would prefer that an informed 
minority existed […] but none want to incur the cost of information necessary to be 
part of that minority. If nobody else does it, then the cost of becoming informed is 
simply a waste to the hapless buyer who does; and if enough other buyers do it, then 
it is more profitable not to read and to free ride on those who do. And if everyone free 
rides, then there will be no one to serve as an informed minority”.289 
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The informed minority argument also fails to account for the fact that marginal 
customers are not necessarily representative of the “average” customer. A customer who 
engages in the costly process of information acquisition is, in all likelihood, different from 
the majority; his needs and priorities are so unique that any changes in the contractual 
terms that come as a result of his demands would not automatically benefit the rest. 
Contractual terms are to be seen as part of the “package” being purchased by the 
customer; they are no different from the horsepower of a car, the storage capacity of a 
computer or the specifics of a vessel carrying cargo across the ocean. Just like the kind of 
customer that wants a sports car is different from the kind that wants a hybrid car, the 
customer who will peruse the intricacies of a contract and demand different terms is 
different from one who will not.  CRUZ and HINCK illustrate this problem, explaining that 
“there is no reason to expect an informed minority to typify the demands of the other 
consumers. The sole unifying factor of the minority is that a sufficient number of 
them are willing not to buy a product if it does not conform to their wishes. Those 
wishes could be for a different warranty, for a different forum selection clause, or 
even for the product to be colored avocado green. If differentiation is not possible, 
then that minority will get its way and everyone will suffer the products dictated by 
the minority's preferences. Thus, there is no reason to assert that the results 
conform to the overall preferences of the market-are efficient-just because the 
minority demands them.”290 
Another flaw is that the proponents of the informed minority argument assume that 
sellers are unable to differentiate among buyers, whereas the opposite is true. Sellers 
regularly differentiate between their buyers, based on the specific characteristics of the 
product being offered; a Toyota dealership, for example, knows that the type of customer 
that purchases a Prius is different from the one that purchases a Land Cruiser SUV and, 
based on this, might offer them different terms. Additionally, sellers often comply with 
demands from their clients regarding the terms in order to secure a deal.  
“Ex ante, while negotiating and interacting with consumers, salesmen can 
sometimes quite easily discover which consumers are informed or sophisticated and 
which are not. A relatively simple conversation or short negotiation can frequently 
reveal the extent to which an individual consumer is educated, articulate, assertive, 
experienced, and the like. Consequently, sellers can offer informed consumers better 
contracts by waiving some of the latent terms, thus avoiding the need to provide all 
consumers with fair [standard form contracts].”291  
Of course, this ability of some customers to negotiate also comes as a result of their own 
bargaining power, which demonstrates that their potential as parts of an “informed 
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minority” is nonexistent. This issue also manifests itself in business dealings; in the 
carriage of goods by sea, for example, an oil company or an important producer of certain 
types of cargo might be able to change the terms of the contract governing the carriage, 
while a merchant that rarely ships anything would just be stuck with the printed terms of 
the ruling booking note or bill of lading. The modifications obtained by the “powerful” 
adhering party would thus not benefit those who lack that bargaining power, since they 
will not represent the needs of the “weak.”292 
Similarly, ex post differentiation by the seller is not only possible, but also quite common. 
“[S]ellers can quite easily identify buyers who are assertive enough to insist upon the legitimacy 
of their complaints. In many cases, those consumers will be granted relief, either because sellers 
will aspire to minimize contact with ‘troublemakers’ or because sellers will fear undermining 
their reputations. By the same token, aggrieved consumers who are neither persistent nor 
assertive will bear the losses."293 This is also common practice in a business setting, where 
commercial solutions are often found for cases involving powerful disgruntled parties, 
even if their right of relief is questionable. As a rule, the seller will prefer to simply 
appease the more demanding or powerful parties, without any benefit being extended to 
those who are either too weak or ignorant to make their demands heard. 
Dominant parties can also differentiate between their clients in regards to the terms of 
their contracts after the agreement has been made, even if no conflict has arisen. A recent 
example of this is that of the cloud-service Dropbox, which in March 2014 added a forced 
arbitration clause in their terms of service. Demonstrating their capacity to separate 
customers, Dropbox added the possibility to opt-out of the arbitration clause within 30 
days of the acceptance of the Terms.294 By including the possibility to opt-out, Dropbox 
differentiates between those customers who read (or at least somewhat care about) the 
terms, and those who do not, as a way to avoid problems with the more diligent ones.295 A 
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similar provision appears in the terms of service of the US cable company Comcast, which 
also allows customers to opt-out of their arbitration clause.296 
2.9 How the Duty to Read Can Backfire 
The final criticism that can be leveled against the opportunity/duty to read doctrine in 
general, as well as to the idea of the informed minority, is that it creates a false image of 
fairness. Once we accept the idea that the weaker party had the opportunity to read the 
terms thoroughly before agreeing to them, and that these were in turn affected by the 
market (as shaped by the informed minority) then it is much easier for a court to dismiss 
any complaints regarding their fairness. As a consequence of accepting the duties of 
disclosure and readership, a court could easily reason that, after all, the adhering party 
could have simply shopped around or been more careful at the time of contracting. In this 
way, “[t]erms that would otherwise be regarded as ‘hidden’ are no longer so, despite people's 
well-known propensity to sign such disclosures without reading them. Thus, an empty but 
formally correct disclosure can keep the contract from being unconscionable, however 
problematic its terms.”297 And so, the forced disclosure of the terms might actually backfire 
in its attempt to protect weaker parties,  
“because it may not increase reading or shopping for terms or motivate businesses to 
draft reasonable ones, but instead, may make heretofore suspect terms more likely 
enforceable. [...] [T]he only effects of the proposal may be to insulate businesses 
from claims of procedural unconscionability and to create a safe harbor for 
businesses to draft suspect terms.”298 
In other words, once contractual terms in a contract of adhesion are covered under this 
cloak of apparent fairness, it is easier to just dismiss complaints against them as merely 
coming from a negligent party that should have contracted better.  In the end, therefore, 
this doctrine can only really benefit the dominant parties, since disclosing the terms is 
virtually free for them, even though they can reap enormous benefits by placing their 
contracts in a “safe harbor,” free from attacks based on unfairness. As WOODWARD has 
pointed out: 
“If virtually no one was reading the terms, then asking vendors to disclose more in 
order to obtain a safe harbor of enforceability is a senseless sunk cost. Vendors might 
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well comply to enter the safe harbor, but consumer decisions—the reason for 
requiring disclosure in the first place—would be no more robust with or without 
disclosures.”299 
As we will soon see, courts will often analyze the unconscionability of a given term or 
contract based on the term or the contract as a whole  being both procedurally and 
substantially unconscionable.300 As HILLMAN explains, referring to the application of the 
doctrine in the United States: 
“Most cases entertaining an unconscionability or related claim […] look for both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability involves 
the manner in which the contract was made and regulates situations resembling, 
among other things, duress, misrepresentation, or, most important here, an unfair 
presentation of the terms. Although contract law generally does not evaluate the 
adequacy of an exchange, substantive unconscionability focuses on whether the 
exchange is grossly imbalanced. Many courts apply a sliding scale to the 
unconscionability inquiry whereby ‘the more substantively oppressive the contract 
term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the 
conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’”301  
What the forced disclosure of terms produces, therefore, is an appearance of “procedural 
conscionability,” as it creates the impression that the adhering party was properly 
informed. As a result, “[p]erhaps marginal terms, insufficiently outlandish to motivate a court 
to strike them on substantive unconscionability grounds alone, will be enforceable” precisely 
because they were disclosed and are supposed to have been read by the adhering party.302 
This, of course, despite the fact that, as we have seen, readership is minimal, 
comprehension is lacking, and reading is, in and of itself, often irrational. 
This situation also responds to a rather interesting psychological phenomenon, as 
empirical studies show that people will systematically fail to read the terms of their 
contracts, will deem them unfair, but will still lay blame on those who in turn failed to 
read their contracts. For example, in one experiment, 
                                                                  
299 WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 926. 
300 See Chapters III-V. 
301 HILLMAN, R. A., 2006, supra note 182, p. 853. 
302 ibid., p. 853. MAROTTA-WURGLER has also argued that firms that opt to disclose their terms will also normally 
make them even worse for their clients. As she noted after several companies commenced a more expansive 
disclosure of their terms, 
“firms that chose to increase their contract accessibility did not, on average, change their contract in a way 
that made it easier for consumers to read or understand and did not change the substance of their terms in 
a buyer- friendly direction. If anything, increases in disclosure may have allowed firms to put forth more 
restrictive contracts and, at the same time, enforce them more effectively.” 
MAROTTA-WURGLER, F., 2015, supra note 224, p. 65. 
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 “respondents clearly believed that using fine print to impose fees on consumers is 
inappropriate—subjects overwhelmingly reported that companies should find other 
ways to inform consumers about fees and many subjects thought that hidden fees 
should be banned altogether. And subjects were sensitive to the reality of consumer 
contracting, indicating that it is somewhat unreasonable to expect a consumer to 
read 15 pages of boilerplate. The puzzle, then, is that these beliefs seem entirely 
disconnected from subjects’ equally strong feelings that the non-reading consumer 
consented to the contract and bears the blame for the resulting transactional 
harm.”303  
Furthering the psychological puzzle posed by boilerplate contracts, evidence shows that 
most people consider that they are very likely to both read and understand a contract, 
much more so than the average person.304 This represents a problem because, at has been 
mentioned before, it makes it much easier for the courts, and society in general, to hold 
someone bound to otherwise unfair boilerplate terms, since that is usually done from the 
comfortable position of “it would not have happened to me”.305  
The flawed understanding of the contract terms, the resulting frustration, and the 
increased expectation of the contracting process being as fast as possible, has created a 
vicious circle. As SCHMITZ explains: 
“On the one hand, consumers admit that they have no interest in reading form 
contracts, enjoy the convenience and efficiency of form contracting, and routinely 
accept forms ‘dressed up’ as deals without stopping to read or question their content. 
On the other hand, consumers are often frustrated with the effectively 
nonnegotiable nature of these contracts and complain that they lack the requisite 
                                                                  
303 WILKINSON‐RYAN, T., 2014, supra note 199, p. 1765. The author puts forward the idea that this “blame” is 
the result of the “just world hypothesis,” and according to which most people will blame victims for their own 
problems, as the opposite would threaten their world view. Blame can also be laid on the lack of seriousness with 
which parties often face contracts of adhesion, something that is particularly true in the case of consumers. As 
PRESTON notes, consumers “are largely unaware of the legal consequences of their actions, have given up trying to 
resist, or believe that somewhere there must be a form of justice that will prevent the actual enforcement of the more 
egregious clauses” (PRESTON, C. B., ‘Please Note: You Have Waived Everything: Can Notice Redeem Online 
Contracts’, 2014, 64 American University Law Review, no. 3, p. 539). 
304 WILKINSON‐RYAN, T., 2014, supra note 199, p. 1773. 
305 WOODWARD references this as one of the biggest societal problems in regards to boilerplate. He argues that a 
true cultural shift is required, so that “consumers are taught not to ‘blame themselves’ when liability is imposed 
through a form they did not agree to.” This, he argues, would be the first step towards true reform (WOODWARD JR, 
W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 936). While WOODWARD’s ideas might appear too ethereal for some, they are quite 
reasonable. Every attorney has encountered clients, whether they be consumers or commercial parties, who 
thought that the fact that they signed a form meant that, automatically, everything in it must be enforceable. 
Education aimed at teaching that form contracts are not inherently enforceable, and that “escape valves” do 
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time or understanding to read or negotiate companies' impenetrable purchase terms. 
Consumers then use this frustration to justify their lack of contract vigilance, which, 
in turn, gives companies more leeway in crafting contracts to their advantage. Some 
companies misuse this power to impose unfair contracts, but consumers also bear 
some responsibility for allowing companies to run roughshod over their rights.”306 
What might be the last nail in the coffin of the opportunity to read doctrine is simply that 
knowing what one is signing means nothing if signing is the only option. Even in that 
fantasy world in which a party is fully aware of what the contract says, and for some 
miraculous reason actually understands all of it, this will not help her if she cannot 
negotiate over the terms, or if there are no other parties with whom to contract under 
better conditions. In other words, simply informing someone that she is about to agree to 
draconian terms does nothing to change their draconian character. As KNAPP has pointed 
out: 
“Anyone with the slightest knowledge of today's world knows that most mass-
transaction contracting takes place in an environment in which it is clear that, 
except for a few ‘dickered’ terms, bargaining is neither expected nor permitted, and 
even reading the relevant documents is implicitly discouraged. Imposing a general 
‘duty to read’ is one thing; imposing such a duty in circumstances where we know it 
cannot or will not be performed is Catch-22 with a vengeance.”307 
2.10 Bargaining Power and its Effects on Contracts 
Since we know that most people are aware of the fact that boilerplate will usually be 
unfair to them, and that it will rarely benefit both parties equally, it is worth asking why 
they agree to sign. After all, if staunch defenders of economic liberalism are to be 
believed, weaker parties could always just be more diligent, shop around and find 
alternatives. Of course, as we have seen, these possibilities are more theoretical than real, 
and weak parties often find themselves in an inescapable situation, unable to find real 
alternatives. Both in a consumer setting, as well as in the business world, the problem 
stems from unequal bargaining power.308 
Despite the relevance that has been given to bargaining power disparities in the 
enforceability of contracts, a fixed and clear definition seems to have escaped both the 
                                                                  
306 SCHMITZ, A. J., ‘Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture’, 2010, 45 Wake Forest Law 
Review, no. 3, pp. 864–865. 
307 KNAPP, C. L., ‘Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law’, 2002, 71 Fordham Law Review, 
p. 770. 
308 For stylistic reasons, “bargaining power” and “market power” will be used indistinctively, and should be 
considered as equivalent, unless the context in which they are employed implies otherwise. 
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doctrine and the judicature.309 In America, for example, “[h]undreds of decisions discuss 
bargaining power, but not one provides a robust description of the term. Only a handful even 
attempt to explain why the parties’ bargaining power should affect the enforceability of their 
contract.”310 At most, there have been attempts to identify some factors that might come 
into play in a contract, and which might be a sign of a disparity in the bargaining power of 
the parties. In the United States, for example, court decisions have sometimes equated 
this disparity in the power of the parties “with the unavailability of alternative counter-
parties, sometimes with the status or organizational form of the ‘powerful’ and the ‘weak,’ and 
sometimes with the parties’ actual or presumed wealth.”311 
The uncertainty is not helped by the fact that definitions of the term often end up being 
the product of circular logic, arguing that the party with the strongest bargaining power is 
the one that obtains the largest benefits from the resulting agreement, which in turn was 
the result of her strong bargaining power, as demonstrated by the fact that she obtained 
the largest benefit, etc.312 These difficulties have made some authors argue that 
bargaining power should not be used at all as a legal criterion in the analysis of contracts. 
HELVESTON and JACOBS, for example, have argued that the idea of “bargaining power” 
serves very little purpose, since it lacks a coherent and unified definition or a way to 
adequately measure it. These are two problems that, in their view, have no clear solution:  
“While the meaning of bargaining power has been assumed rather than defined, the 
meaning of the term's modifier-most commonly, ‘superior’- has been ignored. The 
concept of bargaining power, as developed in the courts and commentary, rests not 
on a simple inequality of interparty power, but on a ‘grossly disproportionate’ 
                                                                  
309 CHOI, A. & TRIANTIS, G., ‘The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design’, 2012, 98 Virginia Law Review, 
no. 8, p. 1674 (“[a]lthough bargaining power is often cited as a critical determinant of contractual terms, neither the 
meaning of power nor the path of its influence is very clear”). 
310 BARNHIZER, D. D., 2005, supra note 159, p. 168. See also HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., ‘The Incoherent 
Role of Bargaining Power in Contract Law’, 2014, 49 Wake Forest Law Review, no. 4, pp. 1021–1022 (explaining 
that even though there are “[h]undreds of decisions discuss bargaining power […] not one provides a robust description 
of the term. Only a handful even attempt to explain why the parties’ bargaining power should affect the enforceability of 
their contract”) and KENNEDY, D., ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’, 1981, 41 Maryland Law Review, no. 4, p. 614 
(arguing that the term bargaining power has been used “in dozens (perhaps hundreds) of judicial opinions as though 
it quite fully explained disallowing contract language so as to restore the background regime, or interpolating a term the 
parties most definitely did not agree to”). English Courts also seem to use “bargaining power”, and the inequality 
thereof, as terms that either cannot be defined, or which simply do not warrant definition. See, for example, Six 
Continents Hotels Inc. v Event Hotels GmbH [2006] EWHC, 2317, and John Michael Lapthorne v Euroﬁ [2001] 
EWCA Civ, 993. 
311 HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, pp. 1018–1019. For the, allegedly, first reference to 
bargaining power as a justification to regulate the relation between employers and employees, See BARNHIZER, D. 
D., ‘Power, Inequality and the Bargain: The Role of Bargaining Power in the Law of Contract-Symposium 
Introduction’, 2006, 2006 Michigan State Law Review, no. 4, p. 841. 
312 CHOI, A. & TRIANTIS, G., 2012, supra note 309, p. 1674. 
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mismatch. Descriptors such as ‘superior,’ ‘overwhelming,’ and ‘substantial,’ among 
others, suggest the nature of the disparity that animates the application of the 
doctrine. The use of those adjectives, however, rests inevitably on the idea that 
power disparities are susceptible to measurement and comparison. Without a means 
of measurement, courts cannot objectively determine when an unacceptable power 
imbalance is present. No judicial or scholarly discussion of bargaining power, 
however, has suggested a coherent method-or any method for that matter-for 
identifying and assessing this critical fact.”313 
In lieu of an all-encompassing definition authors like CHOI and TRIANTIS have opted 
instead for enumerating certain elements that present themselves in situations in which 
bargaining power disparities exist, with one of the parties being in a considerably superior 
position.  
a. Demand and Supply Conditions: If the demand for a certain product is on the rise, 
the provider will be in a much stronger position than those seeking to obtain it. 
b. Market Concentration: In a market where the supply is concentrated in one or few 
providers, they will be in an advantageous position. 
c. Information advantages: The party that knows more about the other party, about 
the product, or about itself, without disclosing this to the other party, has the 
ability to obtain a much larger benefit from the contract.  
d. Patience and risk aversion: Parties who are in an advantageous position are often 
able to spend a longer time negotiating a contract, or waiting for a better 
opportunity, free from the pressures that might affect a weaker party. A weak party 
will often find itself in dire need of contracting, in order to stay in business or to 
obtain a necessary product. 
e. Negotiating tactics: An experienced party will be able to turn the tables of the 
negotiation in its favor, while a naive or novice contractual player will be unable or 
incapable of doing so. 
Regardless of the difficulties defining the term, “bargaining power” has been usually 
understood as referring to the ability of a party to impose his or her terms when 
negotiating with another.314 From that perspective, bargaining power could be defined as 
merely “the capability of the bargainers to favorably reframe or change the bargaining 
relationships, to win accommodations from the other, and to influence the outcome of a 
negotiation.”315 Under that light, when we speak of contracts of adhesion the party with 
                                                                  
313 HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, p. 1019. 
314 This seems to be the position of BARNHIZER, who defines it as “the ability to obtain preferred terms in the parties' 
bargain”, although noting the near impossibility of defining “power” (BARNHIZER, D. D., 2005, supra note 159, 
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315 YAN, A. & GRAY, B., ‘Negotiating Control and Achieving Performance in International Joint Ventures: A 
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the most bargaining power will be the one dictating the terms of the agreement, while the 
weaker party will be the one agreeing to those terms, often in a “take it or leave it” 
basis.316  
In consumer law, the role of bargaining power is fairly obvious and straightforward. In a 
market where there are many consumers and only a few providers, the individual power 
of any single consumer is considerably smaller than that of the provider, as losing a single 
customer will not represent a big loss for the latter. As a consequence of this, providers 
are able to dictate the terms of the agreements, and consumers are forced to take them. 
This situation is, of course, exacerbated when we remember that some contractual terms 
(such as exclusion of liability for certain type of damages, and choice of court agreements) 
are ubiquitous among virtually all market participants, and so the ability of any consumer 
to just shop around for better terms simply does not exist.317 
Although at first it might seem like this is an issue that is mostly, if not exclusively, 
relevant in consumer contracts, this is not the case. Indeed, business dealings are not 
exempt from serious disparities in bargaining power, or of its possible abuses. After all, 
there is a big difference between contracts concluded between businesses of similar size, 
and those concluded between a behemoth corporation and any of its individual providers 
or clients. 
A good case study on the effects of unequal bargaining power in a business setting comes 
from the history of the regulations of the carriage of goods by sea, both in a domestic as 
well as in an international sphere. In late 19th Century, sea carriers possessed a 
                                                                  
316 CHOI, A. & TRIANTIS, G., 2012, supra note 309, p. 1667 (arguing that the bargaining power of the parties 
“affects the terms of their deal”). Aware of this issue, and with a touch of dramatism, RADIN has opted to do away 
with the “contract” word altogether when referring to contracts of adhesion, speaking instead of “boilerplate 
rights deletion schemes” (cited in WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 933). 
317 As BECHER argued, “[I]f all contracts (in a given field of commerce) are basically the same, buyers will have no 
incentive to read SFCs [Standard Form Contracts]. Under these circumstances, consumer cannot realize any private 
gain from the costly process of becoming informed”(BECHER, S. I., 2008, supra note 199, p. 742). THAL recognizes two 
ways in which what he calls contractual “exploitation” can happen as a result of bargaining power disparities. 
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 THAL, S. N., ‘The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness’, 
1988, 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, p. 29. 
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tremendous amount of market power, thanks to which they were able to insert wide and 
all-embracing exclusion clauses in their contracts.  
“Carriers were exempted from liability for loss or damage from perils of the sea, 
decay, strikes, deviation to unseaworthy ships and their own negligence. The 
exclusion clauses operated totally in the carrier’s favour and the goods were carried 
entirely at the merchant’s risk. Judges in Britain, following the tenor set by the 
laissez faire philosophy, were sympathetic to such clauses. And of course, Britain, a 
nation with huge maritime interests, had a lot to gain with the increase in the 
volume of ocean traffic.”318  
The obvious state of defenselessness in which these clauses placed the weaker parties 
quickly motivated countries with cargo interests to demand some sort of protective 
reform. Because of the abuses that came as a result of these clauses, “it was felt that an 
international convention was required to redress the imbalance caused by the laissez faire 
philosophy” in the maritime carriage.319 This lead to the enactment of both domestic and 
international norms aimed at restoring some semblance of balance to these contractual 
relations.  
Regardless of whether the disparities in bargaining power appear in a business or in a 
consumer context, it seems clear that they are an inherent part of free market economics, 
and that no amount of regulation can put an end to them. As a matter of fact, the mere 
existence of a difference between the bargaining powers of the parties should not be 
considered as inherently wrong, or as a problem in the market. As THAL notes, “a party 
cannot call the inequality of bargaining power doctrine into aid merely because he or she is an 
inferior bargaining position. For the doctrine to be relevant, it is essential that the inequality 
arise[s] because of unusual weakness of bargaining power on one side of the transaction.”320 Of 
course, then the issue becomes determining what type of inequalities or weaknesses 
should be addressed by the legal system. 
It is important to understand, and this cannot be stressed enough, that a completely 
healthy market would still allow some players to acquire more and more power as they 
grow, and to be in a better position compared to that of their contracting parties. It is not 
correct, therefore, to suggest that disparities in bargaining power are necessarily a sign of 
                                                                  
318 CARR, I. & STONE, P., International Trade Law, 2014, 5th ed., Routledge-Cavendish, p. 229. See also 
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319 CARR, I. & STONE, P., 2014, supra note 318, p. 230. 
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market failures or inefficiencies.321  This caveat notwithstanding, however, the law has 
often taken a rather critical approach towards these disparities. In general, the view has 
been that if the powerful can dictate the terms that the weak must abide by, then they 
will almost certainly take advantage of them, making the resulting contract an agreement 
in name only. As HELVESTON and JACOBS note:  
“Usually the powerful are corporations, whose wealth and power dwarf those of 
their counter-parties, typically consumers of limited means and limited experience 
with the contracting process. Contracts formed under these circumstances strike 
many as not only intuitively unfair but as a problem that merits judicial 
resolution.”322  
The risks associated with bargaining power disparities and abuses are such that measures 
aimed at preventing such abuses often occupy an important place in the legal system. A 
very good example of how serious this concern can be seen in the Constitution of 
Colombia, where preventing abuses of bargaining power is established as a fundamental 
role of the State. Indeed, as Paragraph 4 of Article 333 establishes: 
“The State, mandated by law, will prevent that economic liberty is obstructed or 
restricted, and will avoid or control any abuse that people or companies might make 
of their dominant position in the national market.”323 
The challenge for the legislature and the courts to regulate the way in which bargaining 
power disparities affect agreements has been a difficult one, since they must find a 
balance between two competing, yet complementing, aims.  
“On the one hand, it must not restrict the legitimate exercise of an individual's 
freedom to enter into such agreements as he chooses; but on the other it must be 
vigilant to ensure that an apparent agreement is the product of a genuine exercise of 
that freedom. The former of these two aims is a matter of substantive freedom; that 
is to say, freedom to bind oneself to any legitimate substantive set of terms. The 
latter is concerned with the procedural propriety of the process leading to a given set 
of substantive terms. On the face of it, these two aims do not compete; rather, they 
complement one another. But in practice there is a great range of situations for 
which the principle of substantive freedom and the principle of procedural rectitude 
are apt to encroach on one another.”324 
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A contractual system in which the law fails to distinguish between negotiated and non-
negotiated clauses “is contradictory to a system reliant on consent and personal autonomy”.325 
Contracts are no less than privately-created laws, and failure to recognize them as such, 
particularly when no real consent has been given by one of the parties, can have dire 
consequences.  
“Those who are subject to private laws without their consent need the protection 
which only judicial review can provide, and judicial review is not likely to be 
forthcoming unless private lawmaking is recognized as lawmaking. A law made by 
one private person for another, without the other’s consent – a standard form sought 
to be enforced against a person who had no reasonable opportunity to read it, for 
example- should be subjected to judicial review by virtue of the same authority as a 
court has for enforcing it in the first place.”326 
On the one hand, nobody could possibly argue that all contracts of adhesion are 
inherently wrong and that therefore they should be subjected to judicial review; on the 
other, however, it should also be kept in mind that, as we have seen, many contractual 
situations are “contractual” in name only. Indeed, it is often the case that one of the 
parties to a contract will limit her actions to merely agreeing with the terms presented to 
her, unaware of their intricacies and consequences, unable to modify anything, and not in 
a position to find any real alternatives. The different ways in which such situations have 
been addressed require closer scrutiny.  
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“The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a 
person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary 
choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least 
endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by 
allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself 
for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it beyond 
that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose 
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no 
longer free. […] The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be 
free not to be free” 
John Stewart Mills, On Liberty.327 
3.1 Introduction 
s we have seen in the preceding chapters, contract law is based on two elements. 
On the one hand, the obligation of the parties to comply with their agreements 
and, on other, the freedom of those same parties to determine the content of their 
own obligations. Despite the importance of these two elements, they are not 
absolute.  Indeed, limits are established based on society’s values, due to both moral 
considerations (ideas as to what is and is not “fair”), as well as due to the recognition of 
the limits of understanding and behavior.  
As we move towards the acceptance and enforcement of certain clauses, particularly those 
relating to forum selection, it is essential to first understand how and why certain terms 
might not be acceptable. As this and the following chapters will show, there are no 
universal solutions, no “one-size-fits-all” methods to determine in advance what clauses 
can be used, or to deter the use of unfair clauses altogether. Still, despite the plethora of 
systems and methods used to tackle unfairness, some commonalities do exist. 
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The common element that, as we will see, is inherent to all regulations of contractual 
imbalances is bargaining power. Indeed, different legal systems, belonging to different 
legal families, all seem to recognize that a balance in bargaining power is an essential 
element of a truly free contractual system. It is precisely when bargaining power 
differences have given way to gross imbalances in the resulting contractual relation that 
the State interferes in the aims of restoring justice and balance.  
3.2 Bargaining Power Disparities and Contractual Fairness 
At the core of the issue of regulating bargaining power disparities and contractual 
(un)fairness always lies a single question: Why should we regulate? It certainly seems 
wrong, at least in principle, that some people or companies, who are perfectly capable of 
conducting their own business dealings, should be somehow relieved of their obligations, 
simply because they are not altogether happy with the outcome of their deal, and allege 
some sort of unfairness. After all, as US Supreme Court Justice Joseph STORY said, 
representing classical contract theory, as well as capitalist free market economics:  
“[E]very person who is not from his peculiar condition or circumstances under 
disability is entitled to dispose of his property in such a manner and upon such terms 
as he chooses; and whether his bargains are wise and discreet, or profitable or 
unprofitable or otherwise, are considerations not for courts of justice but for the 
party himself to deliberate upon.”328  
Critics of regulatory efforts on this subject have also pointed out that employing 
bargaining power as a measure of fairness is in itself unfair. They base this on the fact 
that bargaining power allows the courts to discriminate between contracts containing the 
same terms, but which are concluded by different people. Because of this, some parties 
will find themselves relieved of the same terms with which other parties will have to 
comply. As HELVESTON and JACOBS argue: 
“The bargaining-power doctrine is unique in promoting the differential treatment of 
contracts whose terms are alike but whose signatories differ. Contract law, and 
general notions of fairness, would normally favor treating similar contracts 
similarly. The bargaining-power doctrine is therefore ultimately and unfortunately 
exceptional, affording different treatment to similar contracts solely on the basis 
that some arose from the use of an unspecified, and unspecifiable, power imbalance 
between the relevant parties.  
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Taken together, these flaws constitute an implicit admission that the bargaining 
power construct is too plastic to serve contract law well. Any legal doctrine whose 
most basic terms remain undefined is apt to produce confusion, uncertainty, and 
unfairness. The bargaining-power doctrine has produced all three. Moreover, these 
problems will endure for as long as the concept continues to occupy a role in contract 
law. There is no way to define substantial bargaining-power usefully, no workable 
proxy for identifying the ‘powerful,’ no good justification for preventing the ‘strong’ 
from contracting on terms available to the ‘weaker,’ and thus no way to justify the 
continued use of the construct.”329 
The topic of fairness and unfairness in contract law has always been, and will probably 
continue to be, hotly contested. A case can certainly be made that the courts have no place 
in policing as ethereal and nebulous matters as “fairness” in private dealings. After all, it is 
often impossible to determine what can or cannot be considered “fair”, and thus such 
endeavors would have a negative impact on the law’s ability to provide certainty and 
predictability to human relations.330 As some have argued, in the end, “all values are purely 
subjective, and if the two parties are content with their bargain at the time it is made, there is no 
basis on which it might be said that a contract is unfair”.331 In other words, the law should not 
protect those who, when looking back on their agreements, wish they had acted 
differently, if at the time of contracting they were completely satisfied with them. An 
overreaching approach with the aims of ensuring “fairness” would remove the idea of 
personal responsibility from contractual relations, as negligent parties would know that 
they could always rely on the courts to assist them afterwards, creating an incentive for 
the parties to act less diligently than they otherwise would.332 The concern obviously 
exists that that this would allow the courts to act as paternalistic authorities, policing 
human kindness. 
Judicial intervention in matters of contractual fairness goes against classic contract 
theory, as well as the laissez faire understanding of free market economics. Indeed, within 
these philosophies the role of the courts is seen as limited to their duty to act “as detached 
umpires or referees, doing no more than to see that the rules of the game [are] observed and 
                                                                  
329 HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, p. 1020. 
330  EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 656 (“[e]xcept in extraordinary circumstances, courts [have] avoided 
scrutiny of contract equities on the grounds that efforts to achieve justice in individual cases limited freedom of contract 
and fostered uncertainty that promises would be kept”). 
331 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 297. 
332 As it was stated in the 1986 Canadian unconscionability case of DeWolfe v. Mansour, this doctrine is not 
intended to “open the door for anyone to enter a binding agreement, obtain its advantages, while never intended to 
perform his obligations an later attempt to use the court to have the contract held unenforceable against him, provided 
he could show he was under some pressure to cause him to enter the agreement” (Cited in ENMAN, S. R., ‘Doctrines of 
Unconscionability in Canadian, English and Commonwealth Contract Law’, 1987, 16 Anglo-American Law Review, 
no. 3, p. 212). 
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refusing to intervene affirmatively to see that justice or anything of sort [is] done”.333 Any 
intervention aimed at fixing “unfair” bargains thus represents a challenge to our 
traditional understanding of contractual relations, as it assumes that contract law is (or 
should be) a set of principles limiting “the ability to enter into certain types of contract,” 
while the courts are expected to not only enforce contracts, but also “to ensure that a 
minimum degree of fairness is observed”.334  
Although nowadays laissez-faire contractual theories are largely relegated to the pages of 
history, there is still a significant number of authors, judges and organizations who 
advocate this libertarian understanding of freedom of contract, arguing that regulatory 
attempts are an inherent threat to individual freedom335. They argue that one of the first 
functions of the law is to guarantee each individual a certain sphere within which they can 
operate freely, “without having to justify themselves to the state or to third parties: if one 
individual is entitled to do within the confines of the tort law what he pleases with what he 
owns, then two individuals who operate with those same constraints should have the same right 
with respect to their mutual affairs against the rest of the world.”336 Following this, they insist 
that “government regulation, which establishes the boundary between the use and misuse of 
bargaining power, is detrimental to individual and community prosperity.”337  
While paying attention to these libertarian ideas might seem only useful for philosophical 
discussions, it should be remembered that party autonomy, the ability of a person to 
define the content of his legal relations with other individuals, is a fundamental value. It 
appears in this manner in, for example, the German Constitution, the Federal 
Constitution of the United States of America, and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, among others. As such, any regulation that affects it could, in principle, be 
                                                                  
333 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 656. 
334 THAL, S. N., 1988, supra note 317, p. 21. 
335 Back in 1933 COHEN explained this problem as the result of an ideological struggle against absolutist powers, 
and which, ironically enough, being fought by resorting to an absolute idea: 
“In the fierce fight against the numerous irrational, tyrannical, and oppressive restraints, men jump to the 
conclusion that the absence of all restraint is a good in itself and indeed the one absolute good in the 
political field. The error of this cult of freedom is of the same logical type as that of the tradition which it 
opposes. The latter argues that since our natural impulses are not free from bad consequences, therefore 
they are absolutely bad and must be made powerless by checks and balances or some other device. Both 
sets of arguments jump from the perception of what is evil under certain conditions to the affirmation of 
an untenable absolute.” 
COHEN, M. R., 1933, supra note 16, p. 559.  
336 EPSTEIN, R. A., ‘Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’, 1975, 18 Journal of Law and Economics, no. 2, 
pp. 293–294. 
337 EDWARDS, C., 2008, supra note 120, p. 660. 
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considered a violation of a human right, a difficulty that is only exacerbated by the 
supremacy of constitutional guarantees over other type of regulations.338 
Without prejudice to these caveats in regards to contractual regulations, it is undeniable 
that the majority opinion seems to be that regulation is necessary, and that, in practice, 
freedom of contract is not absolute.339 “The total ‘hands off’ policy with respect to economic 
matters is regarded as incorrect in most political discussions almost as a matter of course, and 
the same view is taken, moreover, toward a more subtle form of laissez-faire that views all 
government interference in economic matters as an evil until shown to be good.”340  
Clearly, in order to ensure freedom of contract and individual liberty, some modicum of 
balance and fairness must exist in the market, and it is the role of the regulators to ensure 
that it stays that way. If we look at the European Community, for example, it is 
undeniable that freedom of contract occupies an important place among its fundamental 
core values; at the same time, however, the Community acknowledges that “the public 
interest places limits on private parties’ freedom to arrange their interrelations as they wish. 
Freedom of contract is not absolute but can be restricted in light of the values upheld in a 
society.”341  
                                                                  
338 A somewhat different view is presented by KERBER and VANBERG, who argue that “party autonomy depends on 
legal rules and thus cannot be a fundamental right a priori” because “though party autonomy indicates, in principle 
freedom from outside control, privately arranged relations have legal relevancy only because the law recognizes them” (in  
KERBER, W. & VANBERG, V., Constitutional Aspects of Party Autonomy and Its Limits: The Perspective of Constitutional 
Economics, in Grundmann, S. et al. (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market, 2001, 
p. 42). In our view, this is a nonsensical, illogical and dangerous statement that, if taken to its logical conclusion, 
makes every fundamental right subservient to the will of the State. Every single one of our human rights and 
liberties depends on the existence of a regulatory system created to recognize it and protect it, and yet nobody in 
his or her right mind would argue that, therefore, they “cannot be a fundamental right a priori”. The existence of 
a right to private property, for example, depends on a legal system that demarcates the boundaries of the objects 
of ownership and recognizes the ability of individuals to hold dominion over them; our right not to be detained 
unlawfully depends on the existence of a judicial system capable of handling Habeas Corpus pleas; our right to 
not be tortured depends on a legal system that defines torture and thus forbids certain practices; etc. What these 
authors therefore seem to argue is the indefensible position that human rights do not precede the State, but vice 
versa. 
339 See, e.g. NAUDE, T., ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation: The Implications of Why We Need it For Its 
Formulation and Application’, 2006, 17 Stellenbosch Law Review, no. 3, p. 361 (“[l]egislative control over unfair 
contract terms is regarded in many countries as an essential tool in the law's response to the abuses attendant upon the 
use of non-negotiated or standard contract terms”) and HUEBNER, C. A., ‘Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes’, 
1946, 30 Journal of the American Judicature Society, no. 4, p. 128 ([a]ll decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
have held that the right to freedom of contract is not absolute, but is always subject to reasonable restraints”).  
340 EPSTEIN, R. A., 1975, supra note 336, p. 294. 
341 MAK, C., ‘The One and the Many: Translating Insights from Constitutional Pluralism to European Contract 
Law Theory’, 2013, 21 European Review of Private Law, no. 5, p. 1190. 
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3.3 Bargaining Power Before the Courts 
Beyond the arguments that can be made for and against regulation from the standpoint 
of free market economics, there is another important difficulty regarding the issue of 
contractual fairness. The fact of the matter is that there seems to be very little coherence 
when it comes to defining some of the essential elements required for this analysis and, as 
such, any regulatory attempt faces an uphill battle. 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem associated with the analysis of bargaining power 
is that it is often impossible to determine exactly what is being analyzed, and what degree 
of relevance should be given to it. After all, once it is acknowledged that the relative 
power of the parties will never be exactly the same, that even in a perfectly competitive 
market some market players will acquire more power than others, and that the use of 
boilerplate terms is not in and of itself a sign of unfairness, then finding a criterion 
through which to analyze the fairness and the real extent of the “free will” of the parties 
becomes extremely important. As one US Court noted, recognizing that differences of 
power are inherent to commerce: 
“Law in its sanctions is not coextensive with morality. It cannot undertake to put all 
parties to every contract on an equality as to knowledge, experience, skill and 
shrewdness.”342 
Acknowledging these difficulties in regulating bargaining power, courts have, in general, 
been reluctant to rely on bargaining power disparities alone to review contractual 
agreements. American courts, for example, have restricted 
“explicit analyses of bargaining power asymmetries to the periphery of contract law. 
For example, the legal doctrine appears primarily as one element of the standard for 
unconscionability and adhesion contracts, and courts occasionally cite it as a reason 
for refusing to enforce private agreements that are objectionable for reasons of 
public policy.  Courts rarely overturn contracts on the basis of these doctrines 
explicitly employing inequality of bargaining power as an element, and inequality of 
bargaining power alone is not a sufficient justification for judicial intervention into 
contract disputes.”343  
                                                                  
342 Goodwin v. Agassiz [1933], 186 NE, 359-365, p. 363 
343 BARNHIZER, D. D., 2005, supra note 159, p. 144. A similar situation has arisen in Australia, where the mere 
differences in the bargaining power of the parties has been held as insufficient grounds to review the contract. In 
a 1983 unconscionability case, for example, the High Court of Australia stated that although the parties  
“did not meet on equal terms […] that circumstance alone does not call for the intervention of equity, .... A 
transaction will be unconscientious within the meaning of the relevant equitable principles only if the 
party seeking to enforce the transaction has taken unfair advantage of his own superior bargaining power, 
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Similarly, English courts have also refused to recognize inequalities in the bargaining 
power of the parties as the sole basis for judicial review of contracts. In general, judges 
have considered that such criterion would be “unworkable.”344  
On this matter, Lord DENNING’s position on the 1974 English Court of Appeal case of 
Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. v. Bundy is worthy of consideration, even if his attempts to create a 
general doctrine of bargaining power as a basis for contractual review failed to be 
accepted by the judicature. The facts of the case were rather simple:  
“The plaintiff (‘the bank’) […] alleged that the defendant had on four occasions […] 
charged his farm by way of legal mortgage as security for monies which he 
covenanted to repay the bank; and that on three occasions, most recently December 
17, 1969 (on this last occasion jointly and severally with his son) he had guaranteed 
up to £ 11,000 the debts owed to the bank by his son's company (MJB Plant Hire). 
On December 10, 1970, […] the bank required of the defendant payment of £ 
11,000 owing to the bank by the company (which had gone into receivership in May 
of that year), but the defendant refused or neglected to pay. The bank accordingly 
sought to exercise its rights as mortgagee […] to sell the property, and required the 
defendant by notice to vacate the farm by January 31, 1972. The defendant did not 
do so, and the bank now sought to have him evicted.  
In his defense the defendant claimed in part that […] he had been induced to execute 
the last charge while under the influence of the bank's agent, Mr. Head, manager of 
the plaintiff's local branch. The defendant counterclaimed for an order setting aside 
the legal charge […] and for an injunction restraining the bank from selling the 
property.  
The critical events were those of December 17, 1969, when the assistant manager of 
the plaintiff's Salisbury branch met with the defendant. Mr. Head had with him 
completed forms of guarantee and charge, requiring only the defendant's signature. 
The new guarantee and charge would bring the father's liability to £ 11,000. Lord 
Denning described the events of that day:  
‘Mr. Head produced the forms that had already been filled in. The father signed 
them and Mr. Head witnessed them there and then. On this occasion, Mr. Head, 
unlike Mr. Bennett [Head's predecessor as assistant manager], did not leave the 
forms with the father; nor did the father have any independent advice.’”345 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Cited in ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 200. 
344 BARNHIZER, D. D., 2005, supra note 159, p. 145 
345 SLAYTON, P., ‘The Unequal Bargain Doctrine: Lord Denning in Lloyds Bank v. Bundy’, 1976, 22 McGill Law 
Journal, pp. 96–97. 
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As Mr. Head explicitly admitted under cross-examination, Mr. Bundy had “relied on 
[…him] implicitly to advise him about the transaction as Bank Manager.”346 More 
importantly, Mr. Bundy had been placed in a very difficult situation, since 
“[h]e was faced by three persons anxious for him to sign. There was his son Michael, 
the overdraft of whose company had been […] escalating rapidly; whose influence 
over his father was observed by the judge - and can hardly not have been realised by 
the bank; and whose ability to overcome the difficulties of his company was plainly 
doubtful, indeed its troubles were known to Mr. Head to be ‘deep-seated.’ There was 
Mr. Head, on behalf of the bank, coming with the documents designed to protect the 
bank's interest already substantially made out and in his pocket. There was 
Michael's wife asking Mr. Head to help her husband. 
The documents Mr. Bundy was being asked to sign could result, if the company's 
troubles continued, in Mr. Bundy's sole asset being sold, the proceeds all going to the 
bank, and his being left penniless in his old age. That he could thus be rendered 
penniless was known to the bank - and in particular to Mr. Head. That the company 
might come to a bad end quite soon with these results was not exactly difficult to 
deduce.”347 
Writing the majority opinion, Sir Eric SACHS took a rather moderate approach, allowing 
the appeal based on the breach of fiduciary duty that existed from the bank towards Mr. 
Bundy.348 The bank, despite knowing that the company belonging to Mr. Bundy’s son 
would almost certainly go under, had insisted Mr. Bundy signed the guarantee, aware of 
the fact that this was his only asset, and that he would most likely end up losing it. This 
represented a breach of the fiduciary duty. As Sir SACHS explained: 
“The situation was thus one which to any reasonably sensible person, who gave it but 
a moment's thought, cried aloud Mr. Bundy's need for careful independent advice. 
Over and above the need any man has for counsel when asked to risk his last penny 
on even an apparently reasonable project, was the need here for informed advice as 
to whether there was any real chance of the company's affairs becoming viable if the 
documents were signed. If not, there arose questions such as, what is the use of 
taking the risk of becoming penniless without benefiting anyone but the bank? Is it 
not better both for you and your son that you, at any rate, should still have some 
money when the crash comes? Should not the bank at least bind itself to hold its 
hand for some given period? The answers to such questions could only be given in the 
light of a worthwhile appraisement of the company's affairs - without which Mr. 
                                                                  
346 Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bundy [1975] QB, 326, p. 343. 
347 ibid., p. 345. 
348 CARR, C., 1975, supra note 324, pp. 465–466. 
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Bundy could not come to an informed judgment as to the wisdom of what he was 
doing 
No such advice to get an independent opinion was given; on the contrary, Mr. Head 
chose to give his own views on the company's affairs.”349 
While Lord DENNING, the Master of the Rolls, agreed with Lord SACHS that the Appeal 
should be allowed, he came to this decision through a different approach. He first stated 
that although, as a general principle, “[n]o bargain will be upset which is the result of the 
ordinary interplay of forces,” the law establishes some exceptions to that rule.350 In his view, 
at their core, the exceptional cases in which courts have the ability to set aside contracts 
are all based on inequalities in the bargaining power of the parties.351 Lord DENNING 
reached his conclusion after looking at what he considered were five distinct categories of 
situations in which the law allows the courts to set aside valid contracts based on 
bargaining power disparities. These were “duress of goods (to which he adds cases of colore 
officii), unconscionable transaction, undue influence, undue pressure (an example being ‘where 
one party stipulates for an unfair advantage to which the other has no option but to submit’ [...]) 
and salvage agreements.”352 As Lord DENNING himself stated: 
“Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these instances there runs a 
single thread. They rest on 'inequality of bargaining power'. By virtue of it, the 
English law gives relief to one who, without independent advice, enters into a 
contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration 
which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by 
reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with 
undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the 
other. When I use the word 'undue' I do not mean to suggest that the principle 
depends on proof of any wrongdoing. The one who stipulates for an unfair advantage 
may be moved solely by his own self-interest, unconscious of the distress he is 
bringing to the other. I have also avoided any reference to the will of the one being 
'dominated' or 'overcome' by the other. One who is in extreme need may knowingly 
consent to a most improvident bargain, solely to relieve the straits in which he finds 
himself. Again, I do not mean to suggest that every transaction is saved by 
independent advice. But the absence of it may be fatal.”353 
                                                                  
349 Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bundy [1975], p. 345. See also SLAYTON, P., 1976, supra note 345, p. 98. 
350 Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bundy [1975], p. 336. 
351 TREBILCOCK, M. J., 1976, supra note 289, p. 359. 
352 SLAYTON, P., 1976, supra note 345, p. 99. 
353 Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bundy [1975], p. 339 
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What Lord DENNING attempted to establish was nothing short of ambitious.354 Wary of 
contracts in which the stronger party is allowed to, as he said in this case, “push the weak 
to the wall”, he aimed to establish a general doctrine based on the inequality of bargaining 
power.355 This doctrine would have allowed this sole consideration, as long as the 
resulting bargain was unfair, to become a sufficient basis for the judicial review of a 
contract.356 Although Lord DENNING referenced the lack of independent advice that had 
existed in the case at hand, the doctrine that he was hoping to create was to be wider than 
that, protecting the weaker party’s vulnerabilities beyond supposed breaches of fiduciary 
duty. He knew that “in extreme cases, neither independent advice nor an understanding of the 
transaction by the weaker party will save it from attack.”357 His attempt, although influential 
to a degree, did not succeed. 358 
                                                                  
354 Although Lord DENNING is credited with giving new life to the idea of an all-encompassing doctrine, it is 
important to note that he was by no means the first to do so. As a matter of fact, cases going as far back as the 
late 18th century had attempted similar feats. As GREENFIELD and OSBORN noted, “in one of the earliest authorities, 
Kenyon MR stated [in a 1787 case] that: ‘I lay great stress upon the situation of the parties to [the bargain], and the 
persons who compose the drama’, before proceeding to note that cases involving infants and guardians: ‘all proceed on 
the same general principle, and establish this, that if the party is in a situation in which he is not a free agent and is not 
equal to protecting himself, this court will protect him’” (GREENFIELD, S. & OSBORN, G., ‘Unconscionability and 
Contract: The Creeping Shoots of Bundy’, 1992, 7 Denning Law Journal, p. 65). 
355 Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bundy [1975], p. 337. See also PIERS, M., 2011, supra note 131, p. 132 (“Lord Denning 
attempted to introduce a general doctrine of inequality of bargaining power”). 
356 A big part of Lord DENNING’s judicial career seems to have been centered around repairing what he perceived 
as inequalities in the Common Law. This behavior, and in which he demonstrated a “willingness to override 
precedent to do what he saw as justice”, earned him the moniker of “the people’s judge” (DYER, C., March 6, 1999, 
‘Lord Denning, Controversial 'People's Judge', Dies Aged 100’, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/mar/06/claredyer1> (last visited 20 October 2014)). In 1983, in the 
case of George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., reflecting on the issue of contractual fairness, he 
remarked that: 
“None of you nowadays will remember the trouble we had - when I was called to the Bar - with exemption 
clauses. They were printed in small print on the back of tickets and order forms and invoices […] He never 
read them or knew what was in them. No matter how unreasonable they were, he was bound. All this was 
done in the name of ‘freedom of contract.’ […] No freedom for the little man who took the ticket or order 
form or invoice. The big concern said, 'Take it or leave it.’ The little man had no option but to take it.”  
Cited in D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 5. 
357 CARR, C., 1975, supra note 324, pp. 464–465. 
358 Writing in 1984, LITTLEWOOD spoke of the general landscape for DENNING’s doctrines in rather grim terms, 
saying that his judgment “has received no elaboration, little support, and much criticism […] His dicta have certainly 
not grown into a comprehensive body of law, and it seems unlikely that they will do so" (LITTLEWOOD, M., ‘Freedom 
From Contract: Economic Duress and Unconscionability’, 1984, 5 Auckland University Law Review, p. 165). Still, 
although DENNING’s general doctrine did not succeed in England, it did greatly influence other Common Law 
jurisdictions, such as Canada and Australia.  As CHEW explained, 
“In Canada, Lord Denning’s doctrine has been accepted as a confirmation of established principles. The 
Canadian authorities state that to find an unconscientious dealing there must be an inequality of 
bargaining power caused by the weaker party’s disadvantage, combined with an ‘improvident exchange’ or 
‘proof of substantial unfairness of the bargain obtained by the stronger’. There is no requirement of any 
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Despite the good intentions of their supporters, it is easy to understand the reticence of 
both English and American courts to use inequalities of bargaining power as all-
encompassing doctrines for contractual review. Since the law is supposed to give some 
modicum of stability and predictability to human relations, adding a concept that, as we 
have seen, is sometimes too nebulous to be practical, might prove to be counterproductive 
in tackling the issue of contractual unfairness. Due to the inability to clearly define 
bargaining power, as well as to determine the situations in which a real disparity can be 
said to exist, in the end courts would have too much leeway to review otherwise valid 
contracts, which would undoubtedly result in wholly unjust measures and severely 
damage legal certainty. As the Privy Council stated in Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long, such a 
doctrine “would render the law uncertain”.359 In general, accepting a wide application of 
Lord DENNING’s doctrine might result in the rise of a “benevolent giant.”360 
Indeed, in Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long Lord SCARMAN was very categorical in his rejection of a 
general rule for voiding a contract based on the unfair use of a dominant bargaining 
position. Criticizing the doctrine, he stated that 
“[Lord DENNING’s] conclusion is that where businessmen are negotiating at arm's 
length it is unnecessary for the achievement of justice, and unhelpful in the 
development of the law, to invoke such a rule of public policy. It would also create 
unacceptable anomaly. It is unnecessary because justice requires that men, who have 
negotiated at arm's length, be held to their bargains unless it can be shown that their 
consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress. […]  
Such a rule of public policy as is now being considered would be unhelpful because it 
would render the law uncertain. It would become a question of fact and degree to 
determine in each case whether there had been, short of duress, an unfair use of a 
strong bargaining position.”361  
Lord SCARMAN would go on to repeat this sentiment in the 1985 case of National 
Westminster Bank v. Morgan. There he explained that the desire for a general bargaining 
power doctrine 
                                                                                                                                                                       
indiscriminately where there is a disparity of contractual values resulting from misrepresentation, undue 
influence or pressure, judgment at time of contracting or even a simple lack of information or sound 
judgment at the time of contracting.” 
CHEW, C., ‘Common Law and Equitable Aspects of Unjust Banking Contracts: A Legal Analysis’, 2014, 29 Journal 
of International Banking Law and Regulation, no. 4, pp. 250–251. See, also, generally, ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra 
note 332. 
359 Quoted in THAL, S. N., 1988, supra note 317, p. 24).  
360 CARR, C., 1975, supra note 324, p. 466. 
361 Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long, 1980 AC, 614–635, p. 634. See also ALIAS, S. A. et al., 2012, supra note 125, pp. 333–
334 (arguing that, generally, SCARMAN failed to address several important points raised by DENNING, citing 
legislation that did not quite tackle the issue of bargaining power disparities). 
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“is not justified, nor is it either necessary or desirable. It causes the court to embark 
on a task of assessing fairness for which it is ill-equipped, overlooks the value of the 
different elements that rightly have been held on highest authority to be the basis of 
relief in cases of duress, salvage agreements, unconscionable bargains and other 
cases that Lord Denning seeks to amalgamate and attempts a task that, if it is to be 
attempted at all, is more appropriate for the legislature with the assistance of the 
Law Commission.”362 
What is more, Lord SCARMAN even went on to add that, in the field of contracts, he 
questioned  
“whether there is any need in the modern law to erect a general principle of relief 
against inequality of bargaining power. Parliament has undertaken the task - and it 
is essentially a legislative task - of enacting such restrictions upon freedom of 
contract as are in its judgment necessary to relieve against the mischief […] I doubt 
whether the courts should assume the burden of formulating further restrictions.”363 
3.4 Bargaining Power & Contractual Review 
While it is clear that bargaining power disparities has not been successful in establishing 
itself as a standalone criterion for contractual review, they still occupy an important place 
in legal doctrine.364 Instead, bargaining power is just one of the elements that need to be 
considered regarding the validity of an agreement, when analyzing, among others, issues 
of unconscionability, duress, undue influence, contractual interpretation, good faith, and 
even public policy.  
Even in this restricted sphere, however, we still face another problem with bargaining 
power, as courts find themselves needing to measure this elusive concept. Even though 
several decisions make references to, for example, “superior”, “overwhelming”, 
“overweening” and “substantial” disparities in bargaining power, there has been a failure to 
                                                                  
362 National Westminster Bank v Morgan [1985] AC, 686–708, p. 698. 
363 ibid., p. 708. 
364 In this matter it is important to make a distinction between Civil Law and Common Law systems. The use of 
bargaining power as a standalone criterion does not seem to have ever been an option in the Civil Law systems, 
perhaps due to the lower amount of leeway that judges have when applying the law, which prevents the sort of 
“creativity” exhibited by DENNING. Although this, of course, does not change the fact that bargaining power 
disparities have been the motivation behind some rules and regulations (e.g. laesio enormis, hardship, consumer 
and labor rules, etc.), their use as the sole ratio decidendi to hold a contract unenforceable appears impossible in 
this setting, unless express legislation allows for it. 
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create a system that allows for a coherent and definitive measurement of the level of the 
alleged disparity.365 
In the very influential 1974 House of Lords case of Schroeder Publishing v. Macaulay, the 
issue of abusive terms resulting from overwhelming bargaining power came to the 
forefront. 366 In this case, a young songwriter had entered into an exclusive agreement 
with a music publishing company, in which the latter acquired the ability (not the 
obligation) to publish the artist’s works for the duration of the contract. Since the 
company failed to publish any of his songs, and the exclusive contract prevented the 
songwriter from publishing with a different company, he sued the publisher seeking to be 
released from his contract. After the publisher prevailed in both the court of first instance 
and the Court of Appeal, the songwriter appealed to the House of Lords which, again, 
sided with the plaintiff. 
In an attempt to determine when it is possible to assume that the bargaining power of 
one party threatens the fairness of the agreement, Lord DIPLOCK stated in this decision 
that, first, it was necessary to differentiate between two types of standard form contracts, 
as it is there that these disparities often manifest themselves. He argued that, on the one 
hand, there were some agreements that even though were based on boilerplate terms, 
“have been settled over the years by negotiation by representatives of the commercial interests 
involved and have been widely adopted because experience has shown that they facilitate the 
conduct of trade” and regarding which there was a certain presumption as to the terms 
being fair and reasonable, as a result of having been agreed upon between parties “whose 
bargaining power is fairly matched”.367 Lord DIPLOCK distinguished these contracts from 
those in which this presumption of “balance” did not exist, referring mostly to consumer 
transactions, and which were “the result of the concentration of particular kinds of business in 
relatively few hands”.368  
                                                                  
365 Critics have argued that the reason why such a system does not exist is simply the consequence of it being 
downright impossible to measure bargaining power in any meaningful way. This would be demonstrated by the 
fact that “no judicial or scholarly discussion of bargaining power […] has suggested a coherent method, or any method for 
that matter- for identifying and assessing” the level of the disparities (HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, 
supra note 310, p. 1019). Still, the lack of a clear criterion to define it has not deterred courts from using 
different adjectives to describe the perceived inequalities. In Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, for example, the Court spoke 
of the “strong bargaining position” of one of the parties; in Courage v. Crehan, the European Court of Justice 
referenced the party that is in a “markedly weaker position” (C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v Crehan [2001], 6314, 
p. 6325); the US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in Nagrampa v. MailCoups, spoke of “overwhelming economic 
power” and “overwhelming bargaining power” (Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc. [2006], 469 F. 3d, 1257, p. 1270); etc. 
366 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay [1974], 1 WLR, 1308. 
367 ibid., p. 1316. See also TREBILCOCK, M. J., 1976, supra note 289, pp. 362–363.  
368 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay [1974], p. 1316. In a later (and very similar) Court of Appeal 
case, and which expressly cited Macaulay, Lord DENNING granted relief to performers from the band Fleetwood 
Mac, who had been bound by a contract that was “restrictive of trade” (as opposed to “in restraint of trade”) since 
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“[In this second category, the terms] have not been the subject of negotiation 
between the parties to it, or approved by any organisation representing the interests 
of the weaker party. They have been dictated by that party whose bargaining power, 
either exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing similar goods and 
services, enables him to say 'If you want these goods and services at all, these are the 
only terms on which they are obtainable. Take it or leave it.’  
To be in a position to adopt this attitude towards a party desirous of entering into a 
contract to obtain goods or services provides a classic instance of superior bargaining 
power.”369 
Despite its clear desire to solve this conundrum, the Macaulay decision actually fell short 
of establishing a clear criterion, and opted instead to enumerate some “symptoms” of 
bargaining disparities. The problem with this approach is that it does not at all facilitate 
the job of those who analyze other cases, since the mere presence of the same “symptom” 
will not necessarily mean that the cause (i.e. the imbalance) is the same. And so, the tools 
for the differential diagnosis are still lost. 
The case of boilerplate is a good example of the difficulties surrounding the “diagnosis” of 
serious imbalances. Even though contracts of adhesion are often seen as a telltale sign of 
bargaining power discrepancies, Lord DIPLOCK himself conceded that their use is 
fundamental for the economy, and that it would be foolish to assume that all of them 
could or should be potentially subjected to judicial scrutiny.370 If anything, eliminating 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd. [1975], 1 WLR, 61–66, p. 64). In DENNING’s view, this 
agreement had been the result of a grave “inequality of bargaining power” and, as such, it had to “be set aside”(ibid., 
pp. 65–66). For a commentary on the facts of this case in light of Macaulay and Lloyd’s v. Bundy, See SLAYTON, P., 
1976, supra note 345, pp. 100–101.  
369 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay [1974], p. 1316.  
370 These considerations aside, authors often appear critical of, if not almost downright opposed to, contracts of 
adhesion, as if they were intrinsically evil, arguing, for example that “generally, [contracts of adhesion] are 
imposed in an abusive manner to the consumer who, because of his weaker contractual position, cannot negotiate their 
essential terms” (VIGURI PEREA, A., ‘Los Contratos de Adhesión: Tendencias en la Evolución de la Protección del 
Consumidor en el Derecho Estadounidense’, 1996, 12 Revista Española de Estudios Norteamericanos, p. 74). This 
position seems incorrect, since it overlooks that this type of agreements is essential for the economy, and 
considers them inherently abusive, instead of inherently risky. DAVIS, for example, notes how even though these 
contracts have “inherent dangers,”  they have been recognized as “a necessary and beneficial part of a functioning 
economy” (DAVIS, N. J., 2007, supra note 232, p. 578). Another criticism that can be leveled against those who 
oppose, almost as a matter of principle, contracts of adhesion, is that such a position also goes, paradoxically, 
against basic considerations of freedom of contract. If contract law establishes that nobody, be it a consumer or a 
multinational entity, can be forced to negotiate against its will, “then it must logically permit parties to adopt take-
it-or-leave-it positions” (HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, pp. 1043–1044). In principle, 
there should not be anything intrinsically negative about a party that states, from the very beginning, that those 
are the only terms under which she is willing to contract. To hold the opposing view means that, somehow, the 
law should go against the freedom of contract of those parties that, for whatever reason, are deemed “powerful” 
in that specific bargain, as they would be forced to contract in terms they do not find agreeable. 
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boilerplate altogether, and forcing all parties to individually negotiate their contracts 
would only hurt the weaker parties, since they would have to bear the added transactional 
costs, not to mention the lengthy process that would be involved in every routine 
transactions.371  
The use of boilerplate should not be seen as, necessarily, a consequence of “the 
concentration of market power,” let alone as inherently abusive, but rather as merely a tool 
aimed at facilitating the conduct of the trade.372 Thus, although it is clear that the 
existence of contracts of adhesion in a given market might serve as an indication of a 
possible bargaining power disparity, it would be ill-advised to consider it as abusive by its 
very nature. It is, therefore, an issue of inherent risks, and not so much of inherent 
wickedness. As GARDNER explained: 
"Dangers are inherent in standardization ... for it affords a means by which one 
party may impose terms on another unwitting or even unwilling party. Several 
circumstances facilitate this imposition. First, the party that proffers the form has 
had the advantage of time and expert advice in preparing it, almost inevitably 
producing a form slanted in its favor. Second, the other party is usually completely or 
at least relatively unfamiliar with the form and has scant opportunity to read it an 
                                                                  
371 LAGUADO GIRALDO, C. A., 2003, supra note 205, p. 238 (arguing that “it is undeniable that boilerplate save 
transactional costs, even for the weak party”). See also WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 923 
(“[boilerplate contracts] save the transaction costs of one-on-one contracting”), and SCHMITZ, A. J., 2010, supra note 
306, p. 864 (“[m]any economists also assume that form contracts foster convenience and cost-savings that corporations 
may pass on to consumers through lower prices and better quality goods and services”). Some authors put forward the 
argument that although in theory this reasoning might hold water, in reality it is “entirely unclear whether 
merchants pass on to consumers alleged cost-savings from using these contracts.” Furthermore, they point out that the 
fact that “these form contracts often are products of one-sided dealings and market failure” might bring as a 
consequence that there is not an optimal allocation of resources as a result of the contract (SCHMITZ, A. J., 
‘Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function’, 2006, 58 Alabama Law Review, p. 76) meaning that any 
benefit obtained from the use of boilerplate would be offset by the added costs that come associated with it. 
There are authors who, within their critique of boilerplate, take a more nuanced view; SLAWSON, for example, 
while recognizing the risks that it poses, concedes that boilerplate is indeed useful in saving costs, as well as 
potentially more efficient for the buyer:  
“First, the buyer of a non-standard form would normally have to pay the expenses of his own attorney in 
negotiating it, in addition to the extra costs of the seller. Second, whatever benefit the buyer could obtain 
from a seller by negotiating a nonstandard form could normally be obtained more easily and less 
expensively in other ways. If he wanted increased warranty protection, for example, a buyer could 
probably obtain the same protection less expensively by purchasing insurance to cover the risks which 
would be covered by an expanded warranty. Even more simply, he could just pay the extra unreimbursed 
repair costs himself.”  
SLAWSON, W. D., 1971, supra note 190, p. 531.  
Others, like DAVIS, see the use of certain boilerplate terms, such as arbitration and forum selection provisions, as 
providing “important economic advantages,” so that their elimination would have “a significant negative effect on 
commerce” (DAVIS, N. J., 2007, supra note 232, pp. 578–579). 
372 TREBILCOCK, M. J., 1976, supra note 289, p. 364. 
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opportunity often diminished by the use of fine print and convoluted clauses. Third, 
bargaining over terms of the form may not be between equals or, as is more often the 
case, there may be no possibility of bargaining at all. The form may be used by an 
enterprise with such disproportionately strong economic power that it simply 
dictates the terms. Or the form may be a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, often called 
a contract of adhesion, under which the only alternative to complete adherence is 
outright rejection."373 
Other apparent signs of disparity, like the existence of homogeneous contractual terms 
across the market, are not enough to assume abuse and unfairness. 
“Even where all contracts are the same, in perfectly competitive markets where the 
product is homogeneous, commonality of terms is what one would expect to find (for 
example, the wheat market). Every supplier simply ‘takes’ his price and probably 
other terms from the market and is powerless to vary them. In a perfectly 
competitive market, with many sellers and many buyers each supplying or 
demanding too insignificant a share of total market output to influence terms, all 
participants, sellers and buyers, are necessarily confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it 
proposition. Thus uniformity of terms, standing alone, is ambiguous as between the 
presence or absence of competition.”374  
It is also not enough to assume that there was some sort of improper behavior in the 
bargaining of the parties (or that there was no bargaining at all) simply because there is a 
disparity in the outcome of the contract. An outcome that seems unfair might just be the 
result that the parties wanted, or simply the consequence of the lack of diligence of one of 
them in an otherwise fair and balanced transaction. It would be a mistake to allow the 
State to act in a paternalistic manner and “rectify”, “correct” or annul contracts that a 
party could have negotiated better, but failed to do so by his own negligence. The law 
should not attempt to protect people from their own negligence, as it would eradicate 
many of the incentives to act with due diligence. A balance must therefore be struck 
between the aims of the law to prevent abuses, and the need for personal responsibility in 
contractual relations. 
A further difficulty comes from the impossibility of defining “unfairness” in a legal and 
generally all-encompassing manner. If anything, it seems more like a situation in which 
pre-established definitions might be counterproductive, with the better option being to 
define “unfairness” on a case-by-case basis. The truth is that “it may not be possible to list 
exhaustively all the bargaining improprieties (justifications for intervention). In other words, it 
may well be that defining contractual unfairness is an evolutionary process, in the sense that 
                                                                  
373 GARNER, B. A., Black's Law Dictionary, 9th, 2009, 9th edition, West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn., p. 366. 
374 TREBILCOCK, M. J., 1976, supra note 289, p. 365. 
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rules of bargaining will be formulated along the way in response to changing normative ideas.”375 
It is indeed hard to imagine a definition, either by the legislature, the courts, or the 
scholarly literature, that would be wide enough to include all cases of unfairness, but that 
would also be, at the same time, restrictive enough to ensure that the normal disparities 
inherent to the market would not be labeled as unfair and thus hurt legitimate 
contractual transactions. As BARNHIZER notes:  
“[G]iven the many different ways in which contract power may be abused, even the 
civilians have been forced to rely on broad, general and judicially administered 
standards of proper contract behaviour. All common law legislation that has tried to 
address the unconscionability issue widely has also come to appreciate the 
impossibility of doing anything other than telling the courts to get on with policing 
fairness on a case by case basis”.376  
And so, since there are no broad general standards to determine when and how 
bargaining power disparities unduly affected the transaction, “contract doctrine seems to 
hold conflicting parallel views on the appropriate legal response to issues of power and its effects 
on the bargaining process”.377 
A case-by-case approach involves reviewing the terms of the contract (or the contract as a 
whole) in search for signs of inequality and, of course, abuse. This might be the only way 
in which bargaining power disparities could play a role in contractual enforcement, since 
general application of the doctrine seems otherwise impossible. And so, from this 
perspective, what courts would need to be on the lookout for are clauses that, “against 
good faith, create against the consumer or the adhering party an important and unjustified 
imbalance in the contractual obligations.”378 Short of listing clauses or terms that cannot be 
included in contracts, determining when a term produces an “important and unjustified 
imbalance” will also be dependent on the facts of the specific case.  
3.5 Finding the Weak Parties 
Even beyond the problems associated with defining “bargaining power”, and determining 
when “unfairness” may or may not exist, further complications arise by the apparent 
inability that exists to accurately determine in advance what party, in any given contract, 
is the weak one. Since, as has been mentioned before, commonly “powerful” actions, like 
                                                                  
375 THAL, S. N., 1988, supra note 317, p. 26. 
376 REITER, B. J., 1981, supra note 97, p. 366. 
377 BARNHIZER, D. D., 2005, supra note 159, p. 150.  
378 ECHEVERRI SALAZAR, V. M., ‘El Control a las Cláusulas Abusivas en los Contratos de Adhesión con 
Consumidores’, 2011, 10 Opinión Jurídica, no. 20, p. 129. In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, where 
a general good faith duty does not exist, “fairness” or “equity” might serve the same purpose.  
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the use of standard forms and even the lack of substitute products and terms, cannot be 
necessarily understood as signs of being in a dominant position, it is evident that 
determining what party is “strong” and which one is “weak,” is a difficult task.379 
In their analysis to determine what party can be considered “weak”, courts, legislators and 
commentators have often shown a tendency to limit any remedies aimed at restoring 
balance to consumer contracting (B2C or “business to consumer” contracts), leaving out 
agreements between companies or businesses (B2B or “business to business” 
contracts).380 While, in principle, this might appear like a rational choice, it is actually the 
result of a mistaken understanding of the contracting process.  
The idea that all businesses are somehow on a similar bargaining position, simply because 
they are businesses, is nonsensical. Just like two people can be in very different positions, 
based on social status, economic situation, education, etc., two businesses can also be in 
completely different situations as a result of, for example, the size of their market share 
or their trajectory in their respective trade. As was already illustrated by the history of the 
international regulation of the carriage of goods by sea, it will often happen that some 
market players in given sectors of the trade will be in a position to impose their will 
against the rest.  
                                                                  
379 On the issue of the use of standard terms and bargaining power, HESSELINK is clear in noting that  
“the party using standard terms is not always the stronger party in the contractual relationship” (HESSELINK, M. W., 
Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses, in Schulze, R. & Stuyck, J. (eds.), Towards a European Contract Law, 
2011, p. 133). 
380 ALIAS, S. A. et al., 2012, supra note 125, p. 333 (“[O]ne of the common oversimplifications of the debate on modern 
contract law is to equate the need to protect the consumer with inequality of bargaining power”). In the case of the 
European Union, although the Community regulation on unfair contractual terms does not generally extend its 
application to B2B contracts, giving priority to consumer protection, different Member States have chosen 
otherwise. In Germany, for example, this differentiation does not exist, as the German Standard Clauses Statute 
departs from this general tendency of excluding business contracts and actually applies its rules to all contracts 
(D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 10). At a European level, German law is at the forefront of protecting 
commercial parties, following the idea that, “honest businesses (typically the small incumbent trader) should be 
protected against their less honest competitors and professional contract parties” (STUYCK, J., Do We Need ‘Consumer 
Protection’ for Small Businesses at the EU Level?, in Purnhagen, K. & Rott, P. (eds.), Varieties of European Economic 
Law and Regulation: Liber Amicorum for Hans Micklitz, 2014, p. 360). It should be noted that even though, by and 
large, Community regulations have focused on protecting consumers and not small businesses, there have been 
some regulatory works that attempted to tackle the unfairness and disparity that might arise in B2B contracts. 
For example, Directive 1986/653 “On the Coordination of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Self-Employed 
Commercial Agents”, recognizes that even though in a commercial relation of agency both parties are businesses, 
the agent requires legal protection, due to the “special asymmetry that affects the agent vis a vis the [principal’s] 
business.” Similar considerations appear in Directive 2000/35 “On Combating Late Payment in Commercial 
Transactions”, which in nº7 of its preamble expressly mentions how “[h]eavy administrative and financial burdens 
are placed on businesses, particularly small and medium-sized ones, as a result of excessive payment periods and late 
payment. Moreover, these problems are a major cause of insolvencies threatening the survival of businesses and result in 
numerous job losses” (See ROPPO, V., ‘Del Contrato con el Consumidor a los Contratos Asimétricos: Perspectivas del 
Derecho Contractual Europeo’, 2011, 20 Revista de Derecho Privado, pp. 185–187). 
  
105 
Repairing Contractual Imbalances 
“[B]eing in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the other party, agreeing to terms 
drawn up in advance by the party without being able to influence the content of 
those terms and, generally, to one-sided standard contracts is not a condition in 
which only consumers find themselves. Businesses come in all sizes and they do not 
contract exclusively within their own size group. Unequal bargaining is just as 
pervasively and structurally present in business to business contracting as it is in 
business to consumer contracting. And if it is a problem then it is no less so in B2B 
than in B2C. In other words, if the rationale is protection against abuse of 
bargaining power, then it is clear that this protection could (and indeed should, on 
account of the equality principle) extend also to businesses.”381 
There is no question that considerations regarding unconscionability, unfair terms, 
bargaining power, and even good faith (in both the Civil and the Common Law), should be 
used differently depending on what party is being affected. At the same time, however, it 
is important that courts are not overzealous in their protection of consumers, so as to 
develop the false and dangerous idea that all businesses are made up of experienced and 
competent people that cannot be taken advantage of by others. While the difficulties 
surrounding bargaining power disparities (and their possible abuses) in merchant 
contracting illustrate the necessity to establish rules that are wide enough to benefit 
businesses, these rules would certainly need to be applied differently. It would be ill-
advised if rules benefitting “weak” businesses were so wide so as to bring uncertainty to 
the marketplace and allow negligent or opportunistic players to void their contracts 
alleging unfairness (in whatever shape or form this claim might take). Furthermore, the 
standards at which the law should hold the parties to a business contract should be 
stricter than those used in regards to consumers, as at least some degree of preparedness 
and skill should be expected of them. 
Recognizing that merchant parties can also be victims of bargaining power disparities 
while, at the same time, nuancing the application of the doctrine, is a position that has 
gained some traction in Europe. SCHÄFER and LEYENS, for example, in their economic 
analysis of the DCFR, recommend doing away with the distinction between the tests 
established for B2B and B2C contracts. This based on the fact that the effects of issues 
like information asymmetries are not limited to a consumer setting, and so there should 
be a uniform standard addressing them.382 At the same time, however, they suggest that 
these protections should be limited to transactions under a certain financial threshold, 
since “when the value of the contract becomes sufficiently important it also becomes rational to 
                                                                  
381 HESSELINK, M. W., 2011, supra note 379, p. 132. 
382 ibid., p. 136. 
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invest in trying to understand the proposed standard terms and their implications, if necessary 
with professional help, even when the provisions deal with risks that are unlikely to occur.”383 
3.6 Tackling Unfairness 
As the preceding paragraphs show, dealing with bargaining power disparities is not a 
simple task, since disparities may present themselves in a contract in many different 
ways. While some might be evident to the average observer, others might be cloaked in an 
appearance of equality, while a few might lie somewhere in between. As a result of this 
“unpredictability,” different methods have been devised to solve the issue (and 
consequences) of contractual disparities and unfairness. These methods can, in general, 
be divided in three categories: administrative, legislative and judicial controls, whether 
performed a priori or a posteriori.384  
Administrative controls exist when governmental organizations or entities are given the 
authority to police certain activities, usually because of the public interest that exists in 
their regard. Classic examples of such activities are the insurance and financial sectors 
which, for a number of reasons, are heavily regulated. When exercised a priori, these 
controls might require the regulated industries to first obtain an authorization from the 
regulators in order to use certain contracts (e.g. the terms and conditions offered to a 
party interested in obtaining a credit card), in order to prevent the inclusion of terms that 
might be deemed unfair. A posteriori controls, on the other hand, manifest themselves in 
sanctions (usually in the form of fines) being leveled against the regulated entity, when 
abuse has occurred.385 
Judicial controls of contractual imbalances depend on the legal system under which they 
are employed. Although this might seem obvious, it is an important issue, as the way in 
which courts will act in regards to an unfair contract will be dramatically different 
whether we are in the presence of a Common Law or a Civil Law system. Although in both 
systems judicial controls will involve the application of the measures established in the 
laws, under Common Law systems judges will possess a wider gamut of tools through 
which to control the fairness of the agreement.386 It is in this area of judicial controls, 
                                                                  
383 ibid., pp. 136–137. 
384 ECHEVERRI SALAZAR, V. M., 2011, supra note 378, p. 137. Although a cursory mention will made of 
administrative controls, we will place most of our focus on judicial and legislative controls, as they are much 
more closely related to the topic at hand. For some further insight on administrative controls, See, generally, 
KIMBALL, S. L. & PFENNIGSTORF, W., ‘Administrative Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative 
Study’, 1965, 40 Indiana Law Journal, no. 2 and HONDIUS, E. H., ‘Unfair Contract Terms: New Control Systems’, 
1978, 26 The American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 4. 
385 ECHEVERRI SALAZAR, V. M., 2011, supra note 378, p. 137. 
386 ibid., p. 138. 
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however, that all-encompassing doctrines like those of good faith in Civil Law and (some) 
Common Law systems, as well as the unconscionability doctrine in some Common Law 
jurisdictions, come into play. Then it will be the courts who will be given the task to 
determine whether the situations put before them are so unfair as to warrant 
interference. 
Closely related to the judicial controls (since, in the end, courts will have to apply the law), 
legislative controls take many forms. A common method is the establishment of “black 
lists” enumerating terms that cannot be included in contracts (be it contracts in general 
or specific categories thereof) because, for example, they are deemed to go against public 
order or basic considerations of good faith. This is a very common control method that, in 
different degrees, has been very well received throughout comparative legislation, albeit 
usually (although not exclusively) related to consumer contracting.387 So, for example, the 
European Union Directive 93/13/EEC (“On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts”) 
establishes in its Annex a list of terms that cannot be included in a consumer contract; 
something similar happens in Section 309 of the German BGB, which enumerates  
standard business terms that are prohibited “without the possibility of evaluation”.388 A 
similar method, albeit less common, is the establishment of “gray lists”, in which case the 
terms that are establish in that list are not per se null and void, but are instead expected to 
be analyzed with certain suspicion by the courts that evaluate the contract. This is, for 
example, the case of the Section 308 of the German BGB, which enumerates terms that 
might be ineffective under certain circumstances (“prohibited clauses with the possibility of 
evaluation”).389 
The problem with lists, whether they are black or gray, is that they also grant an 
opportunity for the dominant parties to analyze the banned terms, work around that 
prohibition and, in the end, obtain the same result. In order to close this loophole, 
legislators usually include an open-ended prohibition, empowering the courts to intervene 
when there is an apparent unfairness, even if the terms in question are not explicitly 
banned. The Chilean Consumer Protection Law, for example, establishes a general ban on 
terms that, “against the general requirements of good faith, and on the basis of objective 
                                                                  
387 MOMBERG URIBE, R., ‘El Control de las Cláusulas Abusivas como Instrumento de Intervención Judicial en el 
Contrato’, 2013, 26 Revista de Derecho (Valdivia), no. 1, p. 12 (noting that legislative controls of abusive clauses 
have been incorporated, “in some degree”, to most contemporary legislations). 
388 In German, “Klauselverbote ohne Wertungsmöglichkeit.” A similar approach was taken by the Chilean Consumer 
law (Law 19.496) which in Art. 16 also prohibits the inclusion of certain terms that are deemed abusive. It is 
important to remember that while lists of prohibited terms might be, for the most part, an issue related to 
consumer law, forbidden terms also exist in other areas of contract law. In the case of maritime law, for example, 
we only need to look at the Hague-Visby, Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules, to see the same phenomenon, when 
contractual terms that lower the liability of the carrier beyond the limits established by the respective convention 
are deemed null and void, precisely because of their abusive nature. 
389 In German, “Klauselverbote mit Wertungsmöglichkeit.” 
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parameters, create, against the consumer, an important imbalance in the rights and obligations 
of the parties derived from the contract.”390  
While, as we have seen, important differences exist between the way in which different 
legal systems tackle unfairness, the similarities are more numerous than the differences. 
Indeed, while some might recoil at the idea being put forward of there being a 
commonality between the treatments of unconscionable contracts in both Common and 
Civil Law systems, this is far from a novel idea. Already in 1969, for example, SQUILLANTE, 
put forward some of these similarities, arguing that they demonstrate that there is a 
unifying thread connecting the way in which both legal systems tackle unfairness.391 He 
suggested that these similarities include: 
1. Language: Although SQUILLANTE recognizes that the way in which the 
doctrines are referred to differ between systems (“unconscionability”, “good 
morals”, “public order”, etc.), their meaning is the same. 
2. Contractual Overreach: The courts react “adversely to any contract that is 
overreaching, oppressive or so unfair as to shock the courts’ consciences.” 
3. Personal Responsibility: The remedies do not look to protect those who 
make bad bargains, but only those who were victims of their contractual 
parties. 
4. Importance of the Transaction as a Whole: In order to assess whether a 
contract can be enforced, the courts must look at the totality of the 
transactions (as opposed to its individual parts, devoid of context). 
5. Special Treatment of Special Contracts: Some contracts (e.g. labor, 
insurance, concessionaires of public services, and consumer contracts), by 
their very nature, are subjected to a higher level of scrutiny in order to 
assess their fairness. This due to the fact that they are inherently 
imbalanced. 
                                                                  
390 The original text of this norm, Article 16 (g) of the Consumer Protection Law, establishes:  
“No producirán efecto alguno en los contratos de adhesión las cláusulas o estipulaciones que: 
[…] 
(g) En contra de las exigencias de la buena fe, atendiendo para estos efectos a parámetros objetivos,  
causen en perjuicio del consumidor, un desequilibrio  importante en los derechos y obligaciones que para 
las  partes se deriven del contrato.” 
It is worth mentioning that this norm basically echoes the definition of unfair terms established in EC Directive 
93/13EEC, where they were defined as those that “contrary to the requirement of good faith, […cause] a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer”. 
391 SQUILLANTE, A. M., ‘Unconscionability: French, German, Anglo-American Application’, 1969, 34 Albany Law 
Review, p. 298. See also, BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, pp. 248–249 (citing SQUILLANTE’s 
view favorably) and, generally, BAUDOUIN, J.-L., ‘Oppressive and Unequal Contracts: The Unconscionability 
Problem in Louisiana and Comparative Law’, 1985, 60 Tulane Law Review, no. 6, 1119–1134. 
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6. Unbargained-For Contracts: All systems adopt measures aimed at 
preventing the abuses that would come as a result of contracts in which 
there was no real bargain. 
7. Grounds for Denying Enforcement: All systems, within their own doctrines, 
consider similar reasons to deny the enforcement or rescission or 
reformation of a contract for reasons of unfairness. 
8. Reason of the doctrine: Unconscionability (or whatever name applies within 
the specific jurisdiction) resorts to reasons of “fair play” to justify its 
application. 
SQUILLANTE’s position, and with which we can readily agree, seems to be almost 
Shakespearean. It seems to be a case of, to paraphrase the English playwright, 
“unconscionability by any other name,” as the remedies established under different 
systems are all manifestations of the same attempts by the legislator and the courts to 
prevent abuses.392 While the methods may vary dramatically across jurisdictions and legal 
systems, their end goal, preventing abuses from those with more power (however this 
“power” is defined), is the common thread that binds them all together. 
Since the full spectrum of the ways in which unconscionable contracts have been dealt 
with goes beyond the scope of this book, and in light of our focus on choices of court, our 
approach will be limited to those doctrines that have played a role in this field. 
Furthermore, as our study continues to enclose around maritime law, we will focus 
heavily on the Common Law, due to the undeniable importance that this system, vis à vis 
the Civil Law, possesses in maritime dispute resolution.  
                                                                  
392 On this issue, See, for example, BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 244 (reviewing some 
similarities and differences between German and American provisions on unconscionability). 
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“We have had frequent occasion to consider the limitations of liberty of 
contract. While it is highly important to preserve that liberty from 
arbitrary and capricious interference, it is also necessary to prevent its 
abuse, as otherwise it could be used to override all public interests and 
thus in the end destroy the very freedom of opportunity which it is 
designed to safeguard.” 
Justice Charles Evan Hughes.393 
4.1 Introduction 
eyond the well-known differences regarding the force of judicial precedent, the 
Common Law is also special in other ways. In the field of contract law, for 
example, the way in which this system looks at contractual noncompliance, as well 
as the options that a party possesses to escape from a bargain, differ significantly 
from those that we can find in Civil Law systems.  
Having already reviewed the philosophical and doctrinal underpinnings of restricting 
contractual freedom to combat unfairness, we now place our focus on how this takes place 
in the Common Law. The leeway that Common Law courts possess has allowed them to 
create ad-hoc doctrines to tackle the issue of contractual unfairness, and which are unique 
to these systems. Although, as we have mentioned before, the underlying principles that 
form these doctrines might be akin to those behind Civilian doctrines, their operation can 
differ greatly.   
                                                                  
393 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo [1936], 298 US, 587–636, p. 627 (dissenting). 
Chapter 4 
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4.2 Defining Unconscionability394 
Despite being a term commonly used to refer to cases of unfairness in contractual 
relations, the meaning of unconscionability “depends on the jurisdiction and the writer using 
it.”395  Indeed, despite its use on both sides of the Atlantic (and elsewhere), both courts 
and commentators seem to agree that it is virtually impossible to put forward a precise 
and all-encompassing definition, opting instead to offer working definitions on a case-by-
case basis.396 
ATIYAH, acknowledging this problem, argued that while it is true that “unconscionability 
does not have a fixed meaning in law”, in a contractual context it is generally used to 
“describe situations in which it is believed that although no duress or fraud took place, one 
contracting party took advantage or exploited the other”.397 Its underlying rationale, 
therefore, “is not that the claimant’s consent to the transaction has been vitiated,” but rather 
that she was in a disadvantageous position, which allowed the other party to gain an 
unfair advantage.398 
This is a doctrine that is intrinsically related to society’s understanding of fairness and 
justice, establishing that oppressive bargains are completely undesirable and should be 
rejected.399 Keeping these notions in mind, TEPPER offer offers a fairly complete 
definition, stating that  
                                                                  
394 Please note that within this section, unless otherwise stated, the terms “unconscionable” and 
“unconscionability” are being used in a strict sense, referring only to the common law doctrine of the same name, 
and not to refer to unfair contracts in general. 
395 ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 191 It is perhaps due this lack of definition (that some see as an asset) 
that BROWN, echoing the words of KNAP and CRYSTAL, calls it “a pure abstraction, devoid of content.” See BROWN, E. 
L., ‘The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic’, 2000, 105 Commercial 
Law Journal, no. 3, p. 307 
396 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1065 
397 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 300. See also BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra 
note 107, p. 249 (“[t]he courts have not succeeded in establishing a general formula or clear guidelines for applying the 
vague concept of unconscionability) and MCLAUGHLIN, G. T., ‘Unconscionability and Impracticability: Reflections on 
Two U.C.C. Indeterminacy Principles’, 1992, 14 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal, 
no. 3, p. 439 (referring to unconscionability as “essentially indeterminate in definition”). This absence of a clear 
definition has more than a merely anecdotal importance, as it is actually part of the ammunition used to attack 
the doctrine, due to the lack of consistency that, allegedly, comes as a result. See, for example, NATION [III], G. A., 
‘Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured’, 2005, 94 Kentucky 
Law Journal, p. 109 and accompanying footnotes.  
398 PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, p. 845. 
399 Although recognizing the relation between the two, FREILICH and WEBB are quick to distinguish between 
unfairness and unconscionability, arguing that “the definition of unconscionable has a higher threshold than the 
definition of unfair [and so] it will be harder to satisfy” (FREILICH, A. & WEBB, E., ‘Small Business - Forgotten and in 
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“an unconscionable contract is one that shocks public sensibilities and is 
unreasonably oppressive. Basically, such a contract results when the parties’ 
bargaining positions are so unequal that the public is best protected by invalidating 
the contract, due to the oppressive and shocking nature of the bargain.”400  
While critics see unconscionability as a tool abrogating freedom of contract, its supporters 
see it as a doctrine established to ensure that the contract is the result of a real 
bargaining, and that it reflects a true agreement between the parties.401 As MEADOWS put 
it: 
“Unconscionability is not intended to erase the doctrine of freedom of contract, but 
to make realistic the assumption of the law that the agreement has resulted from 
real bargaining between parties who had freedom of choice and understanding, and 
the ability to negotiate in a meaningful fashion.”402 
It is easy to understand why some oppose this doctrine that, perceiving it as so vague as 
to be unworkable. Based on the application of the unconscionability doctrine, a contract 
or a clause can be struck down, if it is demonstrated that “one party has extracted an unfair 
bargain by taking advantage of the other’s weakness”.403 Clearly, this represents a threat for 
those who look at this issue from a laissez-faire perspective, viewing such a doctrine as a 
threat to contractual freedom. What is more, even those who look at this issue from a 
more nuanced perspective, can clearly see a danger in a doctrine that even its supporters 
                                                                                                                                                                       
words of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Australia) in the 2009 case of Hall v. Kennards Storage 
Management: 
“'Unconscionable' is a strong word. It is stronger than 'wrong' and stronger than 'unfair'. It connotes 
conduct of a kind that attracts moral obloquy or an adverse moral judgment.” 
Cited in ibid., p. 145. 
400 TEPPER, P., The Law of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 2012, Second Edition, Cengage Learning, 
New York, p. 117 Some have argued that this lack of a precise definition is not a defect but a quality of the 
doctrine, since it gives it the necessary flexibility to adequately serve its role of “protecting humanity’s natural, or 
innate, sense of fairness.” From this perspective, “unconscionability’s resistance to a ‘lawyer-like definition’ is integral 
to its function in contract law” (SCHMITZ, A. J., 2006, supra note 371, p. 74). In the words of EPSTEIN, “[o]ne of the 
strengths of the unconscionability doctrine is its flexibility, an attribute much needed because it is difficult to identify in 
advance all of the kinds of situations to which it might in principle apply.” (EPSTEIN, R. A., 1975, supra note 336, 
p. 304). 
401 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 214. 
402 MEADOWS, R. L., ‘Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device for the Elder Client: How Useful Is It?’, 2005, 
38 Akron Law Review, no. 4, p. 744. Similarly, SPANOGLE argues that 
“the unconscionability doctrine can strengthen the concept of ‘freedom of contract’ that implies the ability 
to codetermine the terms of a contract. Courts may now examine unbargained terms without disturbing 
those terms that have been codetermined, and unilaterally determined terms can be subjected to special 
scrutiny.” 
SPANOGLE, J. A., 1969, supra note 212, pp. 935–936. 
403 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 308. See also NATION [III], G. A., 2005, supra note 397, 
p. 105 (“[t]he doctrine of unconscionability concerns fairness. The doctrine can be used to refuse enforcement of all or 
part of an agreement that is deemed by a court to be sufficiently unfair as to be unconscionable”). 
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consider “undefinable,” as such a defect (although some might call it an asset) would go 
against the goal of predictability that permeates our legal systems. 
4.3 The Strange Case of Unconscionability in English Law 
In the United Kingdom, the power of the courts to set aside unconscionable agreements 
or clauses has its historical origins in the equity jurisdiction of the Courts of Chancery.404 
Originally used to “grant relief against harsh and unconscionable bargains extracted from 
expectant heirs and remaindermen,” its origins can be traced back to the 17th Century.405 
Even though, in theory, the aim of this legal figure was to grant a remedy against 
oppressive bargains, its use was mostly restricted to protecting the estates of the 
nobilities, sometimes stretching its application so as to ensure that the nobles would 
retain their property.406 It was only in the 18th Century, as the application of this doctrine 
became less restrictive in regards to its beneficiaries, that these courts started to regularly 
set aside contractual provisions that would somehow offend the court’s sense of 
fairness.407 This was particularly so in those cases in which the agreements had been 
entered into by poor and ignorant people who lacked independent advice and that, as a 
result, had agreed to unfair terms.408  
                                                                  
404 PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, p. 840. 
405 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, p. 460. See also PAWLOWSKI, M., ‘Unconscionability as a 
Unifying Concept in Equity’, 2001, 16 Denning Law Journal, p. 80 (“the jurisdiction to set aside unconscionable 
bargains was originally confined to reversioners and expectant heirs”). 
406 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, pp. 461–462 and ALIAS, S. A. et al., 2012, supra note 125, 
p. 334. 
407 BIGWOOD, R., ‘Ill-Gotten Contracts in New Zealand: Parting Thoughts on Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionable Dealing - Kiwi-Style’, 2011, 42 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, no. 1, p. 93 
(“[a]lthough this doctrine has its genesis in a protectionist jurisdiction concerned with a special class of case (catching 
bargains with expectant heirs, reversioners and remaindermen just of age), antipodean courts eventually came to view 
the older line of cases as establishing a principle of broader operation, applying potentially to a wide range of 
interactions”). 
408 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 309. Chancellors routinely refused to enforce grossly 
inadequate exchanges, applying the law in a way that would allow them to either set aside unfair provisions, or to 
interpret the contracts in a way that would render a more equitable result (SCHMITZ, A. J., 2006, supra note 371, 
p. 81). In Aylesford v. Morris, for example, Lord SELBOURNE, LC stated: 
"[I]t is sufficient for the application of the principle, if the parties meet under such circumstances as, in the 
particular transaction, to give the stronger party dominion over the weaker; and such power and influence 
are generally possessed, in every transaction of this kind, by those who trade upon the follies and vices of 
unprotected youth, inexperience and moral imbecility.  
In the cases of catching bargains with expectant heirs, one peculiar feature has been almost universally 
present […] The victim comes to the snare [… excluded] from the help and advice of his natural guardians 
and protectors, and from that professional aid which would be accessible to him, if he did not feel 
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Although it is hard to precisely pinpoint the beginnings of an all-encompassing concept of 
unconscionability in English law, the case of Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen is commonly 
mentioned as one of the firsts that hinted at a definition of the doctrine.409 In an often 
quoted dictum, and which has even been referenced by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the Lord Chancellor stated that what the unconscionability doctrine aimed to 
prevent were those bargains that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on 
the one hand, and […] no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”410 This would later 
be refined in decisions such as the 1787 case of Evans v. Llewellin, where the Court, 
without citing any authorities, stated that if a party “is in a situation, in which he is not a 
free agent, and is not equal to protecting himself,” then the Court will protect him.411  As it 
was later stated in an 1818 case, 
“a court of equity will inquire whether the parties really did meet on equal terms; 
and if it be found that the vendor was in distressed circumstances, and that 
advantage was taken of that distress, it will avoid the contract.”412 
This broad rule was later dramatically restricted in the 1884 case of Fry v. Lane, where 
relief was established as being limited to those cases “where a purchase is made from a poor 
and ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, the vendor having no independent advice”.413 
The new and increased requirements established by this decision in order for the doctrine 
to operate, made it extremely hard to actually use unconscionability as a way to obtain 
relief. Indeed, as a result of the limitations imposed by Fry. v. Lane, and despite its early 
origins, the doctrine of unconscionability has not seen much development in English law, 
as its area of applicability has become too restricted. While it did go to inspire, “some 90 
years later,” the attempts of Lord Denning to establish a general doctrine of bargaining 
power disparities in English law, as we have seen, he was unsuccessful.414  
                                                                                                                                                                       
of himself and with nobody else to take care of him. Great Judges have said that there is a principle of 
public policy in restraining this." 
Earl of Aylesford v Morris [1873], 8 Ch. App., 484–499, pp. 491–492. 
409 Earl of Chesterfield and Others Executors of John Spencer v Sir Abraham Janssen [1751], 28 E.R., 82–102. 
410 ibid., p. 100. The Court also recognized that “it is difficult to form any general rule, that can meet every case of this 
kind, that may happen”, adding that “they must in general be governed by the circumstances in each case” (ibid., p. 97). 
See, also SCHMITZ, A. J., 2006, supra note 371, p. 82. For the adoption of this understanding of unconscionability 
in US law, See, inter alia, the 1889 United States Supreme Court case of Hume v. U.S.,  which expressly 
incorporates this definition, albeit by quoting Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, which had itself quoted the English case 
(Hume v. United States [1889], 132 US, 406–415, p. 411). 
411 ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 193. 
412 WADDAMS, S., Protection of weaker parties in English law, in Kenny, M. et al. (eds.), Unconscionability in European 
Private Financial Transactions: Protecting the Vulnerable, 2010, p. 33. 
413 Fry v. Lane [1888], 40 Ch. D., 312–325, p. 322 See also WADDAMS, S., ‘Autonomy and Paternalism from a 
Common Law Perspective: Setting Aside Disadvantageous Transactions’, 2010, 3 Erasmus Law Review, no. 2, 
p. 130. 
414 GREENFIELD, S. & OSBORN, G., 1992, supra note 354, p. 66. See also WADDAMS, S., 2010, supra note 412, p. 34. 
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As some authors have pointed out, Fry v. Lane moved the attention of the doctrine from 
the bargain itself to the internal feelings of the participants.  
“This principle shows a shift in emphasis whereby it is not so much that there must 
be poverty and ignorance […] but that there must be inequality between the parties 
(which arises out of such factors as the poverty and ignorance). Furthermore, for a 
contract entered into by such persons to be vitiated as an unconscientious or 
unconscionable bargain, there must be ‘victimisation’, ‘which can consist of either of 
the active extortion of a benefit or the passive acceptance of a benefit in 
unconscionable circumstances’ […] in other words the court requires more than just 
an unfair bargain or unfair terms (the substantive unfairness) but more 
importantly, the taking advantage of the other’s weakness is also required.”415 
The restrictions established on the doctrine, together with its resulting limited 
application, have made some go as far as claiming that the doctrine of unconscionable 
contracts has itself become a “living fossil” in English law, since although it has not been 
expressly eliminated from the English legal tradition, it has not seen much use.416 The 
reason for the troubled status of this doctrine is that English courts have, in general, 
proven to be very reluctant to go against the will of the parties under the excuse of 
seeking to restore balance or fairness.417 Indeed, despite the already mentioned attempts 
by Lord DENNING, particularly in the case of Lloyd’s Bank v. Bundy, the English judicature 
has been unwilling to go against the principles of freedom of contract in favor of these 
equitable doctrines.418 As a matter of fact, even when the courts have seen it fit to set 
aside contracts for reasons of “fairness,” they often appeal to some other reasons to 
                                                                  
415 ALIAS, S. A. et al., 2012, supra note 125, p. 335 
416 ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 194. See also ALIAS, S. A. et al., 2012, supra note 125, p. 334 (“while the 
English courts have rarely been willing to apply such a doctrine outside a limited class of cases, they have also been 
unwilling to renounce it entirely”), SPANOGLE, J. A., 1969, supra note 212, p. 931 (“although an analogous doctrine [to 
that of unconscionability in the US] was known at common law, it was not extensively used”) and WADDAMS, S., 
2010, supra note 412, p. 26 (“Since the nineteenth century, writers on English contract law have emphasised the 
enforceability of contracts and have tended to marginalise the instances in which contracts have been set aside for 
unfairness”). 
417 PHILLIPS sees this as a result of the influence of classical contract theory in English law, resulting in a model of 
“liberal individualism, with the parties entirely free to pursue their own interests” (PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, 
p. 837). See also PIERS, M., 2011, supra note 131, p. 132 (“English courts, moreover, have been persistently reluctant 
to apply any kind of general principle of fairness. The English propensity to reject the use of general principles such as 
good faith is replicated in case law in which, once again the construction and use of other general theories is rejected”) 
and ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, p. 466 (suggesting that the reason why the doctrine of 
unconscionability failed to take hold in England might be “the reluctance of the courts and the legislature to depart 
in an open manner from the laissez faire concepts of contracts”). 
418 CHEW, C., 2014, supra note 358, p. 248 (“[t]here is general agreement that there is no common law doctrine to 
support a review of unreasonable and unconscionable contracts.”).  
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justify the remedy, even straining the limits of other doctrines in order to “avoid 
unconscionability or inequality of bargaining power if at all possible”.419  
Although English law might have, by and large, dropped the doctrine of unconscionability, 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions, like Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and which 
took the English precedents as a starting point, have gone beyond the English approach. 
Indeed, these nations have expanded the doctrine of unconscionability, reaching many 
more cases or situations than those that would have been covered under the umbrella of 
English law.420 As ENMAN explains: 
“Since Fry v. Lane in 1888, the equitable doctrines of unconscionability in England 
on the one hand and in Canada, Australia and New Zealand on the other, have 
grown radically different, certainly in practice if perhaps less so in theory. In 
England, the equitable doctrine has been virtually dead for almost a century. Neither 
Lloyd's Bank v. Bundy nor statutory enactments show any sign of rejuvenating it. 
[...] In the other three countries, the equitable doctrine has grown from its English 
and Irish roots and continues to thrive and expand, some would say like an octopus 
with ever further-reaching tentacles.”421 
Although it is undeniable that during the 20th century there seemed to have been a move 
towards accepting unconscionability as a general principle (as demonstrated by cases such 
as Lloyds Bank Ltd. v Bundy and Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay), this move 
seems to have lost its momentum as the end of the century drew nearer, perhaps due to 
concerns that it would add uncertainty to legal relations.422 After all, it was argued that 
while unconscionability “may have an appealing ‘natural justice’ flavor, it is terribly uncertain 
                                                                  
419 ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, pp. 202–203. 
420 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, pp. 240–241 (stating that Australia is “at the forefront of 
unconscionability,” having followed the American doctrine on the topic but taking “a greater interest in ensuring fair 
contracts”). 
421  ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 217. In the case of Canada, for example, based on the 1978 case of 
Harry v. Kreutziger [1978] CanLII, 393, a doctrine was created based on which “the single question is whether the 
transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently divergent from community standards of commercial morality that it should be 
rescinded.” This represents a massive difference from the English standard as established in Fry v. Lane, which was 
set so high that it is practically impossible to be met, and which is has largely been blamed for “killing” the 
English doctrine of unconscionability (ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 198). In regards to Canada’s lax 
standard, however, it is worth noting that “the fear has been that unfettered power to set aside contracts for reasons 
of unfairness would be too broad, and various attempts have been made to restrain the practical operation of the 
doctrine”  (WADDAMS, S. M., ‘Abusive or Unconscionable Clauses from a Common Law Perspective’, 2010, 49 The 
Canadian Business Law Journal, no. 3, p. 385). 
422 As CHEW notes, this seems to be a perennial fear, since the doctrine of unconscionability “is frequently 
characterised as inexact, full of uncertainty and incapable of consistent rationalisation and the cases flowing therefrom 
cannot therefore be that easily integrated” (CHEW, C., 2014, supra note 358, p. 248. See also PHILLIPS, J., 2010, 
supra note 18, p. 846). 
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practice,” as “judges can radically differ on the implications to be drawn from an agreed set of 
facts.”423 
The problem with the criticisms laid against unconscionability due to its alleged 
uncertainty, is that they seem to establish a different standard for this doctrine, 
expecting a degree of certainty unheard of in other areas of the law.424 Many essential 
parts of our legal system are based on relatively uncertain elements (e.g. how much 
pressure is required to consider duress strong enough to vitiate a contract) that only 
become precise enough to be workable once the judge makes a casuistic analysis. This 
flexibility is precisely what allows them to be useful to serve those that the doctrine aims 
to protect. This is particularly true in the case of unconscionability, which mostly becomes 
necessary because of “the inflexibility of our inherited contract doctrines”.425  
“In any event the uncertain nature of the doctrine can be overstated since in time the 
courts delineate those circumstances and patterns of behaviour that invoke the 
doctrine and those that do not. The general principle therefore becomes refined by 
judicial decision making, which enables the prediction of outcomes (and the giving of 
proper legal advice) to become much easier.”426 
It is worth noting that the fact that English courts do not favor the unconscionability 
doctrine should not, in any way, be construed as if that meant that there was some sort of 
Darwinian contracting theory in place. On the contrary, English courts readily 
acknowledge the existence of unfair situations in contracts, and recognize that some 
types of curtailments on freedom of contract are necessary. Because of this, and as it has 
already been mentioned, courts have resorted to other doctrines in order to ensure 
fairness, so as to avoid the difficulties inherent to unconscionability, simply by adopting 
and applying English law in a flexible manner. Indeed, as THAL notes,  
“although English courts have rejected the inequality of bargaining power doctrine in 
name, they have not thereby rejected the notion that at least some minimal degree of 
fairness is required to establish the validity of a contract. In fact, considerations of 
fairness are essential to establish duress or undue influence, doctrines which are 
often seen as alternatives to the fairness-based doctrine of inequality of bargaining 
power.”427 
                                                                  
423 ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 192. 
424 NEUBORNE, B., 2015, supra note 100, p. 198. 
425 SPANOGLE, J. A., 1969, supra note 212, p. 933. 
426 PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, p. 846. 
427 THAL, S. N., 1988, supra note 317, p. 33. Following the lead set by Lord DENNING in Lloyd’s Bank v Bundy, some 
authors continue to argue that these other doctrines, which in the end also seek to protect one of the parties, are 
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What is more, doctrines that are analogous to unconscionability have been used 
successfully in other areas of the law of contracts, such as restraint of trade and 
estoppel.428 This clearly demonstrates that English law is by no means in the business of 
leaving weak parties hanging in the wind. 
This practice of “creative interpretation” of the law has drawn some criticism, with some 
arguing that English courts actually apply the doctrine of unconscionability, but do so 
under different names.429 Indeed, it has been argued, for example, that the rather creative 
use of doctrines dealings with consent and contractual interpretation, employed in the 
absence of a general unconscionability doctrine, contribute to the very uncertainty that 
the courts have tried to prevent, by rejecting this doctrine based on (un)fairness and 
(unequal) bargaining power.430  
WADDAMS has argued that the “creative” analysis of consent to prevent the enforcement 
of unfair bargains is “fictitious, artificial, and circular, and […] distorts the concept of consent 
in cases where that concept is really needed, such as mistake.”431 This is true, since a person 
selling an item for a tenth of its price, or “the accident victim who settles a claim for a small 
amount in cash,” are well aware of what they are doing, even if their transactions are not 
particularly beneficial to them. It is a mistake, therefore, to try to protect them by arguing 
that theirs was not a real consent. Furthermore, looking at unconscionable bargains as 
devoid of consent, even when all the “ordinary tests of assent, subjective and objective, are 
fully met,” creates the problem of requiring the court to analyze what assent can be 
understood as “true assent” in those cases where a party might have been taken 
advantage of.432 Clearly, this is the kind of casuistic and vague analysis that the detractors 
of the unconscionability doctrine were hoping to prevent. 
These arguments do seem to hold water, and adopting an all-encompassing doctrine for 
unconscionable bargains would actually eliminate some of the uncertainty. This would be 
achieved by placing issues like undue influence and economic duress outside of the realm 
of vitiated consent (where they are awkwardly paired with the doctrines of fraud, mistake 
and misrepresentation), and would openly accept the influence of morality and fairness 
into the courts’ decisions on contractual matters. This would grant a greater coherence to 
the contractual process, lower uncertainty, and increase predictability. 
                                                                  
428 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, p. 464 
429 PHILLIPS goes as far as saying that, at least in the case of economic duress, it is “no more than the doctrine of 
unconscionability in disguise” (PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, p. 851). 
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4.4 Unconscionability in the United States (and elsewhere) 
Unlike what happened in England, where the doctrine was, for the most part, scrapped 
altogether, in the United States unconscionability was much better received.433 Starting 
with the 1870 Supreme Court case of Scott v. United States, American courts and 
legislatures have been considerably more open than their English counterparts to 
unconscionability.434 Although in Scott the Supreme Court deemed a contract 
unenforceable because of mistake, it recognized that  
“[w]here there is a written contract and a like misunderstanding is developed, a 
court of equity will refuse to execute it. If a contract be unreasonable and 
unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will give to the party who sues 
for its breach damages not according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably 
entitled to.” 435 
Although this decision did not base its refusal to enforce the contract on 
unconscionability, it did open the door to it.  However, since the Court only mentioned it 
in passing, without applying it to the facts of the case, it did not establish a framework to 
guide its application.436 Nevertheless, the Court did lay the groundwork for future 
decisions that aimed to protect weak parties from unfair bargains or, at the very least, 
showed that there was an underlying core set of values that the courts needed to 
acknowledge in order to avoid unfair results. 
The values that American courts assumed underlined their law were better exposed in 
Justice FRANKFURTER’s dissent in the 1942 Supreme Court case of United States v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation.437 This was a case where the US government had contracted 
with Bethlehem Steel for the building of 13 ships during 1917 and 1918, when  
“Germany’s destructive warfare against our ocean shipping essential to the 
successful prosecution of the war made it necessary for the United States to build the 
greatest possible number of ships in the shortest possible time.”438 
The United States’ government argued that the contracts had been “made under ‘duress’ 
and were ‘unconscionable’ as a matter of law.”439 Although the government’s position was 
                                                                  
433 It should be remembered that this “scrapping” was often just nominal since, as we have seen, the doctrine of 
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not welcomed by the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, who reasoned that 
the government had other bargaining tools at its disposal at the time of negotiating the 
contract, it did leave some doors open. Justice FRANKFURTER expressed his displeasure in a 
powerful dissent, where he argued: 
“Today it is held that because the circumstances of this case cannot be fitted into a 
neatly carved pigeonhole in the law of contracts, 'daylight robbery', exploitation of 
the 'necessities' of the country at war, must be consummated by this Court. It is said 
that familiar principles would be outraged if Bethlehem were denied recovery on 
these contracts. But is there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly 
embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic doctrine that the 
courts will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and 
injustice? Does any principle in our law have more universal application than the 
doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative positions of 
the parties are such that one has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities 
of the other?” 
These principles are not foreign to the law of contracts. Fraud and physical duress 
are not the only grounds upon which courts refuse to enforce contracts. The law is 
not so primitive that it sanctions every injustice except brute force and downright 
fraud. More specifically, the courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the 
enforcement of a 'bargain' in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the 
economic necessities of the other. 'And there is great reason and justice in this rule, 
for necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a present 
exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.”440 
It was not until the 1948 case of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, before t the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, and the 1960 case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., before the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, that the unconscionability doctrine received a more 
systematic analysis of its application.441  
In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, the Court recognized the element of oppression as part of 
the doctrine of unconscionability, arguing that the party with the most bargaining power 
in the transaction (in this case Campbell Soup, vis à vis two carrot farmers) was in a 
position to impose its will against the other. In a decision that some commentators have 
called “almost moral in tone,” and being “more of a scolding than a piece of judicial writing,” 
the Court noted that although the agreement in itself was not illegal, its unconscionable 
                                                                                                                                                                       
439 PARRISH, M. E., ‘Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: A Rejoinder’, 1984, 70 Cornell Law Review, no. 6, 
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440 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. [1942], p. 326. 
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character prevented it from being enforceable by the courts.442 Concisely, the Court stated 
that  
“a party who has offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as tough as this one 
is, should not come to a chancellor and ask court help in the enforcement of its terms. 
That equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well established to 
require elaborate citation.”443 
The 1960 Henningsen decision dealt with the unfair surprise facet of unconscionability, 
after the Court reviewed a contract in which terms that excluded certain types of liability 
of the vendor, had been deliberately hidden from the purchaser. The Court considered 
this behavior on the part of the seller to be abhorrent, so much so that only “the 
abandonment of all sense of justice” would allow its enforcement in the terms demanded by 
the seller.444 Demonstrating an acute awareness of the possible criticisms that could be 
leveled against this refusal to enforce unconscionable bargains, the Court reasoned that: 
“In the modern consideration of problems such as this […] judges are ‘chancellors’ 
and cannot fail to be influenced by any equitable doctrines that are available. 
[…T]here is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress, misrepresentation 
and undue influence, not to mention differences in economic bargaining power’ to 
enable the courts to avoid enforcement of unconscionable provisions in long printed 
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Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. [1960], pp. 365–367 (emphasis added). 
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standardized contracts. Freedom of contract is not such an immutable doctrine as to 
admit of no qualification in the area in which we are concerned. As Chief Justice 
Hughes said in his dissent in Morehead v. People of State of New York […]: 
‘We have had frequent occasion to consider the limitations on liberty of contract. 
While it is highly important to preserve that liberty from arbitrary and capricious 
interference, it is also necessary to prevent its abuse, as otherwise it could be used to 
override all public interests and thus in the end destroy the very freedom of 
opportunity which it is designed to safeguard.’”445 
Although the Henningsen decision was an important step in the history of the doctrine, it 
was not creating something. Indeed, by 1952 American law had already recognized the 
existence of unconscionability in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a fact the 
Henningsen Court expressly referenced in its decision.446 Under the heading 
“Unconscionable Contract or Clause,” Section 2-302 of the UCC established two rules on 
unconscionability: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contractor any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contractor any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and 
effect to aid the court in making the determination. 
As it is evident from the wording of this provision, the UCC, like the American and 
English decisions that preceded it, did not even attempt to establish a clear-cut definition 
of unconscionability. What is more, as SPANOGLE notes, the UCC “provides neither a 
definition of the term ‘unconscionable’ nor an elaboration of the conceptual framework of the 
doctrine,” opting instead to describe “the remedies available to a court once it has found an 
unconscionable contract or clause”.447 Instead of an oversight, not giving a fixed definition 
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this seems to have been a deliberate choice when the provision was drafted, opting 
instead to empower the courts to make case-by-case assessments on the basis of certain 
standards of measure.448 
The lack of a definition seems to have been a deliberate decision, motivated by the 
concern that a rigid description would quickly make unconscionability “become outmoded 
and inapplicable to future abuses.”449 LLEWELYN, the drafter of UCC §2-302, would have 
therefore avoided a precise definition in order to keep the norm from becoming useless 
through savvy drafting of contracts. As SPANOGLE explains: 
“Through the unconscionability doctrine, Llewellyn tried to inhibit the businessman 
or attorney from automatically asserting all conceivable rights in all transactions. 
Such a purpose requires that the doctrine be incapable of exact definition. If exact 
definition were possible, draftsmen could draft to the threshold of unconscionability, 
recreating the problem in a slightly different context, and defeating the purpose of 
the doctrine.”450 
The Official Comment to this section of the UCC also avoids strict definitions. Instead, it 
refers to the balancing test that needs to be made by the courts in unconscionability 
cases, and to the governing principles that inform the provision: 
“This section is intended to allow the court to pass judgment directly on the 
unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a 
conclusion of law as to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether, in the light of 
the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade 
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract [...] The principle is 
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise [...] and not of disturbance of 
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.”451 
In the absence of a clearly-defined legal meaning, the most quoted definition of 
unconscionability in American law seems to be that offered by Judge WRIGHT of the Court 
of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit in the “groundbreaking” 1965 case of Williams v. Walker-
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Thomas Furniture Co.452 There he described unconscionability as “an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party”.453  
The plaintiff in the Williams case, Ora Lee Williams, was a single parent of seven children 
whose only income was a USD $218 monthly government stipend.454 bought a stereo for 
USD $514.95 from the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, to be paid in installments. 
Under the pre-printed terms of this contract, if Williams missed any payments, then the 
store would have the right to repossess the item. The terms further established, “in very 
fine print,” that payments of the installments would be credited on a pro-rata basis to all 
the outstanding debts that she already had with the store.455 There was also a cross-
collateralization provision, the purpose of which was extremely difficult to comprehend 
for someone with the background and educational level of the plaintiff. As KOROBKIN 
explains: 
“The effect of the contract's 'cross-collateralization' provision was that none of 
William's purchases from Walker-Thomas Furniture would be paid in full until all 
were paid in full, and the store would retain title to all of the items purchased. The 
practical impact of this was that if Williams missed a payment Walker-Thomas 
would have the right to repossess all of the furniture it had sold her, even if the 
payments she had previously made totaled to an amount greater than the price of all 
of the items except for the most recently purchased one.”456 
Since Williams soon defaulted on her payments, the company moved to repossess all the 
items that she had purchased from them. These amounted to a total of USD $1800, even 
though the balance that was left unpaid before she bought the stereo was only of USD 
$164. 
Williams’ lawyers argued that the clause used by the company was against public policy 
and unenforceable as a matter of law. Both the trial judge and the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals were not moved by this argument, basing their decision on a classic 
understanding of contracts, based on which “a voluntary agreement between competent 
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persons is sufficient to vary their interpersonal rights and duties.”457 To put it bluntly, the 
plaintiff should have been more careful when she signed her agreement and, absent any 
kind of fraud, mistake or duress, she could not expect the courts to set aside her contract. 
It was only upon review of these decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit that enforcement was denied. Here the Court disagreed with the basic idea 
that “fraud, duress, and mistake exhaust the grounds for setting aside a bargain,” arguing that 
unconscionability should also be part of that list of exceptions.458 
Explaining the Court’s decision, Judge WRIGHT stated: 
“Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined 
by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases 
the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining 
power. The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this 
consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or 
lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or 
were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive 
sales practices? Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of 
its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. 
But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a 
commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is 
hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was 
ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the 
agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should 
consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be 
withheld.”459 
As someone known for his devotion to social causes, Judge WRIGHT had an axe to grind 
with companies like that of the defendants. They represented a type of merchant whose 
core business was based on the exploitation of the poor and uneducated, enforcing 
onerous and patently unfair terms against them. Indeed, the practices of the defendant in 
this case had clearly been predatory in nature: 
“The Walker-Thomas Furniture Company operated its business in a neighborhood 
where one quarter of the families lived in poverty. It operated by sending out 
aggressive door-to-door salesmen, who presented customers with the household 
items they badly needed and contracts with very small print. The salesman told the 
customer to ‘just sign here’ and did not point out the contract's lease and pro rata 
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provisions or explain their meaning. [It was] [d]uring one of these salesman's visits, 
[that] Ora Williams signed a contract wherein she risked losing her family's basic 
household items in exchange for credit on the purchase of a stereo.”460 
It is important to note that Judge WRIGHT’s decision did not simply seek to protect 
someone from a bad bargain. The Williams case was not about a plaintiff whimsically 
trying to go back on her contracts because she had second thoughts about what she 
purchased. Instead it was about a plaintiff that risked losing all of her household 
necessities, including her bed and that of her children, their cookware, their washing 
machine, etc., as a result of a virtually hidden clause in a contract to purchase a stereo on 
credit.  
“That is not simply a bad bargain the result of which is merely an unsatisfied 
personal preference or a frustrated subjective goal; Williams traded away the 
material conditions of human freedom, the material conditions of living a life she can 
regard as her own.”461 
An interesting fact about the Williams case, and that further cemented the 
unconscionability doctrine within the American legal system, is that at the time that 
Williams signed her contract, the UCC had not yet been adopted by Congress. So, aware of 
the fact that the decision could not be based on the UCC, the Court used it not as the ratio 
decidendi for the case, but rather as an illustration of the existence of the doctrine of 
unconscionability in the Common Law. And so, the Court took great care in explaining 
that the adoption of the UCC did not mean that, prior to this adoption the Common Law 
of the District did not include such a rule. Instead, “[c]ombining the recent passage of the 
UCC and the common law that it had just cited, the court held that, ‘where the element of 
unconscionability is present at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be 
enforced.’”462 
It is interesting to see how the English and the American systems took such different 
approaches towards the same doctrine, despite starting from the same precedents. While 
English Courts have all but killed the doctrine, American law has come to accept it as part 
of its body of laws, despite the controversy that has surrounded it since its very 
beginnings. A clear example of this acceptance in America involves the UCC itself, since 
even though §2-302 was met with quite a bit of skepticism and was “initially regarded as 
one of the most controversial sections of a somewhat controversial codification, it has been 
adopted even by states which originally resisted it.”463 
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Solid evidence of the acceptance of unconscionability in US law comes from the fact that 
the courts have actually gone beyond the original constraints of the doctrine, and 
expanded its reach. §2-302 is therefore accepted as a general clause “essentially authorizing 
courts to review contract terms,” not limited to specific contracts, despite being part of an 
article governing contracts of sale.464 As a matter of fact, even though “some decisions 
emphasized the limited applicability of section 2-302, it has nevertheless been used in 
transactions other than sales, such as guarantees, insurance contracts, and leases of chattels.”465 
It was this application “by analogy” that allowed this provision in particular, and the 
doctrine of unconscionability in general, to flourish and expand its reach in American 
contract law. 
The doctrine, as well as its general application, was further cemented in American law by 
its inclusion in the 1979 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which established: 
“§ 208. Unconscionable Contract or Term  
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”466 
Despite its original success, the doctrine would see a decline in importance as the 20th 
Century was coming to an end, as “America’s national mood shifted away from faith in 
governmental regulation of business and toward ‘free market’ principles, as proclaimed by […] 
President Ronald Reagan.”467 And so, up to the 1990’s, the doctrine saw its application 
reduced, for the most part, to consumer contracts (although some cases did touch upon 
business transactions), and even receiving only marginal attention in that reduced sphere. 
What is more, as LONEGRASS has noted, for decades the story of this doctrine “has been one 
of survival rather than of growth,” as its scope of application became increasingly 
restricted.468 Interestingly, it was the application of the doctrine in the realm of 
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arbitration provisions that brought with it a renewed interest in the doctrine that led to 
its application in other fields.469  
4.5 The Elements of Unconscionability 
The Williams decisions and, arguably, the UCC before it, clarified what continues to be the 
conventional approach towards unconscionability under US law. This is particularly so in 
regards to the way in which courts must analyze the facts of the case in order to 
determine whether an unconscionable bargain, resorting to a two-tiered approach. As we 
have seen, Judge WRIGHT stated in his decision that unconscionability involves: (a) “an 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties”, and (b) “contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party”.470 This division highlights the differences 
between unconscionability and other defenses such as fraud, duress, mistake, 
impossibility, or illegality, as they focus either on the contracting process or on the 
resulting contract or contractual terms, but not on both.471 The distinctiveness of the 
unconscionability doctrine, therefore, comes from the fact that it devotes its attention to 
both the contracting process (the way in which the agreement was reached), as well as to 
the terms themselves.472 
The analysis of unconscionability, particularly in American law (albeit not exclusively) is, 
as we have seen, characterized by the division of the doctrine in two separate aspects, 
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both of which must be taken into account when a contract is being analyzed.473 On the 
one hand, there is the issue of the fairness (or lack thereof) of the way in which the 
parties arrived to their agreement (known as “procedural unconscionability”) and, on the 
other, the issue of the fairness of the terms themselves (referred to as “substantive 
unconscionability”). This is a fundamental distinction, as it will often be the case that 
unfairness in only one of these prongs will not be sufficient to deem a contract 
unconscionable. So, for example, a contract that was fairly negotiated, but resulted in 
unfair terms for one of the parties, would not be ruled as unconscionable, because doing 
so would somehow remedy one of the parties’ lack of diligence.474 The opposite case would 
                                                                  
473 SCHMITZ criticizes this two-prong test of unconscionability, arguing that it demonstrates how the courts have 
become “increasingly rigid” in its application. This rigidity, the author argues, goes against unconscionability’s 
reliance on “context, common sense and conscience” instead of “mathematical” norms and values (SCHMITZ, A. J., 
2006, supra note 371, p. 75). 
It is worth mentioning that the distinction between these two prongs of unconscionability is not inherently 
American. As Lord BRIGHTMAN of the Privy Council stated in Hart v. O’Connor (on appeal from New Zealand): 
“If a contract is stigmatised as ‘unfair’, it may be unfair in one of two ways. It may be unfair by reason of 
the unfair manner in which it was brought into existence; a contract induced by undue influence is unfair 
in this sense. It will be convenient to call this "procedural unfairness." It may also, in some contexts, be 
described (accurately or inaccurately) as ‘unfair’ by reason of the fact that the terms of the contract are 
more favourable to one party than to the other. In order to distinguish this "unfairness" from procedural 
unfairness, it will be convenient to call it "contractual imbalance." The two concepts may overlap. 
Contractual imbalance may be so extreme as to raise a presumption of procedural unfairness, such as 
undue influence or some other form of victimisation. Equity will relieve a party from a contract which he 
has been induced to make as a result of victimisation. Equity will not relieve a party from a contract on the 
ground only that there is contractual imbalance not amounting to unconscionable dealing.” 
Hart v. O'Connor [1985], 1985 AC, 1000–1027, pp. 1017–1018. 
474 The concern about courts using unconscionability as a way to benefit parties who were not diligent at the time 
of negotiation, or who simply regret their actions, is all too common in the literature. In general, the fear of the 
critics is that “the courts will use unconscionability to free parties from contract commitments regardless of whether the 
parties deliberately entered into the contract, or the agreement as a whole served the parties’ interests at the time of 
contracting” (SCHMITZ, A. J., 2006, supra note 371, p. 96). Indeed, unconscionability has often been seen as 
“impermissibly paternalistic,” since it allegedly “rescues responsible agents from the consequences of their own 
mistakes” (NADLER, J., 2015, supra note 454, p. 213). Regarding the diligence of the parties at the time of 
contracting, ENMAN argues that perhaps the fact that English courts are unwilling to resort to the doctrine of 
unconscionability means that “English consumers may realize that relief from contracts for unconscionability is rare 
and exercise greater care when negotiating contracts”; in contrast, those consumers in jurisdictions where this relief 
is more readily available might “have come to depend on obtaining relief from unconscionable bargains and [have 
therefore become] less vigilant in protecting themselves” (ENMAN, S. R., 1987, supra note 332, p. 218). While 
theoretically sound, this line of reasoning seems incorrect. Although it is true that if consumers know that they 
can always obtain redress from the courts for less-than-favorable agreements they have much less of an incentive 
to be diligent, it is unlikely that legal understanding is as common as ENMAN seems to believe, nor that 
consumers would really see litigation (often long and costly) as a real alternative to simply being careful in their 
dealings. The idea that knowledge about the doctrine of unconscionability, let alone its application, is ubiquitous 
enough so as to have a noticeable effect in the behavior of consumers seems more like wishful thinking than 
anything else. Furthermore, many of the situations in consumer contracting where unconscionability arises are 
not precisely fertile ground for increased diligence, due to, for example, the inability of the consumers to read, 
not to mention understand, the boilerplate terms that they are expected to acquiesce to. 
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also be true, that is if a prima facie unfair negotiation leads to fair terms in the bargain, 
since it would be difficult for a party to demand the court sets aside the agreement if no 
unfair terms resulted from the negotiation.475  
Despite the importance of this division, it is worth nothing that the separation between 
“procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability is often artificial, as there are many 
cases in which it is truly impossible to exactly determine what type of unconscionability 
exists. Although, of course, there are cases in which the unfairness of the bargain is so 
obvious (e.g. exploitation of a party in distress) that procedural unconscionability 
becomes evident, the alleged unfairness only becomes relevant once it is reflected in the 
terms of the contract (i.e. the “substantive” part). And so, both kinds of unconscionability 
“usually go hand in hand;” for example, “the concept of unfair surprise implies the coexistence of 
procedural and substantive unfairness,” etc.476 
Finally, and before we delve into both facets of unconscionability, it should be noted that 
even though American law has more or less expressly accepted this distinction, it should 
not be seen as limited exclusively to America. Indeed, the distinction between substantive 
and procedural unconscionability is not really an American invention, but rather merely 
the consequence of our changing understanding of contracts. As we have already seen, 
classical contract theory was based on the assumption that the fact that the parties 
manifested their assent in a contract meant that this was really what they wanted. Taking 
that presumption of meaningful assent as a starting point, the law was only concerned 
with the way in which the agreement came to be, the procedural aspect of it, since the 
terms themselves, the substantive elements, were assumed to be fair and just. As the 
reality of contracting changed, however, it was realized that the substantive elements, 
just like the procedural ones, could and should be subjected to some degree of scrutiny.477 
From this perspective, even if a specific system does not expressly distinguish between 
                                                                  
475 KNAPP argues that even on their own, substantive and procedural unconscionability can serve as the basis to 
deem a contract (or a term) unenforceable. While in his assessment in regards to extreme cases of procedural 
unconscionability he correctly points at cases in which the unconscionability is such that it approaches cases of 
“fraud, duress, or undue influence,” (while recognizing that they are independent bases of contractual avoidance) 
his treatment of extreme substantive unconscionability is less than satisfying. There his examples refer to cases 
of illegal agreements, such as an employee agreeing to be paid less than the minimum wage or, even more 
bizarrely, a contract to sell a child or a minor “consenting” to sexual intercourse (the latter one being a 
particularly strange choice, as sexual consent, whether over or under the age of consent, has never been 
considered contractual in nature, and therefore its inclusion seems quite odd). In these cases a finding of 
unconscionability would be unnecessary, as the law directly and specifically deems them unenforceable, or 
downright criminal (KNAPP, C. L., 2013, supra note 463, pp. 15–16). 
476 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1073.  
477 FREILICH, A. & WEBB, E., 2013, supra note 399, p. 140. 
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procedural and substantive unconscionability, both elements will always play a role in a 
finding of unconscionability.478 
4.6 Procedural Unconscionability 
As its name implies, procedural unconscionability deals with the way in which the parties 
arrived to the terms that form their contract. It is closely related to the issue of the 
voluntary and knowing assent, as a procedurally unconscionable contract “results in the 
surprise, oppression, or both of the weaker party.”479  
According to BROWNE, procedural unconscionability can be the result of any of the 
following elements: 
“(1) absence of meaningful choice; (2) superiority of bargaining power; (3) the fact 
that the contract is an adhesion contract; (4) unfair surprise; or (5) sharp practices 
and deception”480 
While thorough, BROWNE might actually be a bit overzealous in his approach. Indeed, as 
we have seen, neither superiority of bargaining power, nor the mere existence of a 
contract of adhesion can or should be considered as sufficient causes for setting a contract 
aside. Instead, more than being the result of “any” of the elements mentioned by BROWNE, 
it seems like it would be more accurate to say that a finding of procedural 
unconscionability would often involve a combination of them. 
The above notwithstanding, there is certain agreement on the fact that procedural 
unconscionability manifests itself in, for example, the weaker party being unfairly 
surprised by contractual terms that “hidden in fine print or obtuse language,” or in situations 
where the weaker party was only able to obtain the goods or services if she agreed “to the 
terms dictated by the stronger party.”481 It deals with how the parties came to the agreement, 
taking into account the type of contract that was used, its nature, its language and 
                                                                  
478 See, for example, ibid., p. 149 (“[the new Australian Consumer Law] is concerned with both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability). 
479 NATION [III], G. A., 2005, supra note 397, p. 111. As SPANOGLE notes, defining “oppression” as a source of 
unconscionability is rather complex, as it often intersects with the issue of duress, something that adds to the 
confusion. The fundamental element of oppression, however, is the fact that while the party in question has “the 
choice of contracting or not, [she] has no choice of the terms of the contract – the contract of adhesion,” with this 
resulting in harsh terms imposed against the adhering party. Unlike oppression, “unfair surprise” is fairly easy to 
visualize, as it involves some sort of deception by the other contractual party. Examples of such behavior include 
hiding a particularly nefarious clause in a mass of fine print terms, or to phrase a term in a language that would 
be virtually incomprehensible for the layman reader (SPANOGLE, J. A., 1969, supra note 212, p. 944).  
480 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 222. 
481 NATION [III], G. A., 2005, supra note 397, p. 111. 
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wording, etc.482 Due to its nature, this facet of unconscionability often presents the 
complication of overlapping with “the traditional contract doctrines regarding formation of a 
contract and those that police agreements for fraud, duress, and the like,” and which also deal 
with how the parties achieve their (at least apparent) agreement.483  
Unlike its substantive counterpart, the application of procedural unconscionability has 
been considerably less controversial. This due to the fact that it does not really seem to go 
against the fundamentals of freedom of contract and the related principles of free 
bargaining, as it does not aim to analyze the justice of the contract itself, as defined by its 
terms and its price. Instead, procedural unconscionability seeks to guarantee a fair 
bargaining process, by ensuring that both parties are acting in a way that allows their 
consent to be truly voluntary and informed. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained in 
Weaver v. American Oil Company, is about demonstrating that “there was a real and 
voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting.”484 
When seeking to determine whether procedural unconscionability existed, the courts 
must engage in an intensive analysis of the facts surrounding the contract, relating to 
both the personal situation of the parties, as well as to the contracting environment in 
which the contract was concluded. So, for example, in regards to their personal situation, 
“the age, literacy, and business sophistication of the party claiming unconscionability,” as well 
as his “level of education and socioeconomic status” will play a role in the court’s assessment. 
Similarly, external factors, such as the merchant’s “use of pressure tactics to obtain hasty 
signatures and the presence of boilerplate language buried in small print” will determine 
whether his will be seen as “good” or “bad” contractual behavior.485 In an attempt to list 
the factors that should be considered to determine the existence of procedural 
unconscionability, the Kansas Supreme Court formulated, in Willie v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., a test which, in regards to the procedural prong, said that courts should 
analyze  
“whether the contract was a standard form, whether the clause at issue was 
boilerplate, whether the clause was hidden (nonconspicuous), whether the language 
used was incomprehensible to a layperson, whether there was inequality of 
                                                                  
482 D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 11. 
483 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1072. EPSTEIN does not see this so much as a problem, but rather as 
the correct use of unconscionability, arguing that “ideally, the unconscionability doctrine protects against fraud, 
duress and incompetence, without demanding specific proof of any of them.” EPSTEIN, R. A., 1975, supra note 336, 
p. 302. 
484 Weaver v. American Oil Company [1971], 276 NE 2d, 144–155, p. 148. 
485 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 9. 
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bargaining power, and whether there was an exploitation of the ‘underprivileged, 
unsophisticated, uneducated and the illiterate.’”486 
4.6.1 Economic Duress as Procedural Unconscionability 
According to some critics, the application of the unconscionability doctrine should be 
limited, at least for the most part, to its procedural prong, leaving the “substantive” 
aspects aside. EPSTEIN, for example, argues that even though unconscionability is 
important in regards to the process of contract formation when it comes to issues of 
duress, fraud and undue influence, as well as in cases where one of the parties can be 
deemed as incompetent, it should go no further. He goes as far as arguing that using 
unconscionability to combat substantive unfairness would serve “only to undercut the 
private right of contract in a manner that is apt to do more social harm than good”.487 Even 
when he addresses issues like duress and undue influence, EPSTEIN is very conservative in 
his application of unconscionability, clearly giving preponderance to freedom of contract 
over any consideration of fairness.  
EPSTEIN is clear in his rejection of the unconscionability doctrine being applied in cases of 
economic duress, arguing that it goes against basic considerations of party autonomy.488 
To illustrate his reasoning, EPSTEIN puts forward an argument, in the form of a thought 
experiment: 
“Suppose that B at the outset refuses to clean A's clothes unless A pays him $15, even 
when B's previous price had been $10. There is no doubt that A is worse off on 
account of B's decision to make a ‘take it or leave it’ offer, but it would be the gravest 
mistake to argue that B's conduct constitutes actionable duress because it puts A to 
an uncomfortable choice. Indeed the case is sharply distinguishable both from the 
threats or use of force [(i.e. B forcing A’s consent by those means)] and from the 
duress of goods [(i.e., in this example, B agreeing to clean A’s clothes for $10, 
but then refusing to deliver them unless A pays $15)]. In those two cases of 
duress, B put A to the choice between two of his entitlements. In this situation he 
only puts A to the choice between entitlement and desire, between A's money, which 
                                                                  
486 Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. [1976], 549 P. 2d, 755–765, pp. 758–759 See also DIMATTEO, L. A. & RICH, B. 
L., ‘A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action’, 2005, 33 Florida State 
University Law Review, no. 4, p. 1076. 
487 EPSTEIN, R. A., 1975, supra note 336, p. 315. 
488 Due to its clear relation with the subject matter of this book, special attention will devoted to the topic of 
economic duress. Since the other topics addressed by EPSTEIN, despite their relevance, are not as closely related to 
this research (e.g. the procedural unconscionability that exists due to the lower mental competence of the 
contractual party) we direct the reader to EPSTEIN, R. A., ‘Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’, 1975, 18 
Journal of Law and Economics, no. 2, for a quick overview. 
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he owns, and B's services, which he desires. It is the very kind of choice involved in all 
exchanges. A could not complain if B decided not to make him any offer at all; why 
then is he entitled to complain if B decides to make him better off by now giving him 
a choice when before he had none? If A does not like B's offer, he can reject it; but to 
allow him to first accept the agreement and only thereafter to force B to work at a 
price which B finds unacceptable is to allow him to resort (with the aid of the state) 
to the very form of duress that on any theory is prohibited. There is no question of 
‘dictation’ of terms where B refuses to accept the terms desired by A. There is every 
question of dictation where A can repudiate his agreement with B and hold B to one 
to which B did not consent; and that element of dictation remains even if A is but a 
poor individual and B is a large and powerful corporation. To allow that to take place 
is to indeed countenance an ‘inequality of bargaining power’ between A and B, with 
A having the legal advantage as he is given formal legal rights explicitly denied B. 
The question of duress is not that of the equality of bargaining power in a loose sense 
that refers to the wealth of the parties. It is the question of what means are 
permissible to achieve agreement.”489 
EPSTEIN’s argument, particularly in regards to a party’s inability to demand service, vis à vis 
her right to demand better terms, appears to be convincing. Indeed, in principle, it does 
not seem to be right that the State should have the ability to force a party to conduct her 
businesses in any specific manner; and so, in the example above, it would not seem 
appropriate to force B, after the contract has been concluded, to receive a lower price than 
what she originally charged, and with which A agreed to, even if reluctantly. Despite this 
appearance of solidity, however, the strength of this argument is only skin-deep. Indeed, 
even if we set aside cases, like those of salvage, in which one of the parties is in such a dire 
need of assistance that she might as well be considered to be forced to agree to any terms 
placed in front of her, there is still plenty of space to accept economic duress as a valid 
example of procedural unconscionability.  
Before dealing with EPSTEIN’s examples and criticisms, some conceptual clarifications are 
in order. First, it is undisputed that the presence of duress vitiates the free assent that is 
essential for a contract to exist. Indeed, the Common Law has recognized for years that 
fear of mayhem, of imprisonment, of loss of life, of loss of limb, or of damage to a 
person’s property, are sufficient to set a contract aside.490 Although originally applied in a 
rather strict and limited fashion, a form of duress that affected the way in which a party 
agreed to certain terms, an economic duress, was gradually accepted. As a 1931 US Court 
of Claims case noted: 
                                                                  
489 ibid., p. 297. 
490 HARLEY, J. A., ‘Economic Duress and Unconscionability: How Fair Must the Government Be’, 1988, 18 Public 
Contract Law Journal, no. 1, p. 80. 
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“The rule as to duress, indicated by the trend of authorities, has receded from its 
ancient strictness and has been accepted in numerous instances wherein it appeared 
that the parties were not on equal terms and no alternative existed except to submit 
to an illegal exaction or suffer irreparable injury to business.”491 
Following a 1953 decision of this same Court, the elements of economic duress have been 
fairly easy to enumerate: “(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) 
that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the 
result of coercive acts of the opposite party.”492 
With the above elements in mind, three cases come to mind in which EPSTEIN’s example 
can manifest itself. One of them deals with an indefensible, deliberate and discriminatory 
move on the part of the seller to damage the buyer, by arbitrarily charging him more than 
the rest; another, with a simple case of price-gouging, that is the deliberate attempt on 
the part of the seller to take advantage of a general disruption, as a way to profit from 
some form of catastrophe or disaster; finally, another case deals with seller’s abuse of her 
position in the market or of the disadvantageous (albeit not catastrophic) position of the 
buyer. For the purpose of this analysis, and due to their connection with the topic at 
hand, we shall focus our attention only on the last two possibilities.  
Based on EPSTEIN’s views, restricting price gouging, as statutes in the United States and 
several other countries have done, would in itself be against freedom of contract, since it 
would affect a party’s ability to simply establish whatever price she desires. This due to 
the fact that, unlike what happens in the case of salvage and other matters of exploitation 
of distress, the needs of the buyer are not desperate, even if they do represent a real 
necessity on his part. So, EPSTEIN’s theory would actually deem this type of restrictions as 
unlawful. 
Without even referring to the moral objections that might exist against those who would 
exploit human needs and suffering by means of price gouging, the problem with EPSTEIN’s 
contention is that it is based on a flawed understanding of the market.493 Indeed, if there 
                                                                  
491 Cited in ibid., pp. 81–82. 
492 Cited in ibid., p. 82. 
493 Plenty of ink has been spilled debating the merits and flaws of price gouging regulation, as well as of price 
gouging itself. Although regulations on price gouging do not necessarily deal with issues of unconscionability, the 
arguments seem to be, mutatis mutandis, perfectly applicable to the unconscionability doctrine in regards to 
economic duress.  Supporters of the regulations, like those who argue in favor of preventing bargaining 
imbalances through the doctrine of unconscionability, argue that they are aimed at protecting abuses, in an 
attempt to protect and further some basic societal moral guidelines. “Greed is a vice”, argue these supporters,  
“a bad way of being, especially when it makes people oblivious to the suffering of others. More than a 
personal vice, it is at odds with civic virtue. In times of trouble, a good society pulls together. Rather than 
press for maximum advantage, people look out for one another. A society in which people exploit their 
neighbors for financial gain in times of crisis is not a good society. Excessive greed is therefore a vice that a 
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was in fact a case in which a seller could simply spike up the prices so that the next buyer 
in line would have to pay more than the previous one, we would be in the presence of a 
completely broken market, and in which the goals of efficiency would not be met. It is 
important to remember that in a competitive market sellers are not in a position to 
deliberately and arbitrarily modify their prices, since buyers would simply seek a different 
provider, meaning that the price-gouging seller would quickly go out of business. The fact 
that a market allows for price-gouging shows, in and of itself, that the market is not 
functioning in an effective fashion and that, therefore, allowing the terms obtained by 
means of “economic duress” to be enforced would actually protect and reinforce a 
dysfunctional economic system. 
It is certainly not our contention that prices cannot or should not be raised in cases of 
necessity; on the contrary. In an emergency, the costs of any business are bound to 
increase, and it is understandable that those costs will be passed to the consumer. 
Holding the opposing view would in effect force businesses to work at a loss, perhaps even 
making it more efficient to simply remove themselves from the market than to 
participate in it with artificially low prices. It is obviously in society’s best interest to keep 
markets functioning, and so forcefully maintaining prices low would go against such a 
goal. A business cannot be expected to operate as a charity, and holding any for-profit 
organization to such a standard would be foolish and ill-advised, since in its attempt to 
benefit some players in the market, the State would be simply transferring the hardship 
from the consumers to the businesses.  
The role of the regulators is not, of course, to harm the businesses by forcing low prices in 
times of crisis, but rather to find a balance between the interests of both the businesses 
and of those affected by the catastrophes, and who would otherwise have to pay the 
gouged prices. Regulations, for example, that simply establish a cap on prices would not 
serve society’s best interests, as they might force businesses to choose between closing 
down or running at a loss; a regulation, on the other hand, that prohibits arbitrary surges 
while, at the same time, allowing increased costs to be passed to the consumer, would 
prove to be more useful in its attempt to properly distribute the much-needed assets. This 
latter approach is the one taken, for example, in the California regulation on price 
gouging (Section 396 of the California Penal Code) which, although prohibits increases “of 
more than 10 percent above the price charged […] immediately prior to the proclamation of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
restrain its most brazen expression, and signal society's disapproval of it. By punishing greedy behavior 
rather than rewarding it, society affirms the civic virtue of shared sacrifice for the common good.”  
GIBERSON, M., ‘The Problem with Price Gouging Laws’, 2011, 34 Regulation, no. 1, p. 51. 
In response to this vitriolic criticism, those who oppose this type of regulation argue that the good wishes on the 
part of the regulators do not change the fact that price caps cause more harm than good even in times of disaster, 
because they “exacerbate the effects of natural disasters and tend to concentrate the harm in the location most directly 
hit by the disasters” since businesses will not be willing to trade for low prices (ibid., p. 53).  
  
138 
Unconscionability in the Common Law 
[the] emergency”, also establishes that “a greater price increase is not unlawful if that person 
can prove that the increase in price was directly attributable to additional costs.” 
The criticisms against’ EPSTEIN’s position, however, do not need to be limited to extreme 
cases of distress and price gouging, and can also be applied to more traditional cases of so-
called “economic duress.” However, some qualifications need to be made regarding 
EPSTEIN’s example in order to justify this extension. If B, a dry cleaner, is only one of many 
other providers, some of whom charge the same, some of whom charge more, and some of 
whom charge less, then we would not be in the presence of an unconscionable contract. If 
A could have simply walked down the street and found an alternative provider who better 
fit his budget, or could clean his own clothes himself, but still decided to contract with B, 
then setting aside the contract as unconscionable would negatively impact the freedom of 
choice and the free market, by protecting A from his own wrongdoing. The role of the 
courts is not, after all, to make sure that contractual parties are smart and wise parties. If, 
however, B is the only provider of the service, to the extent that, unlike in the previous 
example, it cannot even be performed by A himself, then the doctrine of 
unconscionability must come into play to repair the abuses in which B might have 
engaged. 
With these caveats in mind, a case can be made that bargains that are based on the ability 
of the provider to impose whatever terms he desires on the buyer, should be considered 
unconscionable. What comes to mind in this respect are, of course, boilerplate 
agreements which, at least in principle, represent clear examples of a party’s ability to 
impose her will. What is more, even though the doctrine of unconscionability is not at all 
restricted to these agreements, it is in regards to them that American courts have seen 
the greater part of its application.494  
4.6.2 Boilerplate, Unfair Surprise and Unconscionability 
As SCHMITZ, has noted, the use of unconscionability in regards to boilerplate agreements 
generally occurs  
“when a party with disproportionate bargaining power over a contract partner takes 
advantage of that power imbalance. Such bargaining disparity often results in 
‘adhesion’ or ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ contracts, especially in consumer and employment 
contexts involving agreements among parties with unmatched economic and 
informational resources.' These cases usually target form or standardized contracts, 
drafted by powerful parties to include pro-drafter terms that accepting parties may 
not understand or have the power to protest.' The procedural prong, therefore, 
                                                                  
494 MAXEINER, J. R., 2003, supra note 103, p. 110. 
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comports with classical will theories of promise enforcement by considering whether 
a contract lacks true consent.”495 
As the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated in a 2009 case, “where there is a disparity in 
bargaining power, the plaintiff may not be deemed to have freely chosen to enter into the 
contract”.496 Following this line of thought, if the party’s choices were simply limited to 
either accept or reject the terms as presented, then procedural unconscionability might 
arise. In a similar fashion, a New York court considered that a contract is unenforceable 
when it was entered into by “a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice”, as 
it is “hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever 
given to all of the terms”, particularly when they were drafted “without discussion and with 
no opportunity […] to participate in the wording of the contract terms.”497 
The above-mentioned decisions notwithstanding, it is important to tread carefully when 
trying to equate adhesion contracts with procedural unconscionability. As it has been said 
before, it is simply impossible to adopt an “anti-adhesion” doctrine when it comes to 
contractual enforcement. By their very definition, contracts of adhesion are drafted by 
only one party, and presented to the other in a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If, as the New 
York court argued, we are to understand that it is “hardly likely” that consent exists in this 
type of form contracts, then truly the modern marketplace will come crashing down, as it 
is impossible to expect that there will always be individual negotiations, both in the case 
of B2B and B2C contracts. 
These reservations have not stopped some authors who have argued that procedural 
unconscionability should be considered as already established by the “existence of a 
consumer form contract of adhesion without requiring additional factual evidence relating to 
either the consumer’s personal characteristics or the specifics of the contracting environment.”498 
Regrettably, there are no explanations as to how the courts and the legal system would 
deal with the countless contracts that are signed every day, and which would be 
considered prima facie unconscionable because there was no thorough negotiation of 
every individual term. 
                                                                  
495 SCHMITZ, A. J., 2006, supra note 371, pp. 91–92. 
496 McGrath v. SNH Development, Inc. [2009], 969 A. 2d, 392–399, p. 397, citing Barnes v. NH Karting Association 
[1986], p. 107. 
497 HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, p. 1023. See also, generally, Knudsen v. Lax [2007], 
17 Misc. 3d, 350–364. 
498 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 59. The author goes on to explain that “the availability of a meaningful 
opportunity to negotiate contract terms is therefore central to the procedural unconscionability analysis.” Similarly, 
KORNHAUSER argues that “most clauses of standard form contracts are candidates for non-enforcement. Form clauses 
have not been dickered over and one party, generally the buyer, has little knowledge of their contents” (KORNHAUSER, L. 
A., ‘Unconscionability in Standard Forms’, 1976, 64 California Law Review, no. 5, p. 1162). 
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While it is impossible to simply advocate for this “presumption” of unconscionability 
when there was a contract of adhesion, we do agree that they require closer scrutiny.499 
This is particularly so when cases of unfair surprise come into play, and which are 
precisely a manifestation of the possible abuses that can occur when one of the parties is 
able to impose her will.  
Unfair surprise exists when the nondrafting party was unaware at the time of the 
contract that certain harsh and burdensome conditions existed in the agreement. As 
SHULKIN explains: 
“Such unfair surprise may be created in two ways. First, the terms of the contract are 
drafted in language so complex that it is unreasonable to expect the nondrafting 
party to understand their meaning. Second, a clause of the contract is so 
inconspicuous that it is unreasonable to expect that the nondrafting party will read 
or comprehend it.”500  
There are many reasons why it might be convenient to intervene when one of the parties 
is presented with unexpected terms.  After all, as TREBILCOCK has noted, 
“[w]here a contract is so worded or arranged that the supplier knows or should know 
that the other party does not understand its implications, and he knows or should 
know that the other party reasonably entertains other understandings as to its legal 
incidents, perhaps based on prevailing contractual practices elsewhere in the market, 
to allow him to sign the contract without correcting these misunderstandings is 
tantamount to misrepresentation and thus conducive to suboptimal allocative 
decisions.”501  
                                                                  
499 LONEGRASS argues in favor of actually inverting the burden of proof when it comes to form contracts, so as to 
start from the assumption that they are, at the very least, suspicious. She argues, although speaking about 
assessing unconscionability as a whole, that “the existence of a form contract of adhesion should ‘tip the scale’ 
significantly toward an overall finding of unconscionability provided that the offending provisions are found to be 
‘commercially unreasonable’ in their onesidedness” (LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 61). 
500 SHULKIN, M. B., ‘Unconscionability--The Code, the Court and the Consumer’, 1967, 9 Boston College Industrial 
and Commercial Law Review, p. 368. SPANOGLE offers a very clear illustration of “unfair surprise”, highlighting the 
fact that it “implies some sort of deception by artifice.” It is actually a fairly clear concept to visualize, often referring 
to situations like “[h]iding a clause in a mass of fine print trivia,” or phrasing the clause(s) “in language that is 
incomprehensible to a layman or that diverts his attention from problems raised or rights lost”. It focuses not so much 
n the source of this surprise, but rather on the “effect of abuses on the non-drafting party, and upon the ‘fairness’ of 
whatever event caused the surprise.” As a result, “the most productive criterion for determining whether the procedural 
abuse of surprise is present is the reasonableness of the non-drafting party's reaction to the clause, rather than the 
culpability of the drafting party.” This is an important issue, since it places the emphasis on the adhering party 
having been “unfairly surprised,” as well as to the drafter taking an “unfair advantage ,“ regardless of whether or 
not there was an active desire on the part of the drafter to achieve that result (SPANOGLE, J. A., 1969, supra note 
212, p. 943). 
501 TREBILCOCK, M. J., 1976, supra note 289, pp. 370–371. 
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As it was mentioned in previous sections, readership of contracts of adhesion is rare. As a 
result of this, there is a certain presumption on the part of the adhering party that the 
terms put forward by the drafting party will not depart from basic notions of fairness and 
rationality. While it is impossible (as well as not recommended) to establish strict rules in 
regards to this issue, a case can be made that when the imposing party does move away 
from these basic presumptions, there is procedural unconscionability caused by this 
unfair surprise. 
Following extensive case law on the matter, US courts usually ask three questions in order 
to determine whether the terms put forward by the drafter can be considered as 
manifestations of an unfair surprise.  
“First, did the purchaser know that the clause existed? Second, had he known of its 
existence, could he have understood the legal effect of the words? And third, did 
reasonable alternatives to the contract exist?”502 
The problem with this enumeration, and which seems unavoidable, is that there can be 
situations in which all of these elements will be present, even though no finding of 
unconscionability should exist. A party can, rationally, choose not to read a contract 
which, due to his own educational background, contains terms he would not have 
understood even if he read them, without there being any other alternatives for him. 
While this should not be used as an argument against the application of this doctrine, it 
does highlight the importance of employing special care in the analysis of a given 
contractual situation. 
4.7 Substantive Unconscionability 
While procedural unconscionability deals with the bargaining “process,” substantive 
unconscionability deals with the bargaining “outcome.”503 Put in a different way, while 
procedural unconscionability addresses the way in which the contract came into 
existence, substantive unconscionability deals with the content of the contract itself, 
seeking to prevent the enforcement of clauses (or whole contracts) that might be “so one-
sided [as] to be oppressive.”504 
Unlike procedural unconscionability, which can be more readily rationalized as a 
manifestation of the rules on meaningful assent, substantive unconscionability poses a 
larger problem. In this case the court is no longer paying attention at how the terms were 
agreed upon, but rather at what the terms are. “Here, the inquiry is centered on whether the 
                                                                  
502 KORNHAUSER, L. A., 1976, supra note 498, p. 1163. 
503 EISENBERG, M. A., ‘The Bargain Principle and Its Limits’, 1982, 95 Harvard Law Review, no. 4. 
504 D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 11. 
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allocation of risks in the contract or one of its terms is commercially unreasonable or 
unexpectedly one-sided”.505 
By its very nature, assessing the substantive unconscionability of a contract, or of its 
terms, represents a significant conundrum for the courts, which find themselves having 
to make a moral judgment on somebody else’s bargain. Evidently, this seems to go against 
the ideas of individualism and self-reliance and which make up the doctrine of freedom of 
contract. It is precisely due to the application of these ideas that courts, when deciding 
whether a contract should be enforced,  
“generally focus not on the content of the exchange regulated by the contract 
between the individuals but only upon the manner of formation. They typically begin 
by asking, "Did the parties agree?", and elaborate by inquiring into the existence of 
offer and acceptance. Further investigation centers upon the competence of the 
parties, the presence or absence of duress, the accuracy, materiality, and nature of 
representations made during the negotiations leading to the contract, the presence 
or absence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, and the existence of 
consideration. What the parties agreed to matters almost not at all; enforceability 
rests upon the process leading to agreement.”506  
This reluctance to accept the courts’ intervention to determine issues as intangible as 
“fairness” and “balance” was better worded by ANSON, who stated that  
“[s]o long as a man gets what he bargained for Courts of law will not ask what the 
value may be to him, or whether its value is in any way proportionate to his act or 
promise given in return. This would be ‘the law making the bargain, instead of 
leaving the parties to make it.’”507 
When courts face issues of substantive unconscionability, they must analyze the values 
exchanged in the bargain, and determine whether the outcome was satisfactory or not, 
compared to an artificial “just” or “ideal” bargain. Of course, the problem here is that it is 
often difficult, if not impossible, to actually know what constitutes a “just term,” let alone 
a “just price.” The problem is further exacerbated when we take into consideration that, as 
EPSTEIN notes, in many cases, “the clauses so attacked are, at the time of formation, arguably 
in the interest of both parties to the agreement.”508 
                                                                  
505 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, pp. 10–11. MALLOR argues that just like procedural unconscionability 
somehow overlaps with issues of knowing assent, the substantive prong “bears some similarity to the exercise of 
courts’ traditional power to withhold enforcement from contracts that violate public policy” (MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra 
note 101, pp. 1072–1073). 
506 KORNHAUSER, L. A., 1976, supra note 498, p. 1151. 
507 Cited in WADDAMS, S., Principle and Policy in Contract Law: Competing or Complementary Concepts?, 2011, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 100. 
508 EPSTEIN, R. A., 1975, supra note 336, p. 306. 
  
143 
Unconscionability in the Common Law 
Determining whether a contract is substantively unconscionable involves an analysis of 
the terms and conditions established in the agreement. Traditionally, this analysis has 
been conducted under a very strict standard, requiring the provisions to be of a kind that 
“no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no honest and 
fair man would accept on the other”, as established over 250 years ago in the English case of 
Earl of Chesterfield v. Jansen.”509 This is a particularly strict standard, as it requires the 
provisions to be so extremely harsh, oppressive and unreasonable that they will 
shock the conscience of the court.  
For obvious reasons, determining whether or not a contract is “substantively” 
unconscionable is much harder than assessing only its bargaining process. Defining the 
value of the exchange from the point of view of whether or not it is “fair” is often 
impossible. This is specially so because in the Common Law there is a widespread 
consensus that inadequacy of consideration is not, in itself, a defense to contractual 
obligations, so that “if there is sufficient consideration to meet the test of contract formation, 
the contract must be enforceable”.510 To put it simply, the fact that the reciprocal obligations 
of the parties are not of the same value, does not, in and of itself, mean that the contract 
was unfair, nor does it allow the supposedly “underpaid” party to default on her 
obligations. As ATIYAH explained: 
“It has for many years, even centuries, been part of the traditional dogma of contract 
law that the adequacy of the consideration is immaterial to the validity of a contract. 
It is for the parties to make their own bargain, not for the courts. Each party to a 
contract must himself decide how much the other's performance is worth to him, and 
then decide whether to enter into the contract, yea or nay. If the contract is 
concluded then it must be assumed that each party is content with his bargain, or he 
would not have made it. There is simply no room for any inquiry into the fairness of 
the exchange. If the parties knew what they were at, then the exchange must, by 
definition, be fair – or at least, it must be as fair as the law cares.”511 
                                                                  
509 Earl of Chesterfield and Others Executors of John Spencer v Sir Abraham Janssen [1751], p. 100; See also 
LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 11. 
510 WADDAMS, S. M., 2010, supra note 421, p. 379. As Sir Frederick POLLOCK wrote, 
“a distinguishing mark of English jurisprudence that the amount of the consideration is not material. […] 
It is accordingly treated as an elementary principle that the law will not enter into an inquiry as to the 
adequacy of the consideration.” 
WADDAMS, S., 2010, supra note 412, p. 26. 
511 ATIYAH, P. S., ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’, 1985, 35 University of Toronto Law Journal, no. 1, p. 1. ATIYAH 
would also restate this point in his work The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, where he argued: 
“[T]he Court is the umpire to be appealed to when a foul is alleged, but the court has no substantive 
function beyond this. It is not the Court's business to ensure that the bargain is fair, or to see that one 
party does not take undue advantage of another, or impose unreasonable terms by virtue of superior 
bargaining position. Any superiority in bargaining power is itself a matter for the market to rectify.” 
Quoted in PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, p. 837. 
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This notion that mere imbalances in the consideration are not enough to void a contract 
has been a staple of the Common Law for several centuries. Already in 1790 English 
courts noted that “under ordinary circumstances, even a considerable inadequacy of price will 
not invalidate a sale”, although noting that “the inadequacy may be so gross as, of itself, plainly 
demonstrate fraud”.512 
The philosophical underpinnings of this position towards substantive unconscionability 
can be better summarized in the words of HOBBES, who in his Leviathan put forward the 
idea that “the value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors, 
and therefore the just value is that which they be contended to give.”513 It is, in other words, 
not up to the courts or the law, to intervene and inquire as to the adequacy of the 
exchange; if the parties agreed to something, then we should assume that it is precisely 
what they wanted, regardless of whether we might disagree with their assessment. 
Notwithstanding the above, although substantive unconscionability cannot be said to 
exist simply because of mere imbalances in the contractual outcome, “gross disparity in the 
values exchanged may be an important factor in determining that a contract is 
unconscionable.”514 Indeed, if a contract shows that one of the parties received a benefit 
that is so disproportionate to the service provided, then the contract should be, at the 
very least, seen with suspicion.  
In general, there are two cate categories of cases that fall within the substantive 
unconscionability prong. These are cases on unfair prices, and cases on remedy-
meddling.515 
4.7.1 Unconscionable Prices 
These are cases in which “one party asserts that the price to be paid is grossly disproportionate 
to the cost or value of the good or service received in exchange.”516Although it was once largely 
restricted to cases in which consumers were taken advantage of by, for example, door-to-
door salesmen, it is now well accepted as actually “part of the basic foundation of contract 
law.”517  
Despite being accepted in contractual doctrine, however, the unconscionability of the 
price represents one the most controversial issues that might be challenged on the basis 
                                                                  
512 See WADDAMS, S., 2010, supra note 413, p. 131, and  WADDAMS, S. M., 2010, supra note 421, p. 379. 
513 HOBBES, T., 1839, supra note 96, p. 67. 
514 BRAUCHER, R., ‘The Unconscionable Contract or Term’, 1970, 31 University of Pittsburgh Law Review, no. 3, 
p. 339. 
515 BROWN, E. L., 2000, supra note 395, p. 299. 
516 DARR, F. P., ‘Unconscionability and Price Fairness’, 1994, 30 Houston Law Review, no. 5, p. 1820. 
517 ibid., p. 1822. 
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of “fairness.” Indeed, the price of a contract is, without a doubt, a salient term, perhaps 
the most salient term of all. While a party might be able to argue that she was unfairly 
surprised by a forum selection clause buried deep into a long boilerplate agreement, or 
that she could not have been expected to understand a complex system to calculate 
liability that actually leaves her without recourse, she would be hard pressed to argue that 
she was not aware of how much she was supposed to pay. Some authors have explained 
this apparent defect in the doctrine by arguing that an excessive price is in and of itself 
“an indication of defects in the bargaining process.”518 On the basis of this idea, the party 
arguing that the agreement is unconscionable for excessive price would, in reality, be 
arguing that the way in which this price was agreed upon was unfair. 
The enforcement of agreements in which there is a disparity in the consideration is a 
demonstration of the commitment of the courts to the free market, as they have 
traditionally shied away from reviewing the adequacy of consideration, arguing that it 
“not only impractical, but [also] dangerous”.519 It has often been argued that, outside of 
monopolies, parties who are not satisfied with a certain price can simply walk away and 
not contract, which in the end would force the other to either lower the prices or go out of 
business. The problem with this perception, however, is that it overlooks market failures 
that although may not rise to the level of monopolies, might still impact a party’s ability 
to make correct decisions. A party, for example, might not have the necessary information 
required to accurately assess the real value of the service or product being received (and 
the price of the information gathering process might be excessive in and of itself) and is 
thus left at the mercy (for lack of a better word) of the seller.  
While, as we have seen, an excessive price can sometimes be considered as a sufficient 
basis for a finding of substantive unconscionability, the uncertainty surrounding its 
application comes as a result of the difficulties inherent to determining what is 
“excessive.” Indeed, courts have been unable to establish a unique system by which to 
determine when a price can be considered excessive, with some resorting to the level of 
profit that it reports to the seller, others to the price in relation to other providers of the 
same item, or even to the economic status of the purchaser himself.520 
This lack of consistency is a serious issue, as it makes it impossible to have a clear idea of 
what can reasonably be understood as “excessive.” As NATION has documented, 
uniformity is lacking in both the case law and the doctrine, with different courts and 
different authors establishing different criteria to determine exactly “how much is too 
much”. 
                                                                  
518 NATION [III], G. A., 2005, supra note 397, p. 114. Using an excessive price (or another unconscionable term) as 
an indication of an unfair bargaining process is not without its problems, as some argue that it blurs the lines 
between the prongs of unconscionability and creates confusion. 
519 DAWSON, J. P., 1937, supra note 129, p. 346. 
520 BROWN, E. L., 2000, supra note 395, p. 301. 
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“Courts […] have been inconsistent in setting a standard for when a price becomes 
unconscionably excessive. Some courts have found that an excessive mark up results 
in substantive unconscionability. Other courts have found a conscionably excessive 
price to be substantively unconscionable if the contract price is higher than those 
charged by other merchants for the same or similar goods. Other courts focus on 
whether the price returns too great a profit to the seller. In addition, a price might be 
considered exorbitant in part because of the economic status of the purchaser. 
Commentators also have been inconsistent in setting a standard for an 
unconscionable price. Some suggest that a substantively unconscionable price results 
when the seller engages in price discrimination.  An argument may be made that 
charging a different price based solely on the identity of the buyer with no cost 
justification is always unconscionable. Others suggest that an unconscionably 
excessive price can only be determined by comparing the contract price to some 
reference price. One commentator suggests that it is necessary to find a sufficient 
disparity (possibly two to one) between the price charged by the seller and the 
average of all retail prices charged for like goods in the community in which the 
consumer resides. Commentators also imply that an excessive price is ‘two or three 
times greater than at least one other available price-in the low income neighborhood 
or elsewhere.’ Yet another commentator suggests a three-prong test consisting of a 
price significantly in excess of a reference price (substantive prong), contracting 
process problems resulting in overreaching (procedural prong), and the inability of 
the market to enforce a fair price (a third requirement, market failure).”521 
                                                                  
521 NATION [III], G. A., 2005, supra note 397, pp. 114–115 NATION puts forward a compelling argument that, in 
America, charges for medical services are often unconscionable, particularly in the case of the uninsured, who are 
the victims of price discrimination, paying much larger fees than those of insured patients. He explains that, in a 
nutshell, insurance companies reimburse hospitals only a percentage of the “real costs” that they charge the 
patients; this creates an incentive to bloat the prices so as to obtain a larger reimbursement, a practice that 
evidently hurts the uninsured, who are then faced with the full (bloated) price. In his scathing criticism of this 
situation, he argues that: 
“The basic unfairness is patent; there is no good reason why one patient should be expected to pay two or 
more times the amount paid by other patients for the same goods and services provided by the same 
hospital. Additionally, the uninsured should not be forced to compensate hospitals for losses incurred as a 
result of federal requirements and contracts with insurers. The uninsured should also not be burdened 
with the obligation of paying exorbitant charges resulting from the hospital's desire to maximize 
reimbursement from third-party payors. The contention that the principle of freedom of contract gives a 
hospital the right to unilaterally set a price for its services that bears no relation to either the cost of the 
goods or services or to the amount customarily paid for such goods or services is untenable. The fact that 
an uninsured patient has signed a hospital admission form that says he agrees to pay the hospital's ‘full 
charges’ does not change the unfairness of hospital pricing. Given the circumstances of hospital 
admissions, the nature of medical services, and the inflated level of ‘full charges,’ the argument that the 
patient's express agreement to pay the hospital's ‘full charges’ should be enforced is grossly unfair and 
places form over substance. It is just this sort of grossly unfair result that the doctrine of unconscionability 
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4.7.2 Remedy-Meddling 
In these cases, one of the parties has “unduly enlarged his own remedies, unduly restricted the 
consumer's remedies, or both.” 522 For example, excessive exculpatory clauses by which one 
of the parties is free from all liability (or limits it excessively), or terms that limit the 
ability of one party to obtain redress would, certainly, fall within this category. 
Courts have always looked with suspicion at disclaimers of liability. If nothing else, there 
is something that appears as inherently unjust about a contract by which a party is able to 
severely limit, or downright disclaim, his liability. If we look at the UCC, for example, 
exclusions of liability, with the exception of liability arising from consequential damages, 
are not permissible. What is more, although limitations of liability are allowed, these must 
be "reasonable" and not "unconscionable," requiring “‘at least minimum adequate remedies’ 
and/or ‘a fair quantum of remedy.’" 523 The Code, therefore, worries that allowing limitations 
of liability to exist without check would lead to the weaker party being left unprotected. 
Terms by which one of the parties severely limits the ability of the other to actually obtain 
redress can sometimes also be deemed substantially unconscionable. This is the case, for 
example, with forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements contained in a contract, 
as they might (although definitely not always) represent a limitation of such magnitude 
that they would, for all practical purposes, deprive the weaker party of her day in court. 
This issue will be dealt with elsewhere.524 
4.8 Assessing Unconscionability 
The first difficulty associated with the process of assessing whether or not a specific 
transaction is unconscionable, deals with the very philosophy of our free market system. 
After all, it is precisely the fact that unconscionability deals with “fairness” and “balance” 
in contracting that has made it a perennially controversial doctrine. Any reference to 
natural law or to moral precepts is, undoubtedly, tricky, since concepts of “right” and 
“wrong”, “fairness” and “unfairness”, etc., are all wide enough to allow reasonable people 
to disagree on their precise content. While for some this lack of a unifying definition 
might justify eliminating them altogether from the legal system, due to their inherent 
                                                                                                                                                                       
ibid., pp. 123–124. 
522 BROWN, E. L., 2000, supra note 395, p. 302 Although BROWN, quoting HAWKLAND, uses the term “consumer”, 
there is no reason why this should be restricted to consumer contracting. On the contrary, as we have seen, the 
doctrine of unconscionability (and, therefore, the parts of which it is made) is not restricted to such contracts 
and is perfectly applicable, mutatis mutandis, in a commercial setting. 
523 ELLINGHAUS, M. P., ‘In Defense of Unconscionability’, 1969, 78 The Yale Law Journal, no. 5, p. 794. 
524 See Chapters VI, VII and VIII. 
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unpredictability and malleability, a case can be made that the fact that they are adaptive 
and flexible actually enhances their usefulness for the courts in their attempts at 
achieving justice. If nothing else, the fact that the lack of a clear definition has not 
hindered their power, their familiarity or their popular acceptance, gives “credence to 
unconscionability’s legitimacy as a reasonable contract defense. Unconscionability’s protection of 
these conventions helps stabilize contract law by enhancing its reputation as ‘fair’ law worthy of 
public obedience.”525  
Still, and for obvious reasons, there is some skepticism surrounding a doctrine that, prima 
facie, might pose a threat to the certainty that is supposed to come from the legal system. 
Contract law has as one of its aims giving human relations a certain degree of 
predictability, and so allowing courts to engage in a subjective assessment of what the 
parties may or may not have really wanted at the time of contracting, clearly appears to go 
against that goal.  
Furthermore, unconscionability’s intervention in the market represents a type of 
paternalism that many see as infringing on an individual’s right to pursue his own self-
interest without extrinsic notions of justice acting as an obstacle.526 Critics are concerned 
that this type of paternalistic policies, which might even go against the express will of the 
parties as manifested in their contracts, violate their individual liberties. Furthermore, 
critics also point out that this intervention, in addition to allegedly hindering freedom of 
contract, would “unduly interfere with [the] fluidity and innovation of a market economy”, as 
merchants, concerned about the courts’ “unpredictable determinations of unconscionability” 
may simply opt to “avoid transactions with those likely to assert unconscionability claims.”527 
As we have seen, English courts have essentially echoed these concerns, prioritizing 
certainty in order to avoid “opening the floodgates of discretion”, and thus threaten the 
stability and predictability of legal relations.528  
At this point we should note that calling unconscionability “paternalistic” is not 
something done only by critics of the doctrine. On the contrary:  
                                                                  
525 SCHMITZ, A. J., 2006, supra note 371, p. 79. 
526 ibid., p. 96 . 
527 ibid., p. 97. 
528 CAPPER, D., Protection of the Vulnerable in Financial Transactions: What the Common Law Vitiating Factors Can Do 
For You, in Kenny, M. et al. (eds.), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions: Protecting the 
Vulnerable, 2010, p. 182. Prophets of doom abound in regards to unconscionability, with some authors, 
reminding us of Chicken Little wailing that the sky was falling, predicting (of course, wrongly) “that the 
application of the principles of unconscionability will fundamentally undermine the sanctity of contract, permitting the 
unscrupulous to escape from an improvident bargain” (PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, p. 846). As SCHMITZ notes, 
there is “no empirical support” for the fear that unconscionability is used by the courts to free negligent or reckless 
parties ( SCHMITZ, A. J., 2006, supra note 371, p. 96). 
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“[A]lthough the unconscionability doctrine is quite controversial, its characterization 
as paternalist is not. Indeed, the unconscionability doctrine is commonly cited to 
exemplify paternalism in the law. Rather than wrangle over the accuracy of this 
characterization, disputants over the unconscionability doctrine tend to contest 
whether ‘paternalism’ is universally and properly a term of derogation. For [its] 
supporters […] some well-exercised paternalism is acceptable and desirable; for its 
opponents, […] this label suffices to close the case against the unconscionability 
doctrine.”529  
Indeed, the paternalism involved in unconscionability is, for some, in itself a big and 
unsurmountable problem. In a recent scathing criticism of the doctrine, KLOCK argued 
that: 
“Unconscionability […] is indeed inconsistent with fundamental contract theory. 
Basic contract theory requires only competent parties making an agreement with 
bilateral consideration to make an enforceable contract. The consideration can be as 
nominal as a peppercorn for the agreement to be legally enforceable. Courts do not 
inquire into the distribution of benefits between the parties. This legal fact is deeply 
rooted in a strong faith in the efficiency of free markets. Individuals do not 
voluntarily enter into agreements that they expect to make them worse off than 
before the agreement. If the agreement was made voluntarily, everyone is presumed 
to have been made better off by the agreement. This presumption can be justified by 
economic thought which, given a few simple axioms, demonstrates that markets will 
channel resources to their most valued use and maximize society's wealth when all 
market participants are permitted to freely make their own decisions. Government 
intervention cannot improve the allocation of resources and can even impede it. 
Unconscionability is an inherently paternalistic doctrine that is intended to protect 
individuals from the consequences of their own decisions and allows them to avoid 
detrimental terms.”530 
In the end, as it is the case in every instance of state’s intervention in private affairs, this 
is an issue inherently related to political and philosophical theories regarding the role of 
the State. Thus, in this case, “the most fundamental question is essentially moral: is it 
                                                                  
529 SHIFFRIN, S. V., ‘Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation’, 2000, 29 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, no. 3, pp. 205–206. Similarly, MORANT refers to unconscionability as “the most notorious” of “all 
paternalistic remedies” (MORANT, B. D., 2003, supra note 126, p. 260). BROWNE and BIKSACKY take exception at 
referring to unconscionability as “paternalistic.” They argue that paternalism, by its very nature, involves the 
State acting against the protected party’s will (e.g. drug prohibition) and so the fact that here one of the parties is 
expressly opposing the enforcement of a contract or term means that it cannot be paternalistic. They base this 
idea on the fact that “the relevant agent actively endorses the supposedly paternalistic conduct” (BROWNE, M. N. & 
BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, pp. 226–227). 
530 KLOCK, M., ‘Unconscionability and Price Discrimination’, 2001, 69 Tennessee Law Review, no. 2, pp. 343–344. 
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legitimate for a court to set aside a contract merely because it is unconscionable?”531 The answer 
to this question is deeply related to our understanding and acceptance of “paternalism” 
and state intervention, and whether we see this as an affront to our liberties or as an 
essential and necessary part of living in a civilized society. As one author noted: 
“More and more, it is becoming apparent in the field of economics and political 
science that one of the great contentious issues of modern times is whether the State 
should intervene to regulate certain aspects of our daily lives; and if it should, to 
what extent such intervention should be carried. In other words the line between the 
provinces of State activity and individual enterprise is indistinct.”532  
As explained by MARNEFFE, it is a matter of differentiating among different ways in which 
the State might intervene, and perhaps even changing the way we see the role of the State 
itself: 
 “Paternalism seems repugnant because it seems infantilizing. In limiting our liberty 
for our own good, it seems that the government treats us like children or that it 
impedes our development into fully mature adults, but there is no reason to think 
this is true of every paternalistic policy. Some liberties have a special value in 
symbolizing the status of adulthood within our society, the freedom to marry, for 
example. Having this freedom also provides an important kind of control over the 
shape and direction of our lives, and creates important opportunities for deliberation 
and choice. So it makes sense to think the government would treat us like children if 
it were to make our marital decisions for us. Not every liberty, though, has this kind 
of significance: the freedom to drive without a seatbelt does not. So there is little 
reason to think that every paternalistic policy is infantilizing in this way”.533  
This situation is further complicated by the fact that neither the commentators nor the 
courts can agree on a way to define fairness, let alone measure it, or to assess 
unconscionability in a prima facie manner.534 The impossibility to create clear standards 
of behavior that would allow a party to know in advance whether her actions could be 
                                                                  
531 SMITH, S. A. & ATIYAH, P. S., 2006, supra note 113, p. 311. 
532 HUGHES PARRY, D., 1959, supra note 13, p. 73. 
533 MARNEFFE, P. de, ‘Avoiding Paternalism’, 2006, 34 Philosophy & Public Affairs, no. 1, p. 68. Following a similar 
line, MORANT considers that “despite its potential for inefficiency, paternalism, if judiciously administered, has a place 
in contract law.” He bases this proposal on the fact that when the parties’ bargaining positions are very disparate, 
the possibility of “dubious assent to unduly burdensome terms” morally justifies a measured intervention by the 
State (MORANT, B. D., 2003, supra note 126, pp. 258–259). 
534 While at first the criticism that we should not allow judges to decide on matters as ethereal as those of 
“fairness” seems rational, as that would empower them to base their decisions on their own particular visions of 
justice (or, as LEFF stated, in whatever makes their “pulses race or their cheeks redden”), this is not necessarily so. 
We already grant judges the right to decide on issues just as ethereal (e.g. “malice,” “reasonableness” and “good 
faith”) and apparently no social cataclysms have come as a result. For LEFF’s comments on the lack of specificity, 
See LEFF, A. A., 1967, supra note 447, p. 516. 
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considered unconscionable (e.g. the type of wording and disclosure of terms) casts some 
doubts as to how useful it is to advocate the use of this doctrine. While it is true that the 
fears that once existed about unconscionability going out of control and allowing absolute 
discretion have proven, to a large extent, to have been unfounded, this says nothing as to 
how useful it is for merchants who are drafting their agreements. The existence of 
different views towards the same doctrine, and which go all over the political and 
economic spectrum (from libertarianism to statism) have meant that, for example, while 
some authors argue that unconscionability has no place in contract law and that therefore 
boilerplate contracts should, for the most part, be left alone, others go as far as arguing 
that all contracts of adhesion should be seen by the courts as procedurally 
unconscionable.535  
In an attempt to balance both positions, that is the fear of excessive state intervention 
and the demands for a safety net, the majority of US courts have adopted a very rigid 
standard to determine when a contract is unconscionable.536 Under this approach to 
unconscionability, and which has been followed by the majority of American courts, 
strong evidence of the existence of both prongs of unconscionability, substantive and 
procedural, is required to deem a contract (or a term) unconscionable. 537 This was the 
position put forward by, for example, the Superior Court of New Jersey in the 2002 case 
of Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, where the Court ruled that: 
“For the most part, the unconscionability cases follow Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
and look for two factors: (1) unfairness in the formation of the contract, and (2) 
                                                                  
535 HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, p. 20. In regards to libertarianism and 
unconscionability, some have argued that the latter should not actually be seen as inherently incompatible with 
the former. BROWNE and BIKSACKY, for example, argue that since both classical and libertarian contract theory are 
“built around the foundational assumption of the existence of a meaningful choice,” unconscionability should be seen 
as ensuring the existence of this choice (BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 214). 
536 Although BROWN recognizes that the majority view is that both prongs are necessary, he sees the lack of total 
harmony in the case law as one of the reasons why the doctrine should be dropped altogether (BROWN, E. L., 
2000, supra note 395, pp. 303–304). The rigidity with which American courts analyze claims of unconscionability 
cannot be overstated. As MAXEINER notes:  
“Unconscionability […] has proven to be a hard standard to meet: only a small handful of cases-according 
to one count, just fourteen in one ten-year period-did. Judge Posner noted some years ago that Indiana 
was ‘so unfriendly to the defense of unconscionability’ that in more than twenty years there was only one 
reported case where it was accepted: a clause, untitled, in fine print, whereby a high school drop-out 
guaranteed a multinational oil company against the consequences of its own negligence.” 
MAXEINER, J. R., 2003, supra note 103, p. 121. 
537 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177- Although plenty of credit is given to professor ANDREW LEFF for this 
two-prong approach, emanating from his criticism of §2-302 of the UCC, it also has its roots in the Williams 
decision, which seems to establish a requirement of both “absence of meaningful choice” for one party, and of terms 
which are “unreasonably favorable” to the other (Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company [1965], p. 449). For 
LEFF’S article See LEFF, A. A., 1967, supra note 447. 
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excessively disproportionate terms.  Professor Leff labelled these two elements as 
“procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability.”538    
This traditional approach has been the object of some criticism, with its formalism often 
being deemed as contrary to the goal of ensuring fairness in contracting.539 Critics argue 
that this approach establishes a standard that is so hard to meet that many contracts that 
should be deemed unconscionable will still be enforced. This is particularly so in the case 
of boilerplate contracts, where the courts have, by and large, accepted their efficacy and 
enforceability despite the well-known lack of readership and/or understanding. Because 
of this, even if there is a gross imbalance in the terms of the contract, the fact that 
boilerplate (despite not being read or understood) is considered completely valid and 
enforceable, would mean that the aggrieved party would not be able to avoid its 
enforcement.  
As a result of these criticisms, an alternative method, based on a “sliding scale” approach, 
has been put forward by both scholars as well as an increasing number of courts in the 
United States.540 Under this method, while both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability are still required, “strong evidence of both prongs is no longer required to 
justify relief;” instead, the larger the quantum of one of the prongs, the smaller the 
quantum that is required of the other.541 This approach, based on a sort of “set-off” 
between both kinds of unconscionability, has allowed courts to relax the standard of 
proof used in unconscionability cases, often (albeit not always) giving priority to the 
fairness of the terms themselves, and considerably less to how these terms were agreed 
upon.542 The problem is, of course, that there is little to no clarity as to the ratios of 
                                                                  
538 Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes [2002], 800 A. 2d, 915, p. 921. The Court goes on to add that although this 
analysis represents the position of most courts, “[o]ther courts have been satisfied merely by proof of substantive 
unconscionability, i.e., an excessively disproportionate exchange of material promises […] Still other courts have 
determined that the two elements need not have equal effect but work together,  creating a ‘sliding scale’ of 
unconscionability” (ibid., p. 921).  
539 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 55. 
540 See, for example, the 1983 case of New York v. Wolowitz, where judge GIBBONS stated  
“In determining the conscionability of a contract, no set weight is to be given any one factor; each case 
must be decided on its own facts […]However, in general, it can be said that procedural and 
substantive unconscionability operate on a ‘sliding scale’; the more questionable the 
meaningfulness of choice, the less imbalance in a contract's terms should be tolerated and vice versa” 
State v. Wolowitz [1983], 96 AD 2d, 47–81, p. 68 (emphasis added). 
541 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 12. The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Funding Systems Leas. Corp. v. 
King Louie Intern., Inc. [1979], 597 SW 2d, 624, p. 634, referencing the work of SPANOGLE, defined this sliding-
scale approach as: 
“[A] balancing between the substantive and procedural aspects, and that if there exists gross procedural 
unconscionability then not much be needed by way of substantive unconscionability, and that the same 
‘sliding scale’ be applied if there be great substantive unconscionability but little procedural 
unconscionability.”  
542 KNAPP, C. L., 2013, supra note 463. 
  
153 
Unconscionability in the Common Law 
procedural vis à vis substantive unconscionability that should exist in a given case so as to 
allow for the application of the doctrine.543 
In a recent case, the California Supreme Court, citing previous authorities, justified this 
sliding-scale approach arguing that: 
“The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must 
both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a 
contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.’ […] But they need not be 
present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards 
the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the 
terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive 
terms themselves.’ In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract 
term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the 
conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”544 
There have also been some cases, although they remain in the minority, in which courts 
have rejected the two-prong approach, and actually deemed a contract or a term 
unenforceable “based entirely on only one of the two prongs, with little or no attention paid to 
the other.”545 While this clearly represents a significantly more liberal approach to 
unconscionability, and might itself be a response to the perceived narrowness with which 
it has been historically applied, it is not without its flaws. For starters, deeming a contract 
unenforceable only because of procedural problems, without there being any actual 
unfairness in its clauses or, vice versa, unbalanced clauses in an otherwise fairly agreed 
upon contract, raises the question as to why should the courts intervene. In the end, it 
goes back to the argument as to what should be the role of the courts in regards to 
fairness, particularly when they seem to be acting in a way that either goes against the 
express will of the parties (when there was no substantive unconscionability to speak of) 
or protecting them from their own negligence (when there was no procedural 
impropriety). Aware of these limitations, and particularly in regards to the presence of 
only substantive unconscionability, the minority of courts that have adopted this single-
                                                                  
543 BROWN, E. L., 2000, supra note 395, p. 306. To an extent, LONEGRASS dismisses these concerns, arguing that 
the sliding-scale approach would actually increase certainty and predictability, by deemphasizing the two prongs 
individually and emphasizing the substance of the provisions (LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 55).  
544 Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare [2000], 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d., 745–778, pp. 767–768. In a more recent 
case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare [2011], 724 SE 
2d, 250–299, p. 289, expressly incorporated the rationale put forward in Armendariz, ruling that: 
“We perceive that a contract term is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable. However, both need not be present to the same degree. Courts should apply a ‘sliding 
scale’ in making this determination: the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence 
of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the clause is unenforceable, and 
vice versa.” 
545 KNAPP, C. L., 2013, supra note 463 
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prong approach have not really done away with the two-prong approach altogether, and 
still require some modicum of “the other” unconscionability, even if only in small doses.546 
A similar logic might explain why courts have, for the most part, been very reluctant (if 
not downright opposed) to invalidate a contract based on procedural unconscionability 
alone, since such an outcome would be hard to justify when the “weak” party actually 
suffered no damages.547 
The rationale behind those who advocate a finding of unconscionability based only on the 
presence of substantive unconscionability is grounded on the requirements of true and 
knowing assent. On the basis of a rather paternalistic and moralistic view, they argue that 
a gross disparity between the rights and obligations created by the contract, with its 
terms and conditions being extremely one-sided, serves as an indication of a lack of 
consent. In other words, they argue that if the afflicted party had really understood what 
she was agreeing to, then she would not have given her assent.548 Already in 1931, in the 
case of Peacock Hotel, Inc.  v.  Shipman, the Florida Supreme Court confirmed this idea that 
even when a party had acted negligently, a court could refuse to enforce the contract if it 
gave the other an unfair advantage. The Court ruled that: 
“It seems to be established by the authorities that where it is perfectly plain to the 
court that one party has overreached the other and has gained an unjust and 
undeserved advantage which it would be inequitable to permit him to enforce, that a 
                                                                  
546 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 21 LONEGRASS cites, among others, the case of Toker v. Perl [1968], 
103 N.J. Super., 500–504 as an example of a case in which unconscionability was based in “excessive pricing” 
alone. This is an interesting example, because it highlights the often difficult task of differentiating between 
issues affecting meaningful assent and procedural unconscionability. In its decision, the Court based its finding 
of unconscionability exclusively on the price of the product sold to the defendants (qualified as “exorbitant” by 
the Court), and considered that the way in which consent was obtained was by means of fraud, and not 
procedural unconscionability; in this way, the course refused to enforce the contract “because it was procured by 
fraud and is unconscionable.” The facts of the case make it clear that the plaintiffs acted in a deceitful way, not 
explaining clearly to the defendants exactly what they were acquiring (they were lead to believe that their 
contract for a one-month food plan included a free freezer, whereas they were actually buying one in 
installments), and apparently even presenting the contract in a way that hid its terms (“[t]he forms were placed 
before defendant, one on top of the other, leaving visible only the signature line on the lower two forms. The top page was 
the food plan contract.” The hidden pages were a financing application and an installment contract for the freezer). 
While the facts of the case made it clear that the seller had acted in a fraudulent fashion, the case law on 
procedural unconscionability is such that it is not hard to imagine other courts deeming said fraud simply as a 
procedurally unconscionable behavior.  
547 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 21. This was the situation in Leos v. Darden Restaurants Inc., a labor 
dispute where the California Court of Appeals declared an arbitration provision to be enforceable, despite being 
procedurally unconscionable. The Court reasoned that since the provision was not substantively unconscionable, 
it was therefore enforceable (Leos v. Darden Restaurants, Inc. [2013], 217 Cal. App. 4th, 473–497). Although a 
petition for review by the plaintiff was later granted by the California Supreme Court in Leos v. Darden 
Restaurants, 307 P. 3d, 878, no records exist of further proceedings.  
548 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, pp. 22–23. 
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court of equity will not hesitate to interfere, even though the victimized parties owe 
their predicament largely to their own stupidity and carelessness.”549 
Under this approach the courts assume the role of protectors of the parties who, in the 
courts’ own opinion, did not know any better at the time and were actually taken 
advantage of. The Florida Supreme Court was rather straightforward in its appeal to 
paternalism, quoting the words of Justice Root in the 1906 Washington Supreme Court 
case of Stone v. Moody: 
“It is well known that many good people and people of average or greater intelligence 
are sometimes duped and misled by the skill, cleverness, and artifices of those who 
are adepts in the matter of deceiving their fellow men; and courts should not throw 
about schemers of this kind a protection that will tend to encourage the practice of 
their arts. Such people should not find encouragement in the thought that, by 
keeping their machinations within the letter of the law, they may find sanction for 
their practices and reap the reward of their craftiness. To the victim it is of little 
import whether his property is taken from him by a bold and forcible robbery or by 
an ingenious and unsuspected deception. The injury to him is the same; and the evil 
effect of court decisions which permit the wrongdoer to enjoy the fruits of his 
chicanery is of no small import when viewed from the standpoint of public policy. It 
is not the function of courts to make contracts for parties, or to relieve them from the 
effects of bad bargains. But where the simplicity and credulity of people are taken 
advantage of by the shrewdness, overreaching and misrepresentation of those with 
whom they are dealing, and they are thereby induced to do unwittingly something 
the effect of which they do not intend, foresee, or comprehend, and which, if 
permitted to culminate, would be shocking to equity and good conscience, we think a 
court of equity may with propriety interpose.”550 
The argument put forward by the Court is certainly not without merits. There is 
something intrinsically wrong about allowing a shrewd party to take advantage of those 
in a weaker position, safe in the knowledge that as long as he follows the letter (albeit not 
the spirit) of the law, he will be allowed to get away with it. The problem, however, is that 
it is difficult to determine when this type of protection should operate, and when the 
caveat emptor approach should take over.551 
                                                                  
549 Peacock Hotel, Inc. v. Shipman [1931], 103 Fla., 633–642, p. 637. 
550 Quoted in ibid., p. 637-638.  
551 Interestingly, Peacock Hotel is actually a considered an example of the caveat emptor approach. Even though the 
Court went out of its way to declare that unfair bargains would not be enforced as a matter of equity, it 
distinguished those situations from the case at hand, where it blamed the plaintiffs for their lack of diligence. See 
NICHOLS, C. L., ‘Misrepresentation: Can A Vendee Rely on a Vendor's Representations?’, 1979, 9 Stetson Law 
Review, p. 506. 
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Critics of the doctrine under which substantive unconscionability alone is enough to 
prevent enforcement argue that it goes against the principles of self-reliance that form 
our economic and political system, since “courts should not engage in any assessment of the 
substantive fairness of freely negotiated contracts.”552 Indeed, as the California Supreme 
Court put it in Gentry v. Superior Court, procedural unconscionability, at least some degree 
of it, must exist to justify the intervention:  
"[A] conclusion that a contract contains no element of procedural unconscionability 
is tantamount to saying that, no matter how one-sided the contract terms, a court 
will not disturb the contract because of its confidence that the contract was 
negotiated or chosen freely, that the party subject to a seemingly one-sided term is 
presumed to have obtained some advantage from conceding the term or that, if one 
party negotiated poorly, it is not the court's place to rectify these kinds of errors or 
asymmetries."553 
The Washington Supreme Court, on the other hand, has followed a different approach. 
The Court stated that unconscionability alone is indeed a sufficient basis for denying the 
enforcement of a contract. As the Court categorically stated in a recent case: 
“In some instances, individual contractual provisions may be so one-sided and harsh 
as to render them substantively unconscionable despite the fact that the 
circumstances surrounding the parties' agreement to the contract do not support a 
finding of procedural unconscionability […] Accordingly, we now hold that 
substantive unconscionability alone can support a finding of unconscionability.”554 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled in a 2014 case that “one-sidedness alone can 
render an agreement unconscionable.” 555 Recognizing that its opinion was not anonymously 
accepted in the case law, the Court also stated that: 
“Although some courts have concluded that ‘[t]o be unenforceable, a contract must 
be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable,’ […] most authorities have 
recognized that, in at least some cases, substantive unconscionability, without more, 
can render an agreement unenforceable. […] Indeed, the courts of this state have 
recognized that, under certain circumstances, an impermissibly one-sided agreement 
may be unconscionable even if there is no unfair surprise.”556 
Critics of this single-prong approach have also argued that basing the relief on 
substantive unconscionability alone is not really a single prong approach. They argue that, 
                                                                  
552 LONEGRASS, M., 2012, supra note 177, p. 24. 
553 Cited in ibid., p. 24. 
554 Adler v. Fred Lind Manor [2004], 103 P. 3d, 773–791, p. 782. 
555 Balogh v. Balogh [2014], 332 P. 3d, 631–661, p. 644. 
556 ibid., p. 643. 
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by using the imbalances in the terms of the contract as an indication of lack of knowing 
assent, what courts supportive of this theory are doing is to simply infer the existence of 
procedural unconscionability.557 It seems to be, therefore, simply an extension of the 
sliding scale rule for unconscionability, and based on which a gross level of substantive 
unconscionability leads to a presumption of the procedural prong. 
4.9 Unconscionability and Bargaining Power 
Regardless of whether we opt for a single or double-pronged approach, or whether we opt 
for a sliding-scale rule, a further complication in the assessment of unconscionability 
comes from its close relation to the doctrine of superiority of bargaining power. Their 
close proximity is such that, in fact, they are often analyzed together, as both deal with 
the imposition of one party’s will over the other and, at least in theory, aim to prevent 
abuses of the strong against the weak.558 As the New York Court of Appeals stated in Rowe 
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,  
“There exists an unavoidable tension between the concept of freedom to contract, 
which has long been basic to our socioeconomic system, and the equally fundamental 
belief that an enlightened society must to some extent protect its members from the 
potentially harsh effects of an unchecked free market system. Thus, rightly or 
wrongly, society has chosen to intervene in various ways in the dealings between 
private parties. […] [T]the law has developed the concept of unconscionability so as 
to prevent the unjust enforcement of onerous contractual terms which one party is 
                                                                  
557 As part of his criticism of the doctrine, BROWN sees the possibility of a court using substantive 
unconscionability to imply the existence of the procedural prong as simply adding “to the confusion in this area” 
(BROWN, E. L., 2000, supra note 395, p. 305). 
558 The New York Supreme Court, for example, in Jones v. Star Credit Corp [1969], 59 Misc. 2d, 189–193, p. 191, 
referred to this close connection stating: 
"The law is beginning to fight back against those who once took advantage of the poor and illiterate 
without risk of either exposure or interference. From the common-law doctrine of intrinsic fraud we have, 
over the years, developed common and statutory law which tells not only the buyer but also the seller to 
beware. This body of laws recognizes the importance of a free enterprise system but at the same time will 
provide the legal armor to protect and safeguard the prospective victim from the harshness of an 
unconscionable contract."  
As HELVESTON and JACOBS noted, “while courts have not linked bargaining power differences directly to substantive 
unconscionability, ‘large’ disparities have influenced their reasoning […] Because courts view many of the factors that 
contribute to power disparities as indicia of procedural deficiencies, large differences in bargaining power have led them 
to invalidate contracts or terms that might otherwise have been enforced” (Helveston, M. N. & Jacobs, M. S., 2014, 
supra note 310, pp. 15–16). 
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able to impose under the other because of a significant disparity in bargaining 
power.”559 
Similarly, the seminal Australian High Court case of Commercial Bank of Australia v. 
Amadio, expressly referred to bargaining power disparities as an element of 
unconscionability: 
“The jurisdiction [to grant relief against unconscionable dealings] is long 
established as extending generally to circumstances in which (i) a party to a 
transaction was under a special disability in dealing with the other party with the 
consequence that there was an absence of any reasonable degree of equality between 
them and (ii) that disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it 
prima facie unfair or "unconscientious" that he procure, or accept, the weaker party's 
assent to the impugned transaction in the circumstances in which he procured or 
accepted it. Where such circumstances are shown to have existed, an onus is cast 
upon the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and 
reasonable.”560  
One of the problems arising form unconscionability’s relation to the doctrine of 
bargaining power is determining what parties can be considered “strong” and “weak” in 
any given contract. This is a problem that, as we have seen, seems to permeate not just 
unconscionability but all of the matters related to bargaining power disparities and 
contractual fairness. This is caused by the fact that it is virtually impossible to create clear 
categories of “weak” and “strong” parties, in light of the many changes that society 
experiences in its makeup, not to mention the unique characteristics of any single 
transaction. There was a time, for example, when women were part of what some have 
called “presumed sillies” in the eyes of the courts (together with, among others, farmers, 
heirs, sailors and orphans) and, therefore, would be benefited by the doctrine of 
unconscionability based, in part, by their indisputably lower position in society.561 
Nowadays, of course, thanks to the improvement of the position of women in the western 
                                                                  
559 Rowe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. [1978], 46 NY 2d, 62–73, p. 68. 
560 Cited in THAMPAPILLAI, D. & TAN, V. et al., Australian Commercial Law, 2015, Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, Australia, p. 438. As PHILLIPS notes, the Court made a rather poor choice of words, since “special 
disadvantage” would have been more appropriate than the chosen “special disability,” as the former is considerably 
wider (PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, p. 841). 
561 LEFF, A. A., 1967, supra note 447, pp. 531–532. Other categories of people benefitted by the doctrine included 
“the old, the young, the ignorant, the necessitous, the illiterate, the improvident, the drunken, the naive and the sick, all 
on one side of the transaction, with the sharp and hard on the other.” KNAPP points that, starting in the 1960’s, 
American courts often resorted to the doctrine of unconscionability to restore the imbalances present in 
consumer contracts where one of the parties was a “bargaining disadvantage in the transaction at issue. Some were 
persons of limited education and/or economic means; some were members of minority groups often subject to invidious 
discrimination in American society; some were immigrants or first generation Americans who could read or perhaps even 
speak English with difficulty or not at all” (KNAPP, C. L., 2013, supra note 463, p. 3). 
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world, it would be ridiculous to argue that, like true damsels in distress, they need the 
courts to protect them from this once (wrongly) presumed silliness.562  
Because of this difficulty in “calculating” each party’s power, courts have resorted to 
stereotyping parties based on certain common characteristics. So, for example, courts 
have looked at “whether the parties belong to certain groups or possess certain qualities, 
including their economic role (employer/employee, seller/consumer, and 
corporation/individual), wealth, level of education, and business sophistication, among others. 
While many courts supplement their initial categorizations with individualized information, 
some have based their assessments exclusively on a party’s membership in the relevant group.”563 
Clearly, this is not an ideal solution, and the difficulties associated have been recognized 
by the courts. The High Court of Australia, for example, in the 1956 case of Blomley v. 
Ryan, stated that  
"The circumstances adversely affecting a party, which may induce a court of equity 
either to refuse its aid or to set a transaction aside, are of great variety and can 
hardly be satisfactorily classified. Among them are poverty or need of any kind, 
sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of 
education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is 
                                                                  
562 Italian courts have taken a strange approach towards women’s standing in contracts, by declaring void 
“spouses’ agreements in contemplation of divorce”, deeming them void due to reasons of being against public policy, 
expressing their “concern or even distrust for wives’ ability to identify and fulfil their own good.” Strangely enough, the 
enforcement of those agreements would often benefit the wives, and so these are cases in which the good 
intention of the courts has been misplaced and actually did more harm than good (MARELLA, M. R., ‘The Old and 
the New Limits to Freedom of Contract in Europe’, 2006, 2 European Review of Contract Law, no. 2, p. 264). In a 
similar fashion, Australian law contains a provision granting married women “a prima facie right to have her 
guarantee of her husband’s debts set aside if the guarantee has been procured by her husband.” Understandably, this 
vestigial provision of less civilized times has been the object of strong criticism, not only because it gives married 
women an unjustifiable advantage vis à vis her husbands, but also because it stigmatizes married women as less 
able than men to understand contractual guarantees (PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, pp. 843–845). Also in 
regards to women’s contractual abilities, for a very interesting reflection on undue influence, unconscionability 
and duress affecting Muslim women in American courts, See, generally, BLENKHORN, L. E., ‘Islamic Marriage 
Contracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim 
Women’, 2002, 76 Southern California Law Review, no. 1. 
563 HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, p. 13. Of course, grouping people into categories in 
regards to their contractual ability is often risky; “[f]irst, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assert that the persons 
who fall into any or all of these classes are not in general competent to fend for themselves in most market situations. 
They are not infants, impressionable heirs, or gullible prisoners of war. Second, the subject matter of the transactions is 
for the most part consumer goods that are sold in generally competitive markets, and not interests in trust funds or real 
estate difficult to value even under the best circumstances. The costs of setting these transactions aside, moreover, are 
apt to be quite great, for it will be more expensive for the members of the ‘protected’ class to contract on their own behalf 
within a complex web of legal rules. In addition, there will no doubt be both opportunity and inventive for many to take 
advantage of the rights conferred upon them by law to manipulate the system to their own advantage” (EPSTEIN, R. A., 
1975, supra note 336, pp. 304–305).  
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necessary. The common characteristic seems to be that they have the effect of placing 
one party at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the other."564  
The problems inherent to measuring the bargaining power of the parties are exacerbated 
by the fact that, in any given contract, the parties are bound to have different degrees of 
power. Contracts in which both parties possess the exact degree of power are, in all 
likelihood, nonexistent. Once this is taken into account, we are forced to concede that 
stereotyping contractual parties based on their belonging to certain categories, as 
imprecise as this method may be, might be the only way to apply and enforce the rules on 
unconscionability. Having said that, however, these categorizations do pose the threat 
that they will excuse a party from fulfilling her contract, even when the “strong” party 
acted in a fully permissible way, and will thus give her a benefit that is not granted to 
others. For example, a merchant that uses the exact same form contract in every 
transaction, will find that it will only be enforceable against some of the parties with 
which he contracted, while in other cases the individual characteristics of the other party, 
and which are not attributable to the merchant, will prevent such enforcement.565  
In principle, a different outcome depending on the individual “weaker” party certainly 
seems to go against basic considerations of fairness, as only some will be bound by equally 
draconian terms.566 Because of this, courts have taken these issues into consideration and, 
as a rule, do not consider the mere inequality of bargaining power as sufficient grounds to 
trigger unconscionability. As the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit ruled in a recent 
case: 
“It is not enough to assert that one party was less sophisticated than the other. 
There must be some evidence that the party holding the superior bargaining power 
exerted that power in overreaching the less sophisticated party by, for example, 
engaging in fraud or coercion or by insisting on an unconscionable clause.”567 
As it is well known, a category that has been often considered “weak”, and for good 
reason, is that of consumers.568  The reasons for this special treatment are many. As 
BARNES explained: 
                                                                  
564 Blomley v Ryan, 99 CLR, 362, p. 405. 
565 See §3.2.1 supra. 
566 HELVESTON, M. N. & JACOBS, M. S., 2014, supra note 310, p. 1020. 
567 Sander v. Alexander Richardson Investments [2003], 334 F. 3d, 712–721, p. 720. 
568 For the purposes of this work we are using a rather broad definition of consumer contracts, applying such 
designation to those contracts where goods or services are provided by a party (the merchant) operating in a 
business capacity to a party (the consumer) acting in a private (i.e. non-business) capacity. 
Since the study of unconscionability has, traditionally, been largely focused on consumer contracting, we will 
only briefly refer to these contracts. First, we feel that due to the overwhelming amount of material that already 
covers unconscionability in consumer contracting, our analysis would mostly appear redundant; second, since the 
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“When consumers enter into transactions with commercial enterprises, they almost 
invariably do so through the use of standard form contracts. The disparity in 
bargaining power between consumers and commercial enterprises is generally 
complete and absolute. Consumers are typically not able to negotiate the individual 
terms of form contracts, and so they cannot dicker with the company over onerous 
terms such as liability limitations, warranty exclusions, and the like. Consumers 
would, in most instances, not be able to understand the various legal issues at stake 
even if they had the bargaining power necessary to seek more favorable contractual 
terms at the time of contract formation.”569 
As adhesion contracts, consumer transactions are generally understood to be one-sided, 
establishing terms that are much more favorable to the drafting party (the merchant) 
than to the consumer. Because of this unequal and unbalanced relation, it has been a 
matter of public policy to establish rules that protect the consumers and prevent abuses 
on the part of the businesses with which they contract. In addition to specific regulations 
seeking to prevent abuses against consumers, courts have also resorted to the doctrine of 
unconscionability in order to further this protection.570 In light of this, “consumers, 
particularly low income consumers, have been the most frequent beneficiaries of the doctrine of 
unconscionability”, and courts seem to apply this doctrine “most aggressively” in order to 
protect them.571 
A perhaps unintended effect of prioritizing the application of the doctrine of 
unconscionability to consumers, is that courts and scholars have traditionally left 
commercial contracts outside the reach of unconscionability. Indeed, as the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota stated in Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch: 
                                                                                                                                                                       
manifestation in choice of court agreements, we feel that analyzing “commercial unconscionability” is much more 
relevant and useful.  
569 BARNES, W. R., ‘Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power’, 2011, 14 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Business Law, no. 3, p. 661. 
570 For an interesting, and occasionally  depressing, review of the application of the doctrine of unconscionability 
in regards to consumers contracts featuring elderly parties that were taken advantage of by merchants, See, 
generally, MEADOWS, R. L., ‘Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device for the Elder Client: How Useful Is 
It?’, 2005, 38 Akron Law Review, no. 4, 741–758. Particularly depressing among the cases she references is that of 
Bennett v. Bailey [1980], 597 SW 2d, 532–535., where the plaintiff, an elderly woman, was the victim of practices 
that preyed on her lack of “knowledge, ability, experience or capacity” (p. 535) in order to get her to sign for 
unreasonably expensive dance lessons.  
571 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1066. It should be kept in mind that unconscionability is not to be 
seen as an ideal solution for consumers. On the one hand, few consumers, on an individual basis, will be able to 
embark in the potentially crippling venture of suing a merchant; this is perhaps why, in general, legislatures have 
been so adamant in creating mandatory rules for consumer contracts, since it establishes a clearer playing field in 
which litigation only becomes the last resource. Additionally, even in those cases in which consumers do litigate, 
unconscionability is rarely successful, “since it only avoids enforcements of contracts found to be ‘extraordinarily 
unfair’” (See D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 108). 
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“Although courts have been receptive to pleas of unconscionability raised by 
consumers, they have been reluctant to do so in commercial transactions.”572  
As a matter of fact, it is precisely that “an unconscionable clause was inserted in a merchant 
form contract in a merchant-consumer transaction that has been a common factor in successful 
unconscionability cases.”573 In other words, courts have traditionally reasoned that clauses 
that might have been considered fear if used between merchants, are considered arbitrary 
or draconian when present in a consumer setting. As JORDAN notes: 
“Courts have thus far proceeded with caution in upsetting commercial arrangements 
as unconscionable. Some have hesitated to undertake the wide-ranging inquiry into 
commercial practice and needs mandated by the [Uniform Commercial] Code, 
suggesting that the task is more properly one for the legislature. Courts have also 
stressed the danger of second-guessing knowledgeable commercial 
negotiators whose assessment of the fairness of the forms they sign is 
probably as accurate as that of even the most conscientious jurist, who has 
struggled to understand the commercial context. Hence, except in the 
consumer setting, where practices clearly bordering on fraud or true duress create 
special problems, courts have generally permitted businessmen to enforce even form 
contracts. Indeed, in those rare cases in which unconscionability has been found in 
merchant-to-merchant transactions, commentators have not hesitated to criticize 
the results as economically dysfunctional and unwise.”574 
The reasoning behind this approach to unconscionability is fairly easy to understand. The 
view is that the fact that commercial parties are, precisely, commercial parties, means that 
the weaknesses that the unconscionability doctrine is aimed to account for simply do not 
exist in any significant way. Some courts have accepted this rationale in full, reasoning 
that commercial parties are not in the weak position required to invoke the protections of 
the unconscionability doctrine. 575 The US Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, for 
example, in We Care Hair Development, Inc. v. Engen, rejected that an arbitration clause 
inserted in a franchise agreement was unconscionable, arguing that the plaintiffs were 
“not vulnerable consumers or helpless workers,” but rather “business people who bought a 
franchise.”576 
                                                                  
572 Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch [1975], 238 N.W., 47–52, p. 50. 
573 DIMATTEO, L. A. & RICH, B. L., 2005, supra note 486, p. 1077. 
574 JORDAN, E. R., ‘Unconscionability at the Gas Station’, 1977, 62 Minnesota Law Review, p. 816 (emphasis 
added). 
575 MORANT, B. D., 2003, supra note 126, p. 237 (“Contractual equity […]can be quite limited, particularly for small 
businesses. Rules that offer possible relief from inequitable bargains apply more readily to consumers rather than 
business entities”). 
576 We Care Hair Development, Inc. v. Engen [1999], 180 F. 3d, 838, p. 843. This consideration not only goes 
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The idea that commercial parties cannot be the victims of unconscionable terms is, of 
course, mistaken. Indeed, as several authors and courts have conceded,  
“although unconscionability is applied most often and most aggressively to protect 
consumers, the doctrine is by no means applicable only to consumers. […] The mere 
fact that a contract is formed between two commercial parties does not insulate that 
contract from a judicial intervention on the ground of unconscionability”.577 
This reluctance, and occasionally outright refusal, to allow the doctrine of 
unconscionability to benefit merchants is shortsighted, and grounded on outdated and 
false suppositions. It is based on the idea that the fact that a party is a merchant 
somehow means that they are automatically free from the biases, cognitive limitations 
and shortcomings that affect consumers. As FREILICH and WEBB explain,  
“businesses tend to be perceived as well-resourced and advised commercial entities. 
Their common commercial character binds them, regardless of the business's size or 
the education and experience of the proprietors. Being regarded as commercial 
'players', it is assumed that the protections available to consumers are 
unnecessary.”578  
This idea starts from the assumption that all commercial parties are the same (or, at the 
very least, that they are all on a similar level) and that therefore they are all able to 
thoroughly plan and negotiate their contracts, to dicker over every single term, and to 
make their interests manifest themselves in the final agreement.579  There is, in other 
words, a pervasive (and pernicious) “belief that the optimistic assumptions of classical 
contract law are accurate in contracts between merchants: that in the merchant-to-merchant 
contract experienced, knowledgeable parties deal on an equal basis, with each party having the 
ability to codetermine contract terms and to shop around for more suitable deals.”580 As a result 
of this apparent lack of protection (or, at least, the reluctance to grant it to them) small 
businesses end up needing to resort to “self-help” mechanisms, adopting “strategies that 
                                                                                                                                                                       
unconscionable bargains, but also against the UCC itself. Indeed, as GOLDBERG notes, “of the ten illustrative cases 
cited in the official comment to section 2-302, a majority involve merchant-merchant transactions” (GOLDBERG, S., 
‘Unconscionability in a Commercial Setting: The Assessment of Risk in a Contract to Build Nuclear Reactors’, 
1982, 58 Washington Law Review, no. 5, p. 348). 
577 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1066. 
578 FREILICH, A. & WEBB, E., 2013, supra note 399, pp. 134–135. 
579 As D’AGOSTINO explains, the traditional view seems to be that while in B2C contracts “the nondrafter party is 
not involved in a job transaction and is presumed not to have enough knowledge to read and understand every 
clause included into the contract,” in B2B contracts “both parties are ‘professional’ and therefore fully informed 
of any aspect of the transaction they are involved into” (D'AGOSTINO, E., 2014, supra note 138, p. 8). 
580 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, pp. 1085–1086. 
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strengthen their bargaining positions, ameliorate their competitive disadvantages, and yet 
conform to the rigor of contractual rules.”581 
This unjustifiably optimistic view of commercial contracts is, of course, inaccurate and 
anachronistic, failing to account for the massive changes that have occurred in the 
market. There are no strong reasons why businesses should be excluded from the relief 
provided from unconscionability. Indeed, as some courts have ruled, the principles of 
unconscionability are perfectly applicable to business undertakings. 
“This might be because the company ‘is in desperate financial position, and, 
attempting to escape from that position, acts without legal advice.’ Additionally, a 
court may be prepared to look behind the corporate structure at the special 
disadvantages of its directors and impute those disadvantages to the company. 
There is merit in this approach. Sometimes individuals are advised to adopt 
corporate structures without understanding the consequences, and, indeed, 
incorporation may simply conceal the commercial reality that the business is being 
conducted by individuals, or a group of individuals. The exclusion of the principles of 
unconscionability from any application to companies would also mean that contracts 
entered into by the directors (for example, a director's guarantee of the company's 
debts) would be subject to the legal regime of unconscionability, but not the 
guaranteed contract entered into by the company and controlled by the directors. 
This is despite the fact that in the usual case all these transactions are related and 
interlinked.”582 
Certainly, while there has been a paradigm shift in regards to non-commercial contracts, a 
similar shift is yet to happen, at least on the same scale, in regards to commercial 
transactions. So, while the meaning of “assent” has changed as some market players 
become more powerful vis à vis their contractual partners, this change in the 
understanding of contracts has not extended to business transactions.  
Although we can certainly agree with the idea that a consumer contract is, first and 
foremost, a contract where the power of the parties is unequal, it is wrong to analyze 
commercial transactions from the standpoint that they are, by their very nature, 
balanced. The situation is particularly evident when it comes to behemoth corporations 
dealing with suppliers, all of whom are in no position to dicker over the terms presented 
to them.583 A good example of this situation is that of enterprises like McDonald’s which, 
as one of the largest purchasers of beef, chicken, tomatoes, lettuce, potatoes, pork and 
                                                                  
581 MORANT, B. D., 2003, supra note 126, pp. 238–239. 
582 PHILLIPS, J., 2010, supra note 18, pp. 842–843. 
583 ibid., p. 843. 
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apples, has a considerably larger bargaining power than that of any individual supplier of 
these products and, as such, is able to dictate the terms of their contracts.584 
Of course, analyzing issues of unconscionability in commercial transactions is a difficult 
task, since its application needs to be more nuanced than it would be in a consumer 
setting, as the grounds on which unconscionability can be applied to favor a consumer 
might not work regarding a merchant.585 After all, it is true that commercial parties are 
more knowledgeable than consumers, and that they are more likely to obtain external 
counsel when they become party to a contract with a fellow merchant (although, 
certainly, it is unrealistic to expect them to obtain proper counsel in every transaction). 
As MALLOR notes, “[i]f all merchant-to-merchant transactions really fitted this model, the 
policies that support certainty and predictability would be overwhelming. The application of 
unconscionability would strike at the heart of freedom of contract in an unprincipled perversion 
of the purposes of the doctrine. As one court put it, unconscionability was not designed to ‘relieve 
an experienced merchant of the misfortune occasioned by his own poor business practices.’”586 
The issue is, of course, that the fact that a party is commercial should not be seen as 
guarantee that he cannot be taken advantage of. 
The UCC itself seems to have recognized that it would not be appropriate to limit 
unconscionability exclusively to consumer transactions. The history of UCC shows that 
there was originally “a special rule for merchant’s negotiations” written into what would later 
become §2-302, and which established that “if the merchant had an opportunity to read a 
contract, he was bound, even if he had not read it (the rule being otherwise for non-
merchants).”587 By the time the UCC was finally published, however, this provision had 
been discarded. Clearly, if the drafters of the UCC, who were codifying existing legal rules, 
had wanted to exclude commercial contracts from the application of the doctrine of 
unconscionability, they could have easily done so by keeping this provision in the final 
text. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the majority of illustrative cases 
                                                                  
584 Regarding the size of McDonald’s as a purchaser, See ADAMS, C., ‘Reframing the Obesity Debate: McDonald's 
Role May Surprise You’, 2007, 35 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, p. 155; SCHLOSSER, E., Fast Food Nation: 
The Dark Side of the All-American Meal, 2012, Mariner Books/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, p. 268; and DEMARIA, 
A. N., ‘Of Fast Food and Franchises’, 2003, 41 Journal of the American College of Cardiology, no. 7, p. 1227 (also 
noting that McDonald’s “annually hires more employees than any American business”). 
585 This is also the opinion of MALLOR, who argues that  
“While it is clear that some forms of unconscionability that occur in merchant-to-consumer transactions 
probably could not occur in many merchant-to-merchant transactions, it is equally clear that a principled 
application of the doctrine of unconscionability to merchant cases requires that courts take into account 
the characteristics of the parties, the details of the transaction, and the type of unconscionability alleged.” 
MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1067. 
586 ibid., pp. 1085–1086. 
587 LEFF, A. A., 1967, supra note 447, p. 507. 
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included in the official comment to the UCC in regards to §2-302 deal, precisely, with 
commercial contracts.588  
While we can certainly concede that commercial parties are indeed “stronger” and more 
knowledgeable than consumers, by extending (or at least not prohibiting) the application 
of the doctrine of unconscionability to commercial transactions, the UCC clearly 
demonstrated that this assumption does not mean that all merchants are the same. 
“[B]usiness experience and knowledge varies as much among merchants as among consumers. 
Certainly the alarming rate at which small businesses fail rebuts the presumption that all 
businesspeople are knowledgeable, competent, and experienced.”589   
Once we have established that unconscionability can, and even should, also apply also to 
commercial contracts, a new problem arises. While in consumer contracts it is easy to 
predict that the consumer will be the one in a disadvantageous situation vis à vis the 
commercial party, this rule of thumb is of no assistance when it comes to commercial 
contracts. This forces courts to create “a standard by which to identify those businesses in 
need of protection from themselves and others.”590 In other words, courts will need to 
determine when a merchant will need to be protected from his own ignorance, or his poor 
market position, both of which are situations for which the other party, the more 
powerful merchant, cannot be held responsible. This is a problem that affects the issue of 
unconscionability in both consumer and commercial contracts, since the application of 
the doctrine seems hard to explain when the only reason why the contract (or one of its 
terms) “shocks the conscience” is because of the individual characteristics of the weaker 
party, and for which the stronger party cannot be blamed. 
Just as it happens with consumer contracts, in a commercial setting the issue of the 
information that is disclosed to the weaker party is of vital importance, although some 
                                                                  
588 ibid., pp. 502–503. 
589 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, pp. 1085–1086. A reluctant agreement to this premise appears in Note, 
‘Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine Gone Awry’, 1961, 70 The Yale Law Journal, no. 3, p. 458. While 
there the author considers that an analogy between merchants and consumers in regards to the application of 
unconscionability is not really appropriate, since “decision[s] of small businessmen are probably better informed and 
more carefully calculated than those of any single worker or consumer”, he concedes that there might be good policy 
reasons to do so anyway: 
“[T]he alarming rate of small business failures in recent years might cast doubt on the presumed 
competency of the small businessman. And since preservation of the small business enterprise is now 
recognized as a major national policy, courts might feel justified in protecting small businesses from their 
own shortcomings as an additional protective measure.”  
590 ibid., p. 458. While some critics have acknowledged this difficulty, such an acknowledgment is done to 
illustrate what they perceive as the futility of unconscionability in merchant contracts. They argue that, unlike 
what happens in antitrust regulation, market power cannot be used as a basis for applying the doctrine of 
unconscionability, since although it might serve as an indication of the power between the parties, it says nothing 
about the need of the party to be protected “from itself”. Because of this, they refer to unconscionability in a 
commercial setting as “essentially a judicial determination of proper business policy” (ibid., pp. 459–460). 
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reservations must be kept in mind. First of all, commercial parties should be held at a 
much higher standard of diligence than consumers, since simply allowing them to default 
on their obligations alleging a lack of knowledge or information would only prove to be a 
protection from their own negligence. Merchants should be expected to seek out the 
information required to understand the nuances of the obligations that they are 
subscribing, as any diligent commercial party would. Second, the level of ignorance or lack 
of understanding that a merchant could allege in regards to contractual terminology or 
technical details of the service or product, should be held at a much higher and stricter 
standard than that required for a consumer to void a transaction.  
In Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., Inc., for example a clause through which the owners of a 
chain of gasoline outlets waived claims for short delivery against the supplier was not 
deemed unconscionable due to the commercial character of the plaintiff.591 In this case, 
the Court of Appeals of New Mexico considered that since this was a contract between 
“experienced and sophisticated” parties, the plaintiff could not claim that the term was 
unconscionable or that he was surprised by it.592 Clearly, and the court seemed to 
recognize this in its decision, an experienced commercial party cannot seek the protection 
that was established to protect the weak and unexperienced parties of a contractual 
relation. 
This fundamental distinction that must be made between consumer and commercial 
contracts can be best illustrated by the following example: 
X, a small Dutch producer of artisan beers, concludes a contract of carriage with Y, a 
large German shipping company, for the carriage of 1 container full of beer bottles 
from Rotterdam, the Netherlands, to Houston, United States. In the face of this 
boilerplate contract, in bold capital letters, there is a choice of law clause that 
establishes that the law ruling the contract is that of the Republic of Germany, and a 
choice of court clause establishing that German courts will have jurisdiction over any 
dispute arising from or in connection to the contract. The contract then spends 10 
single-spaced pages detailing a series of technical issues and mathematical formulas 
based on which liability is to be calculated. On the basis of these obscure formulas, 
the contract allows the carrier to be free of any and all liability for cargo damages.593  
In a consumer contract, for example, for the purchase of a television set in a retail store, it 
would be possible to argue that the choice of law and/or the choice of court are 
unconscionable, even when they are presented to the consumer on the face of the 
contract. An argument could be made that consumers are often unable to understand 
                                                                  
591 Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., Inc. [1983], 662 P. 2d, 661–674. 
592 ibid., p. 664 
593 For the sake of this example, of course, we should ignore any applicable convention that might establish 
minimum liabilities for the carriers. 
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what “choice of law” and “choice of court” mean, let alone being in a position to embark in 
long journeys to seek redress in faraway courts, nor to understand the intricacies of 
foreign legislation; furthermore, it is certainly questionable whether it would be fair to 
include such an unexpected clause in a consumer transaction. In a commercial contract 
like the one mentioned in the example above, however, and which has clear international 
elements, it would in principle be naive to pretend that a merchant cannot understand 
what it means to determine the law that will apply to the contract, or the courts that will 
have jurisdiction. A different situation happens in the case of the highly complex method 
of calculating (and, in the end, excluding) liability, which could be considered 
unconscionable whether it was present in a consumer or in a commercial contract. In the 
example above, it would be irrational to expect a small business, contracting for a small 
shipment, to engage in the long, tedious and highly complex process of merely 
understanding the method of calculating liability, particularly when it is a boilerplate 
contract over the terms of which there can be no negotiation. 
While allowing unconscionability to provide relief in commercial contracts is certainly the 
right approach, this must be done very carefully. A doctrine that is already controversial, 
seen by many as an example of a noxious paternalism that seeks to reward the negligent 
and destroy otherwise valid bargains, must be applied in a way that allows for the special 
characteristics of commercial transactions to be taken into careful consideration.  While it 
is certainly true that merchants are different from consumers, and so the standards of 
care that we can demand from them are completely different, we should also remember 
that commercial parties are not all-knowing, and that they are actually made up of the 
same prejudiced, feeble-minded, biased and impulsive people that, in other facets of their 
lives, are mere consumers.594 
This fallibility of the human element within commercial parties, together with the 
practical impossibility of expecting every commercial contract to be carefully assessed by 
external counsel (due to, for example, the delays and the prohibitive costs that such a 
process would entail), makes it necessary to free the understanding of this doctrine from 
the anachronistic idea that only individual consumers can reap its benefits.595 Although, 
as a Louisiana court recently stated, it is understandable that there is a certain 
“presumption of permissible dealings […] between commercial parties,” this presumption 
should not be treated as an absolute, either explicitly or by establishing such a high 
burden of proof that, in effect, it becomes virtually impossible to defeat.596 
                                                                  
594 GARVIN argues that, in fact, small-businesses might actually be especially susceptible to some heuristics and 
biases (GARVIN, L. T., ‘Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law’, 2005, 40 Wake Forest Law 
Review, no. 1, pp. 382–383). 
595 MALLOR, J. P., 1986, supra note 101, p. 1086. 
596 Helena Chemical Co. v. Williamson [2015], 1298435 WL, 1–7, p. 5. 
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The special care that must be paid in regards to unconscionability is particularly relevant 
in the case of small and middle-sized businesses, regarding whom the strict separation 
between “consumer” and “merchant” is not so straightforward. Indeed, as GARVIN argued: 
“In many ways, small businesses most resemble consumers and non-merchants in 
their abilities to deal with risk, whether financially or cognitively, to secure and 
process information, and to fend for themselves in the market. Nevertheless, they 
are generally-almost invariably- treated like merchants. Small businesses thus get 
the worst of each dichotomy. In their dealings with consumers, small businesses 
must give protections based on asymmetries that may not exist. In their dealings 
with larger businesses, small businesses are treated as though the parties are 
essentially equal, which will not usually be true save in the most formal sense. By 
putting small businesses on the wrong side of each dichotomy, the law may thus 
promote inefficiency, burdening small businesses on the one hand and failing to 
protect them on the other. Put otherwise, the law may effectively subject small 
businesses to a regulatory tax-a peculiar tax indeed, if small businesses are, as we are 
told, the driving forces of our economy.”597 
An interesting example on the legislation of unconscionability regarding small businesses 
is that of Australia. Indeed, until 2010, when the new Australian Consumer Law (ACL) 
was enacted, the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (TPA) included, after regulating 
unconscionability in regards to consumers, Section 51AC on “Unconscionable conduct in 
business transactions.” This section, introduced in 1998, had the express purpose of 
protecting small businesses from exploitation by larger enterprises, as it was thought that 
“overall […they] seemed to suffer similar disadvantages to ordinary consumers.”598 Although 
this section was later repealed when the ACL entered into force, its rules have more or 
less remained in Australian legislation.599 
                                                                  
597 GARVIN, L. T., 2005, supra note 594, p. 297. 
598 BROWN, L., ‘The Impact of Section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974(CTH) on Commercial Certainty’, 
2004, 28 Melbourne University Law Review, no. 3, p. 598. 
599 See FREILICH, A. & WEBB, E., 2013, supra note 399, p. 135 and CHEW, C., 2014, supra note 358, p. 251. While 
originally s51AC was to be echoed in full in s22 of the ACL (See  Australian Government Solicitors, Fact Sheet: 
Australian Consumer Law, no. 12, <http://www.ags.gov.au/publications/fact-sheets/fact_sheet_no_12.pdf> (last 
visited 18 November 2015), p. 7) in the end this was not the case, and the provision was scrapped altogether. 
Despite the absence of this rule, however, the ACL continues to extend the application of unconscionability to 
business transactions, as “many pivotal sections are equally applicable to consumer or business plaintiffs”; among 
them, s21 on unconscionable conducts. While some authors lament that the protection of commercial parties 
does not extend to unfair contractual terms, a sentiment we can certainly side with, this exclusion is not unique 
to Australia (for example, the English Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applies only some of its provisions to 
commercial dealings). It should be noted, however, that, as of this writing, an amendment has been passed in 
Australia that extends the unfair contract terms protections to small business contracts; it is expected that this 
new legislation will come into effect sometime in 2016, under the name of Treasury Legislation Amendment 
(Small Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015. 
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The irrationality of excluding business parties, particularly small businesses, from the 
protection of unconscionability is best explained in the words of the Australian Treasury. 
In a report from 2009, in regards to whether the protection from unfair contractual terms 
should be extended to small businesses, the Treasury explained: 
“Standard-form contracts are used by parties irrespective of the legal status or 
nature of the party to whom the contract is presented, and without any effective 
opportunity for that party to negotiate the term. In such cases, it would be invidious 
to suggest that the same term, which may be considered unfair in relation to a 
contract entered into by a natural person, would not be similarly unfair in relation to 
a business, where neither of them is in a position to negotiate the term."600 
The position put forward by the Australian Treasury is certainly true. If we see a term as 
inherently unconscionable (as might be the case with certain forms of remedy-meddling 
or deliberately complex and obscure fine print) when it exists in a consumer setting, it 
makes no sense to assume that the fact that the parties are “commercial” suddenly makes 
it fair and acceptable. The fact that an individual, for whatever reason, decides to embark 
in a business venture does not mean that he magically becomes impervious to being 
abused by others. On the contrary, the lack of protective regulation in the commercial 
world (as opposed to consumer dealings) creates such a dog-eat-dog environment that 
abuses against the weak are, perhaps, even more likely to occur.  
 
  
                                                                  
600 Cited in FREILICH, A. & WEBB, E., 2013, supra note 399, p. 150. 
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“Auro pulsa fides, auro venalia jura, aurum lex sequitur, mox sine lege 
pudor” 
“By gold all good faith has been banished, by gold our rights are abused, 




s we have already seen, unlike what happens in the Common Law, the philosophy 
of the Civil Law world regarding contractual obligations answers to a different 
moral calling. Indeed, under the influence of Roman law, as interpreted by the 
canon lawyers, pacta sunt servanda, the duty to comply with contractual 
obligations, is a moral imperative. Ideas of, for example, “efficient breaches” of contracts, 
quite common within the Common Law, appear as alien to a system in which compliance 
(and specific performance) are seen as a social imperative.602 As explained by SCALISE:  
                                                                  
601 DUNLOP, J., History of Roman Literature During the Augustan Age, 1828, Longmans, Rees, Orme, Brown and 
Green, London, p. 326. 
602 In his very critical review, FRIEDMAN describes the efficient breach theory as one in which if the promisor’s 
breach allows him to profit to an amount higher than the losses suffered by the promisee, then the breach is to 
be permitted, or even encouraged, since it would allow for the maximization of resources. The idea behind this 
theory is that no party would suffer any losses, since the promisee would be paid expectation damages to an 
amount that would make him indifferent to the breach, and the promisor would still profit since the gains from 
the breach would be higher than the damages he paid (FRIEDMANN, D., ‘The Efficient Breach Fallacy’, 1989, 18 
The Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1, pp. 2–3). An example might serve to illustrate this point in a better way: 
α agreed to sell his car to β for €1000. Between the agreement and the exchange, however, χ approaches α 
and offers him €2000 for the car. α values his car at €800. If he sells the car β, he will have a profit of 
€200; if he instead decides to breach his contract with β and sell it to χ, he will pay expectation damages 
to β of   €1100, and still have a profit of  €900 from his contract with χ. As long as the expectation 
damages paid to β allow him to still profit more than €200, it will be more efficient for α to sell his car to 
χ. 
Chapter 5 
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“Contract law in civilian systems begins with the foundational Latin maxim pacta 
sunt servanda […]. To classify some breaches of contract as "efficient" would be to 
sanction [a] conduct that has been prohibited from the time of the praetors in early 
Roman law. […] Thus, allowing or encouraging some breaches of contract would 
conflict with the foundational moral significance attached to contracts.”603 
While, for historical reason relating to maritime trade, the focus of this work is strongly 
placed in the Common Law, in this section we will perform a cursory review of some of 
the ways in which Civil Law systems have dealt with unconscionable bargains. Due to its 
brevity, this chapter should only be seen as a general overview of the situation, and 
readers are encouraged to consult the accompanying bibliography in order to obtain a 
better picture. 
5.2 Unconscionability and the Civil Law 
As we have seen, the pacta sunt servanda principle has had a much stronger influence in 
Civil Law systems. As a result of this apparently more zealous view regarding the 
inviolability of contracts, it would be reasonable to assume that doctrines aimed at 
dissolving or amending valid agreements would not have a place in these systems. And 
yet, this is not the case. Indeed, despite appearances, Civilian systems have a rich history 
of doctrines aimed at restoring contractual balance, even if that means going against the 
express will of the parties manifested in their contracts. These include situations well 
beyond those in which consent is in question, dealing instead with cases where even 
though the parties freely agreed to their contract, the courts take issue with the rights 
and obligations created by the agreement, or with the way in which such agreement came 
into existence.  
As some have argued, in its early stages, Roman law “was uncompromising on the 
enforcement of contracts,” so much so that if all the formalities were complied with, a man 
“was unconditionally bound to [his contract], and even coercion and fraud were no defenses. 
The Roman Shylock was entitled to his pound of flesh.”604 This strict approach to 
enforceability, however, did not last, and the praetors soon introduced a variety of 
exceptions that allowed parties to prevent the enforcement under certain conditions.605 
Good faith quickly became a fundamental value in the interpretation and performance of 
contracts, allowing the praetors to reject the enforcement of agreements that although 
might be valid in appearance, were somehow affected by wicked provisions.  
                                                                  
603 Jr. Ronald J. Scalise, ‘Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine 
of Efficient Breach of Contract’, 2007, 55 The American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 4, p. 721. 
604 HAHLO, H. R., 1981, supra note 219, p. 71. 
605 ibid., p. 71. 
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Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this shift in favor of fairness, and which has 
persisted to this day in some civilian systems, is the doctrine of laesio enormis, and which 
allowed the severely underpaid seller of a plot of land to rescind the contract. It is a case 
in which the inner feelings of the parties to the contract became irrelevant, authorizing 
the praetor (and later the courts) to simply rescind an agreement in which the price (the 
consideration of the contract, if we are to speak in Common Law terms) was seen as 
absurdly and unfairly low. It had as its only motivation the protection of weak parties 
that might otherwise have found themselves at the mercy of powerful and savvy buyers, 
who would take advantage of their positions. As one author explained:  
“The reason why laesio enormis operated only in favour of a seller (not a buyer) of 
land (and not of movables) is found in the economic conditions of the late Roman 
Empire, which placed peasants and small-scale farmers at the mercy of the owners of 
the large latifundia, who by means of various pressures were often able to compel 
them to sell them their lands at give-away prices and place themselves under their 
protection.”606 
The developing of concepts such as “just price” is also a clear example of the civil law’s 
openness to policing the “morality” or “fairness” of an agreement. It was, without a doubt, 
a paternalistic doctrine in which the legislator knew better, going well beyond the 
precepts of classic Roman law. As a matter of fact, this doctrine of the “just price,” as 
manifested in the laesio enormis doctrine, was heavily influenced by theological and moral 
ideas, as it actually  
“embodied what the Holy Roman Church thought the law ought to be concerning the 
pricing of goods in their economy. This inspiring set of moral values based on fair 
play in contracts had no basis in Roman Law at all[,] yet the Middle Ages giants 
seized upon it to construct an economic system that was so paternalistic that it made 
both ancient Greece and Roman markets look like the essence of the market 
overt.”607  
The plethora of remedies that arose during the Middle Ages, and which aimed at 
protecting the weak and ensuring balance, shaped the development of the Civil Law 
system, even as liberal (and even libertarian) economic and social philosophies started to 
take over the European mindset. In France, for example, the laesio enormis doctrine 
continues to exist in its legislation despite a backlash against the doctrine that arose in 
                                                                  
606 ibid., p. 71.  
607 SQUILLANTE, A. M., ‘Doctrine of Just Price - Its Origin and Development, The’, 1969, 74 Commercial Law 
Journal, p. 334. 
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the aftermath of the Revolution, and in which the legislature, in the middle of a period of 
inflation, abolished it and indefinitely suspended all pending actions.608  
Just as it happened in the development of the Common Law remedies for 
unconscionability, Civilian systems have seen a fair share of disputes. Both France and 
Germany, for example, arguably the most important civil law systems, saw in their 
development a great deal of controversy regarding how to balance liberal ideas of 
commerce with those aimed at ensuring fairness. Even though remedies continue to be 
part of these and many other systems, the fact remains that debates continue as to how 
convenient it is to allow these moral considerations to remain as part of the legal system.  
Beyond specific remedies, however, it is the underlying philosophy that makes up the 
Civil Law systems that has allowed that fairness and balance are policed and ensured. This 
due to the fact that while remedies such as laesio enormis have a specific area of 
application, the ideological underpinnings of the Civil Law apply in all transactions.609 In 
general,  
“[t]he idea underlying this model [of restricting contractual freedom] is that the 
main function exerted by law in setting limits to freedom of contract is to trace a 
sharp divide between what is inside/what is outside of the market, the first realm 
being mostly ruled by laissez faire, the latter by the intervention of the state 
according to a paternalistic approach. Here the state curtails personal choices with 
the goal of satisfying the individual’s deep preferences.”610 
The doctrines of “good faith” and “good morals” (“bonnes moeurs” or “gutten Sitten” in 
French and German law, respectively) are an essential part of most Civil Law systems, and 
actually allow for contracts that would otherwise be considered valid, to be rescinded or 
modified. German and French law, for example, specifically resort to these values as a way 
to police fairness. Indeed, both systems  
“frown upon, discourage and, indeed, give no force or effect, to those harsh 
overreaching, unagreed upon contracts, the very existence of which is considered to 
be corrosive of good morals. The concept of unconscionability is captured in that 
sense of good moral. Contracts promulgated by [a] business, where there is no true 
                                                                  
608 SQUILLANTE, A. M., 1969, supra note 391, p. 302. 
609 It is worth noting that the applicability of laesio enormis is not the same throughout the Civil Law world. 
Indeed, while countries like Chile (arts. 1888-1891 of the Civil Code) and France (art. 1674 of the Civil Code) 
limit its application to the sale of land, others, like Peru (art. 1447 of the Civil Code) and Argentina (art. 954 of 
the Civil Code), do not establish such limitations, extending the laesio enormis protection even to the sale of 
movable goods and to contracts other than sale.  See, generally,  ESPANÉS, L. M. de, ‘Lesión, Elementos y 
Naturaleza Jurídica’, 1998, 38 THEMIS: Revista de Derecho, 173–177. 
610 MARELLA, M. R., 2006, supra note 562, p. 262. 
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equality of bargaining position, cannot be held to be mutually agreed upon between 
the parties.”611 
This is precisely the principle established in §138 of the German Civil Code (BGB), when it 
states that: 
“(1) A legal transaction which is contrary to good morals is void. 
(2) In particular, a legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the 
predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgement or considerable weakness of will 
of another, causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to 
be promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly disproportionate to 
the performance.”612 
Similarly, the French Civil Code establishes in Article 1108, among the requirements for a 
valid obligation, the existence of “a lawful cause” (“une cause licite dans l’obligation”). Then, 
in Article 1133, establishes that:  
“A cause is unlawful where it is prohibited by legislation, where it is contrary to 
public morals or to public policy.”613 
The Chilean Civil Code establishes an analog rule in Article 1467, stating in the relevant 
part that: 
“There can be no obligation without a cause that is both real and lawful […] 
Cause is the reason that informs the act or contract; and unlawful cause is the one 
that is forbidden by law, or that goes against good morals or the public order.”614 
                                                                  
611 SQUILLANTE, A. M., 1969, supra note 391, p. 303. 
612 "§ 138 Sittenwidriges Rechtsgeschäft; Wucher 
(1) Ein Rechtsgeschäft, das gegen die guten Sitten verstößt, ist nichtig. 
(2) Nichtig ist insbesondere ein Rechtsgeschäft, durch das jemand unter Ausbeutung der Zwangslage, der 
Unerfahrenheit, des Mangels an Urteilsvermögen oder der erheblichen Willensschwäche eines anderen 
sich oder einem Dritten für eine Leistung Vermögensvorteile versprechen oder gewähren lässt, die in 
einem auffälligen Missverhältnis zu der Leistung stehen.” 
The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) reached an interesting decision in regards to this provision in 
the so-called  Bürgschaft case (“collateral” case) of 1993, and in which the FCC “established constitutional standards 
to be applied to a private contracts when there is reason to believe that there exists an inequality of bargaining power” 
(MARELLA, M. R., 2006, supra note 562, p. 264). What is remarkable about this decision, as well as those that 
have affirmed and even expanded it, is that it goes beyond merely confirming that contracts that go against this 
boni mores provision are unenforceable, but that it actually resorts to constitutional principles (and the doctrine 
of the horizontal effect of constitutional rights) to argue that it violates German law (See, generally, MILLER, R. et 
al., ‘Constitutional Control Of Marital Agreements II: The FCC Affirms Its Path-Breaking Decision’, 2001, 2 
German Law Journal). 
613 “Article 1133. 
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Regarding the French and the Chilean provisions, it should also be noted that the doctrine 
of cause is, in itself, aimed at policing morality in contracts, and that “it represents the 
essential tool whereby the underlying interests, either economic or non-economic, may be clearly 
identified”.615 On this basis, when a cause is considered illicit, this qualification is not 
limited to only breaches of mandatory rules, public policy, good faith, or good morals, but 
also to situations in which the contract was drafted in the aims of evading the application 
of law.616 
As the cited norms reveal, these Civilian systems have attempted to establish safety 
measures to be used in the event of contracts that, although might appear to be legal and 
enforceable, are somehow “not quite right.” Although, just as in the case of the doctrine of 
unconscionability, there have been those who see these exceptions as going against the 
sanctity of contracts and the principle of party autonomy, proponents of these rules argue 
that they “cannot be seen as a weakness of the pacta sunt servanda principle but, to the 
contrary, as one of its strengths, since they seek to maintain the equitable content of the 
contract in order to provide it with stability and intangibility.”617 
It has also been argued, as it happened elsewhere in regards to the definition of 
unconscionability, that the malleability of these concepts is, despite some criticisms, not a 
weakness, but rather one of their strengths. The argument here is that this flexibility 
allows the courts to shape their analysis based on the specific circumstances of the case. 
As professor SQUILLANTE colorfully put it, “if something smells fishy and there is no legal 
remedy with which to purify the air, then they declare smelly fish to be against public policy 
(bonnes moeurs, ordre public or die Gutten Sitten) and get rid of it.”618  
Just as it occurred in Common Law systems, Civil Law systems have gone through 
different stages in regards to their regulation. From the classical contract theory that was 
based in a laissez-faire understanding, to a more nuanced view of party autonomy. These 
changes and evolution have been characterized by an understanding of the fact that the 
“stability” that was treasured so much in classical law, was often simply confused with 
“rigidity.” 
“General standards of the nineteenth century are now obsolete because they do not 
correspond to new economic realities. Contracts that are unfair, unjust, or 
                                                                                                                                                                       
614 “Artículo 1467.  
No puede haber obligación sin una causa  real y lícita […] 
Se entiende por causa el motivo que induce al acto  o contrato; y por causa ilícita la prohibida por ley, o  
contraria a las buenas costumbres o al orden público.” 
615 FARINA, M. & MALTESE, D., Abuse of Rights and Freedom of Contract in Comparative Perspective: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 2012, 2012/08/07, p. 3. 
616 ibid., p. 3. 
617 RODRÍGUEZ GREZ, P., ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’, 2008, 18 Revista Actualidad Jurídica, p. 167. 
618 SQUILLANTE, A. M., 1969, supra note 391, p. 303. 
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unconscionable ought not to be enforced in the name of stability of contractual 
relationships, for what their enforcement preserves is not so much the contractual 
relationship itself as the unfairness and unconscionability of the system as a whole. 
On the contrary, one may have to start from the opposite premises that fairness and 
good faith always should be present in every contract at the level of both its 
conclusion and its performance, and that instruments which do not abide by these 
basic rules do not deserve to be enforced.”619 
This new understanding lead to an important change in these legal systems and in which, 
as FARINA and MALTESE argue, 
“the fundamental question shifted from whether the State was supposed to 
intervene on economy-related issues to how it actually should [intervene], on the 
assumption that the costs of individual rights are borne by the community, and 
hence re-distribution by law could not but ‘result from the application of [...] legal 
rules aimed at protecting the weaker parties and directing the behaviour of market 
players.’”620 
5.3 Good Faith and Fairness 
For English legal practitioners, the existence of a duty to negotiate a contract in good 
faith is an alien concept.621 As Lord ACKNER stated in Walford v. Miles: 
“[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. 
Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long 
as he avoids making misrepresentations. A duty to negotiate in good faith is as 
unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of the 
negotiating party.”622 
                                                                  
619 BAUDOUIN, J.-L., 1985, supra note 110, p. 1128. 
620 FARINA, M. & MALTESE, D., 2012, supra note 615, p. 3 (emphasis in the original).  
621 PIERS, M., 2011, supra note 131, p. 130. While the duty of good faith is also part of American contract law, our 
focus shall be placed in Civilian systems. This due to the fact that although it is true that American law now fully 
embraces the good faith doctrine in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
this came “[u]nder the influence of civilian traditions” (STEYN, J., ‘The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in 
Contract Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy’, 1991, 6 Denning Law Journal, pp. 133–134). 
622 Walford v. Miles [1992], 2 AC, 128, p. 138. It is worth mentioning that, despite Lord ACKNER’s categorical 
comments in this case, the concept of good faith is not, historically speaking, completely foreign to English law. 
As a matter of fact, it was “part of the mercantile customary law” that “required merchants to act in good faith.” As 
Lord MANSFIELD expressly recognized in the 1766 case Carter v. Boehm, “[t]he governing principle is applicable to all 
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While the view of this principle as “repugnant” does not, of course, mean that under 
English law parties are allowed to act in a predatory manner, it does show that the system 
looks at the contractual parties from a completely different standpoint than Civilian 
systems.623 Indeed, as Justice BINGHAM explained in Interfoto Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Ltd.: 
"English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle 
but has developed solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness. 
Many examples could be given. Thus equity has intervened to strike down 
unconscionable bargains. Parliament has stepped in to regulate the imposition of 
exemption clauses and the form of certain hire-purchase agreements. The common 
law also has made its contribution, by holding that certain classes of contract require 
the utmost good faith, by treating as irrecoverable what purport to be agreed 
estimates of damage but are in truth a disguised penalty for breach, and in many 
other ways.”624 
In a way, English law takes a rather pragmatic view of contracts, looking at the parties not 
as collaborating in fulfilling their interests and desires, but rather competing in an 
attempt to obtain the best possible results, even at the expense of their contractual 
partner.625 It starts from the assumption that the parties are under no obligation to go 
against their own individual interests and benefit the other, and that as long as they do 
not go against the express terms of the contract, or create some sort of 
misrepresentation, they are in the clear.626 And so, while under English law “the reasonable 
expectations of honest men” are not neglected, “parties should look out for themselves and are 
allowed to pursue their own interests without having to concern themselves with the interests or 
fair position of their contractual parties.”627 Furthermore, as part of a system that gives 
special importance to ensuring that the reasonable expectations of the parties prevail, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
into a bargain, from ignorance of that fact, and his believing to the contrary” (cited in PIERS, M., 2011, supra note 131, 
pp. 139–140). 
623 ibid., p. 140 (“[English law] maintains a standard of honesty and fairness that is analogous to the solutions offered 
under the civil law standard of good faith”). 
624 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989], 1 QB, 433–445, p. 439; See also STEYN, J., 
1991, supra note 621, p. 132. 
625 PIERS explains this situation noting that, under English law, 
“contractors will pursue their own (one-sided) economic interests and are under no obligation to concern 
themselves with other party's interests. Parties are under no legal obligation to cooperate within the 
framework of this adversarial model. On the contrary, one can assume that each party will endeavor to 
pursue only their narrow interests in the contractual process.” 
PIERS, M., 2011, supra note 131, pp. 130–131. 
626 STEYN, J., 1991, supra note 621, p. 131. STEYN argues that this difference also stems from the civil law’s 
preference for “broad first principles,” while English law favors “empirical and concrete solutions.” 
627 PIERS, M., 2011, supra note 131, p. 140. 
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English courts “hold the view that a good faith obligation cannot be defined and is thus too 
ambiguous to be enforced.”628 
Within Civilian systems, the view of the contractual process is quite different. Some 
authors (albeit a reduced number) even go as far as seeing contracts as “a sort of little 
partnership in which each [party] must work towards a common purpose which is the sum (or 
more) of individual purposes pursued by each”.629 Extremely optimists commentators aside, 
the majority of authors seem to take a more nuanced approach, and consider that 
although good faith is an important part of contractual theory, it does not mean that the 
parties should forfeit their own interests in the benefit of the other. It is not, in other 
words, a burden laid upon the parties that expects them to do charity in favor of the 
other, but that instead seeks a certain “cooperativism” in contractual relations.630 
Highlighting these philosophical differences further, even when it comes to the 
performance of the contract, English law does not impose a duty to perform in good faith. 
As the English Court of Appeal stated in a 1998 case, “there is no general doctrine of good 
faith in the English law. The [parties] are free to act as they wish, provided that they do not act 
in breach of a term of the contract.”631 Under English law, therefore, why a party decides to 
act in a certain manner within the contract is irrelevant; if the agreement grants him that 
right, he can exercise that prerogative regardless of any other considerations. This 
sentiment was best expressed by the English Court of Appeal in the 1963 case of Chapman 
v. Honig, where it ruled: 
"A person who has a right under a contract or other instrument is entitled to exercise 
it and can effectively exercise it for a good reason or a bad reason or no reason at 
all."632 
It is because of the above considerations that the concept of the “abuse of rights”, so 
common among civilian lawyers, thus appears as alien to English practitioners. Within a 
system where the exercise of rights is seen as inherently legitimate, devoting much 
attention to the volitive aspect behind this exercise become, for the most part, 
unnecessary.633 
In stark contrast with the English tradition, Civilian systems have taken a completely 
different approach. These systems subject the actions of the parties to scrutiny by the 
                                                                  
628 ibid., p. 133. 
629 WHITTAKER, S. & ZIMMERMANN, R., Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in 
Zimmermann, R. & Whittaker, S. (eds.), Good Faith in European Contract Law, 2000, p. 38. 
630 PIERS, M., 2011, supra note 131, p. 131. 
631 James Spencer & Co. Ltd. v. Tame Valley Padding Co. Ltd. [April 8, 1998] Unreported.  
632 Chapman v. Honig [1963], 2 All ER, 513, p. 522. 
633 On the abuse of rights, See Section 5.5 infra. 
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courts, both during the negotiation, as well as during the performance of the contract, 
particularly in regards to the duty to act in good faith. 
According to POWERS, the duty to act in good faith is “an expectation of each party to a 
contract that the other will honestly and fairly perform his duties under the contract in a 
manner that is acceptable in the trade community.”634 This definition, however, is not 
universally accepted. As a matter of fact, none are. Indeed, despite the emphasis that 
these systems place on good faith, defining the term has proven to be a very complex 
endeavor. As TETLEY put it, defining this concept is “a formidable task,” as a result of which 
definitions abound.635  
Disagreements as to what exactly it means for the parties to be under an obligation to 
negotiate and perform in good faith are an expected consequence of a term that, 
throughout all legislations, seems to escape a clear and precise definition.  
Just like it happened with the doctrine of unconscionability under the Common Law, it 
has been hard to pinpoint precisely what this duty imposes on the parties, and what 
exactly it is that they are forbidden to do. Indeed, the exact meaning of this good faith 
obligation depends greatly on the specific system within which it is being used, as well as 
the specific legal tradition to which it belongs, not to mention the specifics of the 
transaction being analyzed.636 This is a consequence of how vague in nature is this notion 
of good faith, and which in practice continues to be “essentially moral,” despite having been 
                                                                  
634 Cited in TETLEY, W., ‘Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration and Chartering’, 
2004, 35 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 4, p. 563. CAJARVILLE defines good faith, “bona fides”, as 
something that is “related to rectitude, honesty, and integrity in social and legal relations.” It is opposed to “bad faith,” 
something that is in turn related to “duplicity, premeditation, ungratefulness or betrayal,” and which can be defined 
as “the malice or recklessness with which something is done or a good is possessed or held” (CAJARVILLE, J. C., ‘La Buena 
Fe y su Aplicación en el Derecho Argentino’, 2012, 74 Prudentia Iuris, p. 250). 
635 TETLEY, W., 2004, supra note 634, p. 563. A good illustration of this problem appears in the work of SOTO 
COAGUILA, who argues that good faith “binds the parties to behave with loyalty and honesty in their contractual 
relations,” and that it also “imposes on them the duty to act in accordance with the law.” He goes on to add that: 
“In practice, this principle translates into the respect that the parties must have for each other, the 
information, confidentiality and clarity during their negotiations, and the conclusion and performance of 
the contract; in not taking advantage of the necessity of the other party, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, 
deceit, etc.” 
The problem with this type of definitions, and which should be fairly obvious, is that they basically consider 
“good faith” to be catch-all concept, inside of which every contractual facet fit (SOTO COAGUILA, C. A., 2012, supra 
note 80, p. 199). TETLEY’s words, therefore, referring to defining the term as “a formidable task” thus ring 
painfully true. 
636 Although in this section we are largely focusing on good faith in Civil Law systems, it should be noted that  
“[g]ood faith differs in its scope and application depending on which legal tradition governs the particular 
commercial transaction. Civil law states tend to use a more expansive approach to the good faith 
obligation, applying it to both contract formation and performance. Common law states prefer a narrower 
good faith duty applicable only to contract performance.”  
POWERS, P. J., ‘Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on the Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods’, 1998, 18 Journal of Law and Commerce, no. 2, p. 336. 
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made into a norm that governs the behaviour of the parties both in their precontractual 
and contractual relations.637 Indeed, in regards to this link to inherent relation to 
morality, as HESSELINK notes how  
“[g]ood faith is often said to be in some way connected with moral standards. On the 
one hand, it is said to be a moral standard itself, a legal-ethical principle; good faith 
means honesty, candour, loyalty et cetera. It is often said that the standard of good 
faith basically means that a party should take the interest of the other party into 
account. On the other hand, good faith is said to be the gateway through which 
moral values enter the law.”638 
In what is perhaps one of the clearest and most complete and thorough definitions of 
good faith, TETLEY had defined it as: 
“[The] just and honest conduct, which should be expected of both parties in their 
dealings, one with another and even with third parties who may be implicated or 
subsequently involved. Good faith requires that each party be fair and honest in 
negotiations and, once the agreement has been reached, that the parties also 
perform their respective obligations and enforce their rights honestly and fairly.”639 
TETLEY’s reference to “fairness” is interesting, as it once again shows how moral and 
ethical considerations are an essential part of the doctrine of good faith. It also shows 
that it goes beyond the oft-quoted requirement of simply not deceiving the contractual 
partner, actually going as far as requiring both parties to act in a collaborative way. 
Noting this close relation with morality, DIEZ PICAZO, a noted Spanish legal scholar and 
former Magistrate of the Spanish Constitutional Court, defined good faith as: 
“A behavioral standard based on the ethical imperatives demanded by the prevailing 
social conscience. This means that […] 1º contracts are to be interpreted assuming 
that there was a loyal and correct behavior in their drafting, that is, assuming that 
the parties, when drafting the contract, wanted to express themselves in a manner 
according to honest people, and not seeking circumlocutions, deliberate confusions, 
or obscure language; 2º good faith, in addition to being a starting point, should also 
be an end-point. The contract must be interpreted in a way that the sense that is 
given to it is the most adequate to reach a loyal performance of the contractual 
                                                                  
637 WHITTAKER, S. & ZIMMERMANN, R., 2000, supra note 629, p. 38. 
638 HESSELINK, M. W., The Concept of Good Faith, in Hartkamp, A. S. et al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 
2011, p. 621. The same sentiment is echoed by O’CONNOR, who states that good faith is “directly related to 
honesty, fairness and reasonableness, the application of which is determined at a particular time by the standards of 
honesty, fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the community which are considered appropriate for formulation in 
new or revised legal rules” (Quoted in TETLEY, W., 2004, supra note 634, p. 563). 
639 ibid., pp. 563–564. 
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relations, and to reach the contractual consequences in accordance to ethical 
norms.”640 
This is also the understanding that Lord Justice BINGHAM demonstrated in Interfoto 
Picture Library Lt. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. where, recognizing the differences 
between the Common Law and Civil law understanding of the doctrine, stated that: 
“In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common 
law world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that 
in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not 
simply mean that they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal 
system must recognise; its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such 
metaphorical colloquialisms as ‘playing fair’, ‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s cards 
face upwards on the table.’ It is in essence a principle of fair open dealing. English 
law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has 
developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness.”641 
In lieu of an all-encompassing definition of good faith, some have suggested that perhaps 
an apt substitute might be to define bad faith. This is reasonable, since while it might be 
impossible to know exactly what a party should do, it is certainly easier to say what she 
should not do. With this in mind, BURTON, for example, states that: 
“Bad faith performance occurs […] when discretion is used to recapture 
opportunities foregone upon contracting -when the discretion-exercising party 
refuses to pay the expected cost of performance. Good faith performance, in turn, 
occurs when a party's discretion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties at the time of formation - to capture opportunities that 
were preserved upon entering the contract, interpreted objectively. The good faith 
performance doctrine therefore directs attention to the opportunities foregone by a 
discretion-exercising party at formation, and to that party's reasons for exercising 
discretion during performance.”642 
REID, on the other hand, speaking from the standpoint of the Quebecer Civil Law, defines 
bad faith in a more concise manner: 
“The attitude of a person whose actions reveal the desire or intention to cause harm 
to another or to evade his obligations.”643 
                                                                  
640 Cited in ZUSMAN, S., ‘La Buena Fe Contractual’, 2005 THEMIS: Revista de Derecho, no. 51, p. 22. 
641 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989], p. 439. 
642 TETLEY, W., 2004, supra note 634, p. 564. 
643 GONZÁLEZ, F. F. V., ‘La Obligación de Negociar con Buena Fe una Convención Colectiva de Trabajo en el 
Régimen Laboral Quebequense’, 2014, 64 THEMIS: Revista de Derecho, p. 285. 
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As the conceptual difficulties above show, it seems undeniable that, as laudable as the 
efforts to create a moral standard within the law might be, injecting morality into the law 
can easily muddle up our understanding. While it is unlikely that anybody would advocate 
for a system that allows for immoral behavior to exist and prosper, the foggy nature of 
these values create a difficulty that seems, at least in principle, larger than that present in 
regards to unconscionability. 
The above difficulties notwithstanding, supporters of the use of the good faith obligation 
see its malleability as an asset. Indeed, it would be this very conceptual plasticity that 
would allow good faith to fulfill its purpose as a safety valve established to ensure fairness 
in otherwise valid agreements. Since it would be impossible for any legislator to simply 
predict every possible case of abusive clauses presented in a contract, this “open-ended” 
solution gives this tool the flexibility that it requires to be actually useful.644 In this way, 
courts are able to, so to speak, “bypass” the pacta sunt servanda principle in case the 
negotiation, the terms, or the performance of the contract seem to go against these 
underlying values. In this manner, by resorting to good faith, we can assure a certain 
balance to the otherwise inherent tension “between the desire of both parties to obtain the 
best commercial deal for themselves and a need to have a good on-going commercial relationship 
based upon a modicum of mutual trust.”645 
In the case of France, the malleability of the good faith concept has allowed it to serve as a 
sort of moderating force vis à vis article 1134 of the Civil Code, under which the contract 
has force of law for the parties, and according to which they are, in principle, “free to make 
and enforce against each other whatever bargains they wish.”646 As one author noted in 
regards to this provision: 
“Contracts were […] the law of the parties, that is, a ‘law’ the parties had freely 
chosen to give themselves and freely chosen to abide by. Being law on the one hand, 
it was enforceable as such and could not be changed, altered, or modified except with 
the consent of both parties. Being an act of free will on the other hand, it was by 
definition just and fair in its results and effects. To find otherwise was simply the 
demonstration that the contracting parties had either lost the ability or capacity to 
do the act (they could then be relieved under the rules of capacity) or that consent 
had not been properly given (they could then find relief under the theory of the vices 
                                                                  
644 DE LA MAZA GAZMURI, I., ‘Contratos por Adhesión y Cláusulas Abusivas: ¿Por qué el Estado y no Solamente el 
Mercado?’, 2003 Revista Chilena de Derecho Privado, no. 1, p. 120. See also MERRYMAN, J. H. & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, 
R., The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America, 2007, Stanford 
University Press, pp. 52–53 and HESSELINK, M. W., 2011, supra note 638, p. 639. 
645 ABELL, M. & HOBBS, V., ‘The Duty of Good Faith in Franchise Agreements – A Comparative Study of the Civil 
and Common Law Approaches in the EU’, 2013, 11 International Journal of Franchising Law, X, p. 1. 
646 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, p. 472. For similar rules in other Civilian jurisdictions 
regarding the binding character of contracts, See supra note 87. 
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of consent). In all other circumstances, the contract was by definition ruled to be 
fair, honest, just, and thus enforceable.”647 
In light of this virtually limitless right, what the legislator does by establishing the good 
faith obligation is to create a safety valve against the ability of the parties to dictate their 
terms (i.e. privately “legislate”) in whatever manner they desire. Indeed, in the case of 
French law, although in its face Article 1134 of the Code seems to establish an almost 
absolute freedom for the parties, the Code quickly limits their otherwise unrestrained 
autonomy, by establishing in its closing sentence that contracts 
“must be executed in good faith.”648 
Furthering this limitation, the Code then adds, in Article 1135: 
“Agreements are binding not only as to what is therein expressed, but also as to all 
the consequences which equity, usage or statute give to the obligation according to its 
nature.”649 
On the basis of these (and other) provisions, the French legislator aims to curtail the 
freedom of the parties, based on ideas of equity and good faith.650 By resorting to these 
moral values, the legislator seeks to ensure a more or less orderly market. Other Civilian 
codifications have, to a large extent, echoed these provisions and incorporated their own 
moral values into their law of contracts. For example: 
Article 1258 of the Spanish Civil Code: 
“[…] contracts bind the parties not only to what they expressly agreed, but also too 
al the consequences that […] result from good faith […]”651 
 
Article 227 of the Portuguese Civil Code  
“The person that negotiates with other for a contract must, both in its preparation and 
formation, act according to the rules of good faith […]”652 
                                                                  
647 BAUDOUIN, J.-L., 1985, supra note 110, p. 1120. 
648 See supra note 84. 
649 “Article 1135. 
Les conventions obligent non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, mais encore à toutes les suites que l'équité, 
l'usage ou la loi donnent à l'obligation d'après sa nature.” 
650 BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, supra note 107, p. 247 (“similar to Germany, French courts employ the 
concept of loyalty or good faith to ensure contractual fairness”). 
651 “Artículo 1258. 
Los contratos se perfeccionan por el mero consentimiento, y desde entonces obligan, no sólo al 
cumplimiento de lo expresamente pactado, sino también a todas las consecuencias que, según su 
naturaleza, sean conformes a la buena fe, al uso y a la ley.” 
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Article 1546 of the Chilean Civil Code  
“Contracts must be performed in good faith, and so they bind the parties not only to what 
they expressly establish, but to all the things that emanate from the nature of the 
obligation, or which belong to it based on the law or customs.”653  
§242 of the German Civil Code (under the heading “Performance in Good Faith”) 
“An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking 
customary practice into consideration.”654 
Article 1337 of the Italian Civil Code  
“The parties, both in the in negotiations and in the formation of the contract, must act in 
good faith.”655 
Article 1375 of the Québec Civil Code 
“The parties shall conduct themselves in good faith both at the time the obligation arises 
and at the time it is performed or extinguished.”656 
An interesting case study on the role of good faith comes from Dutch law, where, as 
HARTKAMP notes, “good faith permeates all branches of the […] law of obligations and contract 
law,” as well as some others.657 Indeed, under Dutch law, morality and equity play a 
fundamental role, as it is evident from the wording of the relevant provisions of the 
Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW): 
Book 6, Article 2, Paragraph 1: 
                                                                                                                                                                       
652  “Artigo 227 (Culpa na formação dos contratos). 
Quem negoceia com outrem para conclusão de um contrato deve, tanto nos preliminares como na formação 
dele, proceder segundo as regras da boa fé […]” 
653 “Artículo 1546. 
Los contratos deben ejecutarse de buena fe, y por consiguiente obligan no sólo a lo que en ellos  se expresa, 
sino a todas las cosas que emanan  precisamente de la naturaleza de la obligación, o que  por la ley o la 
costumbre pertenecen a ella.” 
654 “§ 242 Leistung nach Treu und Glauben 
Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die 
Verkehrssitte es erfordern.” 
655 “Articolo 1337. 
Le parti, nello svolgimento delle trattative e nella formazione del contratto, devono comportarsi secondo 
buona fede.” 
656 Demonstrating the importance given to this principle, extending its application to all areas of private law, 
Quebecer law actually includes two articles regarding good faith in Book One of the Civil Code (“Persons”), in 
article 6 (“Every person is bound to exercise his civil rights in good faith) and article 7 (“No right may be exercised with 
the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and unreasonable manner, and therefore contrary to the requirements of 
good faith”).  
657 HARTKAMP, A. S., ‘Judicial Discretion under the New Civil Code of the Netherlands’, 1992, 40 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, no. 3, p. 554. 
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“The creditor and debtor must behave themselves towards each other in accordance 
with the standards of reasonableness and fairness.”658 
Art. 6:248:  
“1. An agreement not only has the legal effects which parties have agreed upon, but 
also those which, to the nature of the agreement, arise from law, usage (common 
practice) or the standards of reasonableness and fairness.”  
“2. A rule, to be observed by parties as a result of their agreement, is not applicable 
insofar this, given the circumstances, would be unacceptable to standards of 
reasonableness and fairness.” 659 
5.3.1 The Functions of Good Faith 
In Civilian legislations, although not always in the same fashion, good faith affects three 
distinct areas:  
a. Interpretation: All contracts must be interpreted in accordance to good 
faith.660 The effect here is that if the intentions of the parties are unclear, 
                                                                  
658 “Artikel 6: 2 
1. Schuldeiser en schuldenaar zijn verplicht zich jegens elkaar te gedragen overeenkomstig de eisen van 
redelijkheid en billijkheid.” 
659 “Artikel 6:248 
1. Een overeenkomst heeft niet alleen de door partijen overeengekomen rechtsgevolgen, maar ook die 
welke, naar de aard van de overeenkomst, uit de wet, de gewoonte of de eisen van redelijkheid en 
billijkheid voortvloeien. 
2. Een tussen partijen als gevolg van de overeenkomst geldende regel is niet van toepassing, voor zover dit 
in de gegeven omstandigheden naar maatstaven van redelijkheid en billijkheid onaanvaardbaar zou zijn.” 
It is worth mentioning that this article, as well as, for example, art. 1546 of the Chilean Civil Code, are both 
adaptations of article 1135 of the French Civil code (BRITO, A. G., ‘La Buena Fe en el Código Civil de Chile’, 2002, 
29 Revista Chilena de Derecho, p. 11). 
660 HARTKAMP, A. S., 1992, supra note 657, p. 555. See, for example, Article 1366 of the Italian Civil Code (“Il 
contratto deve essere interpretato secondo buona fede”, “The contract must be interpreted according to good faith”), 
§157 of the German Civil Code ("Verträge sind so auszulegen, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die 
Verkehrssitte es erfordern”, “Contracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking customary practice into 
consideration”), Article 1198, Paragraph 1, of the Argentinean Civil Code (“Los contratos deben celebrarse, 
interpretarse y ejecutarse de buena fe y de acuerdo con lo que verosímilmente las partes entendieron o pudieron entender, 
obrando con cuidado y previsión”, “Contracts must be concluded, interpreted and performed in accordance to good faith 
to what the parties likely understood or could have understood, acting with carefully and thoughtfully”) and Article 168 
of the Peruvian Civil Code (“El acto jurídico debe ser interpretado de acuerdo con lo que se haya expresado en él y según 
el principio de la buena fe”, “The legal act must be interpreted based on what was expressed in it, and based on the good 
faith principle.”). Furthermore, the already cited Article 1546 of the Chilean Civil Code (“contracts must be 
performed in good faith”), although apparently restricted to the performance stage of the contract, has been 
understood by the courts and the commentators as extending to the whole of the contractual process, including 
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then “a court should interpret a contract according to the meaning that 
reasonable parties would give to it and not by the literal terms of the 
agreement.”661 
b. Expanding Rights and Obligations (Supplementary Function): Contracts not 
only bind the parties to what is expressly established in them, but also to 
what custom or equity might establish.662 Some have argued that the role of 
good faith as a means to supplement the terms of the contract is similar 
(albeit not equivalent) to the Common Law doctrine of implied terms.663 
c. Estoppel (Restrictive Function): The parties are not bound to those 
obligations that, based on the circumstances, “would be unacceptable to 
standards of reasonableness and fairness.”664 Unlike the other two facets of 
good faith, the restrictive function is, by and large, its most controversial 
aspect. Indeed, its acceptance in civilian legislations is far from harmonious, 
and important differences exist. Under Dutch Law, for example, while the 
already cited art. 6:248 expressly establishes the possibility of some of the 
rights and obligations created by the contract to be extinguished or excluded 
“based on the circumstances”, before the reformation of the Dutch Civil Code 
in 1992 this possibility was not well received by Dutch courts. Indeed, the 
Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) was reluctant to admit such possibility 
except in very specific cases in which “a party may be estopped from asserting a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Revisión del Contrato por las Partes: El Deber de Renegociación como Efecto de la Excesiva Onerosidad 
Sobreviniente’, 2010, 37 Revista Chilena de Derecho, no. 1, p. 56). 
661 HARTKAMP, A., ‘The Concept of Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial 
Contracts’, 1995, 3 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 65. 
662 HARTKAMP, A. S., 1992, supra note 657, p. 555. See, for example, Article 1546 of the Chilean Civil Code, Article 
1258 of the Spanish Civil Code, Article 1135 of the French Civil Code, Article 6:248 of the Dutch Civil Code, 
Article 1374 of the Italian Civil Code. ("Il contratto obbliga le parti non solo a quanto nel medesimo espresso, ma anche 
a tutte le conseguenze che ne derivano secondo la legge, o, in, mancanza, secondo gli usi e la equità", “A contract binds the 
parties not only as to what it expressly provides, but also to all the consequences deriving from it by law or, in its absence, 
according to usage and equity”) and Article 1603 of the Colombian Civil Code ( “Los contratos deben ejecutarse de 
buena fe, y por consiguiente obligan no solo a lo que en ellos se expresa, sino a todas las cosas que emanan precisamente 
de la naturaleza de la obligación, o que por ley pertenecen a ella”, “Contracts must be performed in accordance to good 
faith, and therefore bind the parties not only to what they expressly establish, but also to all the consequences derived by 
law or by the nature of the obligation”). 
663 HARTKAMP, A., 1995, supra note 661, p. 65. 
664 HARTKAMP, A. S., 1992, supra note 657, p. 555. While not many legislations include an express reference to 
this function of good faith, some do exist. See, for example, Article 1198, Paragraph 2, of the Argentinean Civil 
Code (“si la prestación a cargo de una de las partes se tornara excesivamente onerosa, por acontecimientos 
extraordinarios e imprevisibles, la parte perjudicada podrá demandar la resolución del contrato”, “if one of the parties’ 
obligations becomes too onerous due to extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances, the affected party can demand the 
resolution of the contract”). 
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contractual right because of his own conduct incompatible with his exercising that 
right.”665  
5.3.2 Good Faith and Bargaining Power Disparities 
Wherever we choose to place them within the different functions of good faith, it is plain 
to see that abuses of bargaining power disparities, manifested in clauses that go against 
fairness and balance, represent a breach of the obligation of the parties to act in good 
faith. Indeed, abusive clauses appear as the result of the breaking, the destruction, of the 
contractual equilibrium.666  
This relation between abuses of bargaining power and a breach of the good faith 
obligation is more than mere guesswork. Indeed, more and more pieces of legislation 
expressly draw this line between unfair terms and the failure to act in good faith. In 
Spain, for example, Article 82 (1) of the General Law for the Defense of Consumers and 
Users establishes: 
“Abusive Clauses are those stipulations that are not individually negotiated and all 
those practices that were not expressly agreed to, and that, contrary to the 
requirements of good faith, cause, against the consumer, an important imbalance in 
the rights and obligations of the parties that stem from the contract.”667  
While the cited Spanish provision is limited to consumer contracting, this is not always 
the case. §307 (1) of the German Civil Code, for example, establishes: 
“§ 307 Review of subject-matter 
(1) Provisions in standard business terms are invalid if, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user at an unreasonable 
                                                                  
665 ibid., p. 555. HARTKAMP notes, however, that by the early 1990’s the courts had already started to construe the 
rule of the old Code, which only established a “good faith performance” obligation akin to that of article 1134 of 
the French Civil Code, in a way similar to that established in the new text of the Burgerlijk Wetboek. Courts acted 
in this manner, for example, “by refusing a debtor the right to rely on an exemption clause which in the circumstances 
of the case, turned out to be unreasonably onerous ('unconscionable’) towards the creditor.” 
666 DE LA MAZA GAZMURI, I., 2003, supra note 644, p. 120. 
667  “Artículo 82. Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios. 
Concepto de cláusulas abusivas. 
1. Se considerarán cláusulas abusivas todas aquellas estipulaciones no negociadas individualmente y todas 
aquéllas prácticas no consentidas expresamente que, en contra de las exigencias de la buena fe causen, en 
perjuicio del consumidor y usuario, un desequilibrio importante de los derechos y obligaciones de las partes 
que se deriven del contrato.” 
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disadvantage. An unreasonable disadvantage may also result from the fact that the 
provision is not clear and comprehensible.” 668 
The role of good faith as a control method against abusive terms that result from an 
imbalanced bargaining position, becomes even more evident when the cited §307 BGB is 
read in light of §138 BGB, which establishes in its second numeral that a transaction is 
specifically void if the stronger party obtained the disputed terms “by exploiting the 
predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgement or considerable weakness of will of 
another.”669 The fact that this provision aims at remedying the possible abuses that come 
as a result of bargaining power disparities becomes evident when we consider that in the 
1970’s, in consumer credit cases,  
“some German courts produced an interpretation of § 138 Satz 1 BGB – the general 
clause of boni mores – that directly addressed the problem of structural inequality of 
bargaining power between the poor and the rich. Not only the sanction of immorality 
has to grant transparency and fairness in market transactions in order to make 
possible the access to credit of the poor as a group; more radically the central idea is 
that the general limit to freedom of contract has the specific function of correcting 
and/or compensating a sort of original lack of solidarity and proportionality that 
inheres to freedom of contract.”670 
A similarly wide provision appears in article 36 of the Contracts Act of Denmark, which 
establishes that: 
“An agreement may, in whole or in part, be modified or set aside if it would be 
unreasonable or contrary to good faith to enforce it. The same applies to other legal 
acts. 
Deciding in accordance to paragraph 1, the court shall into account the conditions 
surrounding the making of the contract and subsequent circumstances.”671  
                                                                  
668 “§ 307 Inhaltskontrolle 
(1) Bestimmungen in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen sind unwirksam, wenn sie den Vertragspartner 
des Verwenders entgegen den Geboten von Treu und Glauben unangemessen benachteiligen. Eine 
unangemessene Benachteiligung kann sich auch daraus ergeben, dass die Bestimmung nicht klar und 
verständlich ist.” 
Previously, an analogous rule appeared in §9 of the “Law Regulating General Terms and Conditions” (“Gesetz zur 
Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen”). 
669 See supra note 612. 
670 MARELLA, M. R., 2006, supra note 562, p. 266. See also ABELL, M. & HOBBS, V., 2013, supra note 645, p. 3 
(noting that §138 BGB “seeks to adjust the terms agreed by the parties to the agreement to new and unforeseen 
circumstances,” something that comes in stark contrast with “the English concept of 'caveat emptor' and the freedom 
of the parties to negotiate the contractual terms of their relationship is thus limited”). 
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We can also find these links between good faith and contractual imbalances in regulations 
of the European Community, albeit often within a more restrictive sphere. In the realm of 
consumer protection, for example, the European Directive on Unfair Contract Terms 
(Directive 93/13/EEC), establishes in article 3 (1) that: 
“A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as 
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance 
in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of 
the consumer.”  
Further demonstrating the importance that the European Community gives to these 
considerations, it should be noted that this Directive also makes a specific reference to 
bargaining power and good faith in its preamble, stating that “[…]in making an assessment 
of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining positions of the 
parties.” 
What these norms manifest is a desire on the part of the Civilian legislators to express 
that “a contractual party owes a pre-contractual duty of good faith to negotiate fairly and 
honestly,” and that then this “good faith obligation [extends] to performance of the contract, 
requiring that the parties act reasonably.”672 Within this duty of reasonableness, parties are 
thus bound to exercise their bargaining power in a manner that does not put the other to 
an unreasonable disadvantage. It will then be the duty of the judge to determine, within 
his discretion, what actions can amount to an unreasonable exercise of power. 
In a similar vein to what occurs with the doctrine of unconscionability in the Common 
Law, the criticism that is often directed to good faith as a tool to prevent the enforcement 
of an agreement, is that it actually grants too much discretion to the judge. Indeed, as we 
have seen, it will be the judge who will be making the decision as to what behaviors can be 
considered as contravening this general obligation.673 This becomes particularly relevant 
in legal systems (such as the Dutch) where the good faith principle expressly allows for a 
restrictive function through which to strike down agreements.  
Not everyone shares this fear, however, and many authors see the discretion of the judges 
as nothing to be afraid of. HARTKAMP, for example, echoing the words of SAUVENPLANNE, 
argues that “the certainty of the law does not depend on the provisions of a code or the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
En aftale kan ændres eller tilsidesættes helt eller delvis, hvis det vil være urimeligt eller i strid med redelig 
handlemåde at gøre den gældende. Det samme gælder andre retshandler. 
Ved afgørelsen efter stk. 1 tages hensyn til forholdene ved aftalens indgåelse, aftalens indhold og senere 
indtrufne omstændigheder.” 
672 TETLEY, W., 2004, supra note 634, p. 569. 
673 See, for example, ZUSMAN, S., 2005, supra note 640, p. 28 (arguing that legal practice in Perú has, traditionally, 
sought to limit the discretion of the judges, which has in turn lead to the application of good faith being limited, 
lest it allows contractual modifications).  
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strictness of a rule of precedent, but on the wisdom of the judges."674 In other words, he 
dismisses the fear that an open-ended solution in the legislation might pose a threat to 
certainty, since as long as the judges are adequately prepared, they will not indulge in 
excessive discretion. Granted, this is a bit of a gamble, since it requires the legislator to 
blindly trust in the ability of the judges to act appropriately; however, there is no evidence 
to indicate that the catastrophic consequences that are often mentioned have ever 
actually occurred. 
The fears of granting excessive discretion to the judge might also respond to historical 
reasons, as the figure of the Civil judge has often been associated with a more mechanical 
role than that of the Common Law judge. A good example of this almost pejorative look 
comes from a 1969 analysis of the Civil Law systems by MERRYMAN, who described the 
figure of the Civil judge, almost dismissively, as: 
“[A] kind of expert clerk. He is presented with a fact situation to which a ready 
legislative response will be readily found in all except the extraordinary case. His 
function is merely to find the right legislative provision, couple it with the fact 
situation, and bless the solution that is more or less automatically produced from the 
union. The whole process of judicial decision is made to fit into the formal syllogism 
of scholastic logic. The major premise is in the statute, the facts of the case furnish 
the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows ... 
The net image is of the judge as an operator of a machine designed and built by 
legislators ... 
Judicial service is a bureaucratic career; the judge is a functionary, a civil servant; 
the judicial function is narrow, mechanical, and uncreative.”675 
Although Civilian attorneys will probably recoil at the downright derogatory description 
put forward by MERRYMAN, there is some truth to it. Although applying the law is certainly 
not, as MERRYMAN said, “narrow, mechanical, and uncreative”, it is different from the way in 
which a Common Law judge performs the same task. This almost certainly responds to 
historical reasons, as the Civil Law judge was often prevented from using the same level of 
discretion in his work compared to that enjoyed by the Common Law judges.  
We can observe these differences in, for example, the German Code of Law instituted by 
Fredrick the Great of Prussia, which expressly forbid the judge to interpret the law, or in 
the philosophy of the separation of powers that arose in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution, and which put the judges “on probation” in society. The reasons behind both of 
these situations can be traced directly to an inherent distrust, for a plethora of reasons, in 
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675 Cited in MACLEAN, R. G., ‘Judicial Discretion in the Civil Law’, 1982, 43 Louisiana Law Review, pp. 45–46. 
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the figure of the judge as a fair and impartial figure.676 Furthermore, as the contract was 
seen as “law” for the parties, it was thought that the ability of the judge to go against it 
needed to be very restricted. 
“This attitude was perhaps more understandable in the French tradition for two 
reasons. The first is historical: the new revolutionary regime of 1804 was very 
suspicious of judicial power because of the abuses under the old regime ("Que Dieu 
nous garde de I’equité des Parlements" [“may god save us from the equity of 
Parliaments”]). The second is one of basic civilian philosophy regarding the 
hierarchy of the sources of law which considers legislation as the only real source of 
law, jurisprudence being viewed only as the process of application of the law to facts. 
The court does not make law and indeed should not.”677 
The problem with these historical considerations, however, as well as those analyses made 
from a Common Law perspective, is that they are a bit simplistic and perhaps even 
shortsighted. First, the historical mistrust in judges, coming from the Roman iudex, bears 
little to no relation to the current situation. Second, and most importantly, they ignore, 
perhaps willfully, that the Civil judge does possess a large amount of discretion. Codified 
law is far from being a one-size-fits-all endeavor, and it is the judge who must make the 
norm fit the individual characteristics of the case. This is the situation, for example, when 
the judge analyzes the remedies that can be granted to a given plaintiff; determining 
when the actions of a defendant have reached the level of malice; or, of course, whether 
the defendant breached his good faith obligations, resulting in an unconscionable 
agreement. 
5.3.3 Good Faith and Unconscionable Terms 
In regards to contracts, Civil Law judges have, historically, taken an approach similar to 
that of their Common Law counterparts. Indeed, it has been stated repeatedly that it is 
not up to the courts to review and redraft what the parties have freely agreed upon. In a 
1925 case, for example, the Chilean Supreme Court stated:  
“The courts do not have the ability to derogate from or avoid the application of the 
law of the contract, whether for reasons of equity, customs or administrative 
regulations.”678 
Similarly, for most of their history French courts were reticent, if not downright opposed, 
to go against the will of the parties as manifested in their contract.679 This even in the face 
                                                                  
676 ibid., pp. 46–47.  
677 BAUDOUIN, J.-L., 1985, supra note 110, p. 1123. 
678 Cited in MOMBERG URIBE, R., 2013, supra note 387, p. 11. 
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of new events that might jeopardize the ability of one of the parties to adequately 
perform. French judges were, quite simply, “intent to safeguard the principle of [the] sanctity 
of contracts (Pacta sunt servanda).”680 
Despite their original reluctance to go against the manifested will of the parties, however, 
and just as it happened in the Common Law, changes in the makeup of society also 
resulted in a shift in regards to contractual sanctity.681 As contracts of adhesion became 
more and more common, so did the use of abusive clauses. In lieu of a unified regulation 
of unconscionability (as it appears in, for example UCC §2-302), what Civil Law systems 
have often done is to link these abusive clauses to a breach of the good faith obligation of 
the parties.682 In the German case, for example, 
“when an alteration of the legal norms is so unfair or inequitable, it is to be 
presumed that the injured party has agreed to it as a result of some pressure. If this 
presumption cannot be refuted (perhaps by proving some benefit that compensates 
the damage, or by some other reasonable cause), the courts cannot validate the 
existence of the agreement, as a result of being against the spirit of the legal system 
[…] since the courts cannot sanction an evident breach of the basic requirements of 
justice.”683 
The reason why the courts, and even the legislatures, resort to good faith as a way to 
combat abusive clauses is simple. These clauses violate the good faith obligation by 
binding the adhering party to more than what he could have reasonably expected from 
the contract, or by establishing less rights in his favor that what should have been 
understood to come with it.684 Furthermore, good faith serves as a very useful tool, since 
predicting every possible case in which the parties might act in an unconscionable manner 
is impossible, and so resorting to this general value as an open-ended tool is vital. The 
already cited §307 BGB, for example, takes this approach when it establishes good faith as 
the basis for the reasonableness test of a standard business term.  
The German approach towards good faith is quite interesting, because even though the 
BGB makes several references to this principle, the German judge is not really empowered 
                                                                                                                                                                       
679 BAUDOUIN, J.-L., 1985, supra note 110, p. 1124 (arguing that French courts “while treating good faith as an 
essential element of contractual relationship, by and large did not use it as a tool for the control of unconscionable or 
unjust clauses”). 
680 DAVID, R., ‘Frustration of Contract in French Law’, 1946, 28 Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law, no. 1, p. 12.  
681 In regards to the philosophical shift undergone by French courts in regards to pacta sunt servanda, See LANDO, 
O., ‘Is Good Faith an Over-Arching General Clause in the Principles of European Contract Law?’, 2007, 15 
European Review of Private Law, no. 6, p. 847. 
682 DE LA MAZA GAZMURI, I., 2003, supra note 644, p. 120. 
683 ibid., p. 120. 
684 LAGUADO GIRALDO, C. A., 2003, supra note 205, p. 246. Although LAGUADO places an emphasis in insurance 
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to modify the party’s agreement by resorting to principles of fairness and justice. Indeed, 
as MARKESINIS et. al. unequivocally state: 
“Good faith in German law, it should be stressed, does not as a general rule empower 
the judge to look at the terms of the contract and decide whether they are 
substantively fair, i.e., whether the price agreed is ‘just’ or whether the bargain 
evinces a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights.”685 
As exceptions to this general rule, however, we find three situations in which the judge 
does have this ability to resort to good faith in order to interfere with the content of a 
contract: the doctrine frustration, standard business terms, and in cases that relate to the 
so-called constitutionalization of private law.686 Due to their relevance to our analysis, as 
well as to their consequences in other Civilian systems, we shall focus only on the last 
two.687 
Although nowadays German law has expressly incorporated the policing of standard 
business terms (e.g. via §305-§310 of the BGB and, before, the Gesetz zur Regelung des 
Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen or AGB-Gesetz), prior to this express 
regulation the courts had assumed the power to strike down terms that were so abusive as 
to represent a violation of the good faith obligation established in §242 BGB. Of course, 
this provision continues to prevail in those cases where there is an offending term, even if 
it was not part of a boilerplate agreement. In general, on the basis of German law, three 
broad classes of cases fall within the breaches of this good faith obligation: 
“The first group of cases involves instances where the party who was given a promise 
by another misuses its contractual rights. An example is when an insurance company 
cancels a policy after a late premium payment, which courts have ruled violates good 
faith. A second group involves cases where one party seeks a harsh remedy for a 
contractual breach by the other party when a less burdensome alternative exists. For 
example, if one party receives damaged goods, that party should seek repairs before 
exiting the contract entirely. The third group contains cases where one party tells the 
other certain provisions of a contract need not be followed, only later to enforce 
                                                                  
685 MARKESINIS, B. S. & UNBERATH, H. et al., The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise, 2006, 2, Hart 
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687 On the topic of frustration in German law, See a AKSOY, H. C., Impossibility in Modern Private Law: A 
Comparative Study of German, Swiss and Turkish Laws and the Unification Instruments of Private Law, 2014, 
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them, such as when deadlines are said to be lax, only later to be stringently enforced 
by an insurance company.”688 
As we mentioned before, resorting to good faith in this manner is, undoubtedly, very 
similar to the doctrine of unconscionability in the Common Law.689 The parallels that 
exist between unconscionable acts and breaches of good faith are numerous. Indeed, 
speaking about the EU Directive on Unfair Terms, for example, COLLINS references these 
similarities when he suggests that the incorporation of the Directive into English law 
might be better served if the references to good faith are eliminated and they are instead 
replaced with: 
“[The] equitable idea of acting in good conscience or not unconscionably. For the civil 
law idea encompasses all the variety of instances when one party has abused the 
social practice of making promises. It involves taking advantage of another's trust 
either by encouraging misplaced reliance or by securing an unduly advantageous 
transaction.”690 
In a recent ruling, the Quebec Supreme Court was quite open in its acceptance of using 
good faith as a way to ensure fairness. In its ruling, the Court stated: 
"The development of Quebec's law of obligations has been marked by efforts to strike 
a proper balance between, on the one hand, the individual's freedom of contract and, 
on the other, adherence by contracting parties to the principle of good faith in their 
mutual relations.”691 
The meaning of the Court’s words is clear. While the parties may enjoy freedom of 
contract, this freedom needs to be balanced with the parties’ compliance with their good 
faith obligation. Put in another words, freedom of contract can be limited when one of the 
parties has gone against what can be expected from her on the basis of good faith. 
Although resorting to good faith as a safety valve for unfair terms has, in some systems, 
become less necessary as a result of statutory reforms that expressly police them, even 
those statutes themselves are based on this general duty.692 The basic motivation behind 
these rules is that “[t]he parties have duties of information, documentation, co-operation and 
disclosure, and a party should be protected against the other party’s abuse of rights.”693 Failure 
to fulfill with these duties represents a breach of the good faith obligation, and can make 
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a term, or a whole contract, voidable as a result. As a principle that “governs, as far as is 
known, all Continental European Countries,” (not to mention the non-European, yet Civilian 
countries), good faith fulfills a duty of protecting the weaker parties in a contract from 
unfair terms.694 
In regards to the constitutionalization of private law, some clarifications need to be made, 
since the idea of fundamental rights seems alien to private law. Indeed, fundamental 
rights have traditionally been seen as a limit established in benefit of the citizens vis à vis 
the State, but not to be used between the citizens themselves.695 Under the German 
system (as well as some others), however, there is a theory, known as 'indirect secondary 
effect' (“mittelbare Drittwirkung”), and based on which private law must be interpreted in a 
way that is compatible with basic constitutional values, due to the fact that a person's 
constitutional rights affect other areas of the law as well, and so should not be limited 
exclusively to the public sphere.696 As the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
(“Bundesverfassungsgericht”) said, in the seminal 1958 Lüth case: 
“The influence of the basic rights value yardsticks will arise primarily with those 
provisions of private law which contain compulsory law and thus form a part of the 
public order-in the wide sense-i.e. the principles which for reasons of the public 
benefit should also be binding for the formation of legal relationships between 
individuals and therefore are withdrawn from the control of the private will. These 
provisions have, in accordance with their purpose, a close relationship with public 
law, which they complement. That must expose them to a special extent to the 
influence of constitutional law. From case law, the 'general clauses' present 
themselves primarily for the realisation of this influence. They, like s. 826 of the 
BGB, refer to the judging of human conduct by criteria which are outside civil law, in 
fact chiefly outside the law altogether, like 'good morals'. For in deciding what these 
social precepts require at any given time in the individual case, one must primarily 
proceed from the totality of value concepts which the people have reached at a 
certain point in time of their intellectual and cultural development and established 
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in their constitution. Therefore the general clauses have been correctly described as 
the 'break through points' of the basic rights into civil law.”697 
The facts of the Lüth case are interesting, since even though the case has been used as a 
source for the application of constitutional principles in contractual issues, the case was 
actually a tort. Indeed, in this case the producer and distributor of a new film by Veit 
Harland, a movie director made (in)famous for his work in the National Socialist 
propaganda film Jud Süß (“Süss the Jew”), sought an injunction against writer Eric Lüth 
who, due to Hardland’s Nazi past, was organizing a boycott against his new film. The civil 
court that heard the case granted the request of the plaintiff, ruling that Lüth had 
violated the provisions of §826 of the BGB, and ordering him to refrain from uttering 
such statements in the future.698 This section of the BGB, located within the Title devoted 
to Torts (“Unerlaubte Handlungen”) reads: 
“A person who, in a manner contrary to public policy, intentionally inflicts damage 
on another person is liable to the other person to make compensation for the 
damage.”699 
The defendant appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court, arguing that his right to 
freedom of speech, as protected by Germany’s Basic Law, had been violated by the lower 
court’s decision. Even though this was a private law dispute, decided in accordance to 
private law provisions, the Constitutional Court sided with Lüth, arguing that 
constitutional values took priority.  
“[The Court] stated that basic human rights constitute an objective value system, 
influencing all branches of law, whether private or public. This objective value 
system is a standard for assessment of every action, whether legislative, executive or 
judicial. Every private law arrangement must adjust itself to this value system. 
However, the impact of this objective system in private law is by the doctrinal means 
of the private law itself. […] This is particularly apparent in the private law rules 
reflecting public policy. These rules are closely linked to public law, and they 
complete it. They are exposed to influence by constitutional law.”700 
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Based on the Lüth decision, it became an established principle that constitutional rights 
are not to be seen as limited exclusively as defensive rights against the State, but also as 
defensive rights between private parties. Constitutional norms, therefore, “radiate” into 
all areas of the legal system, including those that refer to the private sphere.701 It is 
important to note that this does not mean that the matter becomes constitutional in 
nature; on the contrary, “the dispute remains substantively and procedurally a civil law 
dispute, and the claim or defense continues to be grounded on civil norms, such as the clauses 
of good faith and good morals.”702 
As a non-contractual (yet private) matter, the Lüth decision did not really affect the law of 
contracts. Indeed, for decades after the decision, contract law remained, for the most 
part, unaffected.703 Relatively recent developments, however, have removed this 
“immunity” that surrounded contracts, as fundamental rights began to impact the 
relationship between the contractual parties, in what some commentators have referred 
to as “the constitutionalization of contract law.”704  
It was in 1993, in the Bürgschaft case, that the German Constitutional Court finally put an 
end to the discussion as to whether constitutional values also affect contractual matters, 
answering this question in the affirmative.705 The facts of the case are quite simple, and 
represent a clear example of an abuse of bargaining power disadvantages: 
“In 1982 a real estate agent tried to obtain extra credit for his business from the 
local state bank (Stadtparkasse). The bank agreed to increase his credit limit from 
DM 50,000 (approximately 25,000 Euros) to DM 100,000 (50,000 Euros), but only 
subject to the condition that the agent’s daughter would sign the contract as a surety 
for the whole amount of her father’s debt. Prior to the signing, the bank employee 
told the daughter: ‘Would you just sign this here, please? This won’t make you enter 
into any important obligation; I need this for my files.’ (‘Hier bitte, unterschreiben 
Sie mal, Sie gehen dabei keine große Verpflichtung ein. Ich brauche das für meine 
Akten’). The daughter agreed. At that time she was 21 years of age. She did not have 
any high level of education or any property of her own, and worked as an unskilled 
employee at a fish factory for a salary of DM 1150 DM (575 Euros) per month. That 
income was not even sufficient to be able to pay the interest rate on the amount of 
her eventual liability under the contract. In 1984 her father stopped working as a 
real estate agent to become a shipowner. He obtained a loan of DM 1.3 million 
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(650,000 Euros) from the bank to finance the purchase of a ship. Shortly 
afterwards, however, the father’s business experienced financial difficulties. For this 
reason, the bank terminated the credit agreements with him in 1986. At that time 
the father’s debt to the bank amounted to DM 2.5 million. The bank claimed DM 
100,000 (50,000 Euros) with interest, amounting to a total of DM 160,000 
(80,000 Euros), from the daughter under the suretyship contract. Since 1991 the 
daughter had been a single mother dependent on social security. She defended herself 
by claiming that the contract was void.”706 
After a long litigation, the case reached the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), 
who sided with the bank. The argument put forward by the Court in its decision was that 
since the daughter was an adult (even if barely), and of sound mind (even if uneducated), 
she knew or should have known that signing a surety would entail a risk. It would not be 
possible, therefore, to assume that the bank was under a special obligation to protect the 
daughter by informing her of the inherent risks of her adhesion to the contract. On the 
basis of this, as well as the principles of traditional contract theory, the daughter could 
not escape her bargain.707 Although this was certainly a difficult decision to stomach for 
the daughter, since it meant that she would be put under severe economic strain, it was 
the only way, in the eyes of the Court, in which freedom of contract and pacta sunt 
servanda could be interpreted.708 
The daughter filed a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court decision, 
arguing that her basic rights had been violated. Specifically, she argued that she had been 
undermined in her human dignity and her right to develop her own personality, as well as 
the principle of the social state established in the German Basic Law.709  
In a “ground-breaking” decision, the Federal Constitutional Court reversed the decision of 
the Supreme Court, siding with the daughter, reproaching the extremely strict stance 
taken by the Supreme Court in regards to contractual principles.710 According to the 
Constitutional Court: 
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“[I]n cases where a ‘structural inequality in bargaining power’ has led to a contract 
which is exceptionally onerous for the weaker party, the private law courts are 
obliged to intervene on the basis of the general clauses (§ 138 (1) and 242 of the 
Civil Code concerning, respectively, good morals and good faith). This 
obligation is based on their duty to protect the constitutional right to private 
autonomy (Article 2 (1) of the Basic Law) in conjunction with the principle of the 
social state (Articles 20 (1) and 28 (1) of the Basic Law).”711 
The Bürgschaft decision, based on constitutional values, established a general principle of 
protection of the weaker contractual parties. Together with subsequent similar rulings by 
the Constitutional Court, this new principle brought about a series of important 
consequences: 
“Firstly, according to the Constitutional Court, the Basic Law requires private 
parties to be protected against themselves. This protection should take place through 
legislation and court decisions. Secondly, it is in accordance with the value system 
embodied in constitutional rights and the principle of the social state that private 
law in general, and contract law, in particular, should fulfil not only the task of 
ordering the relationships between private parties but also the task of protection. 
Third, in typical cases of structural inequality between parties, the content of every 
legal transaction is to be scrutinized by a respective court as to its onerousness for 
the weaker party. All kinds of contracts and corporate decisions are open to 
intervention by the courts. In the same way as the phrase ‘a contract is a contract’ 
cannot in isolation provide a sufficient legal basis for the binding force of a contract, 
the phrase ‘a majority is a majority’ can provide a sufficient legal basis for the 
binding force of corporate decisions.”712 
It is truly impossible to overstate the importance of this decision. By resorting to the 
obligation of good faith and coupling it with the constitutional rights established in the 
Basic Law, what the Constitutional Court did was, among other effects, to establish a 
general principle of unconscionability based on the abuse of bargaining power disparities. 
Furthermore, by referencing the principle of the social state of the German nation, as well 
as protecting parties “from themselves”, the Court made paternalism a national policy. 
The pattern followed by the Court in regards to the interpretation freedom of contract is 
fairly easy to see. As MARELLA explained: 
“First, the making of a contract is to be controlled (and eventually restricted) by the 
state as long as weak parties confront strong parties. This implies the identification 
of weak parties in relation to strong parties: women are weak in relation to men, the 
                                                                  
711 CHEREDNYCHENKO, O. O., 2007, supra note 698, p. 237 (emphasis added). 
712 ibid., pp. 237–238. 
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poor are weak in relation to the middle and upper classes, wives are weak in relation 
to husbands, young people are weak in relation to grown-ups, children in relation to 
parents, etc. Second, the making of a contract is to be restricted when there are a 
weak and a strong party and unfair contractual terms. Here comes the fundamental 
rights argument and – third – the intervention of the state in terms of limits to 
freedom of contract is required because the unfair contract disregards the weak 
party’s fundamental rights.”713 
This shift towards constitutionalization of private law, with an emphasis on paternalism, 
has not been free from criticisms. There have been those who argue that there is an 
inherent risk in allowing the State to blur the lines between public and private law, 
“remedying” an individual’s choice, by supposedly freeing him of the biases and mental 
weaknesses that affect him, and which allegedly made him unable to really know what he 
wanted. The risk is that the State can easily move from simply acting in a subsidiary 
manner to an individual’s will (a paternalistic or social model), to directly correct the 
choices that an individual might make that seem to go against the State’s own 
conceptions of what is desirable (a perfectionist model).714 The consequences of a state 
adopting perfectionism as a guiding principle, let alone as a policy, are quite serious. As 
MARELLA explains: 
“[In the perfectionist model] the state enunciates a conception of the good life and 
frowns on choices which are inconsistent with it!  
While paternalism restricts our bargaining freedom only in the name of satisfying 
our deepest set of preferences, the perfectionist is a moralist who is prepared to 
ignore our deepest wishes when these are deemed unworthy. Instead he identifies 
the good ends we have to pursue and obliges us to seek them, whether we want them 
or not.”715 
Although MARELLA’s criticisms against the perfectionist model might seem farfetched and 
outside of what can reasonably be expected from the legislator or the courts, reality is 
considerably more complex. Indeed, as she explains, the perfectionist model is precisely 
the one applied in both the German and French systems. As we will see, in both of those 
systems, on the basis of human dignity, courts have acted against the express will of the 
parties, even when the parties themselves feel that they are getting a good deal. 
According to German and French doctrine, human dignity is understood based on three 
fundamental principles: 
                                                                  
713 MARELLA, M. R., 2006, supra note 562, p. 267. 
714 ibid., p. 269. 
715 ibid., p. 269. 
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i. “[H]uman dignity has to be protected even against the wishes of the person 
whose human dignity is concerned (inalienability);  
ii. [O]nly the judge – not the individual whose human dignity is concerned – is 
entitled to assess individual human dignity and its violations;  
iii. [T]he respect of human dignity can prevail over the social dignity of the 
individual whose human dignity is concerned.”716 
Taking these principles as a starting point, and constructing a legal protection of human 
dignity, some courts have taken paternalism to a new level. German and French courts 
have actually been clear in their refusal to respect an individual’s desires, even in 
contractual agreements in which the individual being protected openly refuses the 
protection. 
In Germany, human dignity was used as the basis for the famous 1981 Peep Show case of 
the Federal Constitutional Court, where a mechanical peep-show was denied a license 
because, according to the Court, the trade itself violated the human dignity of the women 
who would be exhibiting themselves.717 The issue was not whether the women were 
voluntarily participating in this exhibition (the Court did not argue that this was a case of 
human-trafficking or of women held against their will), but rather that, whether they 
wanted it or not, this particular trade was against their dignity and, therefore, could not 
be allowed.718  
This was a truly astonishing decision, since not only was it based on the idea that the 
State knew better than the performers, but also managed to waltz around the fact that 
Germany had a large pornographic industry. The Court, for example, took it upon itself to 
distinguish the peep-shows from, for example, strip tease shows, considering that only 
the former was inherently against human dignity, since it was based on the objectification 
of the women involved. The judges seem to have considered that the dancing involved in 
strip-tease had an inherently artistic value as a performance, whereas a strip-show 
performed in a peep show establishment, let alone a sexual act performed there, was 
somehow inherently against human dignity. As the Court explained: 
                                                                  
716 ibid., p. 271. 
717 The Court explained the working of this show as follows: 
“During this [show], on a round, revolving stage (5m in diameter) the bare body of a female person is 
supposed to be seen (to music) by a spectator on one of 21 single occupancy cubicles. The window of [such] 
cubicle is at any one time covered by a blind, which disappears for a predetermined period after a coin is 
inserted into a slot[,] and . . . the stage becomes visible from the booth.” 
Cited in KADIDAL, S., ‘Obscenity in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, 1996, 44 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, no. 2, p. 353. 
718 CHEREDNYCHENKO, O. O., 2007, supra note 698, p. 250 (“[H]uman dignity as a so-called ‘objective value’ was used 
by the Court as a basis for the prohibition on peep-shows, despite the fact that a woman in that case had freely consented 
to carrying out such acts”). 
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“The mere exhibition of the naked female body does not injure human dignity, since 
most probably no fundamental objections, from the perspective of an injury to 
human dignity, have been raised against the customary striptease entertainment. 
The interpretation of the appellate court [the Verwaltungsgerichthof, or VGH], that 
this critique of the peep-show applies similarly against the traditional striptease, 
cannot be followed in this instance. The peep-show can be fundamentally 
distinguished from the striptease. The striptease actress-appearing before an . . . 
engrossed audience in the hall-moves about in a compass which stands within the 
tradition of a customary stage- or dance-show, and under which the here-ordinary 
authoritative character allows [her] personal subjective position ... to pass 
untouched.”719 
The Court continued its strange harangue adding: 
“Conversely in the peep-show the woman appearing is assigned to a degraded, 
objectified role, to which end several circumstances of the event cooperate: those 
owing to the kind of payment which establishes an atmosphere of a mechanical and 
automatized [business] event, by which the spectacle of the naked woman is bought 
and sold like a commodity through the slot of a machine; those owing to the window-
flap mechanism and the one-sided line of sight emphasize the woman's isolation as a 
thing for hire-she is shown as an object of desire in the show, lent out permanently to 
the voyeur; owing to the [temporal] expiration of the event an especially crass, 
prominent impression of a de-personalized marketing of the woman [is created]; the 
isolation also of the spectators, being alone in the booth and with it [an] allied defect 
[in] social supervision; the possibility- deliberately created by the system of solitary 
booths-of gratification and the commercial exploitation thereof. Taken together, 
these conditions assure that the woman displayed in the show is presented . . . like 
an object in the service of sexual stimulation with a view towards remuneration, and 
each spectator, existing in [his own] isolation-booth, invisible to the woman, has her 
offered as a mere stimulation-object for the gratification of sexual interest. This 
justifies the decision that the woman displayed in the show is degraded through this 
manner of performance-the peep-show characterized (in its own peculiar way) as 
'professional public performance' […] and thereby received a dignitarian injury."720 
In the best-case scenario, the members of the Court suffered from an extreme case of 
naiveté, assuming that men visit strip-clubs for their artistic value and not for sexual 
gratification. In the worst (and most likely) case scenario, the judges took it upon 
themselves to decide what can be qualified as an “artistic performance,” considering peep-
                                                                  
719 Cited in KADIDAL, S., 1996, supra note 717, p. 354. Although we can only guess, it seems fair to assume that 
the patrons of a peep show would be equally (if not more) engrossed as those visiting a strip-club. 
720 Cited in ibid., p. 355. 
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shows inhumane, and strip-teases artistic. Of course, the fact that strip-tease is not only a 
deeply objectifying practice, but also one in which women are systematically targeted for 
different degrees of sexual assault seems to have been lost in the learned judges.721 With 
its bizarre double standard when it comes to the morality of certain practices and the 
immorality of others, the Court perfectly exemplified the risks of granting any authority 
the power to decide what can be considered as possessing artistic merit. 
A similar case of “the State knows best” arose in France, in the so-called Dwarf-Throwing 
case of the Conseil d’ Etat. This case dealt with the practice of “dwarf-tossing”, a practice 
that DAVIS describes as: 
“[A] form of entertainment that was invented in Australia in the nineteen eighties, 
and which spread rapidly to other parts of the world. Dwarf tossing is a contest of 
strength usually held in discotheques and bars, which rewards the person who is able 
to throw a willing and suitably protected dwarf the furthest onto a padded landing 
stage. Another variant, dwarf bowling, involves launching a helmeted dwarf who is 
strapped to a skateboard down a bowling alley; the winner is the contestant who 
knocks down the most pins.”722 
The problems started when the mayor of the small town of Morsang-sur-Orge declared 
the practice of dwarf-tossing illegal. Dwarves challenged the mayor’s ruling, in a case that 
made it all the way to the Conseil d’Etat. While the mayor’s actions were motivated by, 
                                                                  
721 In this regard MARELLA mentions how “[i]n the German cases of peepshows and sexy chat lines, the prohibition of 
the shows and/or the contracts’ nullity will not have effects on the sex workers whose dignity has been supposedly 
harmed other than that of inducing them to work on the streets as prostitutes, which is not less degrading from the point 
of view of the courts themselves” (MARELLA, M. R., 2006, supra note 562, p. 274). For an analysis of the strip club 
industry from a feminist perspective, See JEFFREYS, S., ‘Keeping Women Down and Out: The Strip Club Boom and 
the Reinforcement of Male Dominance’, 2008, 34 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, no. 1, 151–173. 
On the prevalence of violence against women in strip-tease venues and other areas of sex work, See FARLEY, M. et 
al., ‘Prostitution and Trafficking in Nine Countries’, 2004, 2 Journal of Trauma Practice, 3-4, 33–74 and RAPHAEL, 
J. & SHAPIRO, D. L., ‘Violence in Indoor and Outdoor Prostitution Venues’, 2004, 10 Violence Against Women, 
no. 2, 126–139. 
722 DAVIS, J., ‘Forbidding Dwarf Tossing: Defending Dignity or Discrimination Based on Size?’, 2006, 9 Yearbook of 
New Zealand Jurisprudence, pp. 239–240. See also MARELLA, M. R., 2006, supra note 562, p. 271. MCGEE adds 
more to this description: 
“Dwarf tossing is a sport and a form of entertainment that usually takes place in a tavern or sports 
facility. The object is to throw a dwarf as far as possible. Whoever throws the dwarf the farthest wins a 
cash prize or trophy, plus the admiration of the spectators who are watching the tossing. The dwarfs wear 
protective knee and elbow padding, neck braces, and helmets. To minimize the chance of injury, they are 
sometimes thrown into a pile of mattresses. They also wear a harness with a handle, to make it easier for 
the tosser to get a good grip on the dwarf. Dwarf tossing is a fairly safe practice, in the sense that the 
dwarfs who get tossed seldom get injured. Furthermore, the dwarfs who go on tour can earn a six- figure 
income.” 
MCGEE, R. W., ‘If Dwarf Tossing Is Outlawed, Only Outlaws Will Toss Dwarfs: Is Dwarf Tossing a Victimless 
Crime?’, 1993, 38 American Journal of Jurisprudence, pp. 335–336. 
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allegedly, considerations of human dignity (which he felt was not respected in the dwarf-
tossing spectacle), the dwarves alleged that they were being deprived of their means to 
make a living in a discriminatory fashion.723 Both the Conseil d’Etat as well as the United 
Nations High Commission on Human Rights (on appeal by the plaintiffs), confirmed the 
ban. In its ruling, the Commission found that the ban “was necessary in order to protect 
public order, which brings into play considerations of human dignity.”724 
This case demonstrates the incredibly difficult task that is entailed in a system that tries 
to police morality in private relations.  This was a case in which private individuals agreed 
upon a service that was to be performed by someone (the dwarf), in exchange for 
remuneration. Not only that, as the individual in question argued, being tossed around 
provided him with “a good income.”725 The French state and the UN, conceivably patting 
themselves in the back for their progressive ideas, took a measure to protect the dignity 
of the dwarves that were being thrown in these shows, without taking into consideration 
that, in their zeal, they had deprived them of their means to make a living.  
While the practice of dwarf tossing is certainly revolting, and it speaks volumes about the 
people who pay to participate in it, the human dignity of the protected parties was not, in 
reality, protected. Mr. Wackenheim, the submitting party at the UN High Commission, 
argued in his submission that, instead of protecting his dignity, French authorities had 
deprived him of it. He argued that his ability to make a living in a country where “there is 
                                                                  
723 LEGET, C. et al., ‘‘Nobody Tosses a Dwarf!’ The Relation Between the Empirical and the Normative 
Reexamined’, 2009, 23 Bioethics, no. 4, p. 227. 
724 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the 
Optional Protocol (Volume 8): Seventy-Fifth to Eighty-Fourth Sessions (July 2002 – July 2005), 2007, United Nations, 
New York, NY, p. 114. 
725 MARELLA, M. R., 2006, supra note 562, p. 271. The fact that the dwarves being thrown can potentially earn a 
substantial amount has made some (e.g. MCGEE, R. W., 1993, supra note 722, p. 336) refer to the practice as a 
“positive-sum game” where “no one loses,” since 
“[t]he dwarfs who permit themselves to be tossed stand to earn substantial income; those who toss the 
dwarfs the farthest can win money plus gain the satisfaction of having won something; those who watch 
the tossing are entertained; and it is a source of income for promoters.” 
While at first this line of thinking seems satisfying, it is not devoid of problems. It is worth questioning what 
leads a society to be a place where people with a physical disability can only make a good living by being tossed 
around for sport. In his article MCGEE demonstrates a rather extreme libertarian position, going as far as 
advocating for legalizing the sale of human organs as a way to increase transplants (ibid., pp. 349–350), on the 
basis that the only parties affected would be the donor and the recipient, a patently ridiculous idea. Indeed, even 
though there is not a lot of data available, current research shows that individuals who have sold organs have not 
actually improved their situation (See, generally, JHA, V. & CHUGH, K. S., ‘The Case Against a Regulated System of 
Living Kidney Sales’, 2006, 2 Nature Clinical Practice Nephrology, no. 9), not to mention that those selling their 
organs are often in a desperate situation. The problem with MCGEE’s logic is that, while he might be correct in 
regards to the small role that the state should have in regards to some issues, he overlooks the risks of 
establishing a society in which everything becomes inherently commercial.  
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no work for dwarves” was taken from him, something that had, in a demonstrable way, 
damaged his human dignity.726 
A similar case arose in 2011 in the state of Florida, when a lawsuit was commenced 
against then-Governor Jeb Bush and the head of the Florida Department of Business and 
Professional Regulations, after dwarf-tossing was made illegal. In this case: 
“David Flood, a Tampa Bay radio personality known as ‘Dave the Dwarf’, alleged 
that his constitutional right to equal protection was violated by the law that 
prohibited dwarf tossing. Mr. Flood – whose antics have included being frozen in a 
block of ice, being sent to live in a Dumpster for charity, and being stuffed inside a 
giant bowling ball – said, ‘This is serious, I don’t want the government telling me 
what I can or cannot do. They assume [people with dwarfism] don’t have a mind of 
their own. People confuse exploitation with capitalization. If I were 7 feet tall, I’d get 
paid to put a basketball through a hoop.’”727 
Although only tangentially related to our analysis, due to legal and jurisdictional 
differences, the words of Mr. Flood are certainly relevant. There is a certain patronizing 
attitude on the part of the authorities when they are willing to act against the express will 
of the parties, when no real and demonstrable damage is occurring. What we can observe 
is that a rather pseudo-scientific approach was taken by the German authorities in the 
Peep-Show case, as well as the French in the Dwarf-Tossing case. Indeed, both decisions 
assumed, out of thin air, that the behaviors that they were observing were morally 
abhorrent, and that therefore they should be banned. There was, however, no empirical 
data put forward to substantiate this repulsion. While it is certainly not our intention to 
defend or condone peep-shows or dwarf-tossing, practices that we might personally find 
morally repulsive, it is hardly the role of the State to make those decisions without first 
providing empirical support for their measures.728 In the words of Steven PINKER: 
“Could there be cases in which a voluntary relinquishing of dignity leads to 
callousness in onlookers and harm to third parties--what economists call negative 
externalities? In theory, yes. Perhaps if people allowed their corpses to be publicly 
desecrated, it would encourage violence against the bodies of the living. Perhaps the 
sport of dwarf-tossing encourages people to mistreat all dwarves. Perhaps violent 
pornography encourages violence against women. But, for such hypotheses to justify 
restrictive laws, they need empirical support. In one's imagination, anything can lead 
to anything else: Allowing people to skip church can lead to indolence; letting women 
drive can lead to sexual licentiousness. In a free society, one cannot empower the 
                                                                  
726 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007, supra note 724, p. 111. 
727 LEGET, C. et al., 2009, supra note 723, p. 227. 
728 MCGEE, R. W., 1993, supra note 722, p. 343 (“in a free society, acts between consenting adults should be legal and 
unrestricted. The state has no business prohibiting acts that do not result in the violation of someone's rights”). 
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government to outlaw any behavior that offends someone just because the offendee 
can pull a hypothetical future injury out of the air. No doubt Mao, Savonarola, and 
Cotton Mather could provide plenty of reasons why letting people do what they 
wanted would lead to the breakdown of society.”729 
It seems fairly clear that using good faith as a catch-all safety mechanism is not free of 
complications. On the contrary, it is easy to see that it opens the door to the kind of 
policy-making and activism on the part of the courts that we would, most certainly, prefer 
to avoid. The same good faith that protected weak parties that sought relief from abusive 
clauses was, after all, the same good faith that was used to protect parties who argued, 
openly, freely, and loudly, that they did not need such protection. We will revisit these 
issues later. 
5.4 Abuse of Rights 
As we have seen, the notion of good faith is closely related to that of the abuse of rights. 
While, as it is often the case, it is a concept for which it is hard to establish a single, all-
encompassing definition, some decent attempts exist. A good approximation to a stable 
definition comes from the 1972 Japanese Supreme Court case of Mitamura v. Suzuki, and 
in which the Court set “reasonableness” as the criteria to be used to determine when a 
right is being abused: 
“In all cases a right must be exercised in such a fashion that the result of the exercise 
remains within a scope judged reasonable in the light of the prevailing social 
conscience. When a conduct by one who purports to have a right to do so fails to show 
reasonableness and when the consequential damages to others exceed the limit 
which is generally supposed to be borne in the social life, we must say that the 
exercise of the right is no longer within its permissible scope. Thus, the person who 
exercises his right in such a fashion shall be held liable because his conduct 
constitutes an abuse of right.”730 
The abuse of rights doctrine represents a clear example of how contractual rights, even 
though legitimate, are not seen by the courts as granting an absolute right for their 
holder. Indeed, the Italian Supreme Court, for example, demonstrating this anti-
absolutist view of contractual rights, developed an approach through which it does away 
with the idea of contracts as “invincible strongholds” within which the parties can do as 
they please. Instead, Italian Courts (as well as most of the ones in Civil Law systems) see 
                                                                  
729 PINKER, S., ‘The Stupidity of Dignity: Conservative Bioethics' Latest, Most Dangerous Ploy’, 2008, 238 The New 
Republic, no. 9, p. 31. 
730 Cited in BYERS, M., ‘Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age’, 2001, 47 McGill Law Journal, no. 2, p. 393. 
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some exercises of rights as illegitimate, and the abuse of rights as an “indicium revealing a 
breach of the duty of good faith.” In order to qualify an act in those terms, the Italian 
Supreme Court stated that four conditions need to be met, namely that  
“(1) A party derives from the contract a legally protected right; (2) within the 
contract, such a right can be exercised in multiple ways; (3) though formally 
complying with the contract, the right is exercised in an abusive manner; (4) such an 
abusive exercise brings about an unfair disproportion between the benefit enjoyed by 
the right-holder and the counterpart’s sacrifice.”731 
The abuse of rights involves a prima facie legitimate exercise of a right, but which sees its 
legitimacy stripped away due to the motivations of the party exercising it, as well as the 
circumstances surrounding such exercise. In these situations, what the “abusive” party 
(“α”) aims to do is to receive a benefit at the expense of the other (“β”), in such a 
disproportionate way that the law simply cannot tolerate it. What is most relevant here is 
that the abuse involves a right that was legitimately acquired by α (legitimacy ab initio), 
and which was actually granted to her by β at the time of the contract, but that is being 
exercised illegitimately (illegitimacy ex post facto). It is not, therefore, that α is going 
against what is established in the contract, but rather that it is going against its spirit and 
the terms that are implied within it, as well as against the principles that inform contract 
law itself, such as good faith, the duty of solidarity and the principles of proportionality 
and of neminem laedere.732 As the Italian Supreme Court explained in a recent case:  
“[B]oth parties are bound to not only give effect to the obligations stemming from 
the contract, but also to behave in order to reduce each other’s efforts and safeguard 
each other’s interests. Therefore, good faith is [the] expression of the ‘compulsory 
principle of mutual protection’, which requires cooperation by the contracting parties 
with a view to achieving the expected benefits.”733 
German courts have taken a similar approach, also stating that the fact that the contract 
might strictly allow a party to do something does not mean that she can necessarily do 
that in any situation. And so, for example, on the basis of the good faith duty established 
in §242 BGB, courts have ruled that “a promisee may not simply withdraw from a contract 
when his rights can be equally safeguarded by less drastic means”, and that “a landowner 
possesses no right to claim damages from an architect if the landowner can obtain equal 
                                                                  
731 FARINA, M. & MALTESE, D., 2012, supra note 615, pp. 4–5. 
732 The consideration paid to the animus of the abusive party is, of course, not unique to Italian law, and actually 
pervades the Civilian position in regards to abuse of rights. Going back to the already cited §138 of the German 
BGB, for example, we note that the legislator does not merely require that the weak party is careless, weak or in 
need, but also (and arguably most importantly) that these are conditions that were deliberately exploited by the 
stronger party. 
733 ibid., pp. 6–7. 
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satisfaction through minor repairs by the builder.”734 Clearly, it is a policy goal furthered by 
the courts that the exercise of rights must be done in whatever way causes less harm to 
the other party. The party exercising her right, therefore, is not completely free in this 
exercise, as she must take into consideration the consequences that such exercise would 
bring on the other, being actually under an obligation to always seek to avoid or, at least, 
minimize the damage. 
Although certainly an interesting venue by which the will of the parties, as expressed in 
their contract, can be modified by the courts, the abuse of rights doctrine is outside of the 
scope of our research. Those interested in a more in-depth review are directed to the 
different works on the topic suggested in the bibliography. 
5.5 A Good Faith-Based Approach to Unconscionability 
As we have shown in this very brief overview of Civilian control methods of unfair terms, 
the similarities with the unconscionability doctrine are legion. It seems to be that, beyond 
doctrinal differences, both Civilian and Common Law systems seek to achieve the same 
goal, even if they follow dissimilar paths to get there. 
Despite the similarities, however, the Civilian method, relying on good faith and, 
consequently, human dignity, seems to present more problems than a unified 
unconscionability doctrine. What is more, and arguably backing our assertion, even those 
systems in which good faith was used as a method to stop unconscionable clauses (like the 
French and the Spanish) have reduced the application of this principle, opting instead to 
establish direct, specific legislation to tackle unfair clauses.735 While it is certainly possible 
that we might be misunderstanding their motivations, the move towards special 
legislation seems like a clear indication of the insufficiency of the good faith approach as a 
catch-all device.  
What is more, when good faith is coupled with conceptions of human dignity, and 
together they are used as methods to control contractual autonomy, the resulting 
uncertainty seems dangerously high. MARELLA offers two very compelling reasons to 
oppose the use of human dignity in this manner:  
“First, unlike the way courts normally interpret standards like boni mores and public 
policy that are historically determined and relative, and therefore likely to work as 
an objective limit to judiciary discretion, the human dignity doctrine presents dignity 
as a transcendent, pre-legal value, which is not influenced or defined by historical or 
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735 PIZARRO WILSON, C., 2004, supra note 127, p. 125. 
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social circumstances. As such it is completely detached from objective standards, so 
that the court is the only and absolute judge of it.  
Second, in the most significant case law the case could have been decided in two 
opposite ways, both based on dignity protection. In fact, courts prohibit an activity 
alleged as violating human dignity while the same activity is assumed by the person 
whose dignity is concerned as enhancing her/his social dignity.”736 
Historical data seems to side with us in this conclusion, as records exist of good faith 
being employed well beyond its rational sphere. In German law, for example, there has 
been a historical opposition to judges resorting to principles such as this when they lack 
any other legal ground on which to base their decisions. As LANDO notes: 
“Already in 1932 Gustav Hedemann warned against this ‘Flucht in den 
Generalklauseln’ (flight into the general clauses). In Germany there have been cases 
of misdirected use of it; in the Nazi period the courts applied the principle to 
discriminate against the Jews. After the war it led in some cases to a sloppy 
humanitarianism. Therefore, authors and superior courts now agree that § 242 BGB 
is not to be used for what the Germans call a ‘Billigkeits-Justiz’; the courts cannot 
invoke it to replace the effects imposed by law and contract by what they in their 
taste consider to be reasonable and equitable in the concrete case.”737 
While good faith certainly has a position in contract law, particularly in regards to 
interpretation, its use to prevent abusive clauses might be limited. While resorting to 
good faith in this manner might be useful in lieu of specific norms, it should only be a 
stepping stone towards specific regulation seeking to stop contractual abuses. Although, 
as we have seen, there is no question that abusive clauses are inherently against good 
faith, this fact alone does not suffice to identify which clauses or contracts can be struck 
down, nor does it grant the level of certainty that is required for the market to function. 
Even in those systems, such as the Dutch, where the law has expressly given good faith a 
restrictive function in regards to unfair terms, claims that are based exclusively on a 
breach of this duty seldom succeed. As HARTKAMP himself noted, in regards to the good 
faith provision in the Dutch Civil Code: 
“Now it speaks for itself . . . that art 6:248 part 2 does not give the judge the power 
to set aside a contract or clause on the sole ground that he finds the content to be 
unfair towards one of the parties. The mere fact that substantial inequality may 
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exist between the reciprocal performances between the parties or that a clause is 
oppressive in respect of one of the parties does not justify interference.”738 
Just like appeals to human dignity and the horizontal application of constitutional rights, 
good faith seems to be a value better suited for serving as a subsidiary claim against an 
unfair term, and not as a principal, self-sufficient one. Claims lodged in Civilian 
jurisdictions, therefore, will probably have a higher chance of success when they are based 
on specific legislation aimed at curtailing abuses, and not on such ethereal moral values. 
The Civilian methods to tackle contractual unfairness in the absence of specific legal rules, 
seem to do so “by stealth,”  by resorting to “legal fiction[s].”739 Although this might be 
useful at first, it carries the risk of “introducing artifice into the law” and lowering certainty 
and predictability.740 A general system of unconscionability, like the one present in 
American law under UCC §2-302 and, to an extent, German law under §138 BGB, seem to 
offer a much higher protection and usefulness than their more abstract counterparts. 
Finally, although we know that devoting space to human dignity seems ill-suited to a 
work dealing mostly with commercial contracts, there are good reasons for it. With an 
increasing move towards corporate personhood, with some specifically granting 
corporations rights that can only be defined as “human rights,” it might only be a matter 
of time before other such rights are also recognized. If we accept that a company 
possesses a right to free speech, then other rights, which commentators would argue 
emanate from our “human dignity”, will soon follow. If a term, therefore, could be 
considered unconscionable against a person for reasons of depriving him of one of his 
fundamental rights, or because it violates his “human dignity”, there may be no reason 
why such a term, based on the same considerations, should be held valid against a 
corporation.   
                                                                  
738 Quoted in BRAND, F. D. J., ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: 
The Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution: notes’, 2009, 126 South African Law Journal, no. 1, 
p. 89. See also PRETORIUS, C.-J., ‘The Basis of Contractual Liability in Dutch Law’, 2004, 37 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, no. 3, p. 387 (“[t]his provision [Article 6:248-2] sanctions the setting 
aside of express provisions where enforcement would be unjust in the circumstances. However, it seems that the word 
unacceptable (onaanvaardbaar) indicates that such action should be reserved for exceptional circumstances"). For some 
comments on the rather limited interpretation that has been given to this norm, See VIËTOR, D. A. & 
WIJNSTEKERS, B. W., ‘Het Redelijkheidsbeding in Commerciële Contracten’, 2013, 4 Tijdschrift Overeenkomst in de 
RechtsPraktijk, no. 8. 
739 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, p. 502. See also BROWNE, M. N. & BIKSACKY, L., 2013, 
supra note 107, p. 246 (arguing that France, unlike Germany, Australia and the United States, lacks “a general 
unconscionability doctrine,” and so must resort to “a patchwork of provisions” in order to protect parties “against 
contractual unfairness in similar ways as other countries do under the scope of their unconscionability law”). 
740 ANGELO, A. & ELLINGER, E. P., 1992, supra note 176, p. 502. 
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“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends 
on the amount of money he has.” 
Justice Hugo Black.741 
6.1 Introduction 
n essential part of a free society is the ability of the people to obtain satisfaction 
through the judicial system. Indeed, it is the power to resort to the courts that 
allows people to avoid the use of violence as a means to solve conflicts, ensuring 
that a fair, independent and just third party will, in the end, lay down the law. 
Even beyond the realm of public law, where we can easily picture the importance of an 
independent system in charge of, for example, imparting criminal justice, the role of the 
judicial system is essential. In contractual matters, for example, it is the knowledge that 
the parties can enforce each other’s obligations through the courts that allows the market 
to grow and flourish. It is obvious that if the parties had themselves to enforce each 
other’s obligations, by means of direct physical action or coercion, the weaker elements in 
our society, those with less power, would soon find themselves unable to obtain any kind 
of redress. Furthermore, if the courts could not be counted on for enforcement of 
contractual obligations, it is difficult to imagine how any kind of market could exist. If the 
parties cannot be certain that the other will fulfill her obligations, then there will be little 
to no incentive to contract, or to comply with one’s own obligations. Contracting and 
enforcement would quickly become nothing more than a Darwinian social construct 
under which only the strong, those who can push the other, would survive. 
And yet, despite all of the above considerations, contractual practices often move away 
from the default rules in regards to jurisdiction over the contract, and establish different 
venues to solve the conflicts. Some do so by selecting a specific court within a given 
                                                                  
741 Cited in ALLEN, F. A., ‘Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath’, 1957, 25 The University of Chicago Law 
Review, no. 1, p. 152. 
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judicial system (a “choice of court”), while others do it by means of selecting an 
independent arbitral tribunal (an “arbitration clause”).742 
While, in principle, the choice of an independent court (be it one that is part of the 
judiciary or an independent arbitral tribunal) should not, at all, affect the rights of the 
parties to a contract, the reality is actually more complex. A clause by which jurisdiction is 
specifically given to another court will often have a severe impact on the rights and 
obligations of the parties. Even in those cases in which the independence of the tribunal is 
not at stake, the fact of the matter is that the court before which the parties make their 
cases, will often play a significant role in the outcome of the dispute. Judicial proceedings 
are not like mathematical formulas, where the result of a given problem will be the same 
regardless of the mathematician solving it, and so what the parties can obtain (if 
anything) will be heavily dependent on where the bench is located. After all, “the forum 
chosen may be extremely inhospitable to one party, so much so that litigation may not be 
pursued at all.”743 
Just like it happens with any other clause in a contract, forum selection clauses can also 
be the result of unfair contractual practices. Both parties to the contract will often be in 
very different positions in regards to their bargaining power, and so one of them might be 
able to impose a certain jurisdictional clause upon the other. Coupled with the fact that a 
clause might be buried amidst several, barely readable clauses, written in complex legal 
jargon, a jurisdictional clause has the power to affect the outcome of a case, to the point 
of making one of the parties’ rights virtually irrelevant. “On that score, for example, it can be 
argued that the consent reflected in a forum-selection clause is unlikely to be genuine, and may 
often be the product […] of unequal bargaining power.”744 
In this chapter, after a brief overview of how jurisdictional clauses have reached their 
current status as hallmarks of contracting, we look at the risks that they present in 
regards to fairness. On the basis of the doctrines analyzed in previous chapters regarding 
unfair clauses, we wage on the dispute as to whether jurisdictional clauses are to be 
accepted as merely examples of the market’s desires (following the idea that a contract’s 
clauses are part of its price), or whether the blanket acceptance of their validity might 
actually pose a threat to fairness. 
                                                                  
742 When speaking about forum selection, monikers abound. Beyond “forum selection clause”, some 
commentators refer to them as “jurisdiction clause,” “choice of forum provisions,” “consensual adjudicatory 
provisions,” and many others. Unless otherwise stated, these terms should be understood as equal for the 
purposes of this work. Although an arbitral tribunal is, indeed, a forum, our analysis of forum selection will deal 
mostly with courts in a given jurisdiction, and not so much with alternative dispute resolution. Because of this, 
unless the context makes it clear or it is otherwise stated, our references to “forum selection” should be 
understood as not including arbitration.   
743 SOLIMINE, M. E., ‘Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure’, 1992, 25 Cornell 
International Law Journal, p. 52. 
744 ibid., p. 52. 
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6.2 Benefits of Forum Selection Clauses 
Predictability is one of the most important goals for the parties to a contract. The 
contract is, after all, no less than the manifestation of their desire to give some modicum 
of permanence to their private relations. It is, in other words, a “public” statement of 
their desire to work together. Be it a contract of sale, a rental agreement, or a contract of 
carriage, what the parties want is to know exactly what will happen in every stage of the 
contractual formation and performance. As LEDERMAN put it: 
“Parties who memorialize agreed-upon rights and obligations in contracts generally 
do so to impose enforceability on their agreements. A written contract assists 
somewhat in clarifying the parties' expectations.”745  
As contracts become more complex, the costs of performance increase, and the 
transactions cross state and national borders, predictability becomes more than a simple 
desire, and actually turns into a vital concern for the parties.746 When very expensive 
products are at stake, or one of the parties is contracting with a large number of clients, 
knowing not only how the performance will take place, but also what to expect if a dispute 
arises, becomes essential. Limitations of liability, liquidated damages, choice of law, and 
forum selection, are all examples of clauses that the parties add in the hopes of 
minimizing the uncertainty that is inherent to businesses.747 
Forum selection provisions are one of the most important tools that the parties can 
employ in order to increase the certainty regarding the rights and duties emanating from 
their agreements, as well as to reduce and allocate the risks inherent to the contract.748 
                                                                  
745 LEDERMAN, L., ‘Viva Zapata: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity 
Cases’, 1991, 66 New York University Law Review, no. 2, p. 422. 
746 TRAYNOR, R. J., ‘Is This Conflict Really Necessary’, 1958, 37 Texas Law Review, p. 674. 
747 REILLY, J. M., ‘Enforceability of Choice of Forum Clauses’, 1971, 8 California Western Law Review, no. 2, p. 324. 
See also BECKER, J. D., ‘Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum Clauses in New York’, 1989, 38 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 1, p. 167 (noting the role of choice of law clauses in reducing uncertainty) and 
ZAPHIRIOU, G. A., ‘Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International Commercial Agreements’, 1977, 3 
International Trade Law Journal, no. 2, p. 311 (arguing that both forum selection and choice of law provisions 
“provide reasonable predictability” in the event of a dispute). 
748 DEMPSEY, J., ‘Forum Selection Clauses in Attorney-Client Agreements: The Exploitation of Bargaining Power’, 
2011, 114 West Virginia Law Review, no. 3, p. 1196. See also GILBERT, E. P., ‘We're All in the Same Boat: Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute’, 1992, 18 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, no. 2, p. 599 (calling these clauses “one 
of the most important and effective devices parties can use in an attempt to bring stability and certainty to a contractual 
agreement”) and MARCUS, D., ‘The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in 
the Federal Courts’, 2007, 82 Tulane Law Review, no. 3, p. 974 (stating that these clauses, which have “an 
increasingly central role in American civil justice,” are used in order to “hedge against the expensive and uncertain 
vagaries of litigation” so as to “spell out in advance of any dispute how a lawsuit would proceed should their relationship 
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They aim to avoid the great inconveniences that would arise if a suit could “be maintained 
in any court that has jurisdiction”.749  These clauses seek to grant jurisdiction to the courts 
of a certain country or place, excluding all others that might otherwise be equally or more 
competent to hear the case. They are based on the assumption that a court will refuse to 
entertain proceedings brought in contravention of the clause, and that it will then defer 
to the parties’ choice of forum in their contract.750  
Forum selection clauses are an essential tool to minimize the risks to which the parties 
expose themselves. Indeed, they allow the parties to prepare themselves for unforeseeable 
contingencies, associated with an eventual breakdown of the contractual bond. 
Furthermore, their supporters claim that they also promote business transactions, 
particularly in an international context, since it is in that area where, as Lee notes, “a lack 
of certainty and foreseeability can place great burdens upon the parties involved.”751  
What is more, forum selection clauses allow the parties to prevent the risks of litigating in 
hostile forums, something that, in the case of international businesses, ensures that the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
“By guaranteeing that all litigation is in the same state, not only is predictability enhanced, but 
efficiencies may be created through consolidation of actions and reliance on the same local counsel. By 
including such clauses in standard form contracts, transaction costs are reduced.” 
GOLDMAN, L., ‘My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form 
Contracts’, 1991, 86 Northwestern University Law Review, no. 3, p. 700. 
749 CUTLER, M. R., ‘Comparative Conflicts of Law: Effectiveness of Contractual Choice of Forum’, 1985, 20 Texas 
International Law Journal, no. 1, p. 97. See also JUENGER, F. K., ‘Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection 
Clauses’, 1972, 19 Wayne Law Review, no. 1, p. 50 (“[a] transaction which cuts across state or national boundaries is 
fraught with legal risks. Expansive notions of long-arm jurisdiction and the befuddled state of the conflict of laws create 
the unwelcome possibility of litigation in a foreign court applying unfamiliar rules.”), COSTELLO, F. W., ‘The 
Enforcement of Forum Selection Provisions in International Commercial Agreements: : M/S Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore., (U.S. Sup Ct. 1972)’, 1972, 11 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, no. 2, p. 453 (“The best way to 
avoid jurisdictional controversies in litigation arising out of international contracts is, clearly, to have judicial forums 
selected in advance”) and LEDERMAN, L., 1991, supra note 745, pp. 422–423 (“In a multi-state or international 
agreement […] it may be impossible to predict where a plaintiff will file suit. To reduce this un- certainty, control 
litigation costs, and minimize potential tactical advantages to plaintiffs, sophisticated parties may [include a forum 
selection clause]”). 
750 FARQUHARSON, I. M., ‘Choice of Forum Clauses - A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law’, 1974, 8 International 
Lawyer (ABA), no. 1, pp. 85–86.  
751 LEE, Y., ‘Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases and State Courts’, 1997, 35 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, no. 3, p. 663. On that note, LAGERMAN adds that in international 
commercial contracts these clauses are “desirable and necessary” since they “promote stability of transactions, 
encourage trade by eliminating uncertainty of where a dispute will be resolved and give effect to the manifested intent of 
the parties” (LAGERMAN, L. O., ‘Choice of Forum Clauses in International Contracts: What Is Unjust and 
Unreasonable?’, 1978, 12 The International Lawyer, no. 4, p. 779). See also GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 748, 
p. 597 (arguing that forum selection clauses “tend to lessen the complexity” of the transactions and “result in a 
greater feeling of confidence” between the parties) and RAPOPORT, J., ‘Warsaw, Montreal, and the US Department 
of Transportation: Consumer Protection for Forum Selection’, 2012, 77 Journal of Air Law and Commerce, no. 3, 
p. 248 (suggesting that the use of forum selection clauses, by reducing uncertainty, “ultimately benefits consumers 
in the form of lower prices”). 
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competitive advantages obtained from entering foreign markets are not neutralized in 
litigation.752 Indeed, these clauses allow the parties to  
“select a desirable, perhaps neutral, forum in which to litigate disputes. Such 
planning permits orderliness and predictability in contractual relationships, 
obviating a potentially costly struggle at the outset of litigation over jurisdiction and 
venue. Preselecting a forum also reduces the possibility of parallel lawsuits between 
parties in different fora.”753  
Thanks to their flexibility, these provisions also allow the parties to tailor the dispute 
resolution mechanism based on their own particular needs, for example by choosing a 
forum experienced in the subject matter of their agreement, or by using them as a 
complement to a choice-of-law provision.754 Because of this, they have become a common 
part of business agreements.755 What is more, as a consequence of the growth of 
international transactions and trade, they have become an almost essential element of 
this type of contracts.756 
Proponents of forum selection clauses argue that both the potential plaintiff and the 
potential defendant benefit from them. The defendant knows that he can only be sued in 
a specific forum (assuming the forum selection is exclusive), and is therefore not left at 
the mercy of a plaintiff who might try to obtain strategic advantages by selecting a forum 
that might jeopardize his defense. The potential plaintiff, on the other hand, through the 
operation of this clause, is freed from finding a suitable forum where he can exercise his 
rights and enforce the judgment, safe in the knowledge that the defendant will not (or at 
least should not) be able to contest the jurisdiction of the chosen court.757 Additionally, 
these clauses also allow the parties to prepare in advance for an eventual dispute, by being 
able to take into consideration the costs of potential litigation when they are negotiating 
the contract.758 What is more, by reducing the costs associated with the risks inherent to 
                                                                  
752 BRITTAIN JR., J. T., ‘Foreign Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts: All in the Name of International 
Comity’, 2000, 23 Houston Journal of International Law, no. 2, p. 306. 
753 SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, pp. 51–52. SOLIMINE also notes that not only are these clauses 
regularly enforced, but also that “lawyers are now routinely encouraged to place [them] in [the] contracts they 
prepare.” 
754 GILBERT, J. T., ‘Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts’, 1976, 65 Kentucky Law 
Journal, no. 1, p. 3. 
755 GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 748, p. 597. 
756 HERNANDEZ-GUTIERREZ, M. I., ‘Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses in International Commercial 
Contracts: Does the New York Convention Call for a Heightened Enforceability Standard?’, 2009, 18 Dalhousie 
Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1, p. 55. 
757 LEE, Y., 1997, supra note 751, pp. 664–665. 
758 Since many of the reported benefits deal with the ability of the parties to make an assessment, at the time of 
negotiation, of possible costs in case of a dispute, special care should be taken when they are analyzed. As we 
have seen, people are not very good at predicting negative outcomes, since they are plagued by a number of 
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the uncertainty of the forum, the drafting party can “presumably” pass the savings on to 
the other.759 
Forum selection clauses can also play an important role at the time of negotiation, as they 
might force the interested party, on the basis of a quid pro quo bargain, to concede certain 
terms in exchange of choosing the court. This interested party, whether seeking to retain 
jurisdiction in his home turf, or select a foreign tribunal in a third country, might be 
willing to concede many other points in the contract, aware of the many benefits that 
come with forum selection. As JUENGER posed: 
“If counsel is able to negotiate a forum-selection clause designating the courts of his 
home state, he is assured of full control over any disputes which may arise. There are 
obvious advantages in litigating in a familiar setting, quite apart from the avoidance 
of the added expense and inconvenience inherent in long-distance suits. If the 
transaction is international in character, designation of the home forum mitigates 
the further problems posed by differences in language and conceptual framework. 
But even if a foreign tribunal and foreign law are chosen, certainty as to the situs of 
adjudication enhances predictability, and a quid pro quo can be exacted for the 
willingness to meet the other party on its home ground. […] If proper precautions are 
taken, the mere possibility of keeping lawsuits at home may be less valuable than the 
secure knowledge that a particular forum, and no other, will decide all controversies 
which may arise.”760 
Among others, the United States Supreme Court has been clear in recognizing the 
importance of forum selection clauses in regards to predictability of contractual 
relations.761 It was with this in mind, for example, that in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. the 
Court stressed that:  
“A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be 
litigated and the law to be applied is […] an almost indispensable precondition to 
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international 
business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
familiarity with a given forum, or its experience in a certain field (such as English courts for Maritime cases) 
cannot be underestimated, how this translates into the price of the contract is a much muddier topic. 
759 SORENSEN, M. J., ‘Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court after Atlantic Marine’, 2013, 82 
Fordham Law Review, no. 5, pp. 2527–2528. 
760 JUENGER, F. K., 1972, supra note 749, p. 50. 
761 MULLENIX, L. S., ‘Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in 
Federal Court’, 1988, 57 Fordham Law Review, no. 3, p. 294 (“[t]he doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure is 
now well entrenched in federal practice and is widely heralded as a form of salutary progressivism. The doctrine is lauded 
for enhancing the values of predictability, certainty, security, stability and simplicity”). 
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dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests 
of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.”762 
6.3 Criticisms Against Forum Selection Clauses 
Many arguments have been put forward against forum selection clauses or, at least, 
against the way in which they are employed. A primary concern is the fact that these 
clauses are usually part of boilerplate agreements, and as such are often ignored or 
overlooked by the adhering parties. These parties may then find themselves required to 
travel long distances and incur large expenses if they wish to file suit against the other. 
These expenses and complications involved in merely having access to the court create the 
risk of, in effect, depriving one of the parties of an effective remedy, leaving her without 
real access to justice.763 As an author noted in a commentary dealing with travel contracts: 
“Such clauses can have a dramatic effect upon the consumer’s enthusiasm in 
prosecuting his or her claim. Stated simply, the further away the court is, the less 
likely it is that the aggrieved consumer will file a lawsuit. This is because the cost of 
traveling to a distant court house and the cost of retaining out-of-state and, 
particularly, out-of-country attorneys (no contingency fee arrangements in most 
foreign jurisdictions) is too great to justify serious litigation. And this is, of course, 
the very reason why forum selection clauses are so popular with travel suppliers.”764 
From this perspective, forum selection clauses appear as a tool that a savvy, calculating 
and powerful party can deploy against the other. Seen in this manner, depriving the other 
of her day in court would not be so much an unintended consequence of these clauses, but 
rather their real goal. By making litigation cumbersome and expensive, the drafter is thus 
able to dissuade most potential litigants from even trying. 
                                                                  
762 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. [1974], 417 US, 506, p. 516 If anything, this general view has only increased over 
the years, with a New York court stating in a recent case that "[f]orum selection clauses play a crucial role in ensuring 
predictability in contract formation" (Gasland Petroleum, Inc. v. Firestream Worldwide, Inc. [May 4, 2015], 1–8, p. 7). 
In general, it seems safe to say that US federal courts have recognized the value of forum selection clauses, 
“expanding” their enforcement over the past several decades (RAPOPORT, J., 2012, supra note 751, p. 248). 
Although Scherk was an arbitration case, it should be kept in mind that the Court “viewed the arbitration clause as 
essentially a forum-selection clause with a minor difference, because the arbitration clause ‘posits not only the situs of 
suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute” (MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 316). 
763 DEMPSEY, J., 2011, supra note 748, p. 1206 
764 DICKERSON, T. A., ‘Travel Abroad, Sue at Home 2012: Forum Non Conveniens & the Enforcement of Forum 
Selection and Mandatory Arbitration Clauses’, 2012, 32 Pace Law Review, no. 2, pp. 432–433. 
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Another criticism is that forum selection clauses do not only affect the place where the 
trial is conducted, but also the outcome.765 Some studies have shown that forum selection 
clauses tend to benefit the defendant, with outcomes being much more defendant-
friendly in the pre-selected courts, than in those where proceedings were started in 
contravention to the clause.766 Evidently, the drafter of a forum selection clause (like any 
other clause in the contract) will have his own interests in mind, and, as a result, will pick 
the court that benefits him the most. Because of this, as DEMPSEY notes,  
“courts should be leery of forum selection clauses because they can serve as a vehicle 
for a sophisticated party who is knowledgeable of the benefits of a forum selection 
clause and willing to exploit the other party's lack of the same knowledge.”767 
The argument that forum selection clauses save resources is also heavily criticized, as it 
might overlook the greater costs that they create. Critics point out that the savings 
obtained in preventing long pre-trial discussions about the venue might not be large 
enough to justify setting aside “the more fundamental goal of enforcing rights and securing 
the equitable administration of justice.”768 
PURCELL, in his very critical analysis of some American decisions enforcing forum selection 
clauses, argues that the problem is that these clauses, particularly when used in a 
consumer setting, “create an egregious disproportionality.”769 The reason for this being that 
whatever savings are perceived by the weaker party will likely be insignificant compared 
to the cost of, for all practical purposes, not being able to bring suit at all.770 This problem, 
as he argues, is exacerbated by the inclusion of these clauses in the fine print of the 
contract, where the adhering party will almost certainly be unaware of them.  
“Highly technical, apparently inconsequential, and rarely noticed or understood, 
they suddenly become -at a crucial and perhaps devastating time for the individuals 
and families involved- a substantial obstacle to suit and a powerful force pressing 
them to abandon their claims or to discount them substantially. The law should not 
                                                                  
765 MARCUS, D., 2007, supra note 748, p. 975 (“[e]mpirical studies have repeatedly confirmed that where cases proceed 
markedly impacts substantive outcomes”). 
766 DEMPSEY, J., 2011, supra note 748, p. 1206. DEMPSEY cites a study where “the plaintiff win rate dropped from 
[fifty-eight] to [twenty-nine] percent for cases that were transferred from plaintiffs to defend- ant's chosen forum, 
despite the fact that federal rules ensure application of the same law after a case is transferred.” 
767 ibid., p. 1206. 
768 PURCELL, E. A., JR., ‘Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the 
Rehnquist Court’, 1992, 40 UCLA Law Review, p. 431. 
769 ibid., p. 514. 
770 For an opposing view, See SORENSEN, M. J., 2013, supra note 759, p. 2528 (“[c]ourts and commentators have 
noted, ‘the right to litigate in one forum or another has an economic value that parties can estimate with reasonable 
accuracy," and it is arguably superior for the parties to allocate the costs associated with that right via contract’”). 
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sanction market failures that lead to such radical disproportionalities and 
compromise the essential integrity of the nation's system of civil justice.”771 
The very real concern on the part of these critics is that when the bargaining power 
disparities are large enough, these clauses will force the weaker party to give away too 
many of his rights. This becomes particularly relevant when the forum selection is used 
not to designate a court but rather a for-profit arbitral venue, where commercial 
considerations may play a role in the verdict.772 A study on the use of arbitral provisions 
on Social Networking Sites (SNS), for example, showed that through these clauses 
“providers systematically foreclose consumer rights, violating the majority of […] 
minimum consumer due process standards. SNS fail nearly every test of consumer 
due process fundamental fairness by creating a one-sided legal universe where users 
have no meaningful rights because they lack any practical way of obtaining a 
remedy. Arbitration clauses are the classic illustration of a private justice system 
where SNS can sidestep the possibility of punitive damages, jury verdicts, class 
actions, and consequential damages. Tort law is being subsumed by this radical 
extension of contract law.”773 
The commercial benefits that are allegedly rendered by these provisions have also been 
called into question, particularly for not minding the way in which forum selection clauses 
actually affect human behavior. In particular, proponents ignore that most cases will 
never reach a court, since they will often be settled privately by the parties; also, that 
geographical moves can represent a real deterrent for a party to seek relief by the courts, 
placing her at a great disadvantage in comparison to the more powerful party, who is not 
constrained by such costs. Finally, proponents also overlook the fact that forum selection 
clauses are often drafted in a way that maximizes the leverage of the drafting party in the 
claims process.774 If proven true, all of these factors would mean that forum selection 
clauses may not actually enhance predictability and certainty, but rather simply create 
obstacles for the weaker party to obtain redress. 
                                                                  
771 PURCELL, E. A., JR., 1992, supra note 768, pp. 514–515. 
772 HARRINGTON, J., ‘To Litigate or Arbitrate-No Matter-The Credit Card Industry Is Deciding for You’, 2001, 
2001 Journal of Dispute Resolution, no. 1, pp. 104–105 (mentioning the case of American credit card companies 
that become “repeat costumers” of certain arbitral centers). 
773 KOENIG, T. H. & RUSTAD, M. L., ‘Fundamentally Unfair: An Empirical Analysis of Social Media Arbitration 
Clauses’, 2014, 65 Case Western Reserve Law Review, no. 2, p. 410. On the pervasiveness of arbitration provisions 
affecting consumers on the Internet See also CANIS, E., 2015, supra note 295, p. 128 (“[f]or many of these clickwrap 
agreements, it is quite common for companies to try to include a provision that mandates forced arbitration. In fact, large 
companies, such as Facebook, have been in the news for such clickwrap Terms of Services and specifically for these 
provisions that attempt to force consumers to give up their right to sue”). 
774 PURCELL, E. A., JR., 1992, supra note 768, pp. 441–442. 
  
222 
Choice of Court Agreements 
While the benefits of forum selection might appear to be self-evident, their inherent risks 
must also be taken into account. Like any other clause in a contract, particularly one in 
which the rights of the parties are potentially jeopardized, forum selection clauses need to 
be carefully analyzed in order to determine whether they are truly the result of a real and 
free agreement. Particularly when we deal with contracts in which the bargaining power 
of the parties places one of them at the mercy of the other, whether in a consumer or a 
commercial setting, courts must be very careful when they determine whether or not such 
term should be enforced. 
6.4 Forum Selection Clauses and Public Policy 
Although nowadays the legitimacy of forum selection provisions is hardly a divisive issue, 
with courts in most of the world enforcing them as an essential part of international 
commerce, this has not always been the case.775 On the contrary, courts have historically 
taken the position that agreements removing a case from their jurisdiction was against 
public policy.776  
This historical rejection comes as a result of the very way in which forum selection clauses 
work. On the one hand, they work by consensually granting jurisdiction to a court that 
originally did not have it; on the other, they force the parties not to sue in any jurisdiction 
but the one they named, including courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction.777 This is 
a matter of prorogation and derogation of jurisdiction, two sides of the same coin.778 If 
                                                                  
775 RAPOPORT, J., 2012, supra note 751, p. 248 (“[c]ourts in virtually every country around the world recognize the 
validity of such clauses and the important role they play in modern commerce”). 
776 For the same reasons that “unconscionability” and “good faith” have been derided as useless for legal purposes, 
there are those who criticize the use of “public policy” as a legal argument. MCGEE, for example, argues that 
“The public policy/public interest argument is a weak one […]. There is no such thing as a ‘public’ interest 
because ‘public’ is just a collective term for a group of individuals, and individuals have different interests. 
If individual interests could be quantified and added together, we might be able to arrive at some 
approximation of what the majority wants in a particular case. But then we would be degenerating into a 
utilitarian approach, where individual rights fall by the wayside in the interests of majoritarianism.” 
MCGEE, R. W., 1993, supra note 722, p. 358.  
The problem with this line of thinking is that it seems to suggest that everything should be allowed, as long as 
nobody is financially or economically hurt in a direct and immediate fashion. Although it is true that certain 
terms are hard to properly define, such a position seems indefensible, as it suggests that society should have no 
guiding moral values influencing its institutions. 
777 RICHMAN, W. M., ‘Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum Selection Clauses in Adhesion Contracts’, 1992, 40 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 4- 
778 HARRIS, J., ‘Contractual Freedom in the Conflict of Laws’, 2000, 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, no. 2, 
p. 249. Although we will use them for the sake of simplicity, it should be noted that “prorogation” and “derogation” 
are terms most commonly associated with Civil Law systems, and not so much with those belonging to the 
Common Law tradition (on this issue, See MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, pp. 329–332 and GILBERT, J. T., 
1976, supra note 754, p. 5). 
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the parties agree to conduct proceedings in a court that otherwise does not have 
jurisdiction over the dispute, then there is a prorogation of jurisdiction, since the parties 
are the one conferring jurisdiction by consent to this court. On the flip side, the court that 
would have otherwise had jurisdiction to hear the case is thus deprived of it, by means of 
a derogation of jurisdiction by the consent of the parties.779  
The ability of private parties to confer jurisdiction by consent does not have a particularly 
troubled history. Both in Common as well as Civil Law systems it has been long accepted 
that the parties to a contract are indeed able to confer jurisdiction to courts that would 
have otherwise been unable to hear the conflict.780 Disputes have arisen, however, by the 
other side of this issue, the ability of the parties to “waive” the jurisdiction of a court by 
private agreement, i.e. their ability to derogate the jurisdiction of a court.781  
An interesting difference on the issue of derogation and prorogation emerges between 
systems of the Common Law and the Civil Law families, since they traditionally dealt with 
these agreements in completely different ways. As FARQUHARSON explained: 
“The civil law, constructed on the foundation of the Roman law of obligations, had 
developed [by the 19th century] a sophisticated commercial law based upon the 
concept of ‘party autonomy.’ The starting point of the civil law jurisdiction was the 
principle that the parties' choice of forum should, subject to a few exceptions, always 
be given effect. England, on the other hand, had retained almost feudal legal 
concepts until the Industrial Revolution made necessary a more flexible commercial 
law. The change greatly differed from the civil law. One factor attributed as an 
important reason for this difference is that in England the judiciary played (and 
continues to play) a more significant role in the formulation of law. Along with this 
larger role, there was the desire of the judiciary to guard its right to jurisdiction.”782 
Some commentators have argued that the term “derogation” is not entirely accurate, 
since it is not that the otherwise competent court loses its jurisdiction, but rather that, by 
enforcing the forum selection clause, chooses not to exercise it.783 This was, for example, 
                                                                  
779 REILLY, J. M., 1971, supra note 747, p. 324. See also GILBERT, J. T., 1976, supra note 754, p. 5. 
780 BECKER, J. D., 1989, supra note 747, p. 171. 
781 GILBERT, J. T., 1976, supra note 754, p. 6. 
782 FARQUHARSON, I. M., 1974, supra note 750, p. 88. 
783 See, for example, SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, p. 54  (“[t]he ‘ouster’ concept, for example, misconceives 
the real issue, which is whether a court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in a case in favor of a forum- selection 
clause”); DAVIES, M., ‘Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Cases’, 2002, 27 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, no. 2, 
p. 368 (“some views of the proper operation of forum selection clauses suggest (mistakenly, in the author's view) that 
they deprive the court of jurisdiction. If that is the right analysis of the operation of a forum selection clause, it follows 
that a moving party relying on such a clause truly challenges the court's jurisdiction, rather than merely asking the court 
not to exercise it. The better view is, however, that a moving party relying on a forum selection clause must acknowledge 
that the court has jurisdiction and must argue that the clause gives the court reason not to exercise that jurisdiction”); 
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the position put forward by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Muller v. Swedish American Line, where the Court, enforcing a forum selection clause, 
stated that: 
“[T]he parties by agreement cannot oust a court of jurisdiction […]; notwithstanding 
the agreement, the court has jurisdiction. But if in the proper exercise of its 
jurisdiction, by a preliminary ruling the court finds that the agreement is not 
unreasonable in the setting of the particular case, it may properly decline jurisdiction 
and relegate a litigant to the forum to which he assented.”784 
GILBERT has also argued that speaking of “conferring” jurisdiction, or “ousting” a court of 
jurisdiction, is incorrect. In his view, 
“[i]f the [forum selection] agreement is enforced, it cannot truly be said that 
jurisdiction has been conferred or ousted by the parties. Jurisdiction is exercised or 
withheld only by force of the law that gives effect to the parties' agreement. If this 
analysis is accepted, it is still permissible to speak of the ‘conferring’ or ‘ousting’ of 
jurisdiction by contract so long as we do not allow this terminology to mislead us into 
thinking that parties can undermine or augment the powers of states or courts when 
they bargain away merely their own legal privileges.”785 
While GILBERT’s position might seem reasonable at first, in reality it appears to be more of 
a case of cognitive dissonance and of Orwellian doublespeak. As MULLENIX argues: 
“[It] represents some fancy, linguistic mumbo-jumbo that does violence to a common 
understanding of the English language. In truth, when a court enforces a forum-
selection clause it is in derogation of its own jurisdiction and deprives that court of 
its ability to adjudicate the legal claims of the disputing parties. Since [nowadays] 
forum-selection clauses are prima facie valid unless proven otherwise, the original 
forum has, as a practical matter, no choice but to yield its jurisdiction to the selected 
forum. Surely, for those courts that view forum-selection clauses as jurisdictional 
with the concomitant remedy of dismissal, this effectively constitutes an ouster of 
jurisdiction.”786 
Certainly, there is a case to be made that the courts that are “ousted” are, actually, 
exercising their jurisdiction when they decline to exercise it. This is, as a matter of fact, 
the most common opinion. At the same time, however, it seems like a complicated and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
jurisdiction of the courts] is fallacious: forum-selection clauses cannot limit the subject matter jurisdiction of courts, 
since private parties have no power to abrogate statutorily conferred jurisdiction”). 
784 Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd. [1955], 224 F. 2d, 806–808, p. 808. See  also SCHREIBER, H. 
W., ‘Appelability of a District Court's Denial of a Forum-Selection Clause Dismissal Motion: An Argument against 
Cancelling out the Bremen’, 1988, 57 Fordham Law Review, p. 466 
785 GILBERT, J. T., 1976, supra note 754, p. 5 
786 MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 331 
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artificial solution to a fairly straightforward situation. Forum selection clauses, beyond 
any linguistic and philosophical debates that might be had about them, do indeed deprive 
the non-chosen courts of jurisdiction. If not in theory, definitely in practice. The issue 
then becomes whether it is reasonable and convenient to allow the parties to, by private 
agreement, have such a massive effect on what is actually an issue of public order.  
A balancing test between the benefits and the drawbacks of forum selection clauses 
clearly shows that their use is tremendously convenient. Indeed, even though valid 
criticisms exist, the benefits that they report to businesses, particularly in the 
international stage, are sufficient to justify allowing and even encouraging their use. At 
the same time, however, we should keep in mind that the judicial system is, at the end of 
the day, the only assistance that those victimized by others can resort to. Because of this, 
while forum selection clauses in contracts between parties of similar bargaining power 
should be readily accepted by the courts, they should be more skeptical about their use in 
imbalanced situations.  
If one of the parties is able to effectively leave the other without any real chance of 
obtaining relief, the damage caused by such a clause goes beyond any discussion about 
“derogation” and “prorogation.” It then becomes an issue dealing with the fundamental 
right of having access to an impartial system that can resolve our grievances. Whether it 
is being used against a consumer or a small or medium business, courts should tread 
carefully in any situation in which the will of the strong was imposed upon the weak.  
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“Equal justice under law is not merely a caption on the facade of the 
Supreme Court building. It is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our 
society .... It is fundamental that justice should be the same, in substance 
and availability, without regard to economic status.” 
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.787 
7.1 Development of Forum Selection in the United States788 
he idea that litigants can choose in advance the court that will hear their disputes, 
as well as the law that will govern it, enjoys “widespread approval” in federal 
courts.789 This was not always the case, however, since until the second half of the 
20th Century, American courts, both at a federal and at a state level, showed a 
“marked hostility towards choice of forum clauses.”790 They refused to dismiss cases that were 
brought in violation of these agreements, arguing that it was not permissible for someone 
to oust a court of jurisdiction.791792 Based on this understanding of forum selection, 
federal and state courts refused to enforce these clauses, considering them against public 
                                                                  
787 Cited in ZIETLOW, R. E., ‘Exploring a Substantive Approach to Equal Justice under Law’, 1998, 28 New Mexico 
Law Review, no. 3, p. 411. 
788 Due to our focus on international disputes, and although a review of both domestic and transnational cases 
will be made, special attention will be placed in transnational and interstate cases. Although many of the same 
principles apply, inherently domestic disputes, like those pertaining to labor and consumer law, might follow 
different rules. 
789 MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 293. 
790 DELAUME, G. R., ‘Choice of Forum Clauses and the American Forum Patriae; Something Happened on the Way 
to the Forum: Zapata and Silver’, 1972, 4 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 2, p. 295. See also SORENSEN, 
M. J., 2013, supra note 759, p. 2529 (“American courts, both state and federal, were nearly unanimous in their refusal 
to enforce forum-selection clauses”) and MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 294 (“the current doctrine of 
consensual adjudicatory procedure represents a wholesale abandonment of a 100-year taboo against party autonomy in 
procedural matters”). 
791 DELAUME, G. R., 1972, supra note 790, p. 296.  
792 DEMPSEY, J., 2011, supra note 748, p. 1199. 
Chapter 7 
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policy.793 As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled in the 1874 case of Insurance Co. v. 
Morse: 
"Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the 
protection which all the   laws or all those courts may afford him. A man may not 
barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights. In a criminal case, he 
cannot […] be tried in any other manner than by a jury of twelve men, although he 
consents in open court to be tried by a jury of eleven men. In a civil case he may 
submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or to the decision of a 
single judge. So he may omit to exercise his right to remove his suit to a Federal 
tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each recurring case. In these aspects any citizen 
may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, 
bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to 
forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be 
presented.”794 
The United States Court of Appeals of the 5th Circuit restated this approach in the 1958 
case of Carbon Black Export, Inc., v. The SS Monrosa, where the Court stressed that there 
was 
“[a] universally accepted rule that agreements in advance of controversy whose 
object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will 
not be enforced.”795 
This was the so-called “ouster doctrine,” and according to which “a court properly vested 
with jurisdiction could not be ousted by the acts of a private party.”796 This was truly a public 
law issue, as the courts clearly saw forum selection clauses as a tool through which the 
parties could go against the public policy, as manifested in the jurisdictional rules 
established in the law. Additionally, as the cited case of Insurance Co. v Morse shows, the 
view was that the right of a person “to resort to any forum which had jurisdiction,” could not 
be bartered away, nor could it be restricted by any special legislation.797  
Forum selection clauses were thus seen as against public policy because they could result 
in avoiding the application of the rules and norms that would have otherwise applied to 
the conflict.798 With this rationale in mind, courts where cases were brought in 
contravention of a forum selection clause, refused to surrender the action to the selected 
                                                                  
793 GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 702. 
794 Home Insurance Co. v. Morse [1874], 87 US, 445–459, p. 451. 
795 Carbon Black Export Inc. v. The SS Monrosa [1958], 254 F. 2d, 297, p. 300. 
796 SORENSEN, M. J., 2013, supra note 759, p. 2529. 
797 BERGMAN, G. M., ‘Contractual Restrictions on the Forum’, 1960, 48 California Law Review, no. 3, pp. 438–439. 
798 SCHREIBER, H. W., 1988, supra note 784, p. 465. 
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forum, reasoning that “a result which would be distasteful by their own judicial standards 
must be void as against the public policy of their own jurisdiction..”799 
Other reasons given by the courts in their refusals to enforce the choice of forum 
provisions seemed questionable, and were often hard to classify, merely referencing 
previous decisions but not explaining why it was appropriate to continue following 
them.800 This created a significant lack of consistency in the case law, with some decisions 
seeming to have been grounded on the disparity of the bargaining power of the parties, 
others on reasons of convenience of not relegating a local to a foreign forum, and some 
others in completely different reasons altogether.801 
By 1964 the situation in America had been marked by a majority of cases in which forum 
selection clauses had not been enforced by the courts, as well as some outliers also 
present in the case law where the clauses had been more or less enforced. This lead to one 
commentator noting that the one thing that could be said with certainty was that “[i]n the 
United States the effect of a choice of forum clause dealing with future controversies is 
uncertain.”802 It was a fairly chaotic situation where, in addition to the judicial hostility 
                                                                  
799 HIMEL, S., ‘Contracts - Jurisdiction - Absent a Strong Showing of Unreasonableness or Undue Influence, 
Parties' Contractual Selection of Forum in International Transactions Will Be Valid and Enforceable’, 1973, 3 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, no. 1, p. 202. 
800 REILLY, J. M., 1971, supra note 747, p. 327. 
801 GILBERT, J. T., 1976, supra note 754, p. 9. GILBERT also puts forward the idea that the courts’ historical disdain 
for these clauses might have been grounded not so much on legal reasoning, but rather on what were once 
practical factors. He argues that when the courts were paid based on the amount of cases they heard, enforcing 
these provisions would have represented a threat to their livelihood, and that this original rejection was inherited 
by their successors, even after this economic motivation was removed (See also JUENGER, F. K., 1972, supra note 
749, p. 51 and BRITTAIN JR., J. T., 2000, supra note 752, p. 309). On the issue of bargaining power, already in 
1856 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in what for a long time became the leading case on the topic, was 
clear on its rejection of forum selection clauses. Indeed, in the case of Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Insurance, the 
Court illustrated the fear that existed that these clauses could eventually become customary (in this case, in 
insurance contracts) and irreparably affect legal symmetry. As the Court stated: 
“The rules to determine in what courts and counties actions may be brought are fixed, upon considerations 
of general convenience and expediency, by general law; to allow them to be changed by the agreement of 
parties would disturb the symmetry of the law, and interfere with such convenience. Such contracts might 
be induced by considerations tending to bring the administration of justice into disrepute; such as the 
greater or less intelligence and impartiality of judges, the greater or less integrity and capacity of juries, 
the influence, more or less, arising from the personal, social or political standing of parties in one or 
another county. It might happen that a mutual insurance company, in which every holder of a policy is a 
member, and of course interested, would embrace so large a part of the men of property and business in 
the county, that it would be difficult to find an impartial and intelligent jury.” 
Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co. [1856], 72, 174–185, p. 184.  
For background information regarding the Nute case and its decision, See also REILLY, J. M., 1971, supra note 
747, pp. 325–326 and GILBERT, J. T., 1976, supra note 754, p. 12. 
802  REESE, W. L. M., ‘The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States’, 1964, 13 American Journal of 
Comparative Law, p. 187. 
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towards these clauses, there was also a lack of consistency among the different 
jurisdictions.803 
The outlier cases where the forum selection clauses had been enforced (in one way or 
another) contributed to the uncertainty. Indeed, some courts seemed to allow for the 
indirect enforcement of forum selection clauses, resorting to doctrines like that of forum 
non conveniens.804 This was the case in, for example, the 1955 case of Muller v. Swedish 
American Line.  
In Muller, the Muller Company, the cargo interest in a contract of carriage, commenced 
proceedings in New York against Swedish American Lines, the carriers of a cargo of cocoa 
beans between Sweden and Philadelphia. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit, 
pointing to a clause contained in the bill of lading that referred any dispute arising from 
the contract to Swedish courts, under Swedish law. The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York dismissed the suit, a decision that was later affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, based on the “reasonableness of the forum selection 
agreement.”805 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the selection of the Swedish forum did not 
violate the liability provisions of the US COGSA, as it did not involve a lessening of the 
liability of the carrier (the court argued that Swedish courts applied “the same measure of 
damages” as their American counterparts), the only criteria should then be the 
reasonableness of the forum selection. In this case, since the vessel was of Swedish 
ownership, had been built in Sweden and even had a Swedish crew, then it was perfectly 
reasonable to assume that proceedings would not be hindered if they were to be 
conducted in Sweden.806 What is more, the Court refused to entertain the action brought 
in contravention of the clause expressly mentioning that the added costs of litigating in 
Sweden were merely “incidental to the process of litigation,” and could not be understood as 
lessening the liability of the carrier.807 
While the Muller decision was later overruled by the 1967 case of Indussa Corporation v. 
S.S. Ranborg, this was not a ruling based on the reasonableness criteria established in 
Muller, but rather on the interpretation of the liability provision of the US COGSA.808 
Even though later cases, like Geiger v. Keilani, expressly mentioned that the Muller 
                                                                  
803 HIMEL, S., 1973, supra note 799, p. 201. 
804 DEMPSEY, J., 2011, supra note 748, p. 1200.  
805 REILLY, J. M., 1971, supra note 747, p. 327. The Court even dismissed (perhaps wrongly) the idea that there 
was an “absolute taboo” in American law against forum selection clauses, although it recognized that there was 
indeed a certain “general hostility” against them (Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd. [1955], p. 808). 
806 ibid., p. 808. 
807 ibid., p. 807.  
808 Indussa Corporation v. S.S. Ranborg [1967], 377 F. 2d, 200–205. See also REILLY, J. M., 1971, supra note 747, 
p. 328. On the Indussa case, See page 416 infra. 
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rationale should apply in cases that were not ruled by the US COGSA, the authority and 
strength of the Muller decision was severely damaged by Indussa.809  
7.2 The Bremen and the Acceptance of Forum Selection 
The ideological rejection of forum selection clauses in America started its true erosion in 
the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (even if, as we have seen, some decisions go back to the 
mid 50’s), when a minority of courts started to enforce forum selection clauses.810 In 
doing so, and following the ideas popularized by the Muller decision in 1955, these courts 
adopted a standard of reasonableness in order to determine whether a forum selection 
clause should be enforced, instead of simply assuming that it was prima facie 
unenforceable for reasons of public policy.811  
The reasons behind the ouster doctrine were also losing a large part of their justifications, 
particularly after the passing of express legislation allowing for arbitration agreements.812 
This created a truly bizarre situation, since parties that had agreed to submit their 
disputes to an arbitral tribunal would be able to enforce such a clause, while those who 
had agreed to submit their disputes to a court, would not be able to do so. And so, for 
example, courts would allow parties in Florida to “seek justice before the U.S.S.R. Chamber of 
Commerce Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in Moscow,” but not to do defer their 
affairs to a court in Washington.813 
The winds of change became even stronger with the 1971 American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which also favored enforcement.814 As it 
established in §80: 
                                                                  
809 ibid., p. 328. 
810 Some authors point at the opinion of Judge HAND in the 1949 case of Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. as giving 
momentum to rejection of the ouster doctrine (BRITTAIN JR., J. T., 2000, supra note 752, p. 310). As he stated in 
that case: 
“There is of course force in what my brother Swan says: that a man, who has a choice of where to sue upon 
an existing claim, ought to be allowed to make an irrevocable choice before he actually sues; but is there 
any greater reason why he should not be able to make the same choice before the claim has arisen? 
Whatever the grounds for denying him the privilege in the second case, seem to me to deny it in the first. 
In truth, I do not believe that, today at least, there is an absolute taboo against such contracts at all;  […] 
they are invalid only when unreasonable. […] What remains of the doctrine is apparently no more than a 
general hostility, which can be overcome, but which nevertheless does persist.” 
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co. [1949], 174 F. 2d, 556–562, pp. 560–561. 
811 SCHREIBER, H. W., 1988, supra note 784, p. 467. 
812 BRITTAIN JR., J. T., 2000, supra note 752, pp. 324–325. 
813 JUENGER, F. K., 1972, supra note 749, p. 53. 
814 COSTELLO, F. W., 1972, supra note 749, p. 452. See also SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, pp. 54–55 (“a 
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“The parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial 
jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or 
unreasonable.” 
In this section, the Restatement was paying special attention (albeit in different terms) to 
the original discomfort that existed regarding forum selection clauses, based on the 
understanding that they somehow deprived the not-selected courts of jurisdiction. As the 
Restatement noted in the comment to this section: 
“Private individuals have no power to alter the rules of judicial jurisdiction. They 
may not by their contract oust a state of any jurisdiction it would otherwise possess. 
This does not mean that no weight should be accorded a provision in a contract that 
any action thereon shall be brought only in a particular state. Such a provision 
represents an attempt by the parties to insure (sic) that the action will be brought in 
a forum that is convenient for them. A court will naturally be reluctant to entertain 
an action if it considers itself to be an inappropriate forum. And the fact that the 
action is brought in a state other than that designated in the contract affords ground 
for holding that the forum is an inappropriate one and that the court in its discretion 
should refuse to entertain this action. Such a provision, however, will be disregarded 
if it is the result of overreaching or of the unfair use of unequal bargaining power or 
if the forum chosen by the parties would be a seriously inconvenient one for the trial 
of the particular action. On the other hand, the provision will be given effect, and 
the action dismissed, if to do so would be fair and reasonable.”815 
It is important to note that at this time, despite the increasing number of courts that 
recognized the enforceability of forum selection clauses, the large majority of courts still 
followed the traditional view.816 Only once the Supreme Court established a clear rule on 
the matter did the situation finally change for good. Indeed, it was in the seminal case of 
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., that the tides finally turned in American law 
regarding enforcement of forum selection clauses.817 In a breakthrough, 8 to 1 decision, 
the Supreme Court established the notion that forum selection clauses are to be 
considered as prima facie enforceable, unless they are shown to be unfair or unreasonable. 
Although this did not represent a completely new creation (as we have seen, Muller had 
included such reasonableness test), and the Court was actually quite restrictive in the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the American Law Institute's revision of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws calling for choice-of-forum clauses to be 
enforced unless they were ‘unfair or unreasonable’”) GOLDMAN notes that even before this date there were already 
some signs pointing towards acceptance, even going all the way back to 1949. He concedes, however, that “the 
majority of jurisdictions adhered to the traditional view” (GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 702). 
815 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law Section 80.  
816 SCHREIBER, H. W., 1988, supra note 784, p. 467. 
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application that it sought to established for forum selection clauses (in light of the very 
unique facts of The Bremen), it served as the springboard for a whole new era in American 
contract law.  
The Bremen involved a contract between Unterweser Reederei, GmBH, a German 
corporation, and Zapata Off-Shore Company, an American corporation, to tow a drilling 
rig owned by Zapata from Louisiana to a point in the Adriatic Sea off the coast of Italy. 
The contract of towage, which was the result of a bidding process solicited by Zapata, 
included the following terms: 
"Any dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice.”818 
"[The vessel and its] masters and crews are not responsible for defaults and/or 
errors in the navigation of the tow." 
"Damages suffered by the towed object are in any case for account of its Owners."819 
After the rig was damaged during a storm in the Gulf of Mexico, Zapata commenced an 
admiralty suit in Florida against Unterweser. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing 
that the suit had been brought in contravention to the forum selection clause included in 
the contract. Both the Florida Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s 
argument, restating the dominant position at the time that "agreements in advance of 
controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy, and 
will not be enforced."820  
Reviewing the defendant’s appeal, the Supreme Court called the ouster doctrine (that a 
forum selection clause deprives the court of jurisdiction) a “vestigial legal fiction”, and held 
the clause to be fully enforceable. The Court based its decision, in among others, a full 
rejection of the predominant ouster doctrine, arguing that the traditional understanding 
of forum selection clauses 
“appears to rest at [its] core on historical judicial resistance to any attempt to reduce 
the power and business of a particular court, and has little place in an era when all 
courts are overloaded and when businesses, once essentially local, now operate in 
world markets. It reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of 
other tribunals.”821 
And so, with this rationale in mind, the Court vacated the lower Court’s decision, ruling 
that in order to comply with "the legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their 
freely negotiated agreement,” the forum selection had to be enforced, and the plaintiff’s suit 
                                                                  
818 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], 407 US, 1, p. 2. 
819 ibid., p. 24 See also GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 702. 
820 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 6. 
821 ibid., p. 12. 
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dismissed.822 Marking the beginning of a new era in American law, the Court considered 
that  
“[Forum-selection clauses are] prima facie valid and should be enforced unless 
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the 
circumstances […] A freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected 
by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power […] should be given full 
effect.”823 
Primarily, the Court supported its decision on its previous ruling on National Equipment 
Rental v. Szukhent, where the Court had ruled that “it is settled… that the parties to a 
contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to 
be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.”824 Also, the Court took 
into consideration the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and classic notions of 
freedom of contract.825 Finally, the Court even made a passing reference to comparative 
law, mentioning that enforcing forum selection clauses was the approach “followed in 
other common law countries, including England.”826 
Beyond the (sometimes questionable) legal and doctrinal arguments put forward by the 
Court in its decision to justify the massive change represented by The Bremen, it seems 
beyond any doubt that its true foundations laid elsewhere. Indeed, the Court 
demonstrated a (perhaps understandable) sensitivity to the changing face of commerce, 
                                                                  
822 The Court also ruled on the issue of an exculpatory clause present in the agreement, and which the plaintiffs 
argued would be illegal under American law, but enforceable in the chosen forum. The Court rejected this 
argument (SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, p. 56).  
823 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 10 
824 National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent [1964], 375 US, 311, pp. 315–316 In this case,  
“the question in issue was the effect of a clause in a sales contract, by which the defendants authorized an 
agent in the state of New York to receive service of process. The Court said that there was no reason to 
deny giving effect to this authorization, especially since the agent used reasonable diligence in informing 
the defendants of the pending suit.” 
FARQUHARSON, I. M., 1974, supra note 750, p. 97. 
825 GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 703 Placing the legal foundation of The Bremen in National Equipment 
Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent is rather curious (MULLENIX calls it downright “inappropriate”), since it did not involve a 
forum selection clause, but rather the designation of an agent for the service of process. Furthermore, 
considering that at the time of Szukhent the general view among US courts was still of rejecting forum selection 
clauses, the fact that “a conclusive rule of jurisdiction by contractual agreement should appear by fiat in Szukhent was 
surprising, indeed” (See MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, pp. 308–311). Furthermore, even though “the 
Supreme Court in [Szukhent] upheld the right of the parties to designate an agent, thereby accomplishing the same thing 
as a choice-of-forum clause, no court ever extended an interpretation so far [until the decision in The Bremen]” 
(FARQUHARSON, I. M., 1974, supra note 750, p. 97). 
826The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 11  On forum selection in England See Chapter VIII. 
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as well as the importance that international trade would have for America, basing a big 
part of its decision on policy considerations.827 For example, the Court noted that: 
“For at least two decades, we have witnessed an expansion of overseas commercial 
activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The barrier of distance 
that, once tended to confine a business concern to a modest territory no longer does 
so. Here we see an American company with special expertise contracting with a 
foreign company to tow a complex machine thousands of miles across seas and 
oceans. The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged 
if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all 
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. Absent a contract forum, 
the considerations relied on by the Court of Appeals would be persuasive reasons for 
holding an American forum convenient in the traditional sense, but in an era of 
expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute aspects of the doctrine of the 
Carbon Black case have little place, and would be a heavy hand indeed on the future 
development of international commercial dealings by Americans. We cannot have 
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our 
terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.”828 
The Supreme Court also noted that selecting a forum allows for the elimination of 
uncertainties for the parties to a contract. Because of this, the court stated that enforcing 
such a clause “is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce and contracting”.829 
To its credit, the Supreme Court went out of its way to highlight the unique and 
international elements of the contract at the center of The Bremen, as well as how it had 
been the object of careful negotiation by the parties:  
“In this case […] we are concerned with a far from routine transaction between 
companies of two different nations contemplating the tow of an extremely costly 
piece of equipment from Louisiana across the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, 
through the Mediterranean Sea to its final destination in the Adriatic Sea. In the 
course of its voyage, it was to traverse the waters of many jurisdictions. The 
Chaparral could have been damaged at any point along the route, and there were 
countless possible ports of refuge. That the accident occurred in the Gulf of Mexico 
                                                                  
827 MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 312 (“[t]he linchpin of The Bremen’s approval of forum-selection clauses, 
however, lay in policy considerations rather than doctrinal support”). See also SCHREIBER, H. W., 1988, supra note 
784, p. 468 (arguing that The Bremen rested substantially on “grounds of freedom of contract and commercial 
efficiency). DELAUME explains how, by refusing to enforce the forum selection clause, the Court of Appeals had 
“showed a total disregard for the necessities of international business relations and the principle of party autonomy.” 
Because of this alleged “backward step” taken by the Appellate Court, he praises the Supreme Court decision that 
overturned it based on these policy considerations (DELAUME, G. R., 1972, supra note 790, pp. 301–302). 
828 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], pp. 8–9. 
829 ibid., pp. 13–14. 
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and the barge was towed to Tampa in an emergency were mere fortuities. It cannot 
be doubted for a moment that the parties sought to provide for a neutral forum for 
the resolution of any disputes arising during the tow. […] There is strong evidence 
that the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic 
to think that the parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the 
monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in 
their calculations.”830 
 “The choice of that forum was made in an arm's length negotiation by experienced 
and sophisticated businessmen, and, absent some compelling and countervailing 
reason, it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts.”831 
These comments were not mere platitudes, as the Court was concerned with ensuring 
that a distinction would be made between, on the one hand, the type of agreement that 
existed in The Bremen and, on the other, the run-of-the-mill contracts (international or 
otherwise) that people might find themselves into. As a matter of fact, the Court drew a 
clear line between these “ordinary” contracts and the one that was the object of the case, 
noting that:  
“We are not here dealing with an agreement between two Americans to resolve their 
essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum. In such a case, the serious 
inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties might carry 
greater weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause. The 
remoteness of the forum might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one, or 
that the parties did not have the particular controversy in mind when they made 
their agreement; yet even there, the party claiming should bear a heavy burden of 
proof. Similarly, selection of a remote forum to apply differing foreign law to an 
essentially American controversy might contravene an important public policy of the 
forum.”832 
                                                                  
830 ibid., pp. 13–14. The last part of this paragraph has been interpreted by some as meaning that “forum clauses 
[are] of the very substance of contracts” (e.g. STARING, G. S., ‘Forgotten Equity: The Enforcement of Forum Clauses’, 
1999, 30 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 3, p. 408), as opposed to a procedural issue. This is a 
questionable reading (albeit not necessarily mistaken) as in this passage the Court does not seem to have been 
trying to make a declaration about all forum selection clauses, but rather to make it clear that in this particular 
contract, the forum selection clause had been an essential part of the negotiation. 
831 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 12. See also GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 703 
(“the Court, believing the parties conducted their negotiations with the consequences of the forum selection clause 
figuring prominently in their calculations, implied that nonenforcement of forum selection clauses would create a 
windfall to one party and unfairly penalize the other”). 
832 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 17 See also GEHRINGER, A., ‘After Carnival Cruise and 
Sky Reefer: An Analysis of Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime and Aviation Transactions’, 2000, 66 Journal of 
Air Law and Commerce, no. 2, p. 639 (“[t]he Court stressed […] that the choice of forum […]was made in an arm’s 
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By making forum selection clauses prima facie valid, unless they are proven to be 
unreasonable, the Court in The Bremen changed the face of American law. In order to 
prove this “unreasonable” character, the resisting party would have to demonstrate that 
the clause violated a strong public policy, or that its real effect was to deprive her of her 
day in court. As the Court stated: 
“[I]t should be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that 
trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he 
will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court. Absent that, there is no 
basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that 
party to his bargain.”833 
While this reversal of the burden of proof might seem unfair at first (and there are 
certainly those who consider this “prima facie” validity to be unjust) the truth is that it 
does make at least some sense. It would be unreasonable to expect the courts to approach 
contracts from a position in which their enforcement must be somehow justified by the 
parties. Except for the most blatant cases of illegality or violation of public policy 
(prostitution and murder-for-hire contracts come to mind) we cannot expect the courts to 
demand the interested parties to prove that the contract should be enforced. This was, 
however, precisely the situation that existed in the pre-Bremen era, where the burden was 
placed on the petitioners (those interested in enforcing the clause) to prove that the 
chosen forum was more convenient than the “default” forum.834 This situation shows 
that, in The Bremen, the Supreme Court was right, at least in principle, in stating that the 
terms of the agreement are to be considered as prima facie enforceable, even if they 
include a forum selection clause, unless the resisting party can prove that they are 
unreasonable.  
By reversing the burden of proof, the Court sought to prevent similarly-sized parties, in a 
contract that was freely bargained for, to try to escape their agreements for mere 
convenience. As LAGERMAN has noted, “in a freely negotiated international commercial 
contract the parties ought to be able to foresee the amount of inconvenience which will result 
from litigating in the chosen forum”.835 Because of this, it should indeed be the party that 
resists the application of the forum selection clause who should demonstrate that it 
would be unreasonable to hold her to her bargain. The reasonableness, therefore, must be 
presumed, since the parties to a freely bargained for contract had been in a position to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
New Look at Choice-of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine after Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute’, 1991, 53 University of Pittsburgh Law Review, no. 4, p. 1026 (“[t]he Bremen Court pointed out that the 
agreement at issue was not a form contract with boilerplate language”). 
833 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 18. 
834 HIMEL, S., 1973, supra note 799, p. 204. 
835 LAGERMAN, L. O., 1978, supra note 751, p. 782. 
  
238 
Forum Selection in the United States 
calculate their risks and costs in case of a dispute, and still chose to select a specific 
contractual forum. 
7.3 The Bremen’s “Reasonableness” Test 
As we have seen, the Court in The Bremen did not intend to create an absolute 
presumption of validity for forum selection clauses. Instead, the Court sought to 
condition the validity of these clauses to a reasonableness test. 
“Thus, forum selection clauses were invalid and unenforceable if a party could show 
that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable or unjust; if the clause was the 
result of fraud or overreaching; if enforcement would contravene a strong public 
policy of the state in which the suit was brought; or if the parties who sued would be 
deprived of their day in court because the forum selected in the contract would be 
extremely difficult and inconvenient.”836 
On the basis of this test, the burden of proof was now on the parties resisting the 
enforcement of the clause to prove that the clause itself was “unreasonable.” This is no 
easy feat, with the Court itself recognizing that the resisting party “carries a heavy burden 
of proof to overcome the strong presumption that the contractual choice is reasonable.”837 
Based on both The Bremen itself, as well as the cases that have followed it, it is possible to 
recognize some of the criteria that an America court should take into consideration when 
deciding whether to deny the enforcement of a forum selection clause. These are whether 
the clause causes substantial inconvenience for one of the parties; whether it deprives the 
party of an effective remedy; and, finally, whether it is the result of an unconscionable 
bargain. 
7.3.1 Substantial Inconvenience 
What the presumption of reasonableness means for the resisting party is that she will 
have upon her the burden of proving that the selected forum is substantially 
inconvenient. It will not be, therefore, the job of the court to weigh in the convenience or 
inconvenience of the contractual forum, as it will be the party seeking to prevent the 
enforcement of the clause the one that will have to demonstrate the inconvenience.838 
                                                                  
836 MULLENIX, L. S., ‘Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal 
Jurisdiction’, 1992, 27 Texas International Law Journal, no. 2, p. 338. 
837 LAGERMAN, L. O., 1978, supra note 751, p. 781. 
838 ibid., p. 782. 
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The party seeking to prove this substantial inconvenience faces an uphill battle, as the 
burden of proof established by The Bremen, as it has been interpreted by the courts, is 
quite high.839 The very facts of The Bremen show exactly how high this burden is, when we 
consider that, as Justice DOUGLAS noted in his dissent,  
“the casualty [motivating The Bremen] occurred close to the District Court, a 
number of potential witnesses, including respondent's crewmen, reside in that area, 
and the inspection and repair work were done there. The testimony of the tower's 
crewmen, residing in Germany, is already available by way of depositions taken in 
the proceedings.”840 
Clearly, these arguments failed to impress his colleagues on the bench; neither were they 
impressed by the fact that the District Court was not inconvenient to hear the case. What 
was required of the resisting party, therefore, was not only proving that this forum was 
convenient, but also that litigating in the contractual forum would have been greatly 
inconvenient. 
It is worth noting that despite how high this burden is, some courts have been 
sympathetic to situations in which the judicial proceedings themselves would be very 
difficult to conduct if the forum selection was enforced, even if only for geographical 
reasons. This was the case in in Copperweld Steel Company v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 
where a Pennsylvania District Court refused to enforce a forum selection clause included 
in a construction contract for a plant in Pennsylvania, and which granted exclusive 
jurisdiction to a German court. In its decision, the Court reasoned that enforcing this 
clause would jeopardize the proceedings: 
“The casting plant, the performance of which is in dispute, is located here. We 
foresee the necessity to examine the plant in detail. The plant was constructed by a 
Pennsylvania firm, all of whose employees are here. Did the defect occur in 
construction? All of the people who operated the plant are here. Did they operate it 
improperly? All of the plant's customers are here. If they refused the product, why 
did they do so? How can these people be made available in Germany? There is no 
process there to compel their attendance at trial even if they could be transported to 
Germany. What of the language difficulties? Of course, the German engineers will be 
                                                                  
839 In Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd, a California District Court enforced a German forum selection clause, even though the 
facts showed that there was some degree of inconvenience in conducting the proceedings in Germany. The Court 
noted that although it was true that, for example, the witnesses that would need to give their statements in the 
proceedings were located in America, this alone was not enough to meet the burden established by The Bremen of 
“clearly show[ing]” that the clause was unreasonable. The Court weighed the fact that the bill of lading in question 
was issued in Germany, and that the parties were themselves German, and determined that, although it was an 
“extremely close question,” the clause should be enforced (on this issue, See, generally, Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd [1973], 
358 F. Supp., 481 and LAGERMAN, L. O., 1978, supra note 751, pp. 783–784). 
840 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 23. 
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inconvenienced and they will have language difficulties we assume, but we think it 
will be of some advantage to them to have the contractor and the operating people 
available for obvious reasons. 
We remain convinced that in this particular case plaintiffs could not adequately try 
their case if forced to proceed in Germany and thus perhaps could not obtain a fair 
and complete hearing not because of any lack of sincerity or competence of the 
German Courts which we assume to be as fully adequate as our own, but because of 
the obvious impracticality of conducting the litigation in Germany.”841 
Courts will usually set a particularly high burden when it comes to commercial parties in 
international contracts, since such parties are expected to have foreseen any eventual 
inconvenience associated with the selected forum.842 Although this is reasonable when it 
comes to similarly-sized parties, it would certainly not be convenient to deny relief to a 
party simply because it is a commercial entity dealing internationally. The power 
differences among commercial parties are just as big as they can be in other contractual 
settings, and thus a small merchant might find itself litigating in a distant, completely 
inconvenient forum, simply because there was no opportunity to dicker over the terms of 
the agreement. Despite some calls for nuance, however, findings of substantial 
inconvenience remain rare, even outside of a commercial setting.843 
7.3.2 Denial of an Effective Remedy 
Within this criterion, a court might refuse to enforce the forum selection clause if “the 
chosen state has not empowered its courts to hear this type of actions or if the defendant is not 
subject to its service of process. Also, the particular chosen court may lack subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claim.”844 Other reasons might include uncertainty as to whether the 
defendant would appear in the chosen forum, the probability that the plaintiff would be 
denied a remedy, and the possibility that it would be impossible to enforce a judgment 
issued by the forum.845 
This criterion is based on an interpretation of the real meaning of the parties’ agreement. 
Evidently, the parties would not have intended to prevent disputes from being resolved, 
                                                                  
841 Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler [1972], 347 F. Supp., 53, pp. 54–55. The decision was later 
affirmed in Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler [May 25, 1978], 578 F. 2d, 953. See also GRUSON, 
M., ‘Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements’, 1982 University of Illinois 
Law Review, no. 1, p. 182. 
842 LAGERMAN, L. O., 1978, supra note 751, p. 782. 
843 BUXBAUM, H. L., ‘Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation: The Role of Judicial Discretion’, 2004, 
12 Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution, no. 2, p. 194. 
844 LAGERMAN, L. O., 1978, supra note 751, p. 783. 
845 COSTELLO, F. W., 1972, supra note 749, p. 454. 
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and so it would be unjust to enforce a clause that would bring that as a result. This 
sentiment was reflected in a comment in the Model Choice of Forum Act of 1968, and 
which stated that: 
“[This] limitation […] will almost surely be in accord with the intentions of the 
parties. They can hardly have intended to require the plaintiff to bring suit in a state 
where he could at no time have obtained effective relief.”846 
This issue was reviewed by the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in Calzavara 
v. Biehl & Co.847 In this case, the plaintiff, a US citizen brought a suit in the United States 
against the defendant, an American company, for the breach of contract resulting from 
the defendant not honoring his ticket to be a passenger aboard a vessel. The contract 
contained a clause that all disputes “shall be sustained in the Court of law of Venice.”848 
Ruling the clause unenforceable, the court noted that: 
“[The] plaintiff is a citizen of the United States residing in New Orleans and 
defendant is a Louisiana corporation domiciled in the Parish of Orleans. To hold that 
plaintiff can bring his action against the defendant only in Venice, Italy would be 
equivalent to holding that he cannot bring the action against the defendant 
anywhere. Obviously, the courts of Italy could not acquire effective jurisdiction over 
the defendant.”849  
7.3.3 Unconscionability 
In The Bremen, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the agreement between the 
parties had not been the result of an unconscionable bargain. It was, as the Court noted, 
“a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or 
overweening bargaining power.”850 The meaning of this passage is rather straightforward: If 
the clause had indeed been the product of an unconscionable bargain, then it would not 
have been considered valid.851 
                                                                  
846 REESE, W. L. M., ‘The Model Choice of Forum Act’, 1969, 17 The American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 2, 
p. 295. The importance of the Model Choice of Forum Act in The Bremen should not be overlooked, as it is part of 
the background that existed when the case was decided, and which also represented the winds of change in terms 
of enforcing forum selection clauses (See, generally, NADELMANN, K. H., ‘Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United 
States: The Road to Zapata’, 1973, 21 The American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 1). 
847 Calzavara v. Biehl & Company [1966], 181 So. 2d, 809–811. 
848 ibid., p. 810. 
849 ibid., pp. 810–811 See also Lejano v. K.S. Bandak [1997], 86 So. 2d, 158–172 (noting that the reasonableness of 
a forum selection clause is determined by the accessibility of the parties to the selected court). 
850 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 10. 
851 The Model Choice of Forum act reflected this sentiment in Section 3, number 4 and 5, stating that a forum 
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As we saw in previous sections, the motivation that rests behind the refusal to enforce 
unconscionable bargains is that “in situations of unequal bargaining power, there is no real 
agreement between the parties. The weaker party is forced to take the unfavorable clause with 
his bargain or there would be no contract at all.”852 
In Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., a decision predating The Bremen, a 
Minnesota District Court analyzed the issue of fairness and reasonableness of forum 
selection clauses. In its decision, the Court reason that if the provision was not “equally 
bargained for,” then it can “be characterized as unreasonable.”853 It was following that logical 
that in 1985 the Supreme Court, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, stated that  
“[w]here […] forum-selection provisions have been obtained through ‘freely 
negotiated’ agreements and are not ‘unreasonable and unjust,’ […] their 
enforcement does not offend due process.”854 
If, therefore, the clause is contained in a contract that was not “freely negotiated,” or the 
clause itself was not the product of a free bargain, then there is an offense to due process. 
The clause should not be enforced.  
In a fairly recent case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals also expressed this sentiment 
regarding free bargaining. The Court reasoned that forum selection clauses in contracts of 
adhesion, or which were the result of, inter alia, bargaining power disparities, should not 
be enforced, stating that: 
“[A] factor that would cause a forum-selection clause to be unenforceable is its 
inclusion in an adhesion contract. […] An adhesion contract is a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
contract that is the product of the parties' unequal bargaining power. […] Other 
factors to consider include the parties' sophistication, bargaining power disparity, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
“(4) the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of 
economic power, or other unconscionable means; o r 
(5) it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to enforce the agreement.” 
REESE, W. L. M., 1969, supra note 846, p. 295. 
852 LAGERMAN, L. O., 1978, supra note 751, p. 785 See also GILBERT, J. T., 1976, supra note 754, p. 36 (“[t]he fear 
of the courts […] is that the absence of equal bargaining power might indicate that the weaker party did not freely 
consent to the choice of forum clause. If he wanted the goods or services, or whatever the economically superior party 
offered, he was compelled to accept the terms dictated by the other party. Consequently, there was no real agreement and 
the presumption of due consideration is shaken”). 
853 Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc. [1968], 294 F. Supp., 1132, p. 1135. 
854 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz [1985], 471 US, 462, p. 472 See also St George Investments LLC v. QuamTel, Inc. 
[March 3, 2014] Westlaw, Unreported. 
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opportunity for negotiation, opportunity to readily obtain the product elsewhere, 
and the product's status as a public necessity.”855 
7.4 Carnival Cruise and the Expansion of The Bremen 
The text of the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen makes it clear that the rule 
established therein was not intended to be absolute nor should it receive widespread 
application. Instead, this rule required a great deal of nuance from the courts, as it 
recognized that not all contracts are the same.856 As we saw before, the Supreme Court 
made sure to highlight the relative uniqueness of the contract in The Bremen, 
demonstrating a reluctance to simply create a one-size-fits-all rule, expecting courts to 
pay attention to the type of contract at hand in any given case.857 As we will see, however, 
a nuanced application is precisely what did not happen.858 
When The Bremen was decided, and in light of its very peculiar facts, there was very little 
clarity among commentators as to whether it “was announcing a federal common law rule 
                                                                  
855 Lyon Fin. Ser., Inc. v. Film Funding, Inc. [May 15, 2001] Westlaw, Unreported, p. 3. In rejecting the resisting 
party’s defense, the Court stated that their failure to present “any evidence of unequal bargaining power” or of a “ 
lack of opportunity for negotiation” meant the clause should be enforced. 
856 Even favourable commentators at the time, while celebrating the decision, acknowledged its limited scope in 
regards to the facts of the case. See , for example, FARQUHARSON, I. M., 1974, supra note 750, p. 98 (“[t]he 
Supreme Court conditioned this acceptance upon arm's length negotiation in a commercial setting”) and HIMEL, S., 
1973, supra note 799, p. 206 (“[i]t must be assumed that parties to an arms-length transaction are capable of 
considering all aspects of a proposed trial forum and of negotiating an agreement which will be satisfactory to all parties 
concerned”). Commenting on the case several years later, SOLIMINE also conceded this point, stating that “given the 
importance in The Bremen of facilitating international trade […] one might argue that The Bremen does not establish an 
across-the-board federal common law rule. Rather, it can be viewed as restricted to cases in the international context”  
(SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, p. 57). 
857 MULLENIX noted how “[t]he fact that The Bremen involved an international towage contract was crucial to the 
Court's adoption of consensual jurisdiction, because this approach ‘reflect[ed] an appreciation of the expanding horizons 
of American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world’” (MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 312). 
This, however, did not stop its ruling from expanding, even though its very supporters had seen such expansion 
as negative. For example, while celebrating the decision reached by the Court, a commentator at the time noted 
the possible risks that could come as a result of a wide application of The Bremen rule, stating that: 
“Even outside the contract of adhesion field, abuse of such clauses is widespread. In today's economy, equal 
bargaining power cannot be ‘presumed’. Zapata will render a disservice to sound development of the law if 
it leads to a choice-of-court-clauses epidemic.” 
NADELMANN, K. H., 1973, supra note 846, p. 134.  
858 BRITTAIN JR., J. T., 2000, supra note 752, p. 320 (“[t]he facts of the case appeared to limit the scope of The Bremen 
to admiralty cases. However, the courts generally agreed that its principles were to be applied to all cases involving forum 
selection clauses. After The Bremen, the lower courts quickly adopted the reasonableness test to determine the validity of 
forum selection clauses”). See also GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, pp. 704–705 (“[a]lthough Bremen arose in 
admiralty, lower courts universally applied its teachings in diversity and federal question cases. Many state courts also 
followed the Bremen prima facie validity rule”). 
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binding on all courts in all cases, or one with merely persuasive force outside the admiralty 
context.”859 After all, since it was a decision that arose “under the federal courts’ admiralty 
jurisdiction in the context of international commercial contracts,” it had no real “binding effect 
on state courts.”860 Furthermore, and as we have seen, the Court had not intended to create 
a “blanket approval to all forum selection clauses,” having limited this acceptance to those 
that were just and reasonable.861 As BECKER explained in 1989: 
“Although the decision in Bremen was a declaration of federal maritime law, the case 
has had very far-reaching effects for the validation generally of exclusive choice-of-
forum clauses in international contracts. The conditions of Bremen have not been 
forgotten, however. A clause presented to an excluded forum that is the result of a 
bargain struck unfairly or fraudulently, or that offends a strong public policy or 
statute of the forum, or that chooses a seriously inconvenient forum for the 
controversy, or is otherwise unreasonable, remains open to attack. Hence, 
notwithstanding Bremen, a federal district court may use its statutory powers to 
carry on with a case brought in violation of a forum-selection clause when the foreign 
forum is deemed unreasonable”862 
Notwithstanding these reservations, however, the new doctrine quickly expanded beyond 
its original constraints.863 As MULLENIX noted, “federal courts routinely and uncritically 
import The Bremen’s rule on forum-selection clauses into the full range of domestic cases. It is 
rare that a federal court even questions The Bremen’s applicability to domestic cases based in 
                                                                  
859 SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, p. 56. 
860 GOULD, M., ‘The Conflict Between Forum-Selection Clauses and State Consumer Protection Laws: Why Illinois 
Got It Right in Jane Doe v. Match.com’, 2015, 90 Chicago-Kent Law Review, no. 2, p. 684. See also LEDERMAN, L., 
1991, supra note 745, pp. 430–431 (“[t]he Bremen was decided in admiralty jurisdiction and thus is not binding in 
other areas of federal common law. It also is possible to read the decision as limited to cases involving international 
agreements”). On the other side of the argument, while recognizing that The Bremen had a limited scope of 
application, COSTELLO hoped that the case would actually have a more expansive application, arguing that: 
“While strictly applying only to federal courts sitting in admiralty, the Supreme Court's adoption of the 
modem approach in [The Bremen] should nevertheless serve as the necessary imprimatur for a more 
universal application of principles behind the modern approach to international forum selection in 
American courts.” 
COSTELLO, F. W., 1972, supra note 749, p. 453. 
861 LAGERMAN, L. O., 1978, supra note 751, p. 779. 
862 BECKER, J. D., 1989, supra note 747, p. 173. 
863 Already in 1977 ZAPHIRIOU noted how even though “the Bremen decision applies to federal courts sitting in 
admiralty, it has been generally hailed as laying down the proposition that there is a strong presumption in favor of a 
choice of forum with regard to all commercial contracts and that the heavy burden is on the defendant to show that the 
clause is unreasonable” (ZAPHIRIOU, G. A., 1977, supra note 747, p. 321). 
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federal question or diversity jurisdiction.”864 The same happened in state courts, where “The 
Bremen had a pervasive precedential effect.”865 
The Bremen established a very strong presumption in favor of the enforceability of forum 
selection clauses, and which only became stronger as time passed. The question for many 
decisions that followed The Bremen was not whether the case was applicable, which was 
taken as a given, but rather “on whether a party could establish an exception to the prima facie 
validity rule” that the Supreme Court had created.866 As a consequence of this case:  
 “A strong public policy, not just any public policy, is needed to justify overcoming the 
presumption in favor of such clauses. […]  Even when the state supports a public 
policy that undermines forum clauses, courts have upheld forum selection clauses 
despite the underlying federal or state policies that may be threatened. Courts have 
even found that upholding the forum selection clause may be a greater interest than 
the interest that the state has in supporting that particular policy.”867  
The Bremen thus marked a new era for the Supreme Court and, by extension, American 
law. Succeeding cases, “supported party autonomy by enforcing arbitration clauses and 
settlements and, in dicta, continued to speak favorably of forum-selection clauses.”868 Party 
autonomy became one of the most fundamental values to be protected by the courts, even 
at the expense of the weaker parties. As MULLENIX noted: 
“The Bremen and its progeny effectively supersede conventional standards for 
jurisdiction, venue, transfer and forum non conveniens, imposing variegated 
standards for forum selection not contemplated by those rules or doctrines. Indeed, 
the imposition of contract principles on forum selection rules has, in many instances, 
stood jurisdictional principles on their head: traditional deference to the plaintiff's 
choice of forum must yield to the defendant's invocation of contract law, while 
conversely a defendant must yield due process protections when the plaintiff seeks 
enforcement of a forum-selection provision.”869 
                                                                  
864 MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 313. See also SCHREIBER, H. W., 1988, supra note 784, p. 468 (“federal 
courts have read the decision [in The Bremen] as broad support for upholding forum-selection clauses generally”). 
865 SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, p. 56. SOLIMINE notes this expansive effect of The Bremen even though 
“the case is restricted to admiralty with international overtones.” See also COVEY, A. E. & MORRIS, M. S., ‘The 
Enforceability of Agreements Providing for Forum and Choice of Law Selection’, 1983, 61 Denver Law Journal, 
no. 4, p. 839 (“[a]lthough the Bremen Court specifically limited its holding to federal district courts sitting in admiralty, 
the ruling and rationale of the Bremen decision has been applied by the courts to forum selection clauses generally”). 
866 GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 705. 
867 JACKSON, E., ‘Civil Procedure - The Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses under M/S Bremen v. Zapata off-
Shore Co.’, 2001, 25 American Journal of Trial Advocacy, no. 2, p. 379. 
868 SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, p. 57. 
869 MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, pp. 302–303. 
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The precedential value of The Bremen was originally restricted to commercial contracts. 
This is the only logical way in which the case could be interpreted, as the very facts of the 
case separated it from those dealing with other types of agreements. In its decision, the 
Supreme Court itself had noted the unique characteristics of the parties in The Bremen, 
including their relatively equal bargaining power, and so it seemed logical to restrict its 
application only to similar transactions. Indeed, the references that the Supreme Court 
did in The Bremen to the arm’s length dealing that had taken place, show that the Court 
“did not envision a disparity in bargaining power” that would result in “depriving a citizen of 
her jurisdictional rights.”870 The Court had reviewed a case involving two similarly-sized, 
sophisticated parties, and interpreted their contract accordingly. Such a differential 
treatment of this type of contracts vis à vis those in which the power dynamics were more 
asymmetric were needed “to ensure that the power and freedom to contract remain[ed] a 
viable and legally enforceable mechanism for allocating risks in commercial transactions.”871 
In the immediate aftermath of The Bremen, the courts recognized the importance of this 
differential treatment, and handled the precedential value of the case accordingly. Indeed, 
even after The Bremen was decided, consumer contracts were subjected to a different 
standard altogether. As courts continued to emphasize the fact that forum selection 
clauses were enforceable because commercial parties were not unsophisticated consumers, 
they implicitly recognized that The Bremen could not be applied in a consumer setting.872 
In fact, several cases explicitly addressed this issue, stating that  
“individual clauses in such contracts [were] unfair, and therefore unenforceable, 
because the contract chose a forum far from the plaintiff, violated some public policy, 
or failed to give conspicuous notice of the forum clause. In short, even after Bremen, 
there was every reason to believe, and commentators uniformly assumed, that forum 
clauses in consumer adhesion contracts were invalid.”873  
7.4.1 The Carnival Cruise Decision 
The shift in American law came in 1991 as a result of the famous (and often infamous) 
case of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.874 Here the facts “rather squarely and starkly asked 
                                                                  
870 KIRBY, J. M., ‘Consumer's Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized through Forum Selection Clause in Carnival 
Cruise Lines v. Shute’, 1991, 70 North Carolina Law Review, no. 3, p. 904. 
871 GREEN, M. Z., ‘Preempting Justice through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts 
or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer’, 1992, 5 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter, no. 4, p. 112. 
872 GEHRINGER, A., 2000, supra note 832, p. 646 (noting that before Carnival Cruise the courts tended to invalidate 
forum selection clauses in consumer contracts). 
873 GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, pp. 706–707. 
874 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], 499 Supreme Court Reporter, 585–605 The facts of the case, See 
MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 338. 
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the Court to determine whether such [forum selection] clauses are enforceable when used in 
domestic commercial-consumer contracts, that is, whether The Bremen principles applied to 
consumer contracts.”875 Despite the fact that The Bremen seemed to be fairly clear on this 
matter, the Court managed to fumble that task, and answer in the affirmative. Indeed, as 
Borchers notes: 
“[In The Bremen] The Court […] recognized […] that not all forum selection 
agreements are worthy of enforcement. The Bremen rule took into account that in 
some cases inequality of bargaining power can make enforcement unjust. In [… 
Carnival Cruise] however, the Supreme Court disregarded these limitations.”876 
While Carnival Cruise is far from being the worst decision by the United States Supreme 
Court (Dennis v. United States, Korematsu v. United States, Hammer v. Dagenhart, Dred Scott 
v. Sandford and Bowers v. Hardwick will forever hold that “honor”) it is undoubtedly one of 
the least illuminated moments of this distinguished forum.877 As an author has rightly 
pointed out, “[i]f there was ever a case demonstrating that the law is an ass, surely this must be 
it.”878 
The facts of the case were fairly simple: 
“Like millions of Americans every year, Eulala Shute took an excursion on a cruise 
ship. The Tropicale, operated by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. […]  took Mrs. Shute and 
her husband from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to Los Angeles. While off Mexico, she was 
injured during a tour of the galley. Eventually she [and her husband] brought suit 
against Carnival in federal court in the state of Washington, her place of residence, 
to recover damages for personal injuries. The ticket provided by Carnival, however, 
had a forum-selection clause directing that all litigation must be pursued in a court 
in the state of Florida, Carnival's principal place of business.”879 
Since the Shutes received the terms of the contract (including the forum selection 
clause) after they had paid the full price, as pre-printed terms on their tickets, they 
argued that the forum selection had not been “freely bargained for”, and therefore 
could not be enforced. Furthermore, they argued that since they were both physically 
                                                                  
875 ibid., p. 338. 
876 BORCHERS, P. J., ‘Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons 
for American Reform’, 1992, 40 American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 1, p. 149 
877 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, pp. 325–326. See also, generally, MULLENIX, L. S., ‘Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute: The Titanic of Worst Decisions’, 2011, 12 Nevada Law Journal, no. 3. KNAPP took a more 
moderate view, saying that while it is clearly not the worst decision, it was indeed “a bad decision for the parties, for 
the court, and for the future of contract law” (KNAPP, C. L., ‘Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc. v. Shute’, 2011, 12 Nevada Law Journal, no. 3, p. 553). 
878 MULLENIX, L. S., 2011, supra note 877, p. 552. 
879 SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, p. 51. For some more background information about the Shute family, 
See also LIESEMER, J. A., 1991, supra note 832, p. 1025. 
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and financially incapable of litigating their case in Florida, enforcing the clause 
would effectively deprive them of their “day in court.”880 
Each ticket, “an accordion-folding affair consisting of a cover page and three 
additional ‘pages’ on the reverse side”, included in a minuscule type the terms of their 
“agreement”.881 The face of each ticket, on its left-hand lower corner, contained the 
following admonition: 
“SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON LAST PAGES IMPORTANT! 
PLEASE READ CONTRACT-ON LAST PAGES 1, 2, 3”  
The terms provided, in the relevant parts: 
“3. (a) The acceptance of this ticket by the person or persons named hereon as 
passengers shall be deemed to be an acceptance and agreement by each of them of all 
of the terms and conditions of this Passage Contract Ticket. 
8. It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and 
matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract 
shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, 
U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.  
16. The Carrier shall not be liable to make any refund to passengers in respect of [...] 
tickets wholly or partly not used by a passenger.”882 
By the time the plaintiffs received the tickets, and this was not contested, the Shutes were 
in no position to negotiate or bargain over the terms; what is more, they “had been 
unaware of this [forum selection] clause when they reserved the trip and paid their money.”883 
They had already paid the fare in full and, in accordance with clause 16 above, if they 
decided not to accept these terms and reject the tickets, they would not be entitled to a 
refund.884 They had been, to put it simply, trapped into a contract they had no real 
opportunity to agree to. 
                                                                  
880 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 585. 
881 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 331. 
882 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 1524 See also GEHRINGER, A., 2000, supra note 832, p. 641. 
883 STURLEY, M. F., ‘Strengthening the Presumption of Validity for Choice of Forum Clauses’, 1992, 23 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce, p. 132. 
884 In their Reply Brief for the Petitioner, at 9 nº 6, Carnival Cruise contested this, arguing that the Shutes would 
have been able to cancel their contract. According to their brief: 
“Respondents erroneously state, in this regard, that the ticket contract prevents refunds in the event a 
passenger objects to the forum selection clause. […] Paragraph 16(a) of the ticket contract forbids refunds 
for unused tickets after a cruise, but the brochure provided to prospective passengers makes clear that 
refunds are available to passengers who cancel a reasonable period before the cruise. […] The Shutes 
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The plaintiffs argued that Carnival Cruise had availed themselves to the laws of 
Washington by, for example, advertising their products there and working with travel 
agents in the region. As a result, they argued, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the 
plaintiff was not unreasonable and, therefore, the forum selection clause could not be 
enforced. It was a constitutional issue, dealing with whether the contacts that Carnival 
Cruise had with the state of Washington were sufficient to require them to defend their 
case there, or whether the forum selection clause had to be enforced. 
At first, the plaintiffs were not successful, as the court for the Western District of 
Washington granted Carnival Cruise’s motion to dismiss. The Court ruled that it lacked 
personal jurisdiction based on the fact that, in their view, the defendants did not meet the 
“minimum contacts” requirement to be subjected to its jurisdiction. Dismissing the case 
on the lack of personal jurisdiction alone, the Court did not rule on whether the forum 
selection clause was valid.   
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reverted the ruling of the District Court, 
concluding that Carnival Cruise had, indeed, “purposely availed” themselves to “the benefits 
and protections of Washington law by soliciting business there and [that] the Shutes’ claims 
‘arose out of’ its activity in the state.”885 Furthermore, and even though the District Court 
had not ruled on the matter of the validity of the forum selection clause, the Court of 
Appeals decided on the issue, distinguishing the case from The Bremen. The Court 
reasoned that the latter case “involved a large, complex commercial contract between two 
sophisticated parties,” where “[t]here was no evidence […] that the parties were in an unequal 
bargaining position,” a situation that clearly did not arose in Carnival Cruise.886 On the 
contrary, this was a case between an experienced commercial party and a consumer, with 
                                                                                                                                                                       
The final page of the brochure, captioned ‘General Information,’ states that a seven-day cruise (such as the 
one taken by Respondents) can be cancelled between 16 and 45 days before sailing with a $100 penalty, 
and between 3 and 15 days before sailing with a $200 penalty. The brochure advises ‘the purchase of trip 
cancellation insurance from your travel agent.’” 
Carnival Cruise’s defense seems flimsy at best. Even if we were to concede that Carnival Cruise would honor this 
cancellation mentioned outside of the contract (we can certainly picture them alleging privity of contract), it is 
hard to understand why the parties would have to be subjected to a penalty, or to pay for an insurance, in case 
they disagreed with the terms that were provided to them after they acquired the tickets. What Carnival Cruise 
did is to say that not only did the Shutes have absolutely no say in the terms of their agreement, but that they 
would actually be punished if they did not agree to them. The Shutes, in other words, could only lose, regardless 
of what they decided. How the Supreme Court managed to overlook this is, truly, beyond comprehension. See 
also ibid., p. 132 (“Carnival claimed that the Shutes would have received a ticket partial refund if they had canceled the 
cruise with at least three days notice”) and GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 748, p. 612 (“the clause making the ticket 
non-refundable places the average passenger in a no-win situation. […] passengers must either risk having to file suit in 
Florida or forfeit their money”). 
885 STURLEY, M. F., 1992, supra note 883, p. 133 
886 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines [1990], 897 F. 2d, 377, p. 388 See also GEHRINGER, A., 2000, supra note 832, 
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plenty of evidence of “the sort of disparity in bargaining power that justifies setting aside the 
forum selection provision.”887 As the Court of Appeals stated: 
“First, there is no evidence that the provision was freely bargained for. To the 
contrary, the provision is printed on the ticket, and presented to the purchaser on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. […] Even if we assume that the Shutes had notice of [the] 
provision, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Shutes could have 
bargained over this language. Because this provision was not freely bargained for, we 
hold that it does not represent the expressed intent of the parties, and should not 
receive the deference generally accorded to such provisions.”888 
Following the test established in The Bremen, the Court of Appeals determined that the 
forum selection clause was indeed "so gravely difficult and inconvenient" that its 
enforcement would mean that the plaintiffs would "for all practical purposes be deprived of 
[their] day in court."889 On the basis of this, the Court added that, 
“enforcement of the forum selection clause would be greatly inconvenient to the 
plaintiffs and witnesses. There is evidence in the record to indicate that the Shutes 
are physically and financially incapable of pursuing this litigation in Florida. We 
therefore decline to enforce the forum selection provision in this case.”890 
By the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the general consensus was 
that the Court would review the issue of personal jurisdiction, which had been the core of 
the decisions of the lower courts. Surprising everyone, however, the Supreme Court did 
something completely different.891 Invoking the Ashwander rule, which states that “the 
Court will avoid deciding constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary and will not rule 
on constitutional grounds if narrower grounds for a decision exist,” the Justices did not rule on 
the constitutional matter of personal jurisdiction, opting instead to dwell on the issue of 
the validity of the forum selection provision.892 
Although, just as the Court of Appeals had done before, the Supreme Court referenced 
The Bremen in its assessment of the forum selection clause, it actually reached the exact 
opposite result. While it appeared to acknowledge the important differences between the 
facts of The Bremen and those of Carnival Cruise, the Supreme Court actually ignored these 
differences, despite supposedly taking them into consideration to make a refined 
application of the rules of The Bremen. For example, the Court admitted that, unlike the 
                                                                  
887 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines [1990], p. 388. 
888 ibid., pp. 388–389. 
889 ibid., p. 389. 
890 ibid., p. 389. 
891 STURLEY, M. F., 1992, supra note 883, p. 134. 
892 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 339 For the Ashwander rule, See, generally, SCHAUER, F., ‘Ashwander 
Revisited’, 1995, 1995 The Supreme Court Review. 
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contract at stake in The Bremen, which had been thoroughly negotiated by parties of 
similar power, 
“[the Shute’s] passage contract was purely routine and doubtless nearly identical to 
every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and most other cruise lines. 
[…] In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable for us to assume that 
respondents—or any other cruise passenger—would negotiate with petitioner the 
terms of a forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise ticket. Common 
sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are 
not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have 
bargaining parity with the cruise line.”893 
Despite this admission, and even though it recognized that The Bremen had to be “refined” 
in order to be applicable to a contract such as this, in reality the Supreme Court simply 
shoehorned the facts of Carnival Cruise into The Bremen rule, and declared the forum 
selection clause to be fully enforceable.894  
What the Court did in its analysis was, to put it simply, admit that it is well known that 
consumers like the Shutes cannot modify their contracts, that they have no real equality 
in regards to the bargaining power and, therefore, “tough luck.”895 To make matters worse, 
despite speaking about “refining” the doctrine to apply it to this type of (consumer) 
contracts, the Court missed the opportunity to evaluate the many criteria that had been 
developed by lower courts to assess the reasonableness of a forum selection clause, and 
actually added more factors that need to be analyzed when a court is confronted with this 
type of clauses.896 In reality, the Court only paid lip service to the idea of refining The 
Bremen, and just applied it whole cloth.  
                                                                  
893 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 593. 
894 ibid., p. 593 (“In evaluating the reasonableness of the forum clause at issue in this case, we must refine the analysis 
of The Bremen to account for the realities of form passage contracts”). 
895 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 345 See also LIESEMER, J. A., 1991, supra note 832, p. 1026 (“[t]he 
Shute Court obliterated this distinction [between negotiated agreements and form contracts] when it enforced a 
boilerplate forum clause that was included on a standard form cruise ticket”). See also GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 
748, p. 598 (“[t]he Court's almost reflexive enforcement of the cruise ticket forum clause contravenes public policy by 
grouping domestic commercial consumer contracts with international commercial contracts between sophisticated 
business entities”). 
896 Among the many factors that, at the time Carnival Cruise was decided, lower courts had taken into 
consideration to assess the reasonableness of a forum selection clause, are:  
“(1) inconvenience to the parties, (2) fraud, (3) undue influence, (4) overweening bargaining power, (5) 
mistake, (6) coercion, (7) lack of consideration, (8) unconscionability, (9) adhesion, (10) inequality of 
bargaining power, (11) public policy, (12) injustice, (13) availability of remedies in the chosen forum, (14) 
governing law, (15) conduct of the parties, (16) identity of the law governing construction of the contract, 
(17) place of execution of the contract, (18) place where the transactions have been or are about to be 
performed, (19) location of the parties, (20) convenience of the prospective witnesses, and (21) 
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In regards to the plaintiffs’ argument that the forum selection clause represented a 
substantial inconvenience for them, since they would be unable to pursue litigation in the 
selected Florida forum, the Court was less than sympathetic. The majority opinion argued 
that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the “heavy burden of proof […] required to set aside 
the clause on grounds of inconvenience,” and that therefore they could not resist the 
enforcement on those grounds.897 For both procedural and substantive reasons, the Court 
was completely wrong on this. 
7.4.2 The Procedural Flaws of Carnival Cruise 
From a procedural point of view, the Court imposed on the plaintiffs a burden that, up to 
that point, they had not been required to carry. It is important to remember that the 
District Court that had originally dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim had done so based on the 
fact that “Carnival Cruise Lines’ contacts with Washington state were insufficient to support an 
assertion of personal jurisdiction.”898 This dismissal, based on constitutional, not 
contractual, grounds, meant that the issue of the substantive inconvenience caused by the 
clause was not dispositive at the trial level, meaning that the plaintiffs had never found 
themselves in need to improve the factual record on that regard.  
By demanding more evidence of their inconvenience, the Supreme Court penalized the 
Shutes for not doing something they had simply not been required to do before. 
Furthermore, “the Shutes had no reason to believe their factual record was inadequate, 
especially since the district court never considered the forum-selection clause issue in rendering 
its decision to dismiss the case on Carnival's summary judgment motion.”899 Because of these 
procedural reasons, it was not a surprise that there was not a better record of the 
circumstances surrounding the forum selection clause and the inconveniences that its 
enforcement would cause.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
Instead of clarifying the situation, the Court just “muffled the analysis further” (MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 
836, p. 347).  
897 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 595. 
898 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 333 See also STURLEY, M. F., 1992, supra note 883, p. 138 (“[T]he 
Shutes were given no opportunity to prove their inability to proceed in Florida”) . 
899 SOLIMINE does not acknowledge this procedural problem at all, and considers the Court’s findings altogether 
appropriate since, in his view, there was “no evidence in the record [demonstrating] that the plaintiffs or their 
potential witnesses would be inconvenienced, or that Florida courts would be a hostile forum” (SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, 
supra note 743, p. 84). 
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7.4.3 The Substantive Flaws of Carnival Cruise 
From a substantial point of view, the Court was wrong, or at least acted unfairly, when it 
dismissed the idea that the forum selection clause represented a substantial 
inconvenience for the plaintiffs. As the Shutes had stated in their affidavit at the district 
level, both health and economic reasons prevented them from being able to conduct the 
proceedings in Florida. Even though the Court had no qualms in reaffirming some of the 
defendant’s points, without a shred of evidence having been put forward to substantiate 
them, it is certainly unfair that the Court was not as tolerant towards the plaintiff.900 
Furthermore, and unlike what happened with some of the contentions put forward by the 
defendants to enforce the clause, at no point did the Supreme Court even try to deny that, 
as the Court of Appeals had stated, 
“the Shutes, their health care provider, and at least one of the witnesses to the 
accident all reside in Washington. At least one other witness resides in California, 
and it is unclear where other possible witnesses reside. As between Washington and 
Florida, the two states which are capable of exercising jurisdiction, Washington is 
the more efficient forum.”901  
In its attempt to supposedly “refine” The Bremen, the Court also held that Florida could 
not really be considered inconvenient, since it was not a “remote alien forum.”902 This is a 
deliberately shortsighted reading of The Bremen, and which clearly does not go into its real 
and otherwise obvious meaning. Not only did the Court consider the almost 5 thousand 
kilometers separating Florida from Washington to be “not remote enough,” but also 
overlooked the fact that “remoteness” is a relative term. For all intents and purposes, 
conducting the trial in Florida was, for the plaintiffs, almost no different from conducting 
in a court of Mogadishu, Somalia. Just as they would have been unable to travel to the 
                                                                  
900 Despite the Court’s nonchalant dismissal of the issue of inconvenience raised by the plaintiffs, there was at 
least some record of the problems that would affect the Shutes if the clause was enforced. 
“The record contained the uncontroverted, albeit self-serving, affidavit of Mrs. Shute stating that she was 
in the hospital and could not travel and that the expense of proceeding with the lawsuit in Florida would 
be prohibitively burdensome, both financially and physically.” 
GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 710. 
901 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines [1990], p. 387 To his credit, Justice Marshall, in his dissent, acknowledged this, 
stating:  
“It is safe to assume that the witnesses—whether other passengers or members of the crew—can be 
assembled with less expense and inconvenience at a west coast forum than in a Florida court several 
thousand miles from the scene of the accident.” 
Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 603. 
902 ibid., pp. 594–595. This was a reference to The Bremen, where the Court had distinguished the contract 
between the parties from “an agreement between two Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote 
alien forum.” The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. [June 12, 1972], p. 17. 
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African continent to pursue Carnival Cruise’s responsibility, they were unable to do so in 
Florida.  
In its ruling, the Court showed an absolute disregard for the plight of the plaintiffs and, 
by resorting to a literalist interpretation of The Bremen, left them in an absolute state of 
defenselessness. As GILBERT argued: 
“There is little doubt that being forced to travel across the continental United States 
to resolve a slip-and-fall case would constitute serious inconvenience. Furthermore, 
although the majority disagreed, the Court of Appeals did find evidence that the 
Shutes were physically and financially unable to litigate in Florida. Admittedly, one 
party's inconvenience is another party's convenience, but an individual faced with 
suing a large corporate defendant in a distant state is very likely to be deterred. 
Indeed, only the most financially well-off passenger would be able to overcome the 
hurdles of high costs and inability to secure witnesses in a distant forum.”903 
Significantly, this was not the first time the Carnival Cruise company had been sued for 
injuries suffered by passengers aboard one of their ships, nor was it the first time that 
disputes arose over their forum selection clause. In fact, the record shows that many of 
the cases in which the forum selection clause was enforced simply disappeared altogether.  
“This may mean that trial was held in Florida but no judicial opinion was published, 
or it may mean that the parties settled the case without going to trial, or it may 
mean that the plaintiff simply abandoned the case because trial in Florida would 
have been prohibitively burdensome. Empirical research in the international context 
shows that a significant proportion of personal injury plaintiffs who are unable to 
sue in their original forum either settle for much less than they had anticipated 
receiving after trial or abandon the case completely, and to a lesser extent that 
conclusion is probably valid in the domestic context as well.”904 
The truth is that there was no refining of The Bremen. The Court applied the rule of The 
Bremen in full, despite the obvious factual differences, and actually expanded its 
applicability well beyond its original constraints. In reality, the Court in Carnival Cruise 
didn’t use The Bremen so much as a precedent, but rather as “a stepping-stone to a now-
factored and much more far-reaching result.”905 
                                                                  
903 GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 748, pp. 623–624. 
904 STURLEY, M. F., 1992, supra note 883, p. 140. 
905 KNAPP, C. L., 2011, supra note 877, p. 555 In regards to the expansion of The Bremen, See also STURLEY, M. F., 
1992, supra note 883, p. 146 (“if the clause in Carnival Cruise Lines is enforceable against the Shutes, it is hard to see 
why any other boilerplate choice of forum clause in an adhesion contract will not be similarly enforceable under the same 
reasoning”) and GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 748, p. 598 (arguing that the Carnival Cruise decision was unfair, 
disregarded precedent, and “failed to defend the consumer whom Congress has sought to protect”). 
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7.5 Justifying Carnival Cruise 
In order to justify enforcing the forum selection clause, the Supreme Court put forward a 
number of reasons. By doing this, the Court appears to have hoped to defend the practice 
of companies that include this type of provision in their contracts.906 In essence, the Court 
argued that:  
a. Since cruise lines travel to many places, and carry passengers from many 
locales, forum selection clauses allow them to limit their exposure to being 
sued in a plethora of jurisdictions. 
b. Forum selection clauses reduce uncertainty regarding where suits must be 
brought and defended, thus conserving judicial resources. 
c. There was no “fraud or overreaching”, nor any “bad-faith motive”, since 
Carnival Cruise’s principal place of business was indeed in Florida. 
d. Passengers benefit from these clauses, since they allow the company to 
reduce their prices. 
This reasoning is so unsatisfactory, that it is worthy to analyze each of these justifications 
in full. 
7.5.1 Companies Cannot be Exposed to Being Sued in Many Jurisdictions 
The first question that can be put forward against this logic is, quite simply, “why?”; why 
should the Court benefit the defendants in a claim such as this? Why should the burden 
be laid upon individual injured plaintiffs, ostensibly to the benefit of the defendants? 
Why, in other words, should the courts (freed from supposedly clogged dockets) and 
defendants (freed from being sued in many jurisdictions) benefit at the expense of the 
plaintiffs? These are all questions that the Supreme Court did not even try to answer.907 
Indeed, the Court seems to have put the convenience of the judicial system, as well as that 
of the defendants, as a priority, without even trying to explain why this was a fair 
decision. As GOLDMAN has explained:  
“The Shute majority implicitly, if not explicitly, based its decision on principles of 
economic efficiency. One's first impulse is to respond ‘efficiency schmiciency, it's just 
not fair, it's just not right.’”908 
                                                                  
906 KNAPP, C. L., 2011, supra note 877, p. 559. 
907 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 342. 
908 GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 701. 
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The type of rhetoric that was used by the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise, as well as by 
some of the courts that followed its lead, tends to side on the dramatic, arguing that 
refusing to enforce forum selection clauses would lay a serious burden on the 
defendants.909 MULLENIX, with her characteristically caustic style, has mocked this 
dramatic line of arguments, saying: 
“Who among us […] has not been moved by the Court's conclusion that a defendant 
may not be sued in a distant forum, away from its home, because this ‘has been 
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport 
with due process.’ And who among us has not been inspired by the Court's 
observation that ‘the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis’ is whether 
the defendant should have ‘reasonably anticipate[d] being hauled into court 
there.’”910 
Sarcasm aside, the problem with the rationale of the courts on this issue is that it does 
not seem to go both ways. While they seem to bend over backwards to protect the 
defendants, “on the underlying rationale that because plaintiffs have the initial choice of forum, 
defendants need some countervailing fairness protection,” it does not use the same zeal in 
cases in which a powerful corporate defendant, contracting with “Grandma and Uncle Irv,” 
gets to decide in advance where it will be sued.911 After all, if the logic is that the forum 
selection clause should be enforced because otherwise the defendant could end up being 
dragged to a forum where he could not have reasonably expected to appear, then it calls to 
reason that a plaintiff should also be protected if he ends up in a forum where he could 
not have reasonably expected to appear, having only nominally agreed to a forum 
selection clause, which he could not read or understand, let alone negotiate. 
The Court’s explicit reference to the fact that Carnival Cruise’s vessels call in many ports, 
and are as such exposed to litigation in a variety of fora, adds very little to the discussion 
and, once again, brings us to put forward the question: “So what?” After all, whether 
Carnival Cruise could potentially be subjected to litigation in different jurisdictions is not, 
in and of itself, reason enough to deprive the plaintiffs of a convenient forum. 
Furthermore, it fails to explain why it would actually be fairer to force the defendants to 
travel to whatever court the defendants virtually forced them to confer jurisdiction to, by 
means of a take-it-or-leave-it clause. And yet, this is precisely what the Supreme Court 
did; using Carnival’s “plights” as their justification, the majority of the Justices took it 
upon themselves to deem that any complications that could be brought upon the 
plaintiffs was justified, as long as it meant benefitting the defendants. Although, 
                                                                  
909 GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 748, p. 622 (explaining that, in The Bremen, “[t]he first factor cited is that forum 
clauses enable cruise lines to limit the fora where they are sued. This factor obviously benefits the cruise line”). 
910 MULLENIX, L. S., 2011, supra note 877, p. 551. 
911 ibid., p. 551. 
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ostensibly, the Court tried to balance the interest of the plaintiffs with those of the 
defendants, arguing that the plaintiffs did in fact see some benefit from being 
dispossessed of their day in court, we will soon see that this logic also failed to pass 
muster.  
The Court was confronted with two possibilities. One of them was declaring that forum 
selection clauses in the consumer context were not enforceable, due to the bargaining 
power disparities, and the other was enforcing them.912 While the former involved placing 
the costs on the companies, the latter involved placing them on the consumers. What the 
Supreme Court did was making “a policy choice that it is better for injured consumers than 
large companies to bear these costs.”913 MULLENIX said it best when, in the immediate 
aftermath of Carnival Cruise, she wrote: 
“Carnival Cruise Lines was an easy case. It was based on the humblest, most 
uncomplicated, garden-variety slip-and-fall tort ever to grace the federal courts. It 
involved a pure, paradigmatic adhesive consumer contract, complete with non-
negotiable, tiny, boilerplate print. Nonetheless, in spite of the utter simplicity of its 
facts, seven Justices managed to get Carnival Cruise Lines wrong. 
Carnival Cruise Lines made bad law. In holding that particular forum-selection 
cause enforceable, the Supreme Court gave its broad stamp of approval to forum-
selection clauses generally as a method for establishing jurisdiction. However, in 
spite of their persistently touted virtues, forum-selection clauses can be unfair and 
insidious. The result in Carnival Cruise Lines was unfair because under existing 
precedent, and as a matter of pure contract law, courts should not enforce adhesive 
consumer forum-selection clauses. Yet, this is precisely what the Supreme Court did.” 
914 
The position taken by the Supreme Court demonstrates a pro-defendant bias that cannot 
be explained on reasons of justice and fairness, particularly in cases such as this, when a 
powerful defendant is allowed to exploit a term imposed on a weaker plaintiff. While the 
Court went out of its way to consider the burdens that the defendant might have to carry 
if sued in a “foreign” forum, it did not show the same empathy towards a plaintiff 
                                                                  
912 GEHRINGER, A., 2000, supra note 832, p. 644. 
913 STURLEY, M. F., 1992, supra note 883, p. 141. STURLEY adds that the savings that companies enjoy as a result of 
enforcing the clauses come “at the cost of ignoring the plaintiffs’ interest in avoiding a forum where it would be 
inconvenient or unfair to require them to prosecute their suits – the same sort of interest that defendants claim when 
moving for forum non conveniens relief or objecting to personal jurisdiction.”  
914 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, pp. 325–326 Similarly, GEHRINGER noted how even though the Court 
realized that “a form passenger contract is a contract of adhesion, and therefore must to be scrutinized more carefully 
than a freely reached contract between parties of equal bargaining power,” it failed to adequately consider consumer 
protection ( GEHRINGER, A., 2000, supra note 832, p. 645.  
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litigating in those same conditions. It was a case where the weaker was punished to 
benefit the powerful. 
7.5.2 Savings from Forum Selection Clauses are Passed to the Adhering Party 
Here the Court was quoting the oft-cited (albeit often unsourced) line of reasoning that 
savings from contracts of adhesion are passed to the adhering parties. According to 
MULLENIX, this “adds embarrassing insult to the injury of a loss of the right to choose a forum. 
Apart from the justices, are there any consumers naive enough to buy this reduced-fare 
theory?”915 
Indeed, as if repeating a mantra, the Supreme Court regurgitated the idea that consumers 
benefit from pre-printed terms such as forum selection clauses. Without as much as citing 
a single reference, the Court stated: 
“[I]t stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum 
clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the 
savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.916 
There are two serious problems with the Court’s assertion on this point. First, and as we 
have seen, there is a significant dispute as to whether or not savings that are the 
consequence of boilerplate contracts are actually passed to the consumer. Second, and 
most importantly, in Carnival Cruise there was nothing to indicate that the Carnival 
Cruise company had indeed offered lower prices as a result of its forum selection clauses. 
It was, basically, a case of wishful thinking. KNAPP illustrated the irrationality of this idea, 
arguing: 
“At this point, we leave contract law-both ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ behind, and enter 
the Looking Glass world of contract-law-and-economics. We are invited to assume 
that merely because a firm realizes savings by denying to those it has wronged 
appropriate access to a convenient forum for redress of their injuries, it will pass 
those savings along to its customers. Apparently we are expected to imagine a 
hypothetical Professor Farnsworth, CEO of a global transportation business, 
exclaiming to his staff, ‘Good News, everyone!! We have successfully avoided a lot of 
lawsuits, so now we can reduce our prices!!’ […] Of course, companies may compete 
on the basis of price, temporarily or otherwise, in a fashion which does benefit their 
                                                                  
915 MULLENIX, L. S., ‘Supreme Court Review: Analysis: Forum-Shoppers Should Discover a Wider Market’, 1991, 
13 The National Law Journal, p. 4. 
916 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 594 
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customers. But to assume that in fact this will be the result if we enable a company 
to avoid liability for its wrongful actions is to make an unjustified leap of faith.”917 
This affinity for magical thinking demonstrated by the majority of the Justices seems to 
have made them unable to even contemplate the possibility that some of these alleged 
savings would not actually be passed to the other parties, but would just be reinvested in 
the company itself or just passed to the shareholders. The Court wants to believe in the 
intrinsic goodness of those companies that resort to forum selection clauses in their 
contracts, but does not seem to be able to justify its claim. Basically, the Court overlooked 
the fact that  
“companies are able to impose forum-selection clauses on consumers only because of 
a massive market failure and, further, that sanctioning such market failures will 
lead to widespread inefficiencies, inequitable redistribution of wealth, and quite 
likely a reduction in total social wealth. Moreover, […] whatever ‘savings’ companies 
gain from forum-selection clauses will result not from increased efficiencies but, on 
the contrary, from increased inefficiencies and higher transaction costs in the 
litigation process that serve to redistribute, not maximize, wealth. Thus, the Court's 
consideration of the economic impact of forum-selection clauses […] is arbitrarily 
limited to one presumed benefit and ignores numerous other likely and highly 
undesirable consequences.”918 
Another problem with the Court’s idea that the savings are passed to the consumer is that 
it is an incomplete assessment of market economics. The Court ignored that its approval 
of these “savings-via-terms” (knowing that said terms were never read, understood or 
bargained-for) serves as the starting shot for a race to the bottom, “since it provides 
contract drafters with a profit incentive to include low quality (non-salient) terms in their pre-
drafted forms. In other words, competition will actually cause firms to draft worse terms in their 
form contracts.”919  
At best, the economic rationale of the Court “is subject to and lacking empirical proof. At 
worst, economic reality is the opposite of what the Court believes it to be.”920 The fact of the 
matter is that, unless evidence is put forward, and “without information on the 
competitiveness of the market in question,” the idea that the adhering parties will receive 
                                                                  
917 KNAPP, C. L., 2011, supra note 877, p. 560. 
918 PURCELL, E. A., JR., 1992, supra note 768, p. 432. 
919 CHING, K. K., 2015, supra note 196, p. 9. See also FREILICH, A. & WEBB, E., 2013, supra note 399, p. 140 
(“Despite the many benefits of a competitive market, there is little incentive for businesses to compete on the basis of fair 
terms”).  
920 CHING, K. K., 2015, supra note 196, p. 9. SOLIMINE, although supporting the Court’s decision in Carnival Cruise, 
characterized the method of the Court as engaging in “Chicago School economic analysis” (SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, 
supra note 743, p. 59). 
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some economic benefit from these clauses “only ‘stands to reason’ if you want it to.”921 What 
is more, taken to its logical conclusion, what the Court seems to be saying is that as long 
as the passengers receive a reduced fare (or some other consideration), any clause, 
including absolute exculpatory clauses, would, or should, be enforceable.922 Of course, this 
is nonsensical, as it would definitely lead to a widespread use of virtually absolute 
disclaimers of liability and tremendously draconian clauses, justified by some theoretical 
reduction in the price. 
The analysis and the (alleged) balancing test made by the Supreme Court in regards to the 
forum selection clause in Carnival Cruise is thus asking the plaintiffs to trust those same 
defendants they blame for their injuries. The Court is, in so many words, explaining to 
them that the fact that they will not be able to obtain any redress for their injuries (since, 
as they showed, they would be financially unable to pursue the case in the chosen forum) 
is in a way compensated by an alleged lower price in their tickets. It is truly a case of 
adding insult to injury. 
Even if we were to concede that the forum selection clause does, indeed, allow the 
company to pass its savings to the consumers, it is much harder to concede that these 
savings are high enough to compensate for their loss of rights.923  
“The costs of such increasingly widespread and more seriously inadequate 
compensation-fewer and less successful rehabilitations, more seriously damaged 
family relationships and structures, lowered aggregate social and economic 
productivity, reduced faith in the nation's legal institutions, and added burdens of 
care directly and indirectly imposed on governments, private institutions, and the 
public at large-will likely outweigh whatever ‘savings’ otherwise result. Contrary to 
the Court's assumption, then, forum-selection clauses -expanding the areas in which 
inefficient social arrangements may flourish- seem likely to be wealth-destroying 
rather than wealth-maximizing.”924 
                                                                  
921 SHELL, G. R., ‘Fair Play, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A Comment on Speidel’, 1996, 62 Brooklyn Law 
Review, no. 4, p. 1374. SOLIMINE disagrees with this contention and, in his defense of Carnival Cruise, he argues 
(regurgitating the Court’s reasoning) that “such clauses contained in standard form contracts confer ex ante benefits 
to the litigants by providing certainty as to jurisdictional issues, and by conferring savings (spread out among all such 
contracts) realized by the cruise line in limiting the places where it can be sued.” Surprisingly, aware of the flimsy 
ground in which assertions stand, he goes on to say that “[p]resumably, price elasticity studies in the relevant market 
served might confirm or deny the Court’s speculation on the latter point” (SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, supra note 743, 
p. 83 (emphasis added)). 
922 GILBERT, E. P., 1992, supra note 748, p. 623. 
923 See KIRBY, J. M., 1991, supra note 870, pp. 905–906 (“Even assuming that all the savings are passed on when the 
cruise's legal costs are lowered, passengers who are risk averse are better off without the clause. Therefore, considering 
the relatively high burden of having an individual conduct litigation across the country, there are sufficient grounds in 
Shute to find substantive unfairness”). 
924 PURCELL, E. A., JR., 1992, supra note 768, p. 490. 
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If contractual terms are to be seen simply as part of the price that is paid by the buyer, 
then what happened in Carnival Cruise is that the Supreme Court overestimated the 
benefit received by the plaintiffs, and underestimated the cost of the term. Without a 
single shred of evidence, the Court told the plaintiffs, “this is for your own good.” 
7.5.3 Certainty on Jurisdiction Saves Time and Judicial Resources 
It is surprising to see that the Supreme Court would say, without a hint of irony, that a 
forum selection clause, like the one included in the plaintiffs’ tickets, actually reduced 
uncertainty and saved judicial resources.925 If anything, the Carnival Cruise decision is an 
example of exactly the opposite. In fact, as MULLENIX notes, the procedural history of the 
case  
“is somewhat noteworthy if for no other reason than that it took five years and six 
trips up and down the state and federal court systems to finally dismiss the case on 
jurisdictional grounds. The procedural history of Carnival Cruise Lines belies the 
purported utility of forum-selection clauses. Moreover, the lengthy haggling over 
jurisdiction that occurred in Carnival Cruise Lines undercuts the chief supporting 
rationale that such provisions provide for certainty as to the place of suit and hence 
less demand on judicial resources to resolve threshold jurisdictional questions.”926  
Despite the claims of certainty and expediency (that the Court was certainly not alone in 
making) the truth seems to be that forum selection clauses often fail to achieve their goal, 
actually creating an additional hassle to the litigation. As a matter of fact, it is often the 
case that “the battle about jurisdiction is a surrogate for the battle about liability, with the case 
settling once the jurisdictional dispute is over.”927 In other words, it is not that the clause 
actually gives more certainty to the legal relationship, but rather that instead of flooding 
                                                                  
925 This was not the first time the Supreme Court praised forum selection clauses for saving judicial resources. In 
fact, in the 1988 case of Stewart v. Ricoh, Justices KENNEDY and O'CONNOR considered that the benefits rendered 
by these clauses were so strong that "[c]ourts should announce and encourage rules that support private parties who 
negotiate such clauses" (cited in SCHREIBER, H. W., 1988, supra note 784, p. 464). 
926 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, pp. 332–333 See also LEDERMAN, L., 1991, supra note 745, p. 424. 
927 DAVIES, M., 2002, supra note 783, p. 367. See also MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 342 (“the validity 
of forum-selection clauses is now one of the most frequently litigated jurisdictional issues in the lower federal courts. 
Moreover, because unsuspecting plaintiffs will invariably be caught unaware of a fine print provision, this trend to 
litigate over forum-selection clauses will continue unabated”), SPARKA, F., Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in 
Maritime Transport Documents: A Comparative Analysis, 2010, Springer Science & Business Media, p. 8 (arguing 
that the benefits of forum selection clauses regarding a decrease in costs and the increase predictability “remain 
contentious, as many legal disputes concern the validity of choice of forum clauses.” He notes, however, that “since 
those disputes would otherwise likely be about jurisdiction anyway, arguably at least no additional litigation is 
generated”) and DAVIS, N. J., 2007, supra note 232, pp. 589–590 (noting that when clickwrap agreements are 
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the courts with disputes over the subject matter of the case, the parties end up just 
discussing the forum that should hear the dispute, preventing the parties from actually 
finding an appropriate solution to their grievances.   
“Instead of ensuring the certainty of forum selection, Carnival Cruise Lines has 
ensured a thriving satellite industry in challenging such clauses. All this litigation is 
excellent for the corporations who always win because courts uniformly enforce the 
provisions; and it is great for the lawyers on both sides because they earn their 
livelihood whether they win (the corporations) or lose (the plaintiffs). But it is really 
unfortunate for the poor, clueless schlemiel or schamozzel who is faced with the 
choice to either spend a raft of money litigating in distant Kankanee; spend a raft of 
money arguing against the forum selection clause (and then losing); or give up their 
grievances altogether.”928  
The truth is that forum selection clauses do not necessarily conserve judicial resources, at 
least not in the way the Supreme Court hoped they did. They are not a magical device 
that, almost miraculously, puts an end to uncertainty regarding the competent forum. If 
anything, these clauses manage to conserve resources simply by precipitating  
“the dismissal of many lawsuits altogether that are then never reinstituted in the 
defendant’s choice of forum. The lawsuits simply go away. And this does not include 
the lawsuits never brought at all – those in which a prospective plaintiff belatedly 
discovers the restrictive forum-selection clause and decides not to challenge its 
validity.”929  
For the Supreme Court, then, it was an issue of “out of sight, out of mind.” 
Finally, even if we were to concede that the forum selection clause in Carnival Cruise 
actually increased the certainty and predictability of the contract (although it did not), it 
is worth asking whether the price paid for that certainty was too high. Since this certainty 
came at the expense of the plaintiffs’ ability to obtain redress for their injuries, it seems 
to be that the price was excessive, and that the Court should not have granted its 
approval.  
7.5.4 No Fraud, Overreaching or Bad Faith. 
In Carnival Cruise the Court seems to have misunderstood what contractual unfairness 
actually means, adding a new and unnecessary requirement to deem an agreement or a 
term unfair. In ruling the forum selection valid, the Court “seemingly interpreted unfairness 
                                                                  
928 MULLENIX, L. S., 2011, supra note 877, p. 552. MULLENIX explains that the Yiddish words “schlemiel” and 
“schamozzel” mean “an ineffectual person who bumbles through life” and “an unlucky person”, respectively.  
929 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 343. 
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to require [a] bad faith inclusion of a clause designating a distant forum solely to discourage 
legitimate claims.”930 Since the Carnival Cruise company had its principal place of business 
in Florida, and many of its cruises set sail precisely from that state, the Court reasoned 
that, therefore, there was no malice and no fraud.  
The Court, however, ignored the fact that malice or bad faith are not necessary to prevent 
the enforcement of an unconscionable clause. As it was stated in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., unconscionability is determined by the “absence of meaningful choice 
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable 
to the other party”.931 It is therefore dependent on an objective analysis of the terms and 
their effects, regardless of the mindset that the drafting party might have had at the time 
the contract was made.  
It was following precisely this line of reasoning that, in his dissent, Justice STEVENS made 
an explicit reference to the finding of unconscionability in the Williams decision, 
suggesting that the rule set on that case should have also been applied in Carnival Cruise. 
Justice STEVENS saw that, just as in Williams, this was a case in which “a party of little 
bargaining power, and hence little real choice”, signed a “commercially unreasonable contract 
with little or no knowledge of its terms,” which resulted in an absence of any real consent, so 
that “enforcement should be withheld."932  
The bargaining power disparity evident in Carnival Cruise is precisely of the kind that the 
unconscionability doctrine deals with. After all, the case was about “an industry-wide 
contract heavily weighted in favor of one party that is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”933 It 
was a contractual relation where virtually all the bargaining power was held by Carnival 
Cruise, with the only choices left for the Shutes being saying “yes” or “no” to a contract 
they were not even able to read.934  
                                                                  
930 GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, p. 709. 
931 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company [1965], p. 449. 
932 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], pp. 600–601. Justice STEVENS had already raised the alarm about the 
slippery slope that was created by decisions that simply enforced forum selection clauses. In Mitsubishi Motors v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, for example, a case dealing with an arbitration clause, Justice STEVENS argued in his 
dissent that: 
“The Court's repeated incantation of the high ideals of ‘international arbitration’ creates the impression 
that this case involves the fate of an institution designed to implement a formula for world peace. But just 
as it is improper to subordinate the public interest in enforcement of antitrust policy to the private 
interest in resolving commercial disputes, so is it equally unwise to allow a vision of world unity to distort 
the importance of the selection of the proper forum for resolving this dispute.” 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc [1985], 473 US, 614–666, p. 665. See also MULLENIX, L. S., 
1988, supra note 761, p. 318 (referring to the dissents in post-Bremen cases, and the possibility of a “slippery-
slope”). 
933 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 355. 
934 Rather bizarrely, SOLIMINE argues that the Shutes were not “completely without bargaining leverage,” since, for 
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The issue of readership was also analyzed (and dismissed) by the Court in a very 
unsatisfactory manner. The Court justified the enforcement arguing that the plaintiffs 
had been properly informed of the forum selection clause, and that this had actually been 
conceded by the plaintiffs themselves. In stating this, what the Court did was to 
demonstrate an almost absolute inability to understand irony, as well as serving as a 
warning to lawyers that they should always write in a clear and unambiguous manner, 
since the courts might not be the right audience for detecting nuances. 
To reach the bizarre conclusion that the Shutes had actually been informed of the terms, 
the Court referenced a Brief presented by the plaintiffs which stated that they did not 
“contest the incorporation of the provisions nor [sic] that the forum selection clause was 
reasonably communicated to the respondents, as much as three pages of fine print can be 
communicated."935 
What the plaintiffs were clearly arguing in their Brief, and which the Court obviously 
failed to comprehend, was that although they had indeed received the terms (after the 
tickets had been paid for), it is hard to maintain that simply presenting three pages of fine 
print to (legally) unsophisticated people can truly be considered a “reasonable 
communication.” Since the Court did not condition its assessment to the length of the 
terms, we can conclude that if Carnival Cruise had sent the tickets with an attached 50-
page document containing the terms and conditions, the Court would have reached the 
exact same conclusion. After all, if the Court considered that it was a reasonable 
communication to simply mail the terms after the payment had been made, then the 
length should not be an issue. 936 
                                                                                                                                                                       
conceivably could publicize the matter and bring pressure to bear on the cruise lines” (SOLIMINE, M. E., 1992, 
supra note 743, pp. 83–84). Even if we ignore the fact that at the time there were not that many possibilities for 
consumers to create far-reaching grassroots organizations (at least compared to the possibilities granted by the 
advent and massification of the Internet) it is difficult to see what power the Shutes would have had at the time 
of buying the tickets just because they could have, conceivably, created a consumer group. After all, every single 
consumer, all around the world, theoretically has the same possibility, and yet nobody would claim that the fact 
that maybe they could create a movement of dissatisfied consumers actually gave them more power at the time 
of negotiation. As a matter of fact, SOLIMINE himself concedes that “this sort of sanction will only benefit a future 
class of consumers, of whom people like the Shutes may not be members –unless they travel on cruise lines on a regular 
basis.” 
935 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 590 (emphasis added). 
936 This was also the point raised by GOLDMAN, who caustically argued that assuming that all the terms can simply 
be enforced 
“represents the triumph of economic theory over reality. Its premise, that freedom of contract maximizes 
societal wealth because the parties to a contract know what is best for them, simply is inapposite for 
secondary terms in consumer contracts. Consumers do not read or understand the subordinate terms of 
their contracts and, therefore, do not, as a group, voluntarily and knowingly adopt the obligations and 
duties contained therein. The subordinate terms of the contract are just not a reflection of consumers' self-
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With its decision, the Court overlooked the fact that in reality there was “no evidence of 
consent to or even notice of the forum stipulation.” 937 In light of this, the Court “supported its 
decision to enforce the clause entirely with arguments related to its own assumptions regarding 
economic efficiency.”938 
Based solely on the way in which the clause was communicated to the Shutes, the Court 
should have concluded that, at the very least, there was strong evidence of procedural 
unconscionability, and then analyze whether its content could also be considered 
substantially unconscionable.939 The Court, however, failed to do this, opting instead to 
ignore the problem in which the Shutes were placed by forcing them to accept the terms 
only after the contract had been signed. It negated the fact that by then the Shutes were 
not in a position to rationally analyze the terms that were included with their tickets, nor 
did the Court even entertain the notion that at no point, at the time of the contract, did 
the Shutes even contemplate the possibility that a forum selection clause would be 
included. It was a surprising, non-salient term, that the Court somehow decided deserved 
to be enforced. The Shutes were the victims of a savvy merchant that exploited nor only 
their ignorance, but also their inherent mental biases, and instead of protecting them, the 
Supreme Court punished them even further.940 
In his dissent, Justice STEVENS (joined by Justice MARSHALL), also questioned the line of 
reasoning followed by the Court to assume the terms had been communicated. Justice 
STEVENS explained that, in reality, “only the most meticulous passenger is likely to become 
aware of the forum selection provision,” driving his point home by appending a copy of the 
terms, as presented to the plaintiffs. He then added that “many passengers, like the 
respondents in this case […] will not have an opportunity to read paragraph 8 [where the 
forum selection clause was placed] until they have actually purchased their tickets.”941 
By enforcing such a non-negotiated, take-it-or-leave-it, unread, and one-sided clause, the 
Court actually undermined the legitimacy of forum selection. Consensual jurisdiction is, 
of course, based on consent; both parties need to agree on the fact that they are conferring 
jurisdiction to a certain forum. In the case of Carnival Cruise, as well as in the plethora of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
…[C]onsumers' failure to read or understand the subordinate terms of their contracts is rational economic 
behavior, that economic efficiency favors placing the risk of distant litigation on the seller, and that the 
costs of government intervention in the forum selection clause context are de minimis. Thus, neither 
normative judgments about consumers' responsibility for their conduct nor enlightened economic 
reasoning can support the Supreme Court's prima facie validity rule for forum selection clauses in 
consumer contracts.” 
GOLDMAN, L., 1991, supra note 748, pp. 740–741. 
937 SHELL, G. R., 1996, supra note 921, p. 1373. 
938 ibid., p. 1373. 
939 KNAPP, C. L., 2011, supra note 877, p. 558. 
940 On how heuristics played a role in the Shutes actions, See CHING, K. K., 2015, supra note 196, p. 15. 
941 Carnival Cruise Inc., v. Shute [1991], p. 597. 
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unbalanced and unfair clauses that have been enforced using Carnival Cruise as precedent, 
there is no consent. “Two minds don’t meet; rather, one mind prevails.”942 In its attempt to 
uphold the so-called agreement between the parties, and treating the forum selection 
clause as just any other contractual provision, due process values were sacrificed. The 
result of this was a massive change in the landscape of American contract law: 
“[T]he entire basis for enforcement of these clauses is through the application of 
contract principles, and forum-selection clauses automatically shift the jurisdictional 
question from the constitutional to the contractual. Due process is simply no longer a 
concern. Forum- selection clauses radically transform the jurisdictional rhetoric. The 
linchpins of the analysis become consent and contractual sanctity, not affiliating 
circumstances or traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”943 
7.6 The Legacy of Carnival Cruise 
While at first it might appear that focusing on Carnival Cruise is the equivalent of kicking 
a dead horse, it is quite the opposite. After all, despite the many criticisms that have been 
leveled against this decision, it has still served as the foundation for many following cases. 
Just like The Bremen before it, it has gone well beyond its original boundaries in admiralty 
jurisdiction, with courts expanding its application far beyond.944 As KNAPP notes, it has 
been  
“touted by many courts and commentators as a prime exemplar of the so-called 
‘rolling’ contract, in which one party is bound not only to terms of which she-in 
theory, at least-could have been aware at the time she initially manifested her 
                                                                  
942 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, pp. 357–358. As noted by BLOCK:  
“Mutual assent which is essential to the formation of a binding contract must be manifested by one party 
to the other. Such mutual assent cannot be based on subjective intent, but must be founded on an 
objective manifestation of mutual assent to the essential terms of the promise. In other words, the entry 
of the parties into a contractual relationship must be manifested by some intelligible conduct, act, or 
sign… The meeting of minds, which is essential to the formation of a contract, is not determined by the 
secret intentions of the parties, but by their expressed or manifested intentions.” 
BLOCK, D., 2001, supra note 228, p. 231. 
943 MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 366. 
944 In 1991, in the immediate aftermath of the Carnival Cruise decision, LIESEMER theorized that, like The Bremen, 
Carnival Cruise would soon go beyond its otherwise restrictive (admiralty) borders. He was soon proven right 
(LIESEMER, J. A., 1991, supra note 832, pp. 1026–1027). See also MULLENIX, L. S., 1992, supra note 836, p. 367 
(arguing in the immediate aftermath of Carnival Cruise that “it probably is true that neither The Bremen nor Carnival 
Cruise Lines will be confined to their admiralty jurisdiction basis. The history of The Bremen supports this prognosis; if 
anything, lower federal courts, and many state courts, widely rely on The Bremen to enforce forum-selection clauses in 
the full spectrum of contractual arrangements prevalent in every aspect of daily life. Without doubt, Carnival Cruise 
Lines, also an admiralty action, will be widely cited as endorsing the justice and utility of forum-selection clauses”). 
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general assent to the transaction, but to any terms the other party sees fit to add 
either before, during or after what we used to consider as the process of ‘contract 
formation.’ ‘Terms-in-the-box’ contracts, ‘shrinkwrap’ contracts, ‘click-wrap’ 
contracts, ‘scroll-down’ terms, ‘terms to-be-added-or-changed-later’ -all of these 
involve a kind of ‘contracting’ in which one party not only dictates the terms, it may 
even retain the power to change them later, and to do so in ways which the other 
party is effectively powerless either to anticipate or to avoid. Both in the world of 
paper contracts and in the world where contracts are only ‘virtual,’ contract law is 
seemingly moving inexorably toward a state in which neither the presence nor the 
absence of actual consent has any real significance.”945 
While the facts of the case should not have allowed a wide application of the doctrine, the 
principles and justifications presented by the Court in Carnival Cruise made this possible. 
The Court, in essence, put forward an argument that seems to validate every agreement 
through which a powerful party might try to pre-select the forum in the contract. 
“[T]he majority pointed to three factors that made the Carnival Cruise clause 
‘reasonable’ the risk of suit in multiple fora, simplification of the jurisdictional 
inquiry, and the possibility of reduced transactional costs being passed on to the 
consumers. These factors amount to no real limitation on enforcement. Every large 
enterprise runs the risk of suits in multiple fora; every forum selection agreement 
simplifies the jurisdictional inquiry if enforced; reduced transaction costs always 
hold the theoretical possibility of consumer benefit.”946 
The problem here is that, as some commentators have noted, the Carnival Cruise decision 
destroyed the limits that The Bremen had established, allowing for a total transformation 
of forum selection clauses. This is a transformation that converts them from “instruments 
of economic freedom to instruments of economic oppression.”947 
                                                                  
945 KNAPP, C. L., 2011, supra note 877, pp. 561–562. The case of “rolling contracts”, those in which one of the 
parties retains the right to make unilateral changes to the terms, is particularly troublesome, since it places on 
one of the parties (particularly those in an especially weak position) the duty to constantly review the new terms 
in order to simply detect the changes. Online agreements are good example of this; as WOODWARD explains, 
highlighting the already mentioned irrationality of even bothering to read the terms (although, as we have seen, 
they might end up being enforced): 
“Even if one were to read and attempt to understand [for example] Apple’s iTunes Terms of Service when 
first installing the software, can anyone reasonably expect a careful read for changes on the third or 
sixteenth update of the software? More importantly, if the terms can be changed at the vendor’s will (or 
at least between updates), what sense does it make to read them even the first time?” 
WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 927. 
946 BORCHERS, P. J., ‘Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for 
Congressional Reform’, 1992, 67 Washington Law Review, no. 1, p. 74. 
947 ibid., p. 94. NEUBORNE goes as far stating that this virtually limitless enforceability of forum selection clauses 
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An example of this expansive application of Carnival Cruise appears, among many others, 
in Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, where the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of 
New Jersey affirmed a District Court decision that enforced a forum selection clause 
included in a click-wrap agreement.948 Making an express reference to the Carnival Cruise 
decision, the Court in Caspi considered that the clause, included amid several pages of fine 
print presented to the users of the Microsoft Network, was analogous to the situation 
that affected the Shutes, and thus fully enforceable. As the Court reasoned: 
“The scenario presented here is different because of the medium used, electronic 
versus printed; but, in any sense that matters, there is no significant distinction. The 
plaintiffs in Carnival could have perused all the fine-print provisions of their travel 
contract if they wished before accepting the terms by purchasing their cruise ticket. 
The plaintiffs in this case were free to scroll through the various computer screens 
that presented the terms of their contracts before clicking their agreement.”949 
The Court then added that since the forum selection clause was presented in the exact 
same way as the other terms of the contract (e.g. same typeface, size, etc.): 
“To conclude that plaintiffs are not bound by that clause would be equivalent to 
holding that they were bound by no other clause either, since all provisions were 
identically presented. Plaintiffs must be taken to have known that they were 
entering into a contract; and no good purpose, consonant with the dictates of 
reasonable reliability in commerce, would be served by permitting them to disavow 
particular provisions or the contracts as a whole.”950 
Despite the undeniable power of the Carnival Cruise decision, some dissenting cases do 
exist. This dissention becomes particularly relevant in those cases where forum selection 
clauses (and the public policy of enforcing them) come into direct conflict with laws aimed 
at protecting certain categories of contractual parties. A good example of this comes from 
consumer protection legislation, which often comes into direct conflict with blanket 
enforcement of terms.  
In Jane Doe v. Match.com, a female user of the dating site Match.com sued the company 
after the man she met on the website, a person by the name of Ryan Logan, abused and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
reforms, leaving us, today, with a watery legal brew that I call ‘Lochner Lite’” (NEUBORNE, B., 2015, supra note 100, 
p. 185). This comparison, which might appear exaggerated to some, makes some sense, since the protections 
provided by the post-Lochner reforms might end up being diluted by means of contracting via standard forms.  
948 Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC [1999], 732 A. 2d, 528. 
949 ibid., p. 532. 
950 ibid., p. 532. To their credit, the same Court took a different view in Hoffman v. Supplements Togo MGT [2011], 
18 A. 3d, 210, ruling a forum selection clause unenforceable due to a lack of proper notice when the terms were, 
for all practical purposes, never really presented to the plaintiff. 
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raped her.951 The suit was filed after the plaintiff learned that the company had actually 
received allegations from another user regarding Mr. Logan’s behavior, as well as of a 
previous accusation of rape, where he had been acquitted.952 The plaintiff sued the 
company based on, among others, “negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, and violation 
of the Illinois Dating Referral Services Act,” a mandatory piece of consumer protection 
legislation (hereafter IDRSA) that applied to dating websites.953 Since the Illinois Court 
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, who had advertised their services in that 
state, and that both the plaintiff as well as her attacker resided there, that is the place 
where she brought her claim. The terms and conditions which she had agreed on when 
she signed up for the services of Match.com, however, included a choice of forum 
provision establishing: 
“23. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law. If there is any dispute arising out of the Website 
and/or the Service, by using the Website, you expressly agree that any such dispute 
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to its conflict of 
law provisions, and you expressly agree and consent to the exclusive jurisdiction and 
venue of the state and federal courts of the State of Texas, in Dallas County, for the 
resolution of any such dispute.”954 
This choice of law and forum selection clause was in apparent contravention of the terms 
of the IDRSA, particularly its “anti-waiver” provision, which sought to prevent the parties 
from contracting out of the protections granted to them by the applicable state laws.955 
Indeed, as the Court expressly stated, enforcing this provision would mean that 
“Match.com users in Illinois would lose protections that the Illinois legislature 
created for them through enacting [the] IDRSA.”956 
The Illinois Court took a rather novel approach to this private international law issue, 
different from the one used in several other American jurisdictions, deciding first the 
validity of the contract as a whole under the law of the forum. Only then did the Court 
analyze whether the forum selection clause should be enforced. Courts in other 
jurisdictions who have heard claims against the same company, however, have first 
                                                                  
951 Since this case remains unreported, significant portions of this section are based on GOULD, M., ‘The Conflict 
Between Forum-Selection Clauses and State Consumer Protection Laws: Why Illinois Got It Right in Jane Doe v. 
Match.com’, 2015, 90 Chicago-Kent Law Review, no. 2. 
952 ibid., p. 671. 
953 ibid., p. 672. 
954 The terms that existed at the time of the dispute can be viewed on an archived version of the site, available at 
Match.com, 2011, ‘Terms of Use Agreement’, 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110113041408/http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx> (last 
visited 25 May 2015) In their current incarnation, the clause in question was replaced by a binding arbitration 
agreement. 
955 GOULD, M., 2015, supra note 860, pp. 674–675. 
956 Quoted in ibid., p. 676. 
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enforced the forum selection clause, as a matter of public policy, leaving the contractual 
forum to determine the validity of the contract. This brings as a consequence that even 
though the terms of the agreement do not explicitly waive the provisions of the protective 
legislation, the enforcement of the forum selection clause, together with the application 
of the law selected in the contract, result in a waiver. 
A decision more in line with Carnival Cruise, and which is more representative of the state 
of American law regarding forum selection, appears in Brodsky v. Match.com, where a New 
York Court enforced the same forum selection clause that was the object of the Illinois 
case.957 The New York Court stated that there was a strong public policy reason to enforce 
forum selection clauses, so strong indeed that it was not overridden by “New York’s 
interest in protecting its consumers and businesses.”958 The Court even justified its decision 
resorting to a logic similar to that exemplified by the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise, 
mentioning how  
“as a website and service provider, Match would appear to have no practical 
alternative than to include a forum selection and choice of law clause in its User 
Agreement, since otherwise Match could potentially be subject to suit in any of the 
fifty states arising from its website or service.”959 
The legacy of Carnival Cruise has been to create a very lax standard for corporate parties to 
enforce their forum selection clauses against weaker parties. With a very literal and 
shortsighted understanding of what “notice” means, courts have understood that simply 
presenting a party with the terms means that those terms should be read, understood and 
pondered, regardless of their length or complexity. The burden that is thus placed on the 
adhering parties is such that their failure to comprehend dozens of clauses presented in 
unintelligible legalese fine print is seen as a sign of them acting negligently.  
“In the rush to embrace a doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure, the federal 
courts have eagerly chosen the simple, neat solution. Unfortunately, the problems 
involved in consensual arrangements are not so tidy, and the courts have created a 
hodgepodge of principles and rationales to justify the doctrine. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have done an admirable job 
of delineating a coherent and justifiable theory of consensual adjudicatory 
procedure. Due process requirements that normally inform jurisdictional analysis 
have evaporated in favor of expediency. Courts permit contract principles to replace 
carefully crafted jurisdictional rules. Essentially, the courts have evaded troubling 
                                                                  
957 Brodsky v. Match.com LLC [2009] WL, 1–5. 
958 ibid., p. 4. 
959 ibid., p. 4. 
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questions: can parties contract away fundamental attributes of sovereignty or due 
process protection?”960 
It is hard to predict what will be the future of the standards used by the courts to enforce 
forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements. The fear remains that in their zeal to 
enforce these agreements they might overlook the rights of the weaker parties to the 
transactions, who will then find themselves unable to obtain any real redress. While we 
may not yet be in a situation in which merely crossing a door might be used to imply 
agreement to a forum selection, as WOODWARD notes, this has not stopped some 
enterprises from trying: 
“ARBITRATION NOTICE 
By entering these premises, you hereby agree to resolve any and all disputes or claims 
of any kind whatsoever, which arise from the products, services or premises, by way 
of binding arbitration, not litigation. No suit or action may be filed in any state 
or federal court. Any arbitration shall be governed by the FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT, and administered by the American Mediation Association.”961 
7.7 Exceptions to the Validity of Forum Selection Clauses 
As we have seen, The Bremen established a rule, later expanded by Carnival Cruise, 
according to which forum selection clauses are presumptively valid. It is, in other words, 
up to the resisting party to prove that the clause should not be enforced. Following the 
principles set out in the Carnival Cruise decision, a court may use its discretion and refuse 
to enforce a forum selection clause if the clause in question is “unreasonable or unjust.”962 
As explained by the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, forum selection clauses 
will be considered unreasonable if: 
“(1) their formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the complaining party 
‘will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court’ because of the grave 
inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of 
the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) their enforcement would 
contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.”963 
                                                                  
960 MULLENIX, L. S., 1988, supra note 761, p. 302. 
961 Cited in WOODWARD JR, W. J., 2015, supra note 134, p. 918 (emphasis in the original). Reportedly, this bizarre 
notice was posted, of all places, outside of a Texan burger franchise. See also CANIS, E., 2015, supra note 295, 
p. 130, citing Consumer Reports (“[t]here is probably not a single adult in the United States who is not subject to at 
least one binding mandatory arbitration clause”). 
962 GOULD, M., 2015, supra note 860, pp. 680–681. 
963 Allen v. Lloyd's of London [1996], 94 F. 3d, 923–932, p. 928.  
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Of course, due to the “strong public policy” in favor of enforcing these clauses, any of 
these exceptions must be construed in a very strict and narrow manner.964 
7.7.1 Fraud or Overreaching 
A party seeking to escape a forum selection clause arguing that she was a victim of fraud is 
under a heavy burden. Due to the policy considerations that serve as the basis for the 
presumption in favor of these clauses, the standard of proof in this regard is quite high. 
As a result, the party is required to prove that not only was the contract itself illegally 
procured, but also that the forum selection clause within the agreement was specifically 
fraudulent.965 
In Brodsky, the Court dismissed the allegations of fraud brought forward by the plaintiffs 
based on, among other reasons, the fact that “general allegations that the contract as a whole 
was tainted by fraudulent inducement are insufficient to invalidate a forum selection clause 
where, as here, a plaintiff has not alleged fraudulent inducement with respect to the forum 
selection clause itself.”966 The Court reasoned that if “general” fraud was sufficient, then 
“plaintiffs could easily thwart the parties' reasonable expectations regarding forum selection 
simply by alleging fraud in their complaint.”967 
The position of the courts regarding fraud was further demonstrated in the 1998 Afram 
Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, before the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.968 Here the Court 
explained that, following the instructions of the Supreme Court, forum selection clauses 
should be enforced “in the interests of international comity and out of deference to the 
integrity and proficiency of foreign courts." The Court then explained that if the validity of 
the forum selection clause was determined by “what we believe to be the merits of the 
underlying contract,” then the stated goal of comity would be subverted, “by making a merits 
inquiry that the Supreme Court has determined is best left to the forum selected by the parties.” 
969  The Court then added: 
“Only when we can discern that the clause itself was obtained in contravention of 
the law will the federal courts disregard it and proceed to judge the merits. Because, 
in this case, we can draw an inference of an illegally obtained forum-selection clause 
only if we judge the merits of the contract — that is, the movants have offered no 
                                                                  
964 GOULD, M., 2015, supra note 860, pp. 680–681. 
965 JACKSON, E., 2001, supra note 867, pp. 378–379. 
966 Brodsky v. Match.com LLC [2009], p. 3. 
967 ibid., p. 3. 
968 Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens [1998], 145 F. 3d, 298–305. 
969 ibid., p. 300. 
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evidence that the clause itself was obtained as a result of fraud or overreaching — 
we cannot disregard it on that ground.”970 
As the Utah Supreme Court expressed in a 2014 case, the majority of US courts have 
taken this approach in regards to fraud, requiring that the clause itself, not just the 
contract in general, was procured in a fraudulent fashion.971  
“In other words, the majority approach is tailored to dispel the fear that a party 
could avoid the enforcement of a forum selection clause “by merely alleging fraud or 
coercion in the inducement of the contract at issue.” Thus, under this approach, all 
forum selection clauses are presumed to be valid, even when the validity of the entire 
contract is in question, and even when the validity of the contract is central to the 
suit.”972 
A minority of courts, however, and with which the Utah Supreme Court actually sided, 
argues the opposite position. Courts in Georgia, New York and Tennessee actually tend to 
“allow a plaintiff's claim that the contract was entered into fraudulently to be 
sufficient to render the forum selection clause unenforceable. […] The benefit of this 
approach is that it protects defrauded plaintiffs from being forced to litigate 
fraudulent contracts in a potentially inconvenient forum not of their choosing.”973 
Through this method, weak parties that only agreed to a forum selection clause because it 
was part of the package of terms that was given to them, might be able to obtain some 
degree of protection. Indeed, a party that is forced to travel to a distant forum only to 
argue that she should not even be in that distant forum, might find herself in a very 
difficult position. As the Utah Supreme Court noted, “the application of this approach may 
also result in defrauded plaintiffs being forced to litigate a contract that is ultimately deemed 
fraudulent in a different forum as the result of a provision they never bargained for.”974 
The majority position does, of course, have its merits and reasons. In principle, it makes 
sense that a court in which proceedings were brought in breach of a forum selection 
clause should not have to analyze the validity of the underlying contract. This avoids “the 
task of determining whether a contract is valid at the motion to dismiss stage,” reserving such 
issue “until further discovery can be done, at which point that issue can be adjudicated on its 
merits with the benefit of full discovery.”975  
                                                                  
970 ibid., p. 302. 
971 Energy Claims v. Catalyst Inv. Group [2014], 325 P. 3d, 70–86, p. 84. 
972 ibid., pp. 84–85 
973 ibid., p. 85. 
974 ibid., p. 85. 
975 ibid., p. 85. From a comparative perspective, it is worth noting that this is the approach taken by the Brussels I 
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7.7.2 Grave Inconvenience or Unfairness of the Contractual Forum 
US Courts have set a very high standard for a party to prove that she has been “deprived of 
her day in court” or that the chosen forum is inherently unfair. The Carnival Cruise decision 
showed this much, by not considering that the Shutes’ inconvenience in travelling from 
Washington to Florida was significant enough. As the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit stated in Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., the fact that “[the] Plaintiff is unhappy, in 
retrospect, about the forum it designated is insufficient to warrant a finding that the clauses are 
unenforceable."976  While Dayhoff was a decision dealing with experienced commercial 
parties, the same logic is still applied in regards to more imbalanced contractual relations. 
The zeal of American courts in this regard is easy to understand, as there is a concern that 
a party might voluntarily agree to a forum selection clause, but that might simply regret 
that decision once proceedings are to begin. The problem is, of course, that the language 
of the Dayhoff Court is not really applicable to forum selection clauses that come 
embedded in boilerplate terms, where it can hardly be said that the resisting party 
“designated” a forum, any more than she chose any of the other clauses.  
As a result of this increased burden, courts will often require the presence of some 
additional “aggravating circumstances” in order to refuse the enforcement of the forum 
selection clause. Courts have been sympathetic, for example, to parties whose contracts 
were drafted in a language not known to them, or which forces them to litigate in a 
foreign country.977 
This was precisely the situation that arose in Sudduth v. Occidental Peruana Inc.978 In this 
case, the plaintiffs, US citizens living in Texas, had signed an employment contract with 
Oxy Peruana, an American company, to perform some work in the Peruvian jungle. The 
Spanish version of the contract, which the plaintiffs had been required to sign, included a 
forum selection clause submitting all disputes to Peruvian courts. The plaintiffs sued in 
Texas, arguing that the enforcement of the clause would have effectively deprived them of 
their day in court.979 
Recognizing that the plaintiffs bore a “heavy burden of proof” to prove that the clause was 
unreasonable, the Court considered that this burden had been met, and refused to 
enforce the clause.980 The Court reasoned that the “grave inconvenience or unfairness of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
“The validity of the agreement conferring jurisdiction cannot be contested solely on the ground that the 
contract is not valid” 
976 Dayhoff Inc. v. HJ Heinz Co [1996], 86 F. 3d, 1287–1303, pp. 1297–1298. See also JACKSON, E., 2001, supra 
note 867, p. 379. 
977 DEMPSEY, J., 2011, supra note 748, p. 1203. 
978 Sudduth v. Occidental Peruana, Inc. [1999], 70 F. Supp. 2d, 691–699. 
979 ibid., pp. 693–694. 
980 ibid., p. 695. 
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trying the case in Peru” would indeed, for all practical purposes, deprive the plaintiffs of 
their day in court. The Court then distinguished this situation from the events in The 
Bremen and in Carnival Cruise, since in the case at hand it was two American parties that 
were submitting their dispute to a “remote, alien forum.”981  
Dealing with the issue of the “unfairness” of the selected forum, the Court then argued 
that while the forums selected in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise were “neutral,” the 
Peruvian forum was not, since “the Defendants have contracts in Peru, including a subsidiary 
regularly conducting business in Peru,” which would place the increased costs of litigation 
solely on the plaintiffs.982 Furthermore, the Court considered that the clear differences in 
the bargaining power of the parties (individuals seeking employment on the one side, and 
a corporation conditioning employment to the signing of the contract on the other), made 
it impossible to consider that this had been a truly free agreement.983 The Court 
concluded that the burden that would be placed on the plaintiffs by travelling to Peru to 
litigate this dispute was unacceptable and unfair, as it would require “every American party 
to travel to a foreign country to litigate an essentially local dispute.”984 The Court then also 
denied a motion to dismiss by the defendant on the basis of forum non conveniens.985 
Although the decision of the District Court in Sudduth is a positive one for parties seeking 
to escape an unbargained-for forum selection clause, it does little in the way of creating 
certainty. First, the Court follows a rather strange logic in its analysis of the neutrality of 
the Peruvian forum, seemingly arguing that the fact that one of the parties had a close 
connection with Peru meant that the forum was not neutral, since that party would not 
suffer great economic damages by litigating there. At a glance, the Court seems to be 
arguing that a forum will only be “neutral” if both parties are equally burdened by 
travelling there, so that if one of the parties is significantly closer than the other, then the 
forum will not be “neutral”. This does not really make sense, as it would force parties to 
only choose foreign forums with which they are not familiar, or from which they are 
equally distant. What is more, the decision does little to explain why the burden of the 
plaintiffs in Carnival Cruise, travelling from Washington state to Florida, the latter being 
the place of business of the Carnival Cruise company, was not equally significant to 
consider the clause unreasonable. The same happens in the case of any consumer or small 
business transaction, where the bargaining power disparities would be just as severe, if 
not more, and where forum selection clauses are routinely enforced.  
More in line with Carnival Cruise was the decision of a West Virginia District Court that 
dismissed the suit of a patient that, having had surgery in Germany, had agreed to a 
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forum selection clause in her medical services contract granting jurisdiction to German 
courts.986 The Court considered that since “a clearly worded forum-selection clause” had been 
“clearly conveyed” to the plaintiff, then she could not escape its application solely on the 
basis of the “mere inconvenience” involved in travelling to Germany.987 The Court in this 
case did not follow the ideas put forward in Sudduth regarding neutrality, and dismissed 
the proceedings brought in contravention of the forum selection clause. 
Proving that the law of the chosen forum will deprive a party of her day in court is 
perhaps even more difficult than demonstrating the circumstances that, for example, 
make a trip there substantially inconvenient. As the Brodsky Court explained: 
“‘[I]t is not enough that the foreign law or procedure merely be different or less 
favorable than’ that of the forum in which plaintiffs brought their claims. […] 
Similarly, that the applicable statute of limitations for certain claims may be shorter 
in […the contractual forum] cannot […] render the forum selection clause 
unenforceable. […] Furthermore, even an expired limitations period in the selected 
forum would be insufficient to render the clause unenforceable. As courts in this 
Circuit have recognized, accepting plaintiffs' statute of limitations argument would 
‘create a large loophole for the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the forum 
selection clause [who could] simply postpone [his] cause of action until the statute 
of limitations has run in the chosen forum and then file [his] action in a more 
convenient forum.’”988 
7.7.3 Public Policy 
Since The Bremen, the Supreme Court has been rather clear and adamant in establishing 
that there is a strong policy in favor of enforcing forum selection clauses.989 The 
importance of this general policy is such that the party seeking to resist the enforcement 
will have to prove a particularly strong public policy reason if she wishes to avoid it. 
Exactly how restricted this public policy exception is was better expressed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Afram Carriers Inc. v. Moeyken, where it stated: 
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“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of such clauses; these days, the barrier has 
been raised: A strong public policy, not just any public policy, is needed to justify 
overcoming the presumption in favor of such clauses.”990 
The standard established by American courts in favor of enforcement of these clauses is 
so high, that some courts have even stated that “upholding the forum selection clause may be 
a greater interest than the interest that the state has in supporting the particular policy” that 
might be violated by its enforcement.991 In Shell v. RW Sturge, for example, a plaintiff 
seeking to prevent the enforcement of a forum selection clause arguing that it violated 
the public policy of the state of Ohio was told by the Court that he had the burden of 
showing that this public policy “outweighs the policies behind ‘supporting the integrity of 
international agreements.’”992 In other words, the plaintiff was not only required to prove 
that the enforcement of the clause was against public policy, but also, and perhaps most 
importantly, that this public policy was somehow more important than that of enforcing 
the clause in question, and that his own meager dispute was more important that the 
integrity of the system of international contracts. 
Despite the high burden placed on the resisting party, there are some cases in which 
public policy considerations allow her to escape enforcement. In Williams v. America 
Online, Inc., for example, a Massachusetts Superior Court denied enforcement of a forum 
selection clause contained in a click-wrap agreement that would force the user to litigate 
in Virginia. The Court held that: 
“Public policy suggests that Massachusetts consumers who individually have 
damages of only a few hundred dollars should not have to pursue AOL in 
Virginia.”993 
This decision highlights the significant overlap that exists between different exceptions to 
enforcement. It seems to be that the same decision could have been reached by arguing 
that the contractual forum represented a “grave inconvenience” for the party in question, 
or even, more generally, that forcing such a voyage for a small claim was substantially 
unconscionable. 
A similar ruling was delivered by the Appellate Term of the New York Supreme Court in 
Scarcella v. America Online, Inc., where the Court considered that enforcement of the 
forum selection clause would go against the public policy goals of the state of New York. 
Here the Court noted that the plaintiff had sued in a small claims court, and that this 
court had been especially created for litigants “as a low-cost and relatively simple forum 
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available to individuals who were unable to attend court proceedings during the working day.”994 
As a result, and as the Court noted: 
“Enforcement of the forum selection provision in these circumstances would 
frustrate the stated legislative goal of providing a ‘simple, informal and inexpensive 
procedure’ for the disposition of small claims.”995 
Cases such as those mentioned above seem to be in the minority.996 A review of the case 
law shows that, by and large, public policy defenses against enforcement of forum 
selection, even in consumer cases (where protective laws exist almost all across the board) 
tend to fail more often than they succeed.997 
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“The rule of law requires that any persons with a bona fide reasonable 
legal claim must have an effective means of having that claim considered, 
and, if it is justified, being satisfied, and that any persons facing a claim 
must have an effective means of defending themselves.  
[…] 
Frederick the Great supposedly said that ‘Diplomacy without arms is like 
music without instruments’. So is the rule of law without access to the 
courts. If there is no, or only restricted, access to the courts, the 
fundamental underpinning to all forms of dispute resolution systems, 
such as mediation, and even arbitration, falls away.” 
Lord Neuberger.998 
8.1 The Origins of Forum Selection in England 
hroughout its history, the English position towards party autonomy in private 
international law matters has not been static. In fact, even though originally the 
Common Law was receptive to choice of law clauses, courts were not so tolerant of 
the parties’ will when it came to their ability to choose the forum.999 In principle, 
this rejection was grounded on the idea that the jurisdiction of the courts was “to be 
subject only to public and not private control,” meaning forum selection clauses could not 
deprive a court of jurisdiction.1000 
Although these rationales echo those that were used in the United States before forum 
selection clauses were universally accepted, the similarities end there. Unlike their 
American counterparts, English courts have a long(er) history of tolerance towards the 
party’s ability to select the forum. Indeed, the fears that, as we saw in the previous 
section, seemed to infect the American legal tradition, were left behind much faster on 
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the other side of the Atlantic, where, “from an early date [courts] have enforced contractual 
clauses conferring exclusive jurisdiction on foreign tribunals.”1001 
It was in 1796 that a forum selection clause first came to an English court, in the case of 
Gienar v. Meyer.1002 The facts of this case, in which both litigants were foreigners, are 
rather clear: 
“A ship and cargo were confiscated in an English port on its voyage back to The 
Netherlands. Dutch seamen sued their Dutch captain for wages due under a contract 
entered into in Rotterdam. The seamen's contract provided that all disputes should 
be settled by the courts in Rotterdam and specifically provided that the captain was 
not to be sued in foreign countries. In refusing to exercise jurisdiction, the [English] 
court pointed out that since the captain could not pay the wages with his ship and 
cargo confiscated, he might languish in debtor's prison for life. It was thought more 
reasonable to ‘send the parties to their own country there to pursue their remedy.’" 
1003 
Strictly speaking, the Gienar decision seems to be more related to an issue of forum non 
conveniens than forum selection, particularly considering that the parties were not English 
subjects. What is more, the Lord Chief Justice commenced his decision by stating that “no 
persons in this country can by agreement between themselves exclude themselves from the 
jurisdiction of the King's Courts,” albeit noting that “such an agreement between foreigners if 
made in their country and valid according to that law could be enforced in an English Court.”1004 
Despite these words of measure, however, subsequent decisions by the English judicature 
contradict his statement, as “such contractual stipulations between British subjects who were 
domiciled and apparently also resident in England were on principle held valid.”1005 
In the seminal 1878 case of Law v. Garrett, English courts demonstrated their unequivocal 
sympathy towards forum selection, enforcing a clause that granted jurisdiction to a 
Russian court. The reasoning behind this, as presented by Lord Justice Baggly of the 
Court of Appeal, was that if the parties "choose to determine for themselves that they will 
have a forum of their own selection instead of resorting to ordinary courts, a prima facie duty is 
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cast upon the courts to act on such arrangements."1006 Here the court treated the forum 
selection clause as if it was a submission to arbitration, holding that the arbitration 
statute applied.1007 It was certainly a convoluted manner to achieve enforcement, and 
even based on a certain degree of fiction. An arbitration clause is not the same as a forum 
selection clause naming a foreign court; however, the Court of Appeal considered it a 
priority to respect the parties’ intention as expressed in the contract, and to not allow the 
incongruous tolerance of arbitration on the one hand, and rejection of forum selection on 
the other, to get in the way of such goal.1008 
The mindset of the English courts has been that if the parties have agreed upon 
something such as the contractual forum, then the courts should not be used by one of 
them to go against their own agreement. Of course, this general proposition is far from 
being an absolute rule, and exceptions do exist. However, in the same way that The 
Bremen rule in America established a prima facie validity unless strong reasons can be put 
forward to deny the enforcement, under English law it is also required that the resisting 
party puts forward “some good reasons” for not enforcing it.1009 As it was stated in the 1909 
case of Kirchner v. Gruban, a forum selection clause is 
“an agreement by which the parties are bound and upon which the court must act, 
unless for some good cause there is reason to think that the matter ought to be 
determined otherwise than by the tribunal to which the parties have deliberately 
agreed to submit their differences.”1010 
This was also the sentiment manifested by Lord WRIGHT in the 1939 case of Vita Food 
Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., stating: 
“It is true that in questions relating to the conflict of laws rules cannot generally be 
stated in absolute terms but rather as prima facie presumptions. But where there is 
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an express statement by the parties of their intention to select the law of the 
contract, it is difficult to see what qualifications are possible, provided the intention 
expressed is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the 
choice on the ground of public policy."1011  
Although this decision clearly refers to choosing the law of the contract, FARQUHARSON 
has argued that it is also applicable to choice of court agreements, since “it states the 
principle of party autonomy, which encompasses forum-selection clauses.”1012 
As we have seen, and in yet another parallel with the American experience, arbitration 
agreements were regulated before forum selection clauses. It was in 1854 when the 
Common Law Procedure Act established that a court should stay proceedings when they 
had been instituted in contravention of an arbitration agreement between the parties, 
and which, as we saw, was used to enforce forum selection clauses through analogous 
application.1013 Indeed, England’s acceptance of choice of court agreements first became 
possible under the theory (if not downright fiction) that they came under the rules of the 
1889 Arbitration Act. It was not until the 1944 Court of Appeal case of Racecourse Betting 
Control Board v. Secretary of the Air that this fiction was explicitly repudiated. In this case, 
Lord Justice MACKINNON stated: 
“It is, I think, rather unfortunate that the power and duty of the court to stay the 
action was said to be under section 4 of the Arbitration Act, 1889. In truth the 
power and duty arose under a wider principle, namely, that the court makes people 
abide by their contracts and therefore will restrain a plaintiff from bringing an 
action which he is doing in breach of his agreement with the defendant that any 
dispute between them shall be otherwise determined.”1014 
As the above quote clearly shows, the English system, perhaps more so than others, puts a 
special emphasis in the party autonomy principle, favoring the enforcement of private 
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agreements between the parties before other considerations.1015 It is on the basis of this 
principle that, as one commentator noted, the English judicature 
“puts the will of private parties - not the state - at the centre of choice of forum and 
choice of law. The principle is derived not from international law but from free will 
theories of contract law under which contractual obligations flow from the 
agreement of the parties, not the state. At the private international law level, it 
follows that the parties likewise should be free to choose which state's laws will 
govern and which authority should be vested with authority to adjudicate.”1016 
This willingness (if not eagerness) of the English courts to enforce forum selection clauses 
in private contracts is particularly evident in cases where the chosen forum is located in 
England. Indeed, if the contract contains a clause granting jurisdiction exclusively to an 
English court, then  
“once proceedings are commenced in England, it will be very difficult for the 
defendant to obtain a stay (or set aside an order granting leave or permission to 
serve out of the jurisdiction under the Civil Procedural Rules) either according to the 
‘natural forum’ calculus of Spiliada, or by reasons of a lis alibi pendens, even where 
related or identical foreign proceedings are well advanced.”1017 
Although, as we have seen, the English common law possessed a long tradition of 
respecting the will of the parties in regards to forum selection, it was in 1970, in the 
seminal case of The Eleftheria, that the courts, for the first time, “set out in a comprehensive 
and logical manner the principles on which the court will act” in regards to forum selection.1018 
8.2 The Eleftheria and International Forum Selection 
In The Eleftheria, an action for the damages suffered by the cargo carried aboard the M/V 
Eleftheria, was started in England by the cargo interest against the shipowner. “Plaintiffs 
were timber merchants who carried on business in England. Defendants were Greek nationals, 
joint owners of The Eleftheria, a Greek ship registered in Greece, and their principal place of 
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business was Athens. Defendants undertook to ship timber for the plaintiffs from the Rumanian 
port of Galatz to London and Hull.”1019 
Due to labor troubles happening in London and Hull, the cargo was discharged in 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands, with the shipowner then refusing to on-carry the goods to 
England. Because of the shipowner’s refusal, the merchant arranged for the on-carry at 
their own expense, bringing then an action in England against the shipowner for the 
losses he had suffered as a result.1020 
The defendants filed a motion requesting a stay of the action, arguing that there was a 
forum selection clause in the governing bill of lading, and under which proceedings should 
not be brought in England.1021 The clause in question provided: 
 “Clause 3: Jurisdiction. Any dispute arising under this bill of lading shall be decided 
in the country where the carrier has his principal place of business, and the law of 
such country shall apply except as provided elsewhere herein.”1022 
Since the plaintiffs had their principal place of business in Athens, the defendants 
contended that “by the terms of clause 3 of the bills of lading this dispute falls to be decided in 
Greece and in accordance with Greek law.”1023 
The defendants argued that although the Court does have “a discretion to grant or refuse 
stay,” it should always grant that stay unless “the plaintiffs establish strong grounds for 
refusal. The onus is upon the plaintiffs to establish such grounds.”1024 Although the plaintiffs 
conceded that the onus was on them, they replied that the English forum was much more 
convenient for the case, and that Romanian law would have to applied by a Greek court 
(since the port of shipment was in Romania), which would complicate the proceedings.1025 
Once he conceded that this was a dispute that, on the basis of the bill of lading, should be 
submitted to a Greek court, BRANDON J. then analyzed whether his Court should exercise 
its discretion to not stay the proceedings. After reviewing the available authorities on the 
matter, he set out the applicable principles as follows: 
“(1) Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a 
foreign court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the English court, assuming the 
claim to be otherwise within its jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a 
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discretion whether to do so or not. (2) The discretion should be exercised by granting 
a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is shown. (3) The burden of proving such 
strong cause is on the plaintiffs. (4) In exercising its discretion the court should take 
into account all the circumstances of the particular case. (5) In particular, but 
without prejudice to (4), the following matters, where they arise, may properly be 
regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more 
readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of 
trial as between the English and foreign courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign 
court applies and, if so, whether it differs from English law in any material respects. 
(c) With what country either party is connected, and how closely. (d) Whether the 
defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking 
procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to 
sue in the foreign court because they would: (i) be deprived of security for their claim; 
(ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not 
applicable in England; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be 
unlikely to get a fair trial.”1026 
After reviewing the arguments put forward by the plaintiffs, and finding them 
unsatisfactory, BRANDON J. ruled that holding the parties to their bargain was an essential 
principle for English courts, and which should not be dismissed simply by considerations 
of convenience.1027 Since, in his opinion, the factors put forward by both parties “balance 
each other,” he concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to overcome their heavy burden of 
proof, as a result of which a stay of proceedings had to be granted.1028 
Although the Court’s position might be seen as quite favorable to the enforcement of 
forum selection clauses, there were those who did not think it went far enough. As one 
commentator noted soon after the decision:  
“The result [in The Eleftheria] is undoubtedly equitable and logical. If the plaintiff 
had discharged his onus however, and the court let the proceedings in England 
continue, the result would not have been equitable and would have amounted to a 
negation of the original intention of both parties. The fact remains that it was 
possible for the plaintiffs to have complied with their onus and this, as stated above, 
would have made a mockery of the law of contracts between persons of different 
states.”1029 
                                                                  
1026 ibid., pp. 99–100. 
1027 ibid., p. 103 (“[i]t is essential that the court should give full weight to the prima facie desirability of holding the 
plaintiffs to their agreement. […] [T]he court must be careful not just to pay lip service to the principle involved, and 
then fail to give effect to it because of a mere balance of convenience”). 
1028 ibid., p. 105. 
1029 BARRIE, G. N., 1970, supra note 1019, p. 97. 
  
286 
Forum Selection in England 
This criticism seems mistaken. Even though in a case like The Eleftheria, where the parties 
were both experienced merchants, holding them to their word is essential, not leaving a 
safety valve in place would be an error. In situations where, for example, as BRANDON J. 
recognized, justice may not be served in the contractual forum, or evidence may be too 
hard to obtain there, the courts should not grant a stay. It would not be a smart idea to 
force the courts to act automatically before forum selection clauses, without at least 
analyzing some basic factors such as those put forward in this case. The decision in The 
Eleftheria was, quite simply, the correct one.  
The principles enunciated in The Eleftheria were later approved by the Court of Appeal in 
The El Amria, also a maritime case, and which dealt with an Egyptian vessel carrying cargo 
from Egypt to the United Kingdom .1030 Upon discharge of the cargo in Liverpool, it 
became apparent that some of it had deteriorated during the voyage. The receivers 
commenced proceedings against the shipowners, who in turn applied for a stay of 
proceedings, relying on a forum selection clause contained in the governing bill of lading. 
The clause in question read as follows: 
“Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall be decided in the country where 
the carrier has his principal place of business and the law of such country shall apply 
except as provided elsewhere herein.” 
Since the carrier had its principal place of business in Alexandria, Egypt, the shipowners 
argued that the appropriate court for deciding the matter would be the Commercial Court 
of Alexandria. When the Court sided with the plaintiffs, and refused to stay proceedings, 
the defendants filed an appeal. 
Applying the test laid out by BRANDON J. in The Eleftheria, the Court of Appeal confirmed 
the decision, refusing to stay proceedings, on the basis that the proceedings would be just 
too difficult to conduct in Egypt. This based on the fact that the large majority of the 
evidence was located in England, and thus would not be readily available if the trial was to 
be conducted in Egypt. Furthermore, since the plaintiffs had also named the Liverpool 
port authorities in their claim (due to some delays affecting the discharge), enforcing the 
forum selection clause would open the door to conflicting decisions issued by the English 
and the Egyptian courts.1031 
The role that The Eleftheria has had in English law is significant, as it highlighted the 
importance of complying with the terms of the contract. Even though Court in The 
Eleftheria conceded that it was possible for the plaintiff to conduct the proceedings in 
violation of the forum selection clause, it also made it clear that it was her duty to prove 
that this was necessary. It clarified, in other words, that there was a prima facie validity of 
                                                                  
1030 Aratra Potato Co Ltd. v. Egyptian Navigation Co. (The El Amria) [1981], 2 Lloyd's Rep, 119. 
1031 COLLIER, J. G., Conflict of Laws, 2004, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 97–98. 
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forum selection clauses, and that it was the resisting party who had the duty to convince 
the courts that such validity should not be upheld. The case further demonstrated the 
importance attached to the parties’ intentions as manifested in their contracts, raising it 
to the level of an essential concern for the courts. 
The importance given to the will of the parties in this decision is also manifested when it 
comes to enforcing clauses that confer jurisdiction to English courts, even when the 
parties do not really have any connection with that forum. Their prima facie validity is 
such, that even the Court in The Eleftheria mentioned such cases to illustrate that the 
inconvenience that they may create for the parties is not enough to jeopardize their 
validity.1032 As Lord WATKINS explained in The Hida Maru: 
“When people or companies who live and who have their offices in foreign countries 
decide, their commercial interests having become intertwined, to have any disputes 
which may arise between them governed by English law, and resolved by an 
arbitrator or a Court in England, an English Court should hesitate long before 
turning one of them away from its doors.”1033 
8.3 Policy Considerations Supporting Enforcement 
English courts have given a number of reasons to justify their willingness and eagerness 
to uphold agreements on jurisdiction. First, there is the already mentioned principle of 
ensuring that the terms of the contracts are abided by, “thereby giving effect to the 
expectations of the parties.”1034 As we have seen, one the considerations that lead the 
parties to include forum selection clauses is being able to prepare for eventual litigation, 
so it makes sense that the courts seek to protect that objective. The zeal demonstrated by 
the courts in this regard is quite clear, often showing very little sympathy for parties who 
seem to be trying to avoid the application of the clauses. In The Pioneer Container, for 
example, the Privy Council was not moved by the plaintiff’s contention that pursuing her 
claim in the contractual forum would be impossible due it being time barred there, as well 
as being forced to provide a very large sum of money as security.1035 As COLLIER explains: 
                                                                  
1032 The Eleftheria [1970], p. 104. Brandon J. explained that “[m]any commercial and Admiralty disputes are tried or 
arbitrated in England every year, in which most or all of the evidence comes from abroad […]even though it causes 
inconvenience and expense with regard to bringing witnesses to England and examining them through interpreters.” 
Taking that into consideration, he found that the arguments put forward by the defendants regarding his 
“inconvenience” were unsatisfactory. 
1033 Kuwait Oil Co (KSC) v. Idemitsu Tankers KK (The Hida Maru) [1981], 2 Lloyd's Rep, 510, p. 514. 
1034 FAWCETT, J. J., ‘Trial in England or Abroad: The Underlying Policy Considerations’, 1989, 9 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, no. 2, p. 225. 
1035 The Pioneer Container [1994], 2 AC, 324, pp. 348–349. 
  
288 
Forum Selection in England 
“Having chosen a forum, a party could not then argue that the procedures of that 
forum were disadvantageous, nor that the forum was inappropriate or lacked 
connection with the dispute. Something more is necessary.”1036 
Second, by going against a forum selection clause the courts might inadvertently impose 
on a foreign litigant the “great inconvenience” of having to go to England to defend the 
suit, which in turn would encourage forum shopping.1037 Furthermore, if an English court 
acts in defiance of the jurisdiction clause, it might find itself forced to apply foreign law, 
“which is a time consuming and expensive matter, inconvenient both to the parties and the 
court.”1038 
Third, since forum selection often comes up in an international business context, it is 
important that the courts protect the “certainty which businessmen require as a prerequisite 
for good international business relations.”1039 Of course, this last argument is conditioned to 
situations in which both parties are commercial in nature, or at least evenly matched in 
their bargaining power, and that they are both acting on the international stage.  
The discretionary approach put forward in The Eleftheria, and affirmed in The El Amria, 
continues to be the law of the land, confirmed in numerous cases not only in England, but 
also all over the Commonwealth.1040 In a recent High Court case, for example, after 
reviewing the existing authorities, the Court was clear in the state of the law in regards to 
forum selection: 
“[W]here parties have bound themselves by an exclusive jurisdiction clause effect 
should ordinarily be given to that obligation in the absence of strong reasons for 
departing from it.”1041 
Despite the many similarities that exist between this approach and that present in the 
United States, an important difference exists in English law in regards to consumer 
contracts. Unlike the situation on the other side of the Atlantic, where jurisdiction clauses 
in consumer agreements are prima facie binding and enforceable, the rules in England are 
different. When it comes to our area of interest, international contracts, the Brussels I 
(Recast) Regulation, which also applies in England establishes: 
“A consumer may sue the supplier where either is domiciled. Where the supplier is 
not domiciled in a contracting state but has a branch, agency or other establishment 
                                                                  
1036 COLLIER, J. G., 2004, supra note 1031, p. 98. 
1037 FAWCETT, J. J., 1989, supra note 1034, p. 226. 
1038 ibid., p. 226. 
1039 ibid., p. 226. 
1040 TANG, Z., ‘Exclusive Choice of Forum Clauses and Consumer Contracts in E-Commerce’, 2005, 1 Journal of 
Private International Law, no. 2, p. 259. 
1041 Impala Warehousing and Logistics (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. v Wanxiang Resources (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. [2015] EWHC, 
1–146, p. 111. 
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in a contracting state, he is deemed to be domiciled there. However, a consumer may 
generally only be sued where he is domiciled. He may also be sued elsewhere by 
agreement. But the normal rules respecting conferring jurisdiction by agreement do 
not apply. An agreement only confers jurisdiction over a consumer if (a) it was 
concluded after the dispute arose or (b) it allows the consumer to bring proceedings 
in a place other than those already indicated or in a member state in which both he 
and the supplier were domiciled or habitually resident when the contract was 
concluded.”1042 
As we have seen, this type of broad protections is not available for all American 
consumers who, by and large, are bound by choice of court clauses included in their 
contracts. It is important to note, however, that these protections established in the 
Brussels I (Recast) Regulation extend only to consumers, and not to other so-called 
“weak” parties that may find themselves bound by a jurisdiction clause. As a result, forum 
selection clauses included in contracts with small commercial parties will be analyzed on 
the basis of the Eleftheria test, without necessarily taking into consideration the 
significant bargaining power discrepancies that may have existed. 
8.4 Denying Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses 
As we have seen, under English law there is a strong presumption for the validity of 
forum selection clauses. While this rule is not absolute, and just like it happens in 
American law, there is a strong burden placed on the resisting party to justify why the 
forum selection clause should not be enforced.1043  
Despite the apparent sanctity of these clauses, however, it is important to note that it is 
not as strong as it would otherwise appear. Indeed, litigation by parties seeking to 
determine where to litigate, in contravention of a forum selection clause, is actually quite 
common. As BELL notes, the existence and frequency of this type of litigation suggests 
four things: 
“[F]irst, the apparent certainty yielded by exclusive jurisdiction and arbitration 
agreements can be overstated [… since] there are legitimate non discretionary 
arguments that may be raised as reasons why a jurisdiction or arbitration clause 
does not apply or should not be enforced. Secondly, some first instance courts, in 
particular, have not always been as faithful as they might have been to the rhetoric 
                                                                  
1042 COLLIER, J. G., 2004, supra note 1031, p. 153. Although COLLIER wrote his book before the Brussels I (Recast) 
entered into force, the rules established in this new version did not change this consumer protection provision. 
1043 ROBERTSON, G. B., ‘Jurisdiction Clauses and the Canadian Conflict of Laws’, 1982, 20 Alberta Law Review, 
no. 2, p. 298. 
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of the authoritative decisions […] as to the very great commercial significance of 
jurisdiction and arbitration agreements. Thirdly, complex multi-party transnational 
disputes may not always yield or lend themselves to the simplicity of the principle of 
enforcing two parties’ agreements as to forum or mode of dispute resolution […] 
Fourthly, and as a general proposition, the extent to which plaintiffs have been 
prepared to commence proceedings in the face of such clauses, and defendants, 
conversely, have strenuously resisted their institution, underlines […] that venue is 
of vital importance in transnational litigation [...] Indeed, the very real commercial 
significance of arbitration and jurisdiction clauses perhaps assists in explaining why 
the theoretical certainty which they should afford in transnational litigation is not 
always evident in practice.”1044 
Parties seeking to escape a forum selection clause can put forward a series of arguments, 
some of them dealing with the agreement itself, others with the circumstances 
surrounding the case.1045 In essence, the grounds on which a party can base their 
resistance are: 
a. There is no jurisdiction agreement, or it is null and void. 
b. The agreement is voidable. 
c. The agreement is overridden by the mandatory law of the forum. 
d. The agreement is no longer binding. 
e. The agreement is not exclusive. 
f. The dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement. 
g. The agreement should not be enforced, in exercise of the court’s discretion.  
8.4.1 There is No Agreement, or it is Void or Voidable. 
Beyond the issue of whether or not there is a contract between the parties, and which goes 
beyond the scope of this book, it is possible for a party to argue that, specifically, the 
contract did not contain a forum selection clause. Since a significant portion of the case 
law on this issue deals with maritime cases, this is a something that will be discussed 
                                                                  
1044 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 282. 
1045 ibid., pp. 283–284. It should be noted that although several of the principles presented below are applicable 
in both national and transnational cases regarding forum selection clauses, in some issues, like labor and 
consumer law, there are different rules. Due to the emphasis of our work in transnational commercial litigation, 
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later. For now, suffice it to say that this is a topic that often comes up in cases involving 
incorporation of one contract into another, and so on and so forth.1046  
When it comes to the “voidability” of the jurisdiction agreement, there is no question that 
an agreement between the parties existed, even in regards to the forum selection clause 
itself. Indeed, the question here is not the existence of the agreement, but rather the fact 
that its existence is tainted by some sort of vice. This is the case, for example, when the 
agreement was the result of fraud, duress, error or overwhelming bargaining power. 
English courts have shown some sympathy for weak plaintiffs who have “agreed” to a 
forum selection clause that forces them to sue abroad. In these cases, the courts have 
been reluctant to hold the plaintiff to his agreement, particularly when the claim is small, 
since they have understood that such an approach might “in practice deny him recourse to 
the courts at all.”1047 It is because of this rationale that, as a country bound by the 
provisions of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation, English courts will give very limited 
effect, if any, to jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance, employment and consumer 
contracts. As we mentioned before, the problem becomes much more difficult when the 
agreement in question is contained in a commercial contract, since in those cases the 
courts are often quick to assume the parties are in more or less of an equal footing. 
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that, unlike what happens under American 
law, the “overweening bargaining power” exception applied to forum selection clauses 
(regardless of the extreme narrowing that it suffered after the Carnival Cruise decision) is 
not at all favored by English courts, who see it as inherently uncertain. Even the 
“fundamental fairness” test contained in the Carnival Cruise decision has seen little to no 
acceptance in the English judicature (not so in the case of other Commonwealth nations, 
who recognize and apply the doctrine of unconscionability). As a result, parties seeking to 
use this argument to resist the enforcement of a forum selection clause, outside of 
consumer, insurance and employment contracts, might find little help from the courts.1048 
Regardless of the specific vice used to attack the validity of the agreement, practitioners 
should bear in mind that unless the attack is launched specifically against the forum 
selection clause, this particular provision will continue to exist even after the avoidance of 
the contract. This is a consequence of the doctrine of separability or severability, and 
according to which 
“jurisdiction (and arbitration) agreements are separate from the ‘host’ agreement in 
which they are found, which means that even if the substantive obligations of the 
                                                                  
1046 ibid., p. 288. 
1047 BISSETT-JOHNSON, A., ‘The Efficacy of Choice of Jurisdiction Clauses in International Contracts in English and 
Australian Law’, 1970, 19 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 4, p. 551. 
1048 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 294. 
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contract are void or voidable, that does not of itself destroy the associated procedural 
obligations. The jurisdiction agreement can only be invalidated on a ground which 
relates to the jurisdiction agreement itself and not merely as a consequence of the 
invalidity of the main agreement.”1049 
This doctrine is, by all accounts, a firmly-established principle in English law. As 
expressed by LONGMORE LJ of the Court of Appeal in Deutsche Bank v Asia Pacific 
Broadband Wireless Communications Inc.: 
“This [doctrine of separability] is uncontroversial both as a matter of domestic law 
[…] and as a matter of European law […]. It follows that disputes about the validity 
of the contract must, on the face of it, be resolved pursuant to the terms of the clause 
[…] It is only if the jurisdiction clause is itself under some specific attack that a 
question can arise whether it is right to invoke the jurisdiction clause. Examples of 
this might be fraud or duress alleged in relation specifically to the jurisdiction clause. 
Another example might be if the signatures to the agreement were alleged to be 
forgeries, although no authority has so far so stated. Even in such a case someone has 
to decide whether the signatures were in fact forged. It might well be thought that a 
mere allegation to that effect could not have the effect of rendering a jurisdiction 
clause inapplicable.”1050  
This principle was also enshrined under Section 7 of the 1996 Arbitration Act: 
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or 
was intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall 
not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement 
is invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for 
that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement.” 
While no similar express provision exists in regards to jurisdiction clauses, it is 
understood that the Common Law also applies this rule to them. As Justice COLMAN of 
the High Court noted in IFR Limited v. Federal Trade SPA, the doctrine that applies to 
arbitration agreements should also, mutatis mutandis, be extended to forum selection 
clauses: 
“Is there any relevant difference between an agreement to refer one's future disputes 
to arbitration and an agreement to refer such disputes to a particular court? Both 
agreements have the same purpose in the context of the matrix contract. So the 
question has to be whether the policy of the law reflects some intrinsic characteristic 
                                                                  
1049 MERRETT, L., ‘Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code for Jurisdiction Agreements?’, 
2009, 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 3, p. 548. 
1050 Deutsche Bank AG & Ors v Asia Pacific Broadband Wireless Communications Inc. & Anor. [2008], 2 CLC, 520, 
pp. 530–531. See also Mackender and Others v Feldia A. G. and Others [1967], 2 QB, 590. 
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of arbitration as distinct from other forms of dispute resolution. Although, with a 
single exception, the cases in dispute have been confined to consideration of the 
separability of agreements to arbitrate, there would seem to be no reason in principle 
why as a matter of a policy of the law it should be more desirable to preserve an 
arbitration agreement than to preserve a jurisdiction agreement. 
[…] I conclude that there is no conceptual basis for distinguishing the policy 
applicable to the effect of the jurisdiction agreement from that applicable to an 
arbitration agreement, and that in English law the same principle of separability 
therefore applies to a jurisdiction clause as to an arbitration clause.”1051  
This doctrine of separability is based on fairly straightforward reasons, and which actually 
inform most of the rules regarding choice of forum. Through this doctrine, the legislator 
shows a strong preference for the validity of jurisdiction clauses, actually establishing 
much more limited grounds under which to question their validity vis à vis those used to 
attack the host agreement.1052 This follows a simple logic, and which goes to the mindset 
that is presumed the parties were in at the time the contract was made. There is a certain 
presumption that  
“if one were to have asked the parties to the contract whether they intended the 
nominated court to have jurisdiction even though the substantive contract were 
disputed, they would surely have given an affirmative answer, for it is improbable 
that they intended the court to have jurisdiction only to find that the substantive 
contract was valid."1053  
Indeed, it seems to be a fair assumption that the parties wanted the selected court to have 
jurisdiction in regards to all the possible issues that might arise regarding the contract. 
This general presumption that the chosen court should also rule on the validity of both 
the contract and of the clause itself, was also confirmed in the recent House of Lords case 
of Fiona Trust v Privalov. Here, Lord HOPE worded this issue as follows: 
“There is no sign here […] that the parties intended that the disputes which were to 
be determined in accordance with the laws of England and be decided by the English 
courts were not to include disputes about the charter's validity. The simplicity of the 
wording is a plain indication to the contrary. The arbitration clause which follows is 
to be read in that context. It indicates to the reader that he need not trouble himself 
with fussy distinctions as to what the words ‘arising under’ and ‘arising out of’ may 
mean. Taken overall, the wording indicates that arbitration may be chosen as a one-
stop method of adjudication for the determination of all disputes. Disputes about 
                                                                  
1051 In IFR Limited v Federal Trade SPA [2001] EWHC, 519.  
1052 MERRETT, L., 2009, supra note 1049, p. 549. 
1053 BRIGGS, A., Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 2008, Oxford University Press, p. 79. 
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validity, after all, are no less appropriate for determination by an arbitrator than 
any other kind of dispute that may arise.”1054 
8.4.2 The Agreement Overrides the Mandatory Rules of the Forum 
One of the few cases in which we find an exception to the general policy favoring the 
enforcement of forum selection clauses occurs when the agreement seeks to escape the 
application of mandatory rules. While the courts have often expressed their disapproval 
of being used as tools for the parties to go back on their words, or as assistants in a 
contractual breach, they also refuse to aid a party in avoiding the application of 
mandatory law by seeking a different forum. As stated by BYRNE J. in the Australian case 
of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. White: 
"It is undesirable that parties should, by entering into an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement, be able to circumvent a legislative scheme established by parliament to 
protect investors purchasing interests or prescribed interests. Put more positively, 
the statutes creating these standards of commercial behaviour for persons doing 
business in this jurisdiction do not exempt foreign corporations. Moreover, the policy 
behind them would not be served if exemption might be achieved by inserting 
stipulations as to foreign law or forums."1055 
This is an issue that, as we will see later, often becomes relevant in regards to liability. 
When the law has established a mandatory liability system, setting minimum levels for 
which a party can be held liable, English courts will not look kindly on forum selection 
clauses that aim to escape their application. Although it will be analyzed in detail later, a 
relevant case on this topic is that of The Hollandia.1056 In this case, which dealt with the 
liability of the carrier under a bill of lading, the House of Lords refused to enforce a forum 
selection clause granting jurisdiction to a court in Amsterdam, because the effect of such 
enforcement would have been that the liability of the carrier (regulated in England by the 
Hague-Visby Rules) would be lessened beyond the legal limits established under English 
law. As Lord DENNING stated in the appeal case that preceded the House of Lords decision: 
                                                                  
1054 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] Bus. L.R., 1719, p. 1729. 
1055 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v White; ex parte The Society of Lloyd's [1999], 2 VR, 681, pp. 704–705. In this 
case, as explained by KEYES, “the defendant challenged the validity of the exclusive jurisdiction clause directly, asserting 
that the third party which had invoked the exclusive jurisdiction clause had procured the jurisdiction agreement with a 
view improperly to ‘shielding itself’ from the effect of legislation, including the Australian Trade Practices Act and 
companies legislation, and that therefore the clause was void as being contrary to public policy, or unconscionable” 
(KEYES, M., ‘Jurisdiction under the Hague Choice of Courts Convention: Its Likely Impact on Australian Practice’, 
2009, 5 Journal of Private International Law, no. 2, p. 202). 
1056 The Hollandia [1983], 1 AC, 565. 
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“The reason [for denying the request to stay proceedings] is because there is a 
higher public policy to be considered - and that is the public policy which demands 
that, in international trade, all goods carried by sea should be subject to uniform 
rules governing the rights and liabilities - and the limitation of liability - of the 
parties. They should not vary according to the particular country or place in which 
the dispute is tried out. So many persons are concerned down the chain - buyers and 
sellers, bankers and insurers, indorsees and consignees - that each should know what 
the rules are - without having to go by the small print in any particular bill of lading. 
Parties should not by any device, directly or indirectly, be able to contract out of the 
rules.”1057 
The public policy considerations that inform the English approach towards mandatory 
rules, however, will not override a jurisdiction agreement when the chosen court is 
located in a Member State of the European Union, or in a contracting state to the Brussels 
or Lugano Convention.1058 Indeed, as it was ruled by the European Court of Justice in 
Sanicentral GmbH v. Collin:  
“[Choice of court agreements that fall within the scope of the Brussels or 
Lugano Conventions] must be considered valid even in cases in which they would 
have been regarded as void under the national law in force at the time when the 
contract was entered into.”1059 
Clearly, if The Hollandia was to be decided today, on the basis of the Sanicentral decision, 
then the result would have been different. The House of Lords would have been bound to 
enforce the forum selection clause, on the basis of EU public policy. 
The problem that exists in regards to mandatory rules, however, is that, as JUENGER 
observed, “up to now no one has been able to delineate criteria that would tell us, with some 
precision, what rules qualify for the special treatment this class demands.”1060 This creates 
some degree of uncertainty in the application of the doctrine, as it will often be the case 
that the parties will not have clarity as to which of the rules that are being overridden by 
their forum selection clause might be considered “mandatory enough” to warrant 
displacing the jurisdictional agreement. This is not a minor concern, as a failure to clearly 
define what is to be seen as “mandatory” could create an opportunity for parties seeking 
to resist a forum selection clause to simply argue that mandatory rules are being violated. 
                                                                  
1057 The Hollandia [1982] QB, 872, p. 884. Since The Hollandia did not distinguish between choice of court and 
arbitration clauses, it has been understood that its principles are also applicable to arbitration; however, recent 
cases seem to go against this general understanding, so that “the principles of The Hollandia will not be applied to 
arbitration agreements and that arbitration agreements will be enforced irrespective of their effect on substantive 
obligations” (SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 162). 
1058 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 296. 
1059 Case 25-79, Sanicentral GmbH v. René Collin [1979] ECR, 3423, p. 3431. 
1060 Cited in BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 297. 
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Of course, the landscape is not completely blurry, and certain types of laws are seen as 
more likely to be “mandatory” than others. Although an American decision, the 
reflections presented in the dissenting opinion of Judge WISDOM in the 1970 appeal of 
The Bremen shed some light on this topic, by giving an example of such laws: 
“In cases of bankruptcy, divorce, successions, real rights, and regulation of public 
authorities, for example, courts cannot remit the dispute to a foreign forum lest a 
foreign court render a decree conflicting with our ordering of these affairs.”1061 
The cases that WISDOM points at are clearly those in which essential social values are 
concerned. While this is not an ideal method to determine what is mandatory, it is 
perhaps a step in the right direction. Furthermore, WISDOM’s words are also useful in the 
sense that they shed some light on the reasoning behind the acceptance of mandatory 
rules as a way to stop the enforcement of a forum selection clause. Indeed, there seem to 
be some cases that can only be properly tried in a single, specific forum or jurisdiction. If, 
by agreement, these cases are removed from that proper forum and taken to another, 
then the chances of obtaining an appropriate resolution, and which does not conflict with 
the inherently national “ordering of these affairs,” are dramatically reduced. 
8.4.3 The Agreement No Longer has any Efficacy 
Unlike what happens in cases in which the agreement is void or voidable, when the 
voidability existed ab initio, the issue of the continuing efficacy deals with situations in 
which even though the agreement was valid at the onset, it lost its efficacy. This is a 
situation that, cases of frustration notwithstanding, mostly arises as a result of the 
conduct of the parties after they entered into the contract.1062 
A fairly clear-cut case of a situation in which a party might find herself unable to enforce a 
forum selection clause occurs when through her actions, before the requested 
enforcement, she submitted herself to the jurisdiction of a non-chosen court. Of course, a 
party will not be understood to have submitted herself to this jurisdiction simply by 
appearing for the sole purpose of contesting the jurisdiction by seeking a stay or 
proceedings.1063 The courts will understand that a party voluntarily submitted herself to 
their jurisdiction if, for example, they file cross-claims or a defense on the merits against 
the claim presented against her, since this demonstrates a willingness on her part to 
conduct “proper” litigation in that specific forum.1064 
                                                                  
1061 In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH [1970], 428 F. 2d, 888–912, p. 906 Also cited in BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 
1015, p. 298. 
1062 ibid., pp. 302–303. 
1063 BRIGGS, A., 2008, supra note 1053, p. 314. 
1064 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 303.  
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This principle is also manifested in Article 26 (1) of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation, 
regarding implicit choice of forum, and which in the relevant part provides that: 
“Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Regulation, a court of a 
Member State before which a defendant enters an appearance shall have 
jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where appearance was entered to contest the 
jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction […].”1065  
There is a clear desire on the part of the legislator to prevent one of the parties from using 
the forum selection clause as an “ace in the hole,” saving it until the very last minute, in 
case things go awry for him. It would certainly be unfair if a party was allowed to present 
himself as a litigant in a proceeding, only to then backtrack his position and claim the 
court never had jurisdiction to hear the claim. It is precisely to prevent these problems 
that English courts have a rather brief window within which a party should apply for a 
stay of proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. In The Biskra, for example, SHEEN J. 
highlighted this notion, stating that: 
"An application for a stay on grounds that the parties have agreed to submit the 
dispute to a foreign Court should be brought without delay after service of the 
writ."1066 
He would later reiterate this general idea in The Traugutt, where he stated that: 
"When defendants to an action commenced in this Court seek an order that the 
action be stayed in order that the dispute can be resolved in a Court in another 
jurisdiction it is very important that their application be heard without delay so that 
the proceedings in the appropriate Jurisdiction can proceed."1067 
Following this general rule established in The Traugutt:  
“The court has jurisdiction to interfere, whenever there is vexation or oppression, to 
prevent the administration of justice being perverted for an unjust end, and for this 
purpose to stay or dismiss an action or other proceedings, or to restrain the 
institution or continuation of proceedings in foreign courts or the enforcement of 
foreign judgments.”1068 
                                                                  
1065 The Brussels Regulation (Recast) replaces Council Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels 1) as of January 2015. On 
some of the changes, See, generally, DYRDA, Ł., Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters under the Regulation No 
1215/2012 – Between Common Grounds of Jurisdiction and Divergent National Rules, in Larionova, J. et al. (eds.), 
The Interaction of National Legal Systems: Convergence or Divergence?, 2013. 
1066 Cited in BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 303. 
1067 Cited in MARGOLIS, R., ‘Delayed Applications for Stay of Proceedings in Shipping Cases’, 1992, 13 Singapore 
Law Review, p. 170. 
1068 FARQUHARSON, I. M., 1974, supra note 750, p. 93. 
  
298 
Forum Selection in England 
The rules of The Traugutt were later confirmed, again by SHEEN J., in The Sidi Bishr, yet 
another maritime case, regarding an issue of forum non conveniens, and in which the 
actions of the party seeking to remove the case from the jurisdiction of the English courts 
could be seen as deceptive or abusive. This case dealt with a collision action in which the 
plaintiffs arrested the M/V Sidi Bishr in England on July 29th, 1985, four and a half years 
after the collision involving a sister ship of the Sidi Bishr. On October 13th of the next 
year, over a year after the arrest and service of the writ in rem, the defendant applied for a 
stay, arguing that England was not the most appropriate forum, and that in fact Egypt 
was a more natural forum for these proceedings. While the judge agreed with the 
contention that England was not the best forum, he declined to stay the proceedings, 
because the motion to stay had been presented much too late.1069 The reasoning behind 
the Court’s decision was simple:    
“The parties in The Sidi Bishr had already incurred considerable costs in preparing 
for the action in England before the application for stay was made. In particular, 
both sides had filed ‘preliminary acts’, although pleadings had not yet been 
exchanged, nor had there been discovery. Also, importantly, the judge was concerned 
that the defendants did not seriously desire that the action be tried in Egypt; rather, 
he was of the opinion that the application for stay was merely a tactic to make the 
plaintiff's prosecution of their claim more difficult.”1070 
Here the Court once again seems to have put as a guiding principle that the justice system 
cannot be used as a tool for the parties to avoid fulfilling their commitments. And so, 
while courts will honor and enforce forum selection clauses, they will not do so when the 
motivation of the party is nefarious. 
While we might agree that there is a certain moral reasoning behind the court preventing 
a party to allege lack of jurisdiction much too late, whether or not that is the legal 
foundation of the decision is up for debate. Indeed, as BELL has noted, it has been made 
fairly clear that “it is not open to the Court to conclude that the conduct of the defendants falls 
short of waiver but is so ‘reprehensible’ that the Court will decline to enforce the contract as a 
matter of discretion.”1071 In other words, the court will not be able to “punish” the resisting 
party for the (im)moral connotations of her conduct by enforcing the forum selection 
clause, as an actual objective behavior will also be necessary.  
                                                                  
1069 MARGOLIS, R., 1992, supra note 1067, p. 169. 
1070 ibid., pp. 169–170. 
1071 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 305. 
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8.4.4 The Nature of the Jurisdiction Agreement 
This exception refers to cases in which the resisting party argues that although there is a 
valid forum selection clause, it is not exclusive. In other words, the argument of this party 
will be that the forum selection clause only represents a submission to the jurisdiction of 
the designated court, but that it does not prevent the parties from seeking redress 
elsewhere.1072 This is a fundamental distinction, since although  non-exclusive agreement 
will mean that if sued, the defendant will not have any arguments against the jurisdiction 
of the court, it also means that the parties will be able to start proceedings in any other 
court of competent jurisdiction.1073   
This is an issue that the drafters of the contract must be especially careful with, as failure 
to make their intentions clear will result in countless difficulties if they wish to seek a stay 
of proceedings when the other party has commenced them in the “wrong” court. Needless 
to say, clients can suffer great losses as a result of careless wording. 
In an ideal world, parties would draft clauses that leave no room for doubt, such as the 
following: 
“Jurisdiction: The parties to this contract agree that the courts of the city of 
London shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any and all disputes that arise 
out or in connection to this contract.” 
Outside of the type of clarity exemplified in the clause above, and which leaves no doubt 
as to its meaning, there are no magical or foolproof formulas that one can be certain will 
be construed as exclusive by the courts. There are, in other words, no rules set within the 
English system requiring a specific language being used for a clause to be deemed 
“exclusive.”1074 The care that is to be displayed by the drafters is further required by the 
fact that, unlike the situation in other countries, under the Common Law there is no 
dominant presumption in regards to whether jurisdiction agreements are to be seen as 
exclusive or non-exclusive in case of a disagreement between the parties.  
Indeed, a study of the available case law shows that when the clause is not altogether 
clear, it will be a matter of contractual construction or interpretation whether, based on 
the proper law of the contract, the submission to the jurisdiction will be considered as 
exclusive.1075 The majority of cases seem to suggest that the courts are free to decide how 
                                                                  
1072 ibid., p. 305. 
1073 BORCHERS notes that Civilian commentators often refer to “prorogation agreements” to refer to non-exclusive 
clauses, and “derogation agreements” in the case of exclusive clauses. Due to our focus on the Common Law, we 
will use the exclusive/non-exclusive terminology (BORCHERS, P. J., 1992, supra note 946, p. 56). 
1074 BRIGGS, A., 2008, supra note 1053, p. 112. 
1075BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 306 . 
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to interpret the jurisdictional clause, based on the circumstances surrounding the 
contract.  
This “pro-construction” position has been adopted in a number of cases. A very significant 
decision comes from the 1989 Court of Appeal case of Sohio Supply Co. v Gatoil (USA) 
Inc.1076 In this case, the contract in question contained the following clause:  
“Governing Law. 
This agreement shall be governed by the Laws of England. Under the jurisdiction of 
the English courts without recourse to arbitration.”1077 
As proceedings had been started in Texas, the Court of Appeal was tasked with, among 
other duties, determining whether this was an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Despite the 
obvious absence of any word that might indicate exclusivity, Justice STAUGHTON 
considered that the submission was indeed exclusive, reasoning that: 
“The question is one of the construction of this contract and nothing more. It is, I 
think, part of the matrix background, or surrounding circumstances, whichever term 
one chooses to use, that this was a contract made between sophisticated business 
men who specifically chose their words as to English jurisdiction for the purpose of 
this contract. It is not a consumer contract on a printed form, or anything like that. 
To my mind, it is manifest that these business men intended that clause to apply to 
all disputes that should arise between them. I can think of no reason at all why they 
should choose to go to the trouble of saying that the English courts should have non-
exclusive jurisdiction. I can think of every reason why they should choose that some 
court, in this case the English court, should have exclusive jurisdiction. Then, both 
sides would know where all cases were to be tried. It may be that in some other types 
of case, such as a policy of insurance, there is a reason for providing for nonexclusive 
jurisdiction. I can see none here. I am not sure that I can detect what precisely the 
reason was for choosing England. The parties had chosen English law; it may be that 
they thought that the best place for English law to be applied was an English court; it 
may be that they even thought that English courts were a good thing in their own 
right – I do not know. It may be that they wanted to join the 28% of cases in the 
Commercial Court where both sides came from overseas; or it may be that they just 
wanted to choose a neutral forum. But in my judgment, that was their choice.”1078 
                                                                  
1076 Sohio Supply Co v Gatoil (USA) Inc. [1989], 1 Lloyd's Rep, 588. 
1077 ibid. 
1078 ibid. See also S. & W. Berisford Plc. and Another v New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1990], 2 QB, 631, pp. 636–637 
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It should be noted that the Sohio decision, as well as what it means for English law, has 
been interpreted in different manner. Indeed, while TANG argues that under English law 
the way in which the clause will be understood (whether exclusive or not) will be a matter 
of construction, BRIGGS argues that this is only one of several doctrines that have been 
embraced and adopted by the courts. TANG sees of the Sohio decision as establishing that 
“whether or not a jurisdiction clause is exclusive depends on its true construction and whether 
the clause obliges the parties to resort to the relevant jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the 
word ‘exclusive’ is used.” BRIGGS, on the other hand, argues that Sohio actually demonstrates 
that “there is a general presumption in favour of exclusive jurisdiction if the nominated court 
would have had jurisdiction in any event without regarding to the clause,” distinguishing such 
doctrine from those in which it has been held that this issue is a matter of construction. 
In our view, while BRIGGS is correct in his understanding of the decision reflecting but one 
of the different criteria that have been used by the courts, he is incorrect in suggesting 
that there is actually a presumption in favor of exclusive jurisdiction.1079 Indeed, except 
for BRIGGS, the fact that this is a matter of construction of the contract seems to be rather 
settled among commentators and the courts.1080 
Although there have been cases in which the courts have ruled that, unless the opposite is 
proven, the forum selection clause shall be presumed as exclusive, in the end even those 
cases also end up being decided based on issues of construction. What is more, English 
courts have not been favorable to attempts to establish a presumption of exclusivity. A 
good example of this comes from the case of Deutsche Bank v. Highland Crusader, a case 
that was later reversed on appeal. In this case, Justice BURTON seemed to argue for the 
existence of a presumption of exclusivity, stating: 
“Where there is a contractual non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, a party will 
ordinarily act vexatiously and oppressively in pursuing proceedings in the non-
contractual jurisdiction in parallel with proceedings in the contractual jurisdiction, 
unless there are exceptional reasons, not foreseeable at the time when the 
contractual jurisdiction was agreed.”1081 
Justice BURTON’s position was quite radical. Not only did he seem to be suggesting that 
forum selection clauses should be presumed as exclusive, but also that a party that does 
not abide by this arguably non-exclusive clause is acting “vexatiously and oppressively.” As a 
                                                                  
1079 See TANG, Z. S., Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law, 2014, Routledge, p. 9; 
HAINES, A. D., ‘Choice of Court Agreements in International Litigation:: Their Use and Legal Problems to Which 
they Give Rise in the Context of the Interim Text’, 2002, 18 Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
Preliminary Documents, p. 9 and BRIGGS, A., 2008, supra note 1053, p. 113. 
1080 COLLIER, J. G., 2004, supra note 1031, pp. 96–97. 
1081 Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP, Highland Credit 
Strategies Master Fund, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO LP [2009] EWHC, 73. 
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result, the Court of Appeal went out of its way to illustrate exactly why his reasoning had 
been flawed. As Lord TOULSON, expressed: 
“The starting point for considering the effect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause 
must be the wording of the clause. In terms of contract law, I cannot see how a party 
could ordinarily be said to be in breach of a contract containing a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause merely by pursuing proceedings in an alternative jurisdiction. It is 
conceivable that a jurisdiction clause which is not fully exclusive may nevertheless be 
drafted in such a way as to have the effect of barring parallel proceedings in certain 
circumstances, but that is a matter of individual contractual interpretation. […] 
Consistently with that approach, when it comes to the question whether the 
interests of justice require that an anti-suit injunction should be granted, I do not 
consider that it would be right to start with a general presumption that parallel 
proceedings in a non-selected forum are to be regarded as vexatious or oppressive 
and that there is a burden on the party responsible for prosecuting them to make out 
a strong case to justify them on grounds of matters unforeseeable at the time of the 
contract or other exceptional circumstances.”1082 
Settling the issue of the plaintiff’s behavior being considered “vexatious,” the Court then 
continued with the issue of the presumption of exclusivity. Lord TOULSON explained that 
there were several reasons why establishing such presumption would be a bad idea: 
“First, it is equivalent or at least comes close to treating a non-exclusive clause as an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause once proceedings are commenced under it, whereas there 
is an important difference. An exclusive jurisdiction clause creates a contractual 
right not to be sued elsewhere, although the court has a discretion whether to 
enforce it […] In the case of a non-exclusive clause, either party is prima facie 
entitled to bring proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. Duplication of 
litigation through parallel proceedings is undesirable, but it is an inherent risk where 
the parties use a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause.  
Secondly, I see no cogent reason why it should automatically be assumed that 
nomination of a non-exclusive forum should give priority or dominance to that forum 
over any other. It ignores all variables. The non-exclusive jurisdiction clause may in 
one case represent the result of specific negotiations; in another it may result from 
the use of a standard form of contract. In one case there may be another forum 
which is obviously appropriate applying the normal factors; in another case there 
may not be. 
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Thirdly, there is the important factor of comity to consider. If the English court and 
the foreign court take different views about the weight to be attached to a non-
exclusive jurisdiction clause, I do not see that as a sufficient reason for departing 
from the principle that each court should ordinarily be left to determine the 
suitability of the litigation before it and should be chary of attempting to interfere 
with the other court's decision […].”1083 
The problem for parties who are preparing themselves for litigation is that knowing that 
the courts treat the issue of exclusivity as a matter of construction is, actually, a bit of a 
non-answer. Knowing that whether a certain clause will be deemed exclusive “depends of 
how the contracted is interpreted” sheds little light on the whole issue. As BELL explains, 
“[I]t is not unusual for judges to take different interpretations of the same clause. 
Only the most explicit of exclusive jurisdiction clauses will be totally immune from 
challenge and, even then, a perceived clarity may be lost either in translation or in a 
decision, by the court seised, to examine only one of several language versions of the 
contract.”1084 
Finally, it is important to note that this is an issue that will not arise so easily when it 
comes to forum selection clauses that nominate a court located in a Member State of the 
European Union, or in a contracting state to the Brussels or Lugano Convention. In those 
cases, on the basis of Article 25 (1) of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation, there will be a 
presumption of exclusivity of the forum selection, unless the parties made it clear 
otherwise.1085 The provision in question provides, in the relevant part: 
“If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a 
Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or 
which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or 
those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its 
substantive validity under the law of that Member State. Such jurisdiction shall be 
exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.” 
8.4.5 The Dispute Falls Outside the Scope of the Jurisdiction Clause 
In the field of maritime arbitration, BIMCO, the Baltic and International Maritime 
Council, proposes to its members the use of a clause that, in the relevant part, provides: 
                                                                  
1083 ibid., p. 1052. 
1084 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 309. See also BRIGGS, A., 2008, supra note 1053, p. 115 (“For every 
general argument in favour of interpreting an ambiguous jurisdiction agreement as exclusive, another points in the 
opposite direction.”) 
1085 HAINES, A. D., 2002, supra note 1079, p. 9 
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“English Law, London Arbitration 
…[A]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with this Contract shall be referred to 
arbitration in London in accordance with the Arbitration Act 1996 or any statutory 
modification or re-enactment thereof save to the extent necessary to give effect to 
the provisions of this Clause.”1086 
For most, the use in this clause of the determiner “any” is clear: All the disputes will be 
referred to arbitration. Not “some” disputes; not “most” disputes. All of them. As we will 
see, however, despite appearances of clarity, construction issues, even with clauses like 
this one, still arise. 
A party resisting the enforcement of a forum selection clause might argue that even 
though the selected court (or arbitrator) might have jurisdiction, the dispute in question 
does not fall within the scope of the clause. In other words, that party’s position would be 
that the specific issue at hand is not among those that the forum selection clause was 
aimed to address. It is a topic that often arises when the claim in question refers to not 
only contractual counts, but also “non-contractual counts, whether in tort, restitution, or 
statutory.”1087  
Just as it happened in regards to the exclusive or non-exclusive character of the 
jurisdiction clause, this is a matter of construction that must be resolved by resorting to 
the proper law of the contract.1088 An example of this comes from the 1975 case of The 
Sindh.  In this case, the plaintiff was seeking to escape the application of an exclusive 
French jurisdiction clause by framing his action in England in tort instead of contract. 
Facing this issue, Lord DIPLOCK stated that, indeed, this was an issue of construction, 
based on law of the contract: 
“It being [...] undisputed, that the proper law of the contract which included the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause, was French; it being undisputed that, interpreted 
according to French law, the clause covered claims of the kind which the plaintiffs 
are seeking to put forward in the English action, no question of law, other than the 
purely elementary one of private international law to which I have already referred, 
appears to me to arise.”1089 
Determining the scope of the jurisdiction clause was also one of the issues addressed in 
The Pioneer Container. In this case,  
                                                                  
1086 BIMCO, ‘BIMCO Dispute Resolution Clause 2015’, 
<https://www.bimco.org/en/Chartering/Clauses_and_Documents/Clauses/Dispute_Resolution_Clauses.aspx> 
(last visited 24 July 2015). 
1087 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 309. 
1088 ibid., p. 309. 
1089 Cited in KNIGHT, S. M., ‘Avoidance of Foreign Jurisdiction Clauses in International Contracts’, 1977, 26 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 3, pp. 670–671. 
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“a dispute arose between the plaintiff-owners of goods and the shipowner to whom 
they had been sub-bailed by the carrier to whom they had bailed for carriage by sea. 
The sub-bailment had been on terms which included an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
for the courts of Taiwan, and when the owners sued the shipowners it was held, 
against the owners, that they were bound by the jurisdiction agreement in a claim 
against the sub-bailee as they had consented to sub bailment ‘on any terms’. The 
owners then argued that because the clause in question was worded to apply to 
disputes arising under the bill of lading contract, it was inapplicable to a claim 
founded not on the bill of lading contract, but on the relationship of bailor and sub-
bailee.”1090 
The Court was not impressed by the argument put forward by the owners. The Court 
stated that the logical construction of the contract, on the basis of the aims that the 
parties must have had at the time of its conclusion, would lead to understand that every 
type of claim should be covered under the forum selection clause. Delivering the ruling, 
Lord GOFF stated that it would make no commercial sense to exclude these other claims 
from the application of the jurisdiction clause, particularly because of how bills of lading 
work: 
“This is a case where goods have been shipped under bills of lading. Bills of lading are 
documents which operate as receipts for the goods, and which contain or evidence 
the terms of the contract of carriage. Such terms include provisions relating to the 
shipowners' obligations in respect of the goods while in their care, and so regulate 
their responsibility for the goods as bailees. In these circumstances, their Lordships 
find it difficult to believe that a clause providing for the governing law and for 
exclusive jurisdiction over claims should be held not to be apt to cover claims by the 
cargo owners against the shipowners framed in bailment rather than in contract, 
simply because the clause refers to claims under the bill of lading contract as opposed 
to claims under the bill of lading. Furthermore, if this view is correct, it must follow 
that shipowners who are sub-bailees of the goods may similarly be able to invoke 
such a clause against owners of the goods who are seeking to hold them liable as 
bailees and who have consented to the inclusion of the clause in the bill of lading. 
                                                                  
1090 BRIGGS, A., 2008, supra note 1053, p. 411 The jurisdiction clause in question (Clause 26) provided the 
following: 
"This bill of lading contract shall be governed by Chinese law. Any claim or other dispute arising 
thereunder shall be determined at Taipei in Taiwan unless the carrier otherwise agrees in writing.” 
The Pioneer Container [1994], p. 333. 
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Their Lordships cannot help feeling that any other conclusion […] would lead to 
refinements and inconsistencies which are unacceptable in a commercial context.”1091 
A similar conclusion had been reached in the 1976 Court of Appeal case of The Makefjell, 
where the plaintiffs framed at least one of their causes of action in tort, so as to escape 
the application of an exclusive Norwegian jurisdiction clause.1092 The clause in question 
read: 
“… any claim against the carrier shall be decided at the principal place of business of 
the carrier and in accordance with the law of that place…”1093 
As it is customary in matters regarding the scope of a clause, the argument dealt with 
semantic issues as to whether the clause’s use of “any claim” truly included every type of 
claim, or only contractual ones. CAIRNS L.J. was not impressed by the restrictive 
interpretation of the clause, considering that it should be read as referring to all disputes. 
In his decision, he stated that: 
“I do not think there can be any doubt that the parties intended that any claims in 
respect of damage to the goods carried under the bills of lading should be decided in 
Oslo and according to Norwegian law, however they were framed. To a business man 
it would be absurd to suppose that if one cause of action was pleaded it should be 
triable in Norway according to Norwegian law, whereas if another cause of action 
was pleaded it might be triable anywhere where one of the owners' ships might be 
arrested and possibly according to a different system of law; and that if cargo owners 
wished to pursue both causes of actions they could pursue them in two different 
courts and according to two different legal codes. Giving a common-sense meaning to 
the words of the clause I am satisfied that they apply to the claim in tort as well as 
the claim in contract.”1094 
More recently, in the House of Lords case of Donohue v. Armco Inc., Lord SCOTT also ruled 
on this issue, favoring an expansive interpretation of jurisdiction clauses. This would 
allow the clauses to cover even those cases that are not inherently contractual in 
nature.1095  
“A claim for damages for, for example, fraudulent misrepresentation inducing an 
agreement containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the same form as that with 
which this case is concerned would, as a matter of ordinary language, be a claim in 
                                                                  
1091 ibid., pp. 343–344. See also The Cap Blanco [1913] P, 130–136, p. 136 (“In dealing with commercial documents of 
this kind, effect must be given, if the terms of the contract permit it, to the obvious intention and agreement of the 
parties”) and  BRIGGS, A., 2008, supra note 1053, pp. 411–412. 
1092 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 310. 
1093 KNIGHT, S. M., 1977, supra note 1089, p. 672. 
1094 Quoted in ibid., p. 673. 
1095 Donohue v Armco Inc. & Others [2002] CLC, 440, p. 459. 
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tort that arose ‘out of or in connection with’ the agreement.1096 If the alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentation had been made by two individuals jointly, of whom 
one was and the other was not a party to the agreement, the claim would still be of 
the same character, although only the party to the agreement would be entitled to 
the benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause. The commencement of the claim 
against the two alleged tortfeasors elsewhere than in England would represent a 
breach of the clause. The defendant tortfeasor who was a party to the agreement 
would, absent strong reasons to the contrary, be entitled to an injunction restraining 
the continuance of the foreign proceedings. He would be entitled to an injunction 
restraining the continuance of the proceedings not only against himself but also 
against his co-defendant. The exclusive jurisdiction clause is expressed to cover ‘any 
dispute which may arise out of or in connection with’ the agreement. It is not limited 
to ‘any claim against’ the party to the agreement. To give the clause that limited 
construction would very substantially reduce the protection afforded by the clause to 
the party to the agreement. The non-party, if he remained alone as a defendant in 
the foreign proceedings, would be entitled to claim from his co-tortfeasor a 
contribution to any damages awarded. He could join the co-tortfeasor, the party 
entitled to the protection of the exclusive jurisdiction clause, in third party 
proceedings for that purpose. The position would be no different if the claim were to 
be commenced in the foreign court with only the tortfeasor who was not a party to 
the exclusive jurisdiction clause as a defendant. He would be able, and well advised, 
to commence third party proceedings against his co-tortfeasor, the party to the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause.”1097 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above cited decisions. First, English courts seem 
to reject argumentative lines that, in essence, seek to find loopholes in jurisdiction clauses 
by means of framing the action outside of the contractual sphere. And so, “if it can be seen 
that a plaintiff is attempting a subtle method of forum shopping the court will find any way of 
curtailing that attempt rather than permit abuse of their policy.”1098 Second, the courts favour 
a one-stop adjudication approach to forum selection clauses.1099  What this means is that 
courts will usually interpret the clauses, particularly in commercial cases, as granting 
jurisdiction on all types of claims to a single forum. As BELL notes, by taking this approach:  
                                                                  
1096 The clause read as follows: 
“[T]he parties hereby irrevocably submit themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts to 
settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with this agreement.”  
ibid., p. 444. 
1097 ibid., p. 459. 
1098 KNIGHT, S. M., 1977, supra note 1089, p. 674. 
1099 See, for example, Black Diamond Offshore Limited & Others v Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas S.A. [2015], 
997509 WL, Unreported, p. 42 
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“[The courts] exhibit the strong modern prejudice […] to minimize the scope for 
inconsistent decisions as a result of related concurrent proceedings or, to express it 
positively, to foster the goal of ‘one-stop-adjudication’. This presumption may be 
particularly important in cases where the clause in question simply records that the 
parties submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of one particular forum 
without specifying the nature of the disputes submitted.”1100 
Through this understanding of the clauses, the courts presume that, at the time of 
drafting the contract, the parties wanted to avoid the risk of inconsistent decisions that is 
inherent to “fragmenting” the claims through different jurisdictions.1101 On the basis of 
this general presumption, “the parties, especially parties to a commercial contract, should not 
be taken to have intended that certain types of claims should be heard exclusively in one court or, 
as the case may be, by arbitration (those strictly falling within the scope of the clause) but that 
others need not be.”1102 
8.4.6 Denial of Enforcement by Discretion of the Court 
Most commonly, when the resisting party is unable to frame her defense within any of 
the previously mentioned scenarios, she will appeal to the discretion of the court to refuse 
the enforcement of the forum selection clause.1103 As we have mentioned before, this is a 
difficult gamble for the party, as there is a prima facie validity of the clauses themselves, 
and so a very strong cause is required for a court to refuse enforcement.  
A number of distinctions must be made in regards to this option, depending on the 
special characteristics of the clause in question. First, between clauses submitting the 
disputes to a foreign court, and clauses submitting disputes to a foreign arbitration. While 
in the former case the court will be able to use its discretion to deny the enforcement of 
the clause, in the latter “a stay must be granted automatically and there is no scope for 
retention of jurisdiction based on the court’s discretion.”1104 Clauses granting jurisdiction to 
foreign courts require yet another distinction, depending on whether the selected court is 
located in, on the one hand, a EU Member State, a signatory of the Lugano Convention, or 
which otherwise fall within the scope of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation and, on the 
other, agreements submitting disputes to courts located in the rest of the world, and 
which are to be decided according to Common Law principles.  
                                                                  
1100 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 311. 
1101 TAN, Y. L., Choice of Court Agreement: From a Viewpoint of Anglo-Commonwealth Law, 2004, p. 13. 
1102 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 311. 
1103 ibid., p. 315. 
1104 ibid., p. 315. 
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In the first group of cases, those involving clauses submitting disputes to courts within 
the EU/Lugano Convention/ Brussels I (Recast) scope, the situation is, to an extent, more 
or less clear. In accordance with the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation, courts cannot exercise 
their discretion and refuse to enforce an exclusive forum selection clause.1105 As Article 25 
(1) of the Regulation establishes in the relevant part: 
“If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a 
Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or 
which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or 
those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its 
substantive validity under the law of that Member State. Such jurisdiction shall be 
exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”1106 
The situation is different when the selected court is located in a non-Member State, or a 
state which falls outside the scope of the Regulation, in which case English courts are 
empowered to exercise their discretion and assert their jurisdiction over a dispute, even in 
the presence of a choice of forum clause. Of course, the use of this discretion is quite 
restrictive since, as we have seen, English courts demonstrate a strong preference for 
enforcing jurisdiction clauses. This position is, clearly, commercially desirable, particularly 
in light of the important role that forum selection clauses play in international trade; 
furthermore, as BELL has notes, it “is consonant with the maxim pacta sunt servanda, and is in 
line with the general policy evinced by the Conventions to jurisdiction agreements.”1107 
As Lord WILLMER of the Court of Appeal stated in The Chaparral:  
“It is always open to parties to stipulate (as they did in this case) that a particular 
Court shall have jurisdiction over any dispute arising out of their contract. . . . Prima 
                                                                  
1105 HARTLEY, T. C., Choice-of-Court Agreements Under the European and International Instruments: The Revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Convention, 2013, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
United Kingdom, p. 182. 
1106 The text of this provision differs slightly from its equivalent in the Brussels I Regulation, and which 
established: 
“Article 23 
1. If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a court or the 
courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may 
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. 
Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.  
[…] 
3. Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, none of whom is domiciled in a Member State, the 
courts of other Member States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts 
chosen have declined jurisdiction.” 
While nº 3 cited above was eliminated from the final text of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation, it seems to now be 
part of Article 25 (1), where “one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State” was replaced by “regardless of their 
domicile.” 
1107 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 318. 
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facie it is the policy of the Court to hold parties to the bargain into which they have 
entered […] [T]he Court has a discretion, but it is a discretion which, in the ordinary 
way and in the absence of strong reason to the contrary, will be exercised in favour of 
holding parties to their bargain.”1108 
Similarly, in a more recent case, Lord BINGHAM expressed this same view regarding how 
restrictively English courts will exercise their discretion against a jurisdiction clause. As he 
stated in Donohue v. Armco: 
“If contracting parties agree to give a particular court exclusive jurisdiction to rule on 
claims between those parties, and a claim falling within the scope of the agreement is 
made in proceedings in a forum other than that which the parties have agreed, the 
English court will ordinarily exercise its discretion (whether by granting a stay of 
proceedings in England, or by restraining the prosecution of proceedings in the non-
contractual forum abroad, or by such other procedural order as is appropriate in the 
circumstances) to secure compliance with the contractual bargain, unless the party 
suing in the non-contractual forum (the burden being on him) can show strong 
reasons for suing in that forum. I use the word ‘ordinarily’ to recognise that where an 
exercise of discretion is called for there can be no absolute or inflexible rule governing 
that exercise, and also that a party may lose his claim to equitable relief by 
dilatoriness or other unconscionable conduct. But the general rule is clear: where 
parties have bound themselves by an exclusive jurisdiction clause effect should 
ordinarily be given to that obligation in the absence of strong reasons for departing 
from it. Whether a party can show strong reasons, sufficient to displace the other 
party's prima facie entitlement to enforce the contractual bargain, will depend on all 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”1109 
In accordance with the principles expressed in, among others, the above cited decisions, 
English courts have taken the position that they will only entertain proceedings brought 
in contravention of a forum selection clause when “strong cause” is shown to justify it.  It 
has been suggested that this strict approach adopted by the English courts aims at 
guaranteeing the normal working of commerce; indeed, as LEOW argues, bargains made by 
the parties (particularly those related to forum selection) must be upheld by the courts 
since “[t]o hold otherwise would be to open up a Pandora's Box in respect of the sanctity of 
                                                                  
1108 Cited in COLLINS, L., ‘Forum Selection and an Anglo-American Conflict: The Sad Case of the Chaparral’, 1971, 
20 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 3, p. 554. ZAPHIRIOU distinguishes this approach from 
that taken in in American law in regards to discretion; he argues that in The Chaparral the Court, instead of 
applying the forum non conveniens doctrine “in the American sense, i.e. to decline jurisdiction conferred by a forum 
selection clause,” opted instead to reserve the exercise of jurisdiction “when convenience so demands” (ZAPHIRIOU, G. 
A., 1977, supra note 747, p. 316) 
1109 Donohue v Armco Inc. & Others [2002], p. 449. 
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contract, which is undeniably the life blood of commerce.”1110 This approach has resulted, as 
we have already seen, in a presumption of validity for the forum selection clauses, so that, 
prima facie, a court should give full validity to the clause, unless the plaintiff resisting the 
clause can justify otherwise.1111  
As RIX J. expressed in Sinochem v. Mobil Sales:  
“[O]f fundamental importance, it is in my judgment a principle of the court's 
residual discretion to stay even proceedings commenced in the consensual forum of 
an exclusive jurisdiction clause that the strong cause which needs to be shown if that 
discretion is to be exercised must go beyond matters of mere convenience and must 
enter into the interests of justice itself. After all, when parties agree to an exclusive 
forum for their disputes, they are or must be treated as being mindful both that they 
have chosen for themselves where such considerations of convenience take them and 
also that their choice may override pure matters of convenience — as where, 
typically, a neutral forum is chosen which has nothing whatsoever to do with their 
transaction or any likely dispute that may arise out of it. […] [I]t is necessary to 
point to some factor which could not have been foreseen in order to displace the 
bargain which has been agreed. […]It is or may be different, however, where the 
quality of the consideration is different and goes to a matter of justice, although even 
in such a case it might be said that the factor in question should be regarded as 
having been foreseen and encompassed in the bargain struck.”1112 
The emphasis placed by the courts on the resisting party proving “strong reasons” to 
justify the breach is quite telling, as it demonstrates that not just any reason, nor any 
simple “inconvenience” will be enough. What is more, the resisting party will not be able 
to escape the clause if the reasons that she puts forward were known, or should have been 
known, by her at the time of the contract. Indeed, as GROSS J. stressed in a recent case, 
the weight of the factors analyzed by the court will be dependent on whether or not they 
were foreseeable at the time of the contract:  
“In the nature of things, for the court to exercise its jurisdiction so as not to give 
effect to an EJC [exclusive jurisdiction clause], the ‘strong reasons’ relied on must 
ordinarily go beyond a mere matter of foreseeable convenience and extend either to 
some unforeseeable matter of convenience or enter into the interests of justice itself. 
Even then, it cannot simply be assumed that the court will automatically exercise its 
                                                                  
1110 LEOW, V., ‘Exclusively Here to Stay: The Applicable Principles to Granting a Stay on the Basis of an Exclusive 
Jurisdiction Clause - Golden Shore Transportation Ptd. Ltd. v. UCO Bank’, 2004 Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies, no. 2, p. 576. 
1111 TAN, D., ‘No Dispute Amounting to Strong Cause; Strong Cause for Dispute’, 2001, 13 Singapore Academy of 
Law Journal, p. 429. 
1112 Sinochem International Oil (London) Co Ltd. v Mobil Sales and Supply Corp (No.2) [April 4, 2000] CLC, 1132–
1145, p. 1144. 
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discretion so as to release one party from its contractual bargain. Once the interests 
of justice are engaged, then factors of convenience will be relevant to the exercise by 
the court of its discretion. These conclusions, in my judgment, recognise the 
importance to be attached to the parties' choice of contractual forum (whether 
exclusive or non-exclusive), accommodate the possible tension between the choice of 
a neutral forum and factors of convenience and, furthermore, enjoy the support of a 
weight of observations in the authorities […].”1113 
Similarly, in Ace Insurance v. Zurich Insurance, Lord RIX of the Court of Appeal also 
affirmed that the exercise of discretion requires that the arguments put forward by the 
resisting party are not foreseeable. In a rather categorical fashion, he stated: 
“If a party agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of a state, it does not 
easily lie in its mouth to complain that it is inconvenient to conduct its litigation 
there (i.e. to assert that the agreed forum is a forum non conveniens). […] [I]t is 
necessary to point to some factor which could not have been foreseen in order to 
displace the bargain which has been agreed. In such a case that party must show 
some good reason or special cause why it should not be held to its agreement to 
submit to the agreed jurisdiction; and if it cannot do so, there seems no reason why 
the English court should entertain parallel proceedings here, with their attendant 
evils — duplication of expense and the danger of inconsistent decisions.”1114 
Despite this apparent absolute nature of the courts’ preference for enforcing forum 
selection clauses, however, there is a certain glimmer of hope for the parties who seek to 
resist them. Indeed, as BRIGGS had already noted in 1993, despite the courts’ routine 
statements favoring enforcement, “the practice is rather different”.1115 For better or worse, 
some authorities have suggested that even though theoretically this pro-enforcement 
policy exists, as HIRST J. noted in The Nile Rhapsody, “the only difference rendered by the 
presence of a choice of court clause was one of burden of proof.”1116 In other words, the only 
certainty created by these clauses refers to the party who will have the burden to prove 
that the court should or should not exercise its discretion. Nothing more, nothing less. 
A case can certainly be made that decisions such as those in The Nile Rhapsody and The 
Fehmarn seem to undermine the certainty that the courts are, supposedly, trying to create 
in the commercial world.1117 However, it is also true that a zealous enforcement that 
                                                                  
1113 Import Export Metro Ltd. & Anor v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA [2004], 2 CLC, 757–777, p. 767. 
1114 Ace Insurance SA-NV v Zurich Insurance Co & Anor [2001] CLC, 526–549, p. 547. 
1115 BRIGGS, A., ‘Jurisdiction Clauses and Judicial Attitudes’, 1993, 109 Law Quarterly Review, p. 383. 
1116 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 319, citing Hirst J. in Hamed el Chiaty & Co (t/a Travco Nile Cruise Lines) 
v Thomas Cook Group Ltd (The Nile Rhapsody) [1992], 2 Lloyd's Rep, 399. 
1117 See Hamed el Chiaty & Co (t/a Travco Nile Cruise Lines) v Thomas Cook Group Ltd (The Nile Rhapsody) [1992], 2 
Lloyd's Rep, 399 and Owners of Cargo Lately on Board the Fehmarn v Owners of the Fehmarn (The Fehmarn) [1958], 
1 W.L.R., 159–164.  
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leaves no room for escaping the effect of jurisdiction clauses might give way to an utterly 
unfair system. Notwithstanding this considerations, however, it should be noted that the 
issue of discretion has become less relevant in recent years, as courts have become less 
likely to refuse the enforcement of these clauses. Even though discretion continues to 
play a role, the standard seems to be set particularly high for those seeking to escape the 
clauses.  
BELL has suggested that this shift towards more enforcement is the result of is that since 
English courts have adopted an “almost automatic” enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements nominating English courts, they have been forced to use a similarly strict and 
pro-enforcement approach towards clauses nominating foreign forums.1118 The 
motivation of the courts makes sense, since it avoids a kind of double-standard in which 
the courts would only be deeming themselves as capable of exercising jurisdiction. Indeed, 
since it is unlikely that an English court will not exercise her jurisdiction when there is an 
English forum selection clause in place, not using the same approach when the clause 
selects a foreign forum would create a rather jingoistic result in which only English courts 
appear worthy of being selected. 
8.5 Judicial Discretion and Forum Selection Clauses 
In The Eleftheria, BRANDON J. put forward a series of principles that, in his view, inform 
the exercise of discretion by the English courts.  These are, in essence, the following:1119 
1. If a plaintiff brings forth a suit before an English court in breach of a forum 
selection clause granting jurisdiction to a foreign court, the English court, 
assuming the claim to be otherwise within its jurisdiction, is not bound to grant 
a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. 
2. The court should grant a stay of proceedings unless strong cause for not doing so 
is shown. 
3. The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs.1120 
4. In exercising its discretion, the court should take into consideration all the 
relevant facts and circumstances of the case, particularly (but not exclusively): 
                                                                  
1118 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 320 See also COLLIER, J. G., 2004, supra note 1031, p. 98 (“It is unlikely 
that a stay of English proceedings will be granted when the parties have agreed to English jurisdiction or arbitration”). 
1119 The Eleftheria [1970], pp. 99–100. 
1120 ibid., p. 97. 
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a. In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more 
readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and 
expense of trial as between the English and foreign courts.  
b. Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs 
from English law in any material respects.  
c. With what country either party is connected, and how closely.  
d. Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or 
are only seeking procedural advantages.  
e. If the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign court 
because they would:  
i. Be deprived of security for their claim;  
ii. Be unable to enforce any judgment obtained;  
iii. Be faced with a time-bar not applicable in England;  
iv. For political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a 
fair trial. 
8.5.1 (In)Convenience of the Contractual Forum 
The factors enumerated by BRANDON J. emphasize the convenience of the parties. Indeed, 
two of the considerations that he put forward (points (a) and (c) above) deal, precisely, 
with this issue.1121 Although appeals to (in)convenience certainly continue to be a fairly 
common tactic used by the party seeking to prevent the enforcement of a forum selection 
clause, BRANDON J. did try to downplay their importance in later cases. As a matter of fact, 
in The Makefjell he specifically referred to the risk of “convenience” being used as a way to 
undermine the certainty that should surround forum selection clauses: 
“If all or most such cases are to be treated as exceptions to the general rule, there is, 
it seems to me, a danger that such exceptions should be so frequent as to undermine 
the generality of the rule; or, to put it another way, that the rule will be nearly as 
much honoured in the breach as in the observance. Such an outcome would, in my 
view, involve a departure from the basic principle that foreign jurisdiction clauses of 
this kind should be enforced save only in cases which can truly be described as 
exceptional.”1122 
                                                                  
1121 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 322. 
1122 Cited in ibid., pp. 322–323. 
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Resisting parties will often argue that the selected forum is inconvenient for them for 
reasons of costs. In other words, that conducting proceedings in the contractual forum 
will be so expensive that it will prevent them from being able to obtain redress. Just as we 
saw in the case of the United States, English courts are not very sympathetic to those 
brandishing this line of argument. Cases abound in which the courts have not been moved 
by parties who seek to escape the enforcement in this manner. Indeed, the case law shows 
that “increased cost to the plaintiff or decreased likelihood of success have rarely influenced the 
decisions” of whether or not to stay proceedings.1123 In The Media, for example, Lord 
MERRIVALE, despite acknowledging that proceedings in the contractual forum in India 
would be “needlessly expensive” and “highly inconvenient”, ruled that these were issues that 
the parties should have taken into consideration at the time of the contract, and not to 
seek to backtrack once problems arose.1124As GROSS J. ruled in Metro Exports v. Sud 
Americana de Vapores: 
“While all the circumstances are to be taken into account and it cannot be said that 
the court will never release a party from a bargain contained in an EJC [(exclusive 
jurisdiction clause)] unless circumstances have arisen which could not have been 
foreseen at the time the contract was entered into, releases on the ground only of 
foreseeable matters of convenience are likely to be rare […] In the nature of things, 
for the court to exercise its jurisdiction so as not to give effect to an EJC, the ‘strong 
reasons’ relied on must ordinarily go beyond a mere matter of foreseeable 
convenience and extend either to some unforeseeable matter of convenience or enter 
into the interests of justice itself. Even then, it cannot simply be assumed that the 
court will automatically exercise its discretion so as to release one party from its 
contractual bargain. Once the interests of justice are engaged, then factors of 
convenience will be relevant to the exercise by the court of its discretion.”1125 
A similarly restrictive view had already been expressed in The Kislovodsk, a case in which a 
bill of lading contained a clause selecting Soviet courts as the competent forum. Here 
SHEEN J. also demonstrated that the courts were not willing to lend themselves to allow a 
party to go back on his word using “costs” as an argument. In his decision he stated that: 
“I am prepared to assume that the unrecovered costs of proceedings in Russia exceed 
the amount of the costs which probably would not be recovered in England: But that 
is a part of the system of justice to which the plaintiffs agreed to submit when the 
bills of lading were signed. If it is thought that the system of administering justice in 
                                                                  
1123 CUTLER, M. R., 1985, supra note 749, p. 124. BELL does note that although the excessive costs incurred by one 
of the parties are not often analyzed sympathetically by the courts, they do take into consideration “the overall 
cost of the proceedings.” 
1124 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 323. 
1125 Import Export Metro Ltd., Metro Exports v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores S.A. [2003], 1610416 WL, 
Unreported, p. 15 
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USSR has built into it some aspect which appears unfair to litigants that will be a 
good reason for not signing bills of lading which contain a clause giving exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of the USSR. But it seems to me that it does not lie in the 
mouth of a party who agreed to such a clause to say, when the clause is invoked, that 
the cost of proceeding in Russia is expensive.”1126 
In British Aerospace plc v. Dee Howard Co., WALLER J. also expressed this view, when the 
defendants sought a stay of proceedings arguing that it would be more convenient to 
conduct them in Texas, where the defendants had already started their own 
proceedings.1127 The Commercial Court rejected this argument, stating: 
"It seems to me on the language of the clause that I am considering here, [that] it 
simply should not be open to DHC [the defendants] to start arguing about the 
relative merits of fighting an action in London, where the factors relied on would 
have been eminently foreseeable at the time that they entered into the contract. 
Furthermore, to rely before the English Court on the factor that they have 
commenced proceedings in Texas and therefore that there will be two sets of 
proceedings unless the English Court stops the English action should as I see it simply 
be impermissible, at least where jurisdiction in those proceedings has been 
immediately challenged. If the clause means what I suggest it means they are not 
entitled to resist the English jurisdiction if an action is commenced in England, it is 
DHC who have brought upon themselves the risk of two sets of proceedings if as is 
likely to happen BAe commence proceedings in England. Surely they must point to 
some factor which they could not have foreseen on which they can rely for displaying 
the bargain which they made i.e. that they would not object to the jurisdiction of the 
English Court. 
Adopting that approach it seems to me that the inconvenience for witnesses, the 
location of documents, the timing of a trial and all such like matters are aspects 
which they are simply precluded from raising. Furthermore, commencing an action 
                                                                  
1126 The Kislovodsk [1980], 1 Lloyd's Rep, 183. In The Fehmarn, an earlier case with a Soviet-forum clause, the 
Court of Appeals reached the opposite decision, and actually refused to stay proceedings, with Lord DENNING 
arguing that since “the dispute is more closely connected with England than Russia” then there was no reason to 
prevent the proceedings brought in England (against the forum selection clause) from continuing (cited in WEBB, 
P. R. H., ‘The Fehmarn’, 1958, 7 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 3, p. 605). MENDELSOHN 
sees the decision in The Fehmarn not so much as an exercise of the discretion of the courts, but rather as a covert 
move on the part of the court to, by appealing to some “convenient reasons”, disregard a freely agreed-upon forum 
selection clause and allow the litigant to remain in an English court (MENDELSOHN, A. I., ‘Liberalism, Choice of 
Forum Clauses and the Hague Rules’, 1970, 2 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, pp. 662–663).  ZAPHIRIOU, 
on the other hand, sees the decision in The Fehmarn as completely legitimate, since “there was no conceivable 
reason for the case to be tried in Russia. It merely appeared to be an attempt by the shipowners to make matters difficult 
for the plaintiffs” (ZAPHIRIOU, G. A., 1977, supra note 747, p. 316). 
1127 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 327. 
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in Texas, albeit that may not be a breach of the clause, cannot give them a factor on 
which they can rely, unless of course the action has continued without protest from 
BAe."1128 
In these decisions the courts seem to be giving the resisting parties a fairly 
straightforward message: “If you do not want to end up litigating a case in a faraway 
court, paying higher costs than at home, or being inconvenienced by distant evidence, 
then do not agree to it when you sign the contract.” The fact that these contracts involved 
commercial parties must have certainly had some weight in this regard, as it would have 
made it much harder for the resisting parties to argue that they had been the victims of 
an oppressive bargain.  
8.5.2 Unfairness or Injustice of the Contractual Forum 
Plaintiffs seeking to resist the application of the forum selection clause by reasons of an 
alleged injustice of the selected forum have also found English courts to be less than 
welcoming.1129 The reason for this reluctance is rather plain to see: Courts cannot remove 
themselves from the political realities of the moment, and so they must keep in mind that 
referring to a certain legal system as inherently unfair would certainly strain the relations 
between the two countries.  
In The Abidin Daver, Lord DIPLOCK attempted to create a standard to determine when a 
certain system can be considered “unjust.” In his view, when it speaks of an “unjust” or an 
“unfair” forum, a court is referring to: 
“[C]ountries in whose courts there is a risk that justice will not be obtained by a 
foreign litigant in particular kinds of suits whether for ideological or political 
reasons, or because of inexperience or inefficiency of the judiciary or excessive delay 
in the conduct of the business of the courts, or the unavailability of appropriate 
remedies.”1130 
In the modern world, particularly among developed nations, countries whose judicial 
systems fit the description put forward by Lord DIPLOCK are in the minority, if not in 
practice at least in theory. What we mean by this is that even though some countries 
might have corrupt internal systems, it is difficult, if not impossible, for an English court 
to disregard them as unfair. What is more, within the European Union, an English court 
would be unable to refuse the enforcement of a clause granting jurisdiction to any country 
located within the European Community, in compliance with the terms of the Brussels I 
                                                                  
1128 British Aerospace Plc v Dee Howard Co. [1993], 1 Lloyd's Rep, 368, p. 376. 
1129 CUTLER, M. R., 1985, supra note 749, p. 124. 
1130 Cited in FAWCETT, J. J., 1989, supra note 1034, pp. 213–214. See also The Abidin Daver [1984] AC, 398. 
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(Recast) Regulation, even in cases when the selected court is located in a corrupt 
European nation.  
The issue of corruption in the European Union, particularly in newer Member States, has 
created some frictions within the EU. Some argue that the principles of mutual trust that 
underlie rules such as the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation, for example, cannot exist 
between very dissimilar nations. As KRAMER notes: 
“This has raised criticism from the member states and in doctrine, particularly where 
it concerns the public policy exception. In the Netherlands, this has even raised a 
debate in the Dutch Parliament, where earlier developments in this area went by 
unnoticed. The concerns specifically addressed the unreviewable import of judgments 
emanating from corrupt proceedings from particular member states.  
The issue of corruption is a sensitive one in the EU, and is usually avoided in the 
legislative discussions on private international law. But the existence of corruption 
in general is acknowledged, and was put on the political agenda. Recent reports from 
Transparency International and the EU have revealed that corruption is a major 
problem in many member states, and that it has increased over the past few years. 
Corruption exists in every member state, but the reports make clear that the 
expansion of the EU to countries with weaker institutions requires serious 
attention.”1131 
The above caveats notwithstanding, however, there are some cases in which this defense 
has been accepted. Indeed, some cases, to different degrees, have considered that a 
foreign forum, despite having jurisdiction, is inconvenient for reasons of injustice or 
unfairness, both in situations of forum selection as well as in cases of forum non 
conveniens.  
One of the most dramatic examples of this is that of Oppenheimer v. Louis Rosenthal and Co 
AG, a case in which a Jewish German citizen, domiciled in London, England, was 
dismissed from his job as the manager of the London branch of a German company. After 
he commenced proceedings against the company for wrongful dismissal, and was granted 
leave by the court to serve the defendant company in Germany, the company moved to 
have the service of writ set aside based on the fact that, for a number of reasons, the 
German forum was the forum conveniens. After the defendant prevailed, the Court of 
Appeal reversed this decision, and sided with the plaintiff, considering that the German 
forum would not ensure the fair treatment of a Jewish plaintiff. As GREER L. J. stated: 
                                                                  
1131 KRAMER, X. E., Private International Law Responses to Corruption: Approaches to Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments and the International Fight Against Corruption, in Van de Bunt, H. G. (ed.), International Law and the 
Fight Against Corruption, 2012, p. 139. 
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"It is said that Germany is the forum conveniens in this case, or that it would be in 
normal circumstances, as the contract is governed by German law […] This need 
occasion no difficulty as there is in London at present a large number of 
distinguished German lawyers, so there will be no injustice to the defendant 
company by depriving them of the opportunity of proving German law. On the other 
side there is said to be grave reason to suppose that, if the plaintiff goes to Germany, 
he would not be allowed to be represented by an advocate. He would have to appear 
in person before the Labour Court and conduct his own case; he would also be under 
a real risk of being arrested and put in a concentration camp. I find that the German 
courts are not the forum conveniens notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff and 
the defendant company are both German."1132 
There are also a minority of cases in which even though there is a valid forum selection 
clause in a contract, English courts refuse to stay proceedings, due to the selected forum 
being considered inherently unfair for the specific case. In the 1939 case of Ellinger v. 
Guinness, Mahon & Co, for example, and which is similar to the Oppenheimer case above, 
an exclusive choice of forum granting jurisdiction to a German court was not enforced 
because it was considered that the fact that the plaintiff was Jewish would deny him the 
opportunity of a fair trial before the courts of the Third Reich.1133  Similarly, in Carvalho v. 
Hull, Blyth (Angola) Ltd., the Court of Appeal recognized that although the forum selection 
clause was undisputed, the plaintiff had satisfied the test established in The Eleftheria by 
presenting strong enough reasons as to the inconvenience of the selected forum, 
including the possible risks to his own life if he was to appear before it. Although noting 
that he did not wish to base his decision on this fact alone, Lane L.J. stated that  
“[o]n all the evidence it seems to me that, plainly, the plaintiff was the sort of person 
who would be anathema to the present government in Angola. That can scarcely be 
disputed, and it seems to me there was a ground for the plaintiff's fear.”1134 
The issue of the lack of justice and impartiality of the selected forum will place on the 
resisting party a heavy burden of proof in order to demonstrate that it is, indeed, 
impossible for him to obtain justice there. In Muduroglu Limited v T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, for 
example, the Court of Appeal was not moved by the defendant’s claims regarding the 
injustices that occurred in Turkey, such as massive human right abuses and the existence 
of only an appearance of democracy and freedom, since this was not enough to 
demonstrate that the competent commercial courts would not be fair and balanced in their 
work. The claims put forward by the plaintiff, that the judges would feel pressured to act 
                                                                  
1132 Oppenheimer v Louis Rosenthal & Co. AG [1937], 1 All ER, 23. 
1133 Ellinger v Guinness, Mahon & Co. [1939], 4 All ER, 16. See also BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 328. 
1134 Carvalho v Hull, Blyth (Angola) Ltd. [1979], 1 W.L.R., 1228. See also Mohammed v Bank of Kuwait and The 
Middle East K.S.C., 1 W.L.R., 1483. 
  
320 
Forum Selection in England 
unfairly towards him were not enough to satisfy the Court, who granted the stay of 
proceedings requested by the defendants.1135 
8.5.3 The Conduct of the Parties 
One of the most controversial factors enumerated by BRANDON J. in The Eleftheria deals 
with the private motivations of the party seeking to enforce the clause. The issue of 
“whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking 
procedural advantages,” is, as a matter of fact, rather unique, and actually finds no similar 
criteria in, for example, the case law of the United States.1136 This is understandable, as it 
is a rather strange criterion to take into consideration when deciding whether or not to 
enforce the clause. 
There are actually no good reasons to justify using this criterion to determine the 
enforceability of a forum selection clause, as its mere presence implies that the otherwise 
presumptive validity of these clauses is not so. It creates the idea that there are lawful 
motivations, in a private, contractual setting, and that the court suddenly becomes able to 
analyze and value these motivations in order to decide whether an agreement is worth 
enforcing. This is a problem, because it seems to change the rules of the game for the 
parties; after all, forum selection clauses are always included for reasons of convenience, 
otherwise they would not be employed as much, and what BRANDON J. seems to have said 
is that sometimes that strive for “convenience” is not legitimate.  
This criterion also adds an unnecessary layer of uncertainty and complexity to an already 
complex field. It is hard to imagine a workable and universal criterion that could be used 
to differentiate between moral and immoral motivations to seek a judgment abroad. After 
all, a party including a forum selection clause will always do so in the hopes of obtaining 
some type of advantage, and not because of some ethereal “genuine desire,” emotional or 
otherwise, to litigate in a foreign tribunal. Whether a party chooses a forum that is 
located near her, or which possesses special knowledge of a certain field, it is beyond any 
doubt that these are concerns that, in the event of litigation, will certainly render a 
procedural advantage. Perhaps what BRANDON J. was seeking to avoid were situations in 
which the only reason for a selected forum was to damage the other party, such as 
deliberately choosing the farthest or slowest possible court available; however, in this case 
the resisting party would probably be able to argue that it is an unfair or inconvenient 
forum, without the need to argue over the mental motivations of the other. Even parties 
that ended up subjected to a forum selection clause for reasons of bargaining power 
disparities might be better suited seeking the discretion of the court by arguing that the 
                                                                  
1135 Muduroglu Ltd. v T.C. Ziraat Bankasi [1986] QB, 1225. 
1136 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, 324-235. 
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contractual forum is severely inconvenient, than by arguing over the “genuine desire” of 
the other party.  
In truth, this criterion seems to penalize the party that is seeking to enforce the clause, 
and who might have given adequate consideration in exchange for a procedural advantage 
during the bargaining process. As ROBERTSON explained: 
“Surely the reason why the defendant very often asks for the foreign choice of venue 
clause is that he knows the periods of limitation and rules of evidence of the chosen 
law. It is arguable, however, that the defendants' desire to abide by any procedural 
advantages derived from the application of the law of the chosen foreign forum 
seems both reasonable and genuine and certainly no worse than the attitude of a 
plaintiff who is seeking to gain procedural advantages by utilising the provisions of 
an English forum rather than the stipulated law.”1137 
Despite the above reservations, however, as COLLINS notes:  
“[A]lthough the cases require the plaintiff to show good reason why the clause should 
be overridden, in practice the court will want to know what advantage the defendant 
obtains from the foreign forum and whether that is a proper advantage. If he seeks 
merely to inconvenience the plaintiff or to delay the proceedings, he is unlikely to 
receive much sympathy from the court.”1138 
Although it might appear like a good thing that the plaintiff needs to show “good reason,” 
such a requirement exists in regards to all other exercises of discretion. What this means 
is that this exception to the prima facie validity in reality carries the same weight as any 
other. Some have argued that this challenge should only succeed in extreme cases in 
which “it could be shown that the chosen forum was calculated to make litigation as expensive 
or difficult as possible,” but it hard to imagine how proving such a desire might work.1139 
In Town Shoes v. Panalpina, a Canadian Federal Court analyzed this issue, in a case dealing 
with the carriage of a cargo of shoes from Italy to Canada. As the cargo was stolen prior to 
the delivery, the merchants sued the carrier in Federal Court. The defendants made a 
motion to stay proceedings or to dismiss them altogether, based on the existence of a 
forum selection clause in the governing bill of lading. The clause in question provided: 
“18. Law and Jurisdiction: Any dispute arising under or in connection with this bill 
of lading shall be exclusively decided by the court of Hamburg according to the law of 
                                                                  
1137 BISSETT-JOHNSON, A., 1970, supra note 1047, p. 543. 
1138 COLLINS, L., ‘Choice of Forum and the Exercise of Judicial Discretion: The Resolution of an Anglo-American 
Conflict’, 1973, 22 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, no. 2, p. 343. 
1139 MICHELL, M. P., ‘Forum Selection Clauses and Fundamental Breach: Z. I. Pompey Industrie v. Ecu-Line N. V., 
The Canmar Fortune’, 2002, 36 Canadian Business Law Journal, no. 3, p. 467. 
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Germany. The carrier reserves the right to bring suit against the merchant at the 
merchant's domicile.”1140 
The Court reasoned that there was a “strong reason” to have the case be heard in Canada 
and not in Germany.1141 TEITELBAUM J. explained that “the factual evidence or almost all of it 
is to be found in the Province of Quebec,” and so having the procedure in Germany would 
involve a significant “waste of money and time.”1142 On the basis of these facts, and 
referencing the factors mentioned by BRANDON J. in The Eleftheria, the judge concluded: 
“[T]he defendants do not have a genuine desire to have the trial take place in 
Germany, but are using this as a means to cause the plaintiffs additional and 
unnecessary expenses to possibly force a settlement. 
I make the above statement solely from the evidence that is in front of me, that is, I 
see absolutely no reason for the defendants to insist that this matter is heard in 
Germany other than to cause additional problems for the plaintiffs to make their 
case.”1143 
The Court’s decision is very hard to explain. By referencing the very high costs of 
litigating in the contractual forum, TEITELBAUM J. seemed to be preparing the field for 
refusing to stay the proceedings based on the issue of inconvenience. In a non sequitur 
decision, however, TEITELBAUM J. instead opted to refer to the issue of the genuine desire 
of the defendants to litigate in the contractual forum. Indeed, the clause in question is a 
fairly straightforward exclusive jurisdiction clause, and so seeking its enforcement should 
not be seen as a wicked act on the part of the defendants, but simply as them trying to 
hold the plaintiffs' to their word.1144 Had the decision been based exclusively on the 
inconvenience of the contractual forum, then it would truly be beyond reproach; however, 
by choosing to reference this “contractual mens rea”, the decision ends up standing on 
shaky ground. 
The difficulties involved in proving something as ethereal as the “genuine desire” of the 
party relying on the jurisdiction clause might explain why comparatively few decisions 
                                                                  
1140 Town Shoes Ltd and Emfaro Calzature Srl v Panalpina Inc. and M.G. Transport Ltd [2000] ILPR, 172–180, 
pp. 173–174. 
1141 ibid., p. 178 (emphasis in the original). 
1142 ibid., p. 178. 
1143 ibid., p. 178. 
1144 In Euromark Limited v. Smash Enterprises, Justice Coulson seems to have considered that the existence of an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause meant that seeking its enforcement is inherently a genuine desire. In his decision he 
noted how 
“it is not a relevant consideration when there is, as here, an exclusive jurisdiction clause […] the defendant 
can answer this contention simply by asserting the right to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause which 
was agreed as part of the contract.” 
Euromark Limited v Smash Enterprises PTY Ltd. [2013], 2300013 WL, Unreported, pp. 16–17. 
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actually resort to it. Clearly, even though the sentiments expressed by the courts are 
certainly noble, seeking to prevent abusive behaviour, resorting to this criteria, at least as 
the sole deciding factor, does not seem adequate.  
8.5.4 Risk of Inconsistent Decisions Involving Third Parties 
In addition to the factors enumerated by Brandon J in The Eleftheria (and which, as we 
have seen, can be the subject of some criticism), the Court of Appeal decision in The El 
Amria added one more factor to be taken into consideration. According to this decision, 
and which was recently confirmed in Donohue v. Armco: 
“The authorities show that the English court may well decline to grant an injunction 
or a stay, as the case may be, where the interests of parties other than the parties 
bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause are involved or grounds of claim not the 
subject of the clause are part of the relevant dispute so that there is a risk of parallel 
proceedings and inconsistent decisions.”1145  
Courts are sensitive to the enormous problems that would result from parallel 
proceedings being conducted in different jurisdictions, and so they have, “with increasing 
frequency, referred to the desirability of grouping related litigation in one comprehensive set of 
proceedings.”1146 As BRANDON LJ explained in El Amria: 
“I do not regard it merely as convenient that the two actions, in which many of the 
same issues fall to be determined, should be tried together; rather that I regard it as 
a potential disaster from a legal point of view if they were not, because of the risk 
inherent in separate trials […] that the same issues might be determined differently 
in the two countries.”1147 
The damage that could result from parallel proceedings is such that courts have even been 
willing to overlook whether this was a foreseeable risk at the time the clause was 
drafted.1148 This makes sense, since parallel proceedings might make it very difficult, if 
not downright impossible, to be able to adequately enforce the rulings. 
The Donohue v. Armco decision first recognizes this risk in regards to third parties who are 
not bound by the jurisdiction clause. Of course, parties who are not part of a forum 
selection clause cannot be compelled to comply with its terms, and so in the interest of 
                                                                  
1145 Donohue v Armco Inc. & Others [2002], p. 450. 
1146 BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 329. 
1147 Aratra Potato Co Ltd. v. Egyptian Navigation Co. (The El Amria) [1981], p. 126. 
1148 TAN, Y. L., 2004, supra note 1101, p. 32. 
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protecting them and preventing inconsistent decisions, a court might go against a 
jurisdiction clause.1149  
An interesting case in this regard happened in The Frinton, dealing with a bill of lading 
claim brought by the cargo interests for the damage of the goods transported aboard the 
vessel. As it is common in maritime trade, the vessel carried cargo owned by different 
merchants, under different bills of lading, several of them containing different clauses. 
“The 87 plaintiffs were holders of 69 bills of lading issued by the Liberian owners of 
the 'Frinton' in respect of goods shipped in Argentina and Brazil for delivery in Far 
East ports. A fire on board the 'Frinton' was alleged to have caused damage to the 
cargo, and the plaintiffs' action was for 'breach of contract and/or duty and/or 
negligence.' The cargo had been discharged partly in Singapore, where the fire was 
eventually extinguished, in Keelung in Taiwan, and in Hong Kong; surveys of the 
'Frinton' and her cargo had been carried out in each of these ports. The various 
plaintiffs gave addresses in eleven countries between them. The defendants applied 
to have the Hong Kong action stayed.  
The neat point of the case was that 65 of the 69 bills of lading, to which 85 of the 87 
plaintiffs (the 'majority' plaintiffs) were party, contained an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause, whereas the remaining four bills contained no such clause.”1150 
The mentioned jurisdiction clause included by the carrier in those 65 bills of lading stated 
in the relevant part that: 
“Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall be decided in the country where 
the carrier has his principal place of business.”1151 
Since proceedings were started by some of the cargo owners in Hong Kong, and the carrier 
had its place of business in Greece, he applied for a stay of the proceedings. FUAD VP of 
the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, writing the majority opinion, sided with the carrier, and 
granted the stay. 
What is relevant about this decision in regards to the exercise of discretion by the Court is 
that even though the stay was granted, the grounds upon which it was based actually 
opened the door to reaching the opposite decision. Indeed, as BELL has noted, the decision 
was based on the fact that “Greece was in fact the natural forum,” meaning that if that had 
                                                                  
1149 FISHER, G., ‘Anti-suit Injunctions to Restrain Foreign Proceedings in Breach of an Arbitration Agreement’, 
2010, 22 Bond Law Review, 1, Article 1, p. 20. 
1150 MARGOLIS, R., ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses and Multiple Plaintiffs’, 1991, 21 Hong Kong Law Journal, no. 2, 
pp. 241–242. 
1151 ibid., p. 242. 
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not been the case, then the Court would (or at least should) have rejected the motion to 
stay.1152 
The second situation contemplated in the Donohue v. Armco decision refer to cases in 
which grounds that are not the subject of the jurisdiction clause are part of the relevant 
dispute. Here, the forum selection clause cannot be invoked in regards to these other 
grounds of action, as they are beyond the scope of the clause.1153 
8.6 The Risks of Discretion 
The use of the court’s discretion in order to escape the applicability of a forum selection 
clause constitutes a wide gap in the otherwise steadfast resolve of the English courts to 
enforce these clauses. As a matter of fact, some see the exercise of judicial discretion as 
reducing the status of exclusive jurisdiction clauses, by failing to give them the 
importance that they deserve.1154 This discretion is also blamed as the reason why 
attempts at evading the application of a jurisdiction clause are often more successful than 
attempts at evading arbitration agreements.1155  
BELL has gone as far as suggesting that the discretionary criterion included in The 
Eleftheria should be abandoned altogether. Indeed, he argues that, with the sole exception 
of inherent unfairness and injustice of the selected forum, all the other situations in 
which discretion can be used should be “reconsidered and overruled.”1156 In his view: 
 “What is required is a clear statement that it is simply not legitimate for a court to 
exercise its discretion on the basis of many of the factors set out in The Eleftheria 
(and others under its aegis) in circumstances where those factors were foreseeable at 
the time of entry into the jurisdiction agreement.”1157 
It is hard to argue with BELL’s position regarding foreseeability. Indeed, it makes little 
sense to not hold a party to a term that she agreed with, aware of its implications, even if 
this represents a complication in the future. If the plaintiff knew, for example, that 
litigating in the selected forum would be more expensive than litigating in her home turf, 
then she should not have agreed to those terms. In principle, therefore, BELL’s desire to 
overrule the majority of The Eleftheria decision makes sense.  
                                                                  
1152  BELL, A. S., 2003, supra note 1015, p. 330. See also Verity Shipping SA v NV Norexa [2008], 370973 WL, 
Unreported. 
1153 FISHER, G., 2010, supra note 1149, p. 21. 
1154 KEYES, M., 2009, supra note 1055, pp. 200–201. 
1155 ibid., pp. 200–201. 
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Despite BELL’s reasonableness, however, it might not be such a good idea to change the 
current system based on The Eleftheria. Particularly when it comes to the inconvenience of 
the contractual forum, leaving a door open to allow parties to escape the bargain can be 
the only way to ensure fairness. 
As we have seen many times before, even among commercial parties it is not uncommon 
that one of them is placed in a position that allows them to dictate the terms in a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. Leaving weak parties at the mercy of the contract drafter, forced to 
litigate in distant forums that, for all intents and purposes, will prevent them from 
obtaining any redress, would certainly go against the type of justice and fairness that our 
legal systems seek to ensure. 
The issue of judicial discretion regarding forum selection clauses should not be seen in 
absolutes. Discretion is certainly necessary, as it prevents a mechanical enforcement of 
the contracts, and ensures that fairness can be protected. Of course, this discretionary 
power should be employed in a restrictive manner, not allowing the parties to go against 
their own bargains, while at the same time being able to adapt to the facts of the case.  
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“[T]he maritime law is not the law of a particular country, but the general 
law of nations.” 
Lord Mansfield.1158 
 
“The sea with its winds, its storms and its dangers never changes and this 
demands a necessary uniformity of juridical regime.” 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini.1159 
9.1 Introduction 
here is no doubt that, as one commentator noted, the dependence of the West “on 
the use of the sea for its survival and prosperity is a geopolitical fact of life.”1160 Despite 
being virtually invisible to most of the people who benefit from it, maritime trade 
is the backbone of our society. Approximately 90% of all trade is performed by sea, 
and that trade itself contributes to around 5% of the world economy.1161  
“Over 10,000 […] maritime companies are in charge of the efficient operation of 
around 50,000 ships coming from 150 countries, dedicated to international trade, 
thanks to the skill and enthusiasm of one million seamen. This intricate heap of 
efforts, from the private sector, international organizations, and national 
                                                                  
1158 Cited in GORMLEY, W. P., ‘The Development of the Rhodian-Roman Maritime Law to 1681, with Special 
Emphasis on the Problem of Collision’, 1961, 3 Inter-American Law Review, no. 2, p. 322. 
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1161 See NORDENMAN, M., ‘Europe and Its Seas in the Twenty-First Century’, 2016, 27 Mediterranean Quarterly, 
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Transporte Marítimo Internacional de Mercancías: Advertencias en Torno a la Búsqueda de una Tercera Vía’, 
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Chapter 9 




Contracts in Maritime Law 
jurisdictions, makes it possible for maritime transport to continue being the most 
competitive means of transport in terms of costs.”1162 
Even though sea trade is an industry to which we owe a large part of our modern-day 
comfort, for most of the population it seems to remain a mystery.1163 People tend to be 
completely unaware of how much we owe to the trade, actually seeing the navigation of 
the seas as merely a relic from times long gone. One First Sea Lord of the British navy is 
quoted as describing this phenomenon as one of “sea blindness” since, despite its 
importance staring us in the face, we remain ignorant of how vital this trade really is.1164 
“We travel by cheap flights, not ocean liners. The sea is a distance to be flown over, a 
downward backdrop between takeoff and landing, a blue expanse that soothes on the 
moving flight map as the plane jerks over it. It is for leisure and beaches and fish and 
chips, not for use or work. Perhaps we believe that everything travels by air, or 
magically and instantaneously like information (which is actually anchored by cables 
on the seabed), not by hefty ships that travel more slowly than senior citizens 
drive.”1165 
We have grown accustomed to the most visible aspects of trade and transportation, with 
most people imagining that air transport is not only an alternative, but rather the natural 
successor to maritime carriage. And yet, despite the passage of time, air transport, with all 
of its technological wonders, can only act as a complement to the trade conducted by sea. 
“Habitual air travel has blinded [the public] to the fact that aircraft lift only people 
and light freight: commercially, they can lift no fuel other than that required to 
complete their own journey. Everything else must go by sea. A single medium-sized 
container ship can carry around one hundred times more weight and volume than 
the largest freight aircraft; a large passenger ship can readily carry ten to fifteen 
times as many people as the largest passenger airliner.”1166 
                                                                  
1162 ibid., p. 80. ENRÍQUEZ illustrates the issues of costs by explaining how shipping a “20-foot container, from Asia 
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Our dependence on maritime trade is such that even national security, the very existence 
of our nations, would be at stake if the trade was affected.1167 This dependency manifests 
itself in the fact that countries like the United Kingdom, for example, live in what is 
known as a “just enough, just in time” economy, where “consumer goods, energy, food and raw 
materials are supplied on demand from around the world.”1168 Nations do not, as a rule, hold 
large reserves to be used in cases of emergency and are, as such, fully reliant on the 
existence of a vibrant trade. Interruptions to the maritime trade resulting from war, 
blockades, economic problems, or similar situations, would quickly lead to “catastrophic 
shortages of food, fuel, and other vital resources within a few days.”1169 
9.2 Defining Maritime Law 
The carriage of goods by sea is regulated by what is known as “maritime law” (in German 
“Seerecht,” Spanish “derecho marítimo,” French “droit maritime,” Dutch “zeerecht,” and 
Norwegian “sjørett”). This is the body of laws and regulations that, as GARNER explains, 
governs 
“marine commerce and navigation, the carriage at sea of persons and property, and 
marine affairs in general; the rules governing contract, tort, and workers' 
compensation claims or relating to commerce on or over water.”1170  
Although their names might lead to confusion, maritime law must be distinguished from 
what is known as “the law of the sea,” and which is defined as “the body of international law 
governing how nations use and control the sea and its resources.”1171 This is a fundamental 
distinction, since while maritime law refers to private relations (even if it can sometimes 
touch upon some public law issues), and is generally considered as part of commercial law, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
2010, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 1 (“[n]o other mode of transport can move such large quantities of cargo over such great 
distances so efficiently and at such low cost [as maritime carriage]”). 
1167 MOORE, S. K., 2011, supra note 1163, p. 700. On some of the dangers that “sea blindness” represents for the 
European Union, See ROGERS, J., ‘To Rule The Waves: Why a Maritime Geostrategy is Needed to Sustain 
European Union’, 2010, 6 Egmont Security Policy Brief, p. 5. 
1168 MOORE, S. K., 2011, supra note 1163, p. 700. In the case of fuel, it is worth noting that a full eighty percent of 
the world’s liquid-fuel energy resources travel by sea at some point in their journey,” and that, in addition to that, an 
increasing proportion of these resources are now being extracted directly from the sea-bed, thus increasing our 
reliance on sea carriage (BLACKHAM, J. & PRINS, G., 2010, supra note 1160, p. 17). 
1169 MOORE, S. K., 2011, supra note 1163, p. 700. 
1170 GARNER, B. A., 2009, supra note 373, p. 1055. 
1171 ibid., p. 967. 
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the law of the sea is part of (international) public law, often dealing with the relationship 
between State actors.1172 
Due to its complexity and extension, some have referred to maritime law as “a complete 
legal system,” just like the Common Law and the Civil Law are “complete” legal systems in 
their own right.1173 This, according to TETLEY,  
“can be readily seen from its component parts. For centuries maritime law has had 
its own law of contract--of sale (of ships), of service (towage), of lease (chartering), 
of carriage (of goods by sea), of insurance (marine insurance being the precursor of 
insurance ashore), of agency (ship chandlers), of pledge (bottomry and 
respondentia), of hire (of masters and seamen), of compensation for sickness and 
personal injury (maintenance and cure) and risk distribution (general average). It is 
and has been a national and an international law (probably the first private 
international law). It also has had its own public law and public international 
law.”1174 
Maritime law is divided in two parts. First, the lex maritima, the general maritime law, a 
ius commune that has evolved from different maritime codes throughout the ages and 
from time immemorial.1175 It is part of the lex mercatoria and has, traditionally, been made 
up of uniform principles and rules that have, through their application, avoided conflicts 
of laws arising in disputes that involved different countries.1176 
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1175 TETLEY, W., ‘The General Maritime Law - The Lex Maritima’, 1994, 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law 
and Commerce, p. 108. See also CHRISTENSEN, K. J., ‘Of Comity: Aerospatiale as Lex Maritima’, 2003, 2 Loyola 
Maritime Law Journal, p. 1 (referring to the lex maritima as “perhaps the oldest form of Jus Gentium or the law of 
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of Its International Character’, 2009, 34 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, no. 2, p. 573 (stating that it is “the living 
source of principle[s] derived from ancient practice, custom, codes, and organised doctrine that affects, constrains, and 
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1176 TETLEY, W., 1998, supra note 1173, p. 321 (stating that this system has “the immense advantage of averting 
conflict of laws problems because uniform principles and rules were applied to resolve disputes in all countries”). 
  
331 
Contracts in Maritime Law 
“Today's general maritime law consists of the common forms, terms, rules, standards 
and practices of the maritime shipping industry-standard form bills of lading, 
charterparties, marine insurance policies and sales contracts are good examples of 
common forms and the accepted meaning of the terms, as well as the York/Antwerp 
Rules on general average and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits. Much of this contemporary lex maritima is to be found in the maritime 
arbitral awards rendered by arbitral tribunals around the world by a host of 
institutional and ad hoc arbitral bodies.”1177 
The second component of maritime law is the “maritime statutory law.” It is composed of 
both national statutes as well as international conventions dealing with the maritime 
trade.1178 
9.3 The Characteristics of Maritime Law 
As William O’NEIL, former secretary general of the International Maritime Organization, 
stated, shipping is “the most international of all industries.”1179 This is easy to see when we 
consider that a seagoing vessel may visit several ports in different countries, carrying 
cargo from owners located in even more countries, and having contractual ties to even 
more nations, with all of these links having significant legal consequences.1180  
“Foreign commodities remain in demand. Because of their nature, juridical relations 
pertaining to navigation are not restricted to a single country, but transcend 
boundaries and extend their sphere of operation to several countries. This explains 
why one of the most distinctive features of maritime law is the extension of the 
application of the law governing navigational relations beyond the frontiers of the 
state which enact such a particular national law. This extended application also 
touches upon the rights of persons and real property. In practical terms this means 
that the dealings of one country is so closely interwoven with another in matters 
                                                                  
1177 ibid., p. 321. See also TETLEY, W., 1994, supra note 1175, p. 107 (stating this general maritime law is made up 
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such as carriage and transport in general, that the boundaries of a single nation are 
transcended and that legal matters arising from the above involve the application of 
foreign laws by the courts.”1181 
All of these elements have resulted in some seeing maritime law as the only “true” 
international law, as it often comes not from national power, but from international 
cooperation.1182 As Justice FRANKFURTER stated, the binding character of maritime law 
comes 
"not from [the] extraterritorial reach of national laws, nor from abdication of its 
sovereign powers by any nation, but from acceptance by common consent of civilized 
communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable commercial 
relations."1183 
This historical and international character has allowed maritime law to achieve a certain 
degree of uniformity that is unheard of in virtually all other areas of the law. This has, in 
part, been achieved by countries “borrowing solutions from other countries’ legislation, and 
partly by countries co-operating to develop common solutions,” as well as through the 
adoption of international conventions that have homogenized the solutions to given legal 
problems.1184 
Although we are still far from reaching a unified international system, the spirit of 
commercial cooperation and trade that informs maritime law has allowed for some 
uniformity to exist. This is particularly true in the case of nations in similar stages of 
development which, as a result of facing similar challenges, have achieved an even higher 
degree of harmonization.1185 Of course, complete uniformity and harmonization are still 
far from being a reality, and remain a difficult (and perhaps impossible) goal to reach.  
Some have argued that the lack of a universal system of maritime law is actually a recent 
development.1186 As a matter of fact, for a long time general maritime law, the lex 
                                                                  
1181 LOURENS, M., ‘Overview of the Regimes Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea, An’, 1999, 10 Stellenbosch 
Law Review, no. 2, p. 244. 
1182 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 1 (referring to maritime law as “the most prominent example” of 
international cooperation towards harmonization). 
1183 Quoted in ALLSOP, J., 2009, supra note 1175, p. 572. 
1184 FALKANGER, T. et al., 2011, supra note 1172, p. 24. See also VALDERRAMA, F. J., ‘Las Obligaciones del Porteador 
en el Contrato de Transporte Marítimo de Mercancías’, 2015, 42 Revista Chilena de Derecho, no. 2, p. 516 
(referring to maritime trade as an “eminently international activity”). 
1185 A good example of this situation is what happens in Scandinavian countries, who possess a “practically 
identical” Maritime Code (FALKANGER, T. et al., 2011, supra note 1172, p. 24). 
1186 TETLEY, W., 1994, supra note 1175, p. 113 (“[e]arly maritime law was not characterized by conflicts, because until 
at least the end of the sixteenth century in Europe, there was considerable homogeneity in maritime law”). But See also 
HETHERINGTON, S., 2014, supra note 1177, p. 161 (arguing that this historical unity was not such a panacea, as 
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maritima, stood as the only field of law that could truly be held as uniform, as in every 
other type of law “conflicts between national laws” were simply inevitable.1187 They argue 
that the 20th century’s attempts to achieve uniformity in the maritime field only became 
necessary as a result of the increased nationalism and governmental intervention that, 
over the centuries, destroyed the uniformity that had existed among traders from time 
immemorial.1188  
“The pioneers of travel and commerce by sea found it necessary to develop various 
types of codes, laws, and regulations to facilitate trading. A ship master needed to 
know what procedures and standards were expected of him in whatever port he 
might be obliged to enter. Thus the purpose of these codes was to give all who 
engaged in maritime trade a uniform understanding of their rights and obligations, 
thereby minimizing surprises and supporting rather than restricting trade. Because 
of the disputes which invariably arise in trade, systems were developed very early in 
the history of maritime commerce to resolve them and to further interport ship- 
ping. A port which had an understandable, urbane, and civilized method of resolving 
such disputes in a way comprehensible to ‘outlanders’ would be attractive to 
international trade and to merchants from other ports. […] While the traders, vessel 
owners, and navigators brought with them different languages, laws, and customs, 
they nevertheless lived and worked together within the wide world of trade and 
commerce. The wideness of sea trade fostered certain rules and a degree of 
uniformity in maritime law which only later, as a result of the passage of time and 
the advent of nationalism, was to be abandoned.[…] 
This uniform regulation of commerce and trade was recognized as a benefit and 
service to the nations involved; a fresh source of wealth was generated by interport 
trade. Not surprisingly, this wealth invariably led to government involvement as 
certain nations saw opportunities for increasing their gains. Also, because traders 
were by the nature of their work explorers, the resources of the foreign lands with 
which they traded were looked upon by their nation's rulers with covetous eyes. 
International commerce thus became a tool of international politics.”1189 
                                                                                                                                                                       
desire amongst traders (and some rulers) to adopt uniform laws to govern their activities arising from transportation by 
sea”). 
1187 TETLEY, W., 1994, supra note 1175, p. 113. See also CHRISTENSEN, K. J., 2003, supra note 1175, p. 1 (“the Lex 
Maritima was remarkable both for its homogeneity and for its relatively uniform application throughout most of Western 
Europe”). 
1188 PAULSEN, G. W., ‘Historical Overview of the Development of Uniformity in International Maritime Law’, 
1982, 57 Tulane Law Review, no. 5, p. 1065. 
1189 ibid., p. 1067. Somewhat similarly, FOX stated in 1919 that  
“The mutual relations of carrier to shipper, and shipper to shipper, give rise to many problems that cannot 
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As tempting as it might be to adopt this rather nostalgic view of the law, it is unfair to 
compare the situation that existed when “the pioneers of travel and commerce by sea” first 
started to develop the trade, with that of the 20th century, let alone the 21st century. 
Achieving legal uniformity centuries ago was considerably easier, as the amount of 
countries that were involved in trade, or which had a possibility to negotiate terms, was 
considerably smaller. What is more, the existence of large empires, with colonies and 
dominions spread all over the world, made it much easier to achieve a higher degree of 
uniformity, as “inter-empire” trade would certainly be harmonized.  
We should also be careful when we blame State interference as the culprit for our lack of 
harmonization. It is true, of course, that the sight of the wealth emanating from 
international trade was tempting for State actors, making them interested in 
participating in it, sometimes at the expense of their competitors in other nations. 
However, the actions of the State in this regard are not limited to merely trying to profit, 
but also to regulate the trade and protect some of its players. While regulation can often 
be unsatisfactory, if not downright incompetent, when traders have been left to their own 
devices, they have been known to give rise to systems that benefit the few at the expense 
of the many. As we will see, maritime trade and carriage are, without a doubt, prime 
examples of such a situation. 
9.4 The Commercial Exploitation of Vessels 
The commercial exploitation of a vessel can be basically done in three ways. The carriage 
of goods by sea (“contracts of affreightment” or “contracts of carriage”), the carriage of 
passengers (“passenger contracts”), and the contracts of towage.1190 In this and the 
following chapters we will only focus on the carriage of goods, as passenger and towage 
contracts follow different rules, and possess their own unique characteristics. 
In a nutshell, the carriage of goods is basically performed through two types of 
agreements.  
“[W]hen a shipowner […] agrees to carry goods by water, or to furnish a ship for the 
purpose of so carrying goods, in return for a sum of money to be paid to him, such a 
contract is called a contract of affreightment, and the sum to be paid is called freight. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the application of a set of rules entirely distinct and different from common law. These rules and customs 
are of most ancient origin and were in use long before our modern law was conceived.” 
FOX, J. M., ‘The Importance of Maritime Law in Wisconsin’, 1919, 3 Marquette Law Review, no. 2, p. 96. 
1190 CONTRERAS STRAUCH, O., 2000, supra note 1172, p. 165. 
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Depending on the manner in which the ship is employed, the contract of 
affreightment may be contained in a charterparty or evidenced by a bill of 
lading.”1191 
Even though there are significant differences between the two, and that the rights and 
obligations assumed by the parties are quite different, charterparties and bills of lading 
are sometimes confused. This misunderstanding can be explained by how both contracts 
are often interconnected, with bills of lading incorporating charterparty terms, 
charterparties incorporating rules that govern bills of lading, etc. What is more, even 
though the distinction between both instruments “is usually obvious from a quick perusal of 
the document,” the lines can become blurred in, for example, the case of hybrid contracts 
of carriage, typically relating to only part of a ship.1192 
Generally speaking, the differences between bills of lading and charterparties deal with 
the obligations that each party assumes. In a bill of lading, the carrier contracts with the 
shipper to carry the cargo from the port of loading to the port of discharge. In a 
charterparty, on the other hand, the charterer contracts the use of the vessel from its owner, 
be it for a specific voyage or for a period of time. Strictly speaking, bills of lading are 
contracts for the carriage of goods, while charterparties are contracts for the use of a 
vessel.1193  
While charterparties occur, for the most part, between parties of significant bargaining 
power (the owner of a vessel and a party economically capable of chartering the ship), bill 
of lading contracts often take place in more imbalanced situations.1194 Indeed, as the US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion: 
                                                                  
1191 BOYD, S. C. & BURROWS, A. S. et al., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 1996, 20º Edition, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, p. 1. See also BAUGHEN, S., Shipping Law, 2015, 6th ed., Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, p. 8 
(stating that the “two main types of contract in use for the carriage of goods by sea are the bill of lading and the 
charterparty”). 
1192 AIKENS, R. & LORD, R. et al., Bills of Lading, 2016, 2nd ed., Taylor & Francis, 2.33. 
1193 BAUGHEN, S., 2015, supra note 1191, p. 188. CONTRERAS STRAUCH seems to see the difference between 
charterparties and bills of lading as being one between obligations de moyens and obligations de resultat, 
respectively (CONTRERAS STRAUCH, O., 2000, supra note 1172, pp. 165–166). This is not really accurate, since the 
owner providing the vessel has an obligation de resultat of providing the ship, and maintaining it in working 
order. The owner is not simply binding himself to do his “best efforts” to provide the ship, but instead to actually 
provide a fully operational vessel. An alternative reading of this author’s work might suggest that he argues that 
in a charterparty the owner provides “the means” (“proporciona un medio”), therefore implying that the vessel is 
the means by which the charterer will perform his own duties, while in a bill of lading the carrier binds himself to 
achieving a result (“obtener un resultado”). Even if this latter interpretation is correct (as his review of the owner’s 
obligations in the charterparty might suggest) his choice of words is very unfortunate, as it lends itself to 
confusion.  
1194 See STURLEY, M. F., ‘Jurisdiction and Arbitration under the Rotterdam Rules’, 2009, 14 Uniform Law Review, 
no. 4, p. 972 (explaining that “[b]ecause charterparties are generally used when commercial parties have more-or-less 
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“[T]he bargaining power of charterers and vessel owners [has generally been 
considered] to be merely equal, unlike the edge in bargaining power held by vessel 
owners and charterers over cargo owners.”1195 
Similarly, in the 1972 House of Lords case of Federal Commerce and Navigation v. Tradax 
Export, Lord DIPLOCK commented: 
“The freight market for chartered vessel still remains a classic example of a free 
market. It is world-wide in coverage, highly competitive and sensitive to fluctuations 
in supply and demand. It is a market in which the individual charterers and 
shipowners are matched in bargaining power and are at liberty to enter into 
charterparties in whatever contractual terms they please.”1196 
Clearly, the power dynamics that exist in the case contracts evidenced by a bill of lading 
are the opposite to the ones we find in charterparties. While, as we have seen, the powers 
are more or less balanced in the case of charterparties, shippers and consignees are 
“usually in a far weaker position vis-à-vis shipowners when entering into carriage contracts.”1197 
                                                                                                                                                                       
significantly reduced”) and LANNAN, K., ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea–A General Overview’, 2009, 14 Uniform Law Review, no. 4, p. 307 
(explaining that “the principle of freedom of contract has already been accepted in certain situations in the Hague, 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, particularly in terms of contracts of carriage concluded under charterparties”). The 
fact that the tramp trade, performed via the use of charterparties, occurs in a more or less balanced environment 
has been expressly recognized by many. In 1922, for example, speaking before the Comité Maritime 
International, a Danish shipowner explained this issue as such: 
“Tramp shipping […] is done on a basis of free contract. The bill of lading is not the primary document; the 
primary document is the charter party, and the charter party is gone through by both parties and signed 
by both parties. It is generally signed by the merchants and signed over by a representative of the 
shipowner, at any rate he acts for the owner and the owner must abide by what he does. Therefore the 
cargo interests are as regards tramp shipping in a much better position to protect their interests, and as 
there are so many trades in the world it is natural that there will be different charter parties, and it is 
possible for both parties, and convenient for both parties to be able to do so, to put such special conditions 
into any given charter party that any given special trade may demand.” 
Cited in BERLINGIERI, F., ‘Freedom of Contract Under the Rotterdam Rules’, 2009, 14 Uniform Law Review, no. 4, 
p. 831. 
1195 Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd. v. M/T Stolt Lion [1980], 617 F. 2d, 907–916, p. 913. 
1196 Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Tradax Export S.A. [1978] AC, 1–16, p. 8. 
1197 NAIR, A., ‘Note on Norden: Voyage Charterparties, the Hague/Visby Rules and Enforcing Foreign Arbitration 
Awards, A’, 2013, 27 Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, no. 2, p. 97. See also COLDWELL, R., 
‘Jurisdiction and the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods: Where the Freedom 
of Contract Prevails’, 2014, 17 International Trade and Business Law Review, no. 1, p. 109 (“although not to the 
extent that was once present in the industry, a carrier is likely to retain a stronger negotiating position than the shipper, 
allowing it to impose on the shipper jurisdiction agreements beneficial to the carrier. This uncompetitive outcome is a 
product of the exercise of parties' freedom of contract”). 
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Indeed, it is generally undisputed that in the negotiation of the bill of lading, the carrier 
of the goods will often enjoy a superior bargaining position over that of its merchant.1198  
On the basis of their characteristics, and considering that our work has centered around 
unconscionable terms, with bargaining power disparities being a component of such 
clauses, we will place our focus on bills of lading. 
9.5 Defining Bills of Lading 
Contracts of carriage evidenced by bills of lading are the result of a complex and dynamic 
process. When a person (the shipper) wishes to ship a consignment of goods by sea, she 
will get in contact with a shipping company (the carrier), be it directly or through a 
forwarding agent, so as to book space on the ship for her cargo. The carrier will then 
instruct the shipper regarding the time and place for the delivery of the goods. Once the 
shipper has delivered the cargo for loading, the carrier will hand the shipper a mate’s 
receipt, or a similar document, containing the number and state of the loaded goods. 
Later, the shipper will receive a copy of the bill of lading, containing the quantity and 
quality of the loaded cargo, the port of destination, and the name of the consignee (the 
receiving party), which the shipper will have to compare with the previously issued 
receipt. In order to receive the cargo at the port of destination, the consignee will have to 
surrender his copy of the bill of lading.1199  
Bills of lading, like those issues in the example above, and which represent the large 
majority of the shipping market, are one of the most important documents in the 
commercial transport of goods.1200 Despite being fairly commonplace, however, and as 
                                                                  
1198 GAUFFREAU, S. C., ‘Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: The Supreme Court's Decision in 
Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer’, 1995, 21 NCJ Int'l L. & Com. Reg., no. 2, p. 395. See also 
VILLAREAL, D. R., JR., ‘Carrier's Responsibility to Cargo and Cargo's to Carrier’, 1970, 45 Tulane Law Review, 
pp. 777–778 (“[f]reedom of contract is allowed in private carriage under the rationale that charterers have as much 
bargaining power as owners and operators and that the language used and the rate of charter are bargained for on a 
case-by-case basis”) and DIAMOND, A., ‘The Rotterdam Rules’, 2009 Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 
p. 459 (“[c]harterparties, especially in the bulk trades, have long been regarded as the typical example of a type of 
contract where freedom of contract should prevail on the ground that they are individually negotiated and that no 
question arises of a need to protect a weaker party from another in a stronger bargaining position”). 
1199 A more thorough and elaborate description of the shipping process appears in OANA, A., ‘Implications of the 
Bill of Lading Usage in the Process of Goods Transportation by Sea’, 2013, 20 Constanta Maritime University 
Annals, no. 2, p. 183. See also WILSON, J. F., Carriage of Goods by Sea, 2010, 7th ed., Pearson/Longman, Harlow, 
p. 115 (referring to the issuing of the bill of lading in the case of liner trade shipments). 
1200 ibid., p. 115. Similarly, See also FORCE, R., 2004, supra note 1172, p. 52 (“[i]n carriage by water, the contract of 
carriage is often embodied in a negotiable bill of lading”), PECEROS, G. E. Y., ‘Contratación Electrónica en el Comercio 
Internacional de Mercaderías’, 2003, 5 Docentia et Investigatio, no. 8, p. 199 (referring to bills of lading a “the most 
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AIKENS has noted, “[l]ike an Elephant, a bill of lading is generally easier to recognise than to 
define.”1201 Indeed, a review of the available literature shows that, in general, authors 
prefer to describe bills of lading, instead of defining them. SCRUTTON, for example, after 
noting that a bill of lading is issued as a receipt once the goods are shipped, explains that, 
in addition, it also serves two other distinct functions: 
“1. Evidence of the contract of affreightment between the shipper and the carrier. 
2. A document of title, by the indorsement of which the property in the goods for 
which it is a receipt may be transferred, or the goods pledged or mortgaged as a 
security for an advance.”1202 
AIKENS takes a similar approach, enumerating the functions of the bill of lading, adding 
that a document that “has all these characteristics will almost certainly be a bill of lading, and 
a document which lacks any of them will rarely be [one].”1203 Confirming this terminological 
difficulty, CARR and STONE explain how  
“[n]either common law nor existing legislation affecting bills of lading or the terms 
of carriage where a bill of lading is used provide a definition of a bill of lading. Its 
essence is to be gathered from the various functions it assumes. It is a receipt, 
evidence of the contract of carriage, a contract of carriage and a document of title, 
depending on whether the holder of the bill of lading is the shipper, consignee or 
endorsee.”1204 
In an attempt to simplify the situation, CARVER offers the following definition: 
                                                                                                                                                                       
commercial transport of goods by sea”) and WILLISTON, S. & LORD, R., Williston on Contracts, 2002, West Group, 
Minnesota, p. 3 (calling them the “principal type” of documents related to the carriage of goods by sea). 
1201 AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, 2.1. 
1202 BOYD, S. C. et al., 1996, supra note 1191, p. 2. 
1203 AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, 2.3 (emphasis added). 
1204 CARR, I. & STONE, P., 2014, supra note 318, p. 166. See also AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, p. 3 
(“there is no universally applicable definition of a bill of lading”) and MITCHELHILL, A., Bills of Lading: Law and Practice, 
1990, Second Edition, Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., p. 5 (stating, in regards to the United Kingdom, 
that “neither the Bills of Lading Act 1855 nor any other Act of Parliament has defined the meaning of 'Bill of Lading'”). A 
review of comparative legislation does show a general reluctance to define the term. Indeed, besides the United 
Kingdom and the United States, countries like Spain, Germany and the Netherlands have opted not to define it at 
all. A minority of nations, however, have made the attempt. Article 977 of the Chilean Code of Commerce, for 
example, defines the bill of lading (“conocimiento de embarque”) as: “a document that proves the existence of a 
contract for the carriage by sea, y which proves that the carrier has received the cargo or has loaded the goods and has 
become bound to deliver them against the exhibition of this document to a determined person, the endorsee of the bill of 
lading, or to its holder” (“un documento que prueba la existencia de un contrato de transporte marítimo, y acredita que el 
transportador ha tomado a su cargo o ha cargado las mercancías y se ha obligado a entregarlas contra la presentación de 
ese documento a una persona determinada, a su orden o al portador"). It should be noted that although this definition 
covers the essential elements of a bill of lading, it still fails to account for some of its functions.  
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“A bill of lading is a document issued by or on behalf of a carrier of goods by sea to the 
person (usually known as the shipper) with whom he has contracted for the carriage 
of goods. Its basic features are that it contains promises by the carrier to carry the 
goods to the agreed destination subject to the terms of the document, and to deliver 
them there, in accordance with those terms; and a promise by the shipper to pay the 
agreed remuneration, known as freight.”1205 
Despite being quite thorough, CARVER’s definition is not complete, as it does not include 
all of the functions served by the bill of lading. This shortcoming, however, can hardly be 
blamed on the author, as it instead demonstrates the rather futile attempt of offering 
complete and total definitions of these documents.  
9.6 The Bill of Lading and the Contract of Carriage 
Although, as we have seen, bills of lading fulfill a number of functions, not all of them 
appeared at the same time. As a matter of fact, when bills of lading originated around the 
14th century, they merely acted as non-negotiable receipts for the cargo transported 
aboard the ship, issued by the carrier.1206 As disputes arose between shippers and carriers 
regarding the terms of the contract, however, it became customary to include the terms in 
the bill of lading itself, something that eventually evolved into the modern practice of 
adding the details of the cargo on the front of the bill, and the terms on the back.1207 Later 
on, by the 18th century, “with the increasing availability of methods of international 
transport,” merchants were encouraged to sell their goods while they were still in transit; 
due to the obvious logistical problems that a physical transfer would entail, a workaround 
was found in the transfer of the bill of lading by the holder of the bill of lading, which was 
also understood to transfer the title over the goods mentioned therein.1208  
In regards to the evidentiary function of the bill of lading, evidencing or containing the 
terms of the contract, it is important to make some clarifications. WILLISTON and LORD, 
for example, incorrectly state that this function developed at a time when the bill of 
                                                                  
1205 TREITEL, G. H. & REYNOLDS, F. et al., Carver on Bills of Lading, 2011, Third Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 10.  
1206 WILSON, J. F., 2010, supra note 1199, p. 115. See also WILLISTON, S. & LORD, R., 2002, supra note 1200, p. 79 
("[o]riginally, a bill of lading was merely a bailment receipt for goods received for carriage to a particular destination").  
1207 WILSON, J. F., 2010, supra note 1199, p. 115. See also MORALES ARAGÓN, J. A., ‘La Carga Dinámica de la 
Prueba dentro del Proceso Contractual de Transporte Marítimo bajo Conocimiento de Embarque’, 2013, 10 
Revista Ciencias Humanas, no. 1, p. 57 (noting that “although their original function was to provide a receipt” for the 
cargo aboard the vessel, other functions, like serving as a document of title, were added later). 
1208 WILSON, J. F., 2010, supra note 1199, p. 115. See also GIRVIN, S., Carriage of Goods by Sea, 2011, 2º Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, p. 34. 
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lading “also became the contract of carriage.”1209 Indeed, even though overlapping certainly 
exists, and that some courts have even treated them as equal, it is not correct to say that 
the bill of lading is the same as the contract of carriage.1210 Indeed, as TETLEY has noted, 
the bill of lading “is really not the contract of carriage but the best evidence of the contract."1211  
The difference that exists between the contract itself and the bill of lading is, in essence, 
an issue of time. The contract of carriage precedes the bill of lading, and therefore must 
have been made before the bill is issued. By its very nature, the bill must come after the 
contract has been concluded, since only then can it be signed and delivered.1212 The bill of 
lading will, therefore, serve as the best evidence of the terms of the contract or, if it is in 
the hands of a third-party endorsee, as the only evidence, without, however, being the 
contract. According to TETLEY, the “real” contract of carriage is made up of “the 
advertisements, the booking note, the freight tariff, and custom and usage of the carrier and the 
place of shipment all taken together.”1213 
Making this distinction is not merely an academic issue, as determining the exact terms 
of the contract of carriage has important consequences. This was the situation that arose 
in, for example, the 1950 English case of The Ardennes.1214 In this case, the claimant, a 
shipper of a cargo of oranges from Cartagena to London, had agreed orally with the 
shipping agents that the cargo would be shipped directly to its destination, in order to 
avoid an upcoming increase in import tariffs. Despite the verbal assurances, however, the 
bill of lading that was issued when the cargo was loaded contained a liberty clause that 
allowed the carrier to call at other intermediate ports in the voyage to London. As the 
vessel did in fact call at other ports before reaching its final destination, prolonging the 
voyage, by the time the cargo arrived to London the import duties had increased, and the 
price of oranges had fallen. This caused a significant monetary damage to the shipper.  
                                                                  
1209 WILLISTON, S. & LORD, R., 2002, supra note 1200, p. 79 (emphasis added). Similarly, after explaining the 
different functions of the bill of lading, GIRVING notes how “bills of lading of various types constitute the main 
contract of carriage for many commercial parties engaged in the shipment of their goods from one country to another” 
(GIRVIN, S., 2011, supra note 1208, p. 35). 
1210 SCHNARR, C. N., ‘Foreign Forum Selection Clauses Under COGSA: The Supreme Court Charts New Waters in 
the Sky Reefer Case’, 1996, 74 Wash. ULQ, no. 3, p. 868 (noting that “courts use the bill as the contract itself” 
despite not being the same thing). 
1211 Cited in ZEKOS, G. I., ‘The Contractual Role of Documents Issues under the CMI Draft Instrument on 
Transport Law 2001’, 2004, 35 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 1, p. 103. See also TETLEY, W., ‘Selected 
Problems of Maritime Law under the Hague Rules’, 1963, 9 McGill Law Journal, no. 1, p. 56 (“[t]he real contract of 
carriage is not the bill of lading, it being only the best evidence of the contract”) and PECEROS, G. E. Y., 2003, supra 
note 1200, pp. 198–199 (“[the contract of carriage] is a consensual contract, evidenced by the bill of lading “). 
1212 BOYD, S. C. et al., 1996, supra note 1191, p. 67. 
1213 Cited in SCHNARR, C. N., 1996, supra note 1210, p. 868. See also WILSON, J. F., 2010, supra note 1199, p. 129 
(“[t]he contract is normally concluded orally long before the bill is issued, and the terms are inferred from the carrier’s 
sailing announcements and from any negotiations with loading brokers before the goods are shipped”). 
1214 The Ardennes [1951], 1 KB, 55–61.   
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When the claimant sought to recover the losses that resulted from the breach of the 
contract, the carrier pleaded in his defense the existence of the liberty clause.1215 
Lord GODDARD CJ, after ruling that oral testimony was admissible in regards to the terms 
of the contract, stated: 
“[A] bill of lading is not in itself the contract between the shipowner and the shipper 
of goods, though it has been said to be excellent evidence of its terms […] The 
contract has come into existence before the bill of lading is signed; the latter is signed 
by one party only, and handed by him to the shipper usually after the goods have 
been put on board. No doubt if the shipper finds that the bill contains terms with 
which he is not content, or does not contain some term for which he has stipulated, 
he might, if there were time, demand his goods back; but he is not, in my opinion, for 
that reason, prevented from giving evidence that there was in fact a contract entered 
into before the bill of lading was signed different from that which is found in the bill 
of lading or containing some additional term. He is no party to the preparation of the 
bill of lading; nor does he sign it.”1216 
This separation between the bills of lading and the contract which is evidenced by them, 
can also be seen in some of the rules that govern them. The Chilean Code of Commerce, 
for example, defines the bill of lading, in the relevant part of Article 977, as: 
 “a document that proves the existence of a contract of maritime carriage […]”1217 
                                                                  
1215 WILSON, J. F., 2010, supra note 1199, pp. 129–130. 
1216 The Ardennes [1951], pp. 59–60. Similarly, in the more recent case of Cho Yang Shipping Co. v. Coral, Hobhouse 
LJ stated: 
“In English law the bill of lading is not the contract between the original parties but is simply evidence of it 
[…] Indeed, though contractual in form, it may in the hands of a person already in contractual relations 
with the carrier (e.g. a charterer) be no more than a receipt […] Therefore, as between shipper and carrier, 
it may be necessary to inquire what the actual contract between them was; merely to look at the bill of 
lading may not in all cases suffice. It remains necessary to look at and take into account the other evidence 
bearing upon the relationship between the shipper and the carrier and the terms of the contract between 
them […] The terms upon which the goods have been shipped may not be in all respects the same as those 
actually set out in the bill of lading.” 
Cho Yang Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Coral (UK) Ltd. [1997] CLC, 1100–1108, p. 1102. See also Dry Bulk Handy Holding Inc, 
Compania Sud Americana de Vapores S.A. v Fayette International Holdings Limited, Metinvest International S.A. 
[2012] EWHC, 2107. It should be noted that, under English law, if the shipper considers it appropriate and 
necessary, he is still able to “adduce  oral evidence to show that the true terms  of the contract are those contained in 
the bill of lading, but are to be gathered from the mate’s receipt, shipping-cards, placards, handbills announcing the 
sailing of the ship, advice-notes, freight-notes, or undertakings or warranties by the broker, or other agent of the carrier” 
(BOYD, S. C. et al., 1996, supra note 1191, p. 67). In the of the United States, on the other hand, ZEKOS argues 
that a case like The Ardennes would have been ruled differently, since “the bill of lading would be found to be the 
contract of carriage, superseding any oral promises or agreements” ( ZEKOS, G. I., 2004, supra note 1211, p. 106).  
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Similarly, Article 1(7) of the Hamburg Rules establish in the relevant part that a bill of 
lading is: 
“a document which evidences a contract of carriage by sea […]”1218 
While the Hague-Visby Rules do not define bills of lading, they do seem to recognize the 
distinction. Indeed, when Article 1 (b) defines the term “contract of carriage,” it 
establishes that such term 
“applies only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any similar 
document of title […]” 
Under German law the situation is the same, with the HGB, the Commercial Code, 
making a clear distinction between the contract of carriage itself and the bill of lading.1219 
For example: 
“§513. Entitlement to issuance of a bill of lading 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed in the contract for the carriage of general cargo, 
the carrier must issue to the Ablader [shipper], at the latter’s request, an order bill 
of lading […]”1220 
In Scandinavia, the Norwegian Maritime Code of 1994 (versions of which also apply in 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland) is also careful not to confuse bills of lading with contracts 
of carriage.1221  
“§ 292. Bills of Lading 
By a bill of lading is meant a document 
1) which evidences a contract of carriage by sea and that the carrier has 
received or loaded the goods […]”1222 
                                                                                                                                                                       
El conocimiento de embarque es un  documento que prueba la existencia de un contrato de  transporte 
marítimo […]” 
(emphasis added). 
1218 Emphasis added. 
1219 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 44. It is worth noting that some of SPARKA’s comments in regards to the 
applicable HGB rules are no longer applicable, based on the HGB’s 2013 amendment.  
1220 “§ 513 Anspruch auf Ausstellung eines Konnossements 
(1) Der Verfrachter hat, sofern im Stückgutfrachtvertrag nicht etwas Abweichendes 
vereinbart ist, dem Ablader auf dessen Verlangen ein Orderkonnossement auszustellen [..…]“ 
(emphasis added). 
1221 On the applicability of the Maritime Code in Scandinavia, See FALKANGER, T. et al., 2011, supra note 1172, 
pp. 26–27. 
1222 “§ 292.Konnossement 
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These important considerations notwithstanding, some caveats need to be made. First, 
even if it is not, strictly speaking, the same as the contract of carriage, the bill of lading 
will, in fact, serve as prima facie evidence of the terms contained therein. In fact, the 
burden of proof that must be carried by the party seeking to prove that the terms are 
different from those contained in the bill of lading, might be virtually impossible to 
defeat. Second, despite the ruling in The Ardennes, it might not be altogether accurate to 
say that the shipper does not participate in the preparation of the bill of lading, since he 
will often fill in the details of the cargo being shipped, at which point he will also be able 
to review the terms that it contains.1223  
Finally, irrespective of the situation of the shipper himself, it should be kept in mind that 
in regards to a bona fine third party, the terms contained in the bill of lading will be seen 
as conclusive evidence of the contract of carriage.1224 As CARR and STONE put it: 
“The view that the bill of lading is evidence of the contract of carriage is correct only 
in so far as the holder of the bill is the shipper. On endorsement to a third party (i.e., 
the consignee or endorsee) in the hands of that third party, the bill of lading is the 
contract of carriage. Any oral or written agreement between the shipper and the 
shipowner not expressed on the bill of lading will not affect the third party on 
grounds of lack of notice.”1225 
This difference in regards to third parties makes sense. The endorsee has no way of 
knowing what were the terms that, privately, the shipper and the carrier might have 
agreed upon, and must therefore rely exclusively on what he can see in the bill of lading. 
When a negotiable bill of lading is issued, the carrier knows that it might be transferred to 
third parties, and so it is in his best interest to make sure that it reflects the correct 
terms. If the carrier does not wish to be bound to terms he did not agree upon, it is his 
duty to ensure that the bill of lading accurately reflects the contract.1226  
                                                                                                                                                                       
1) som er bevis for en avtale om sjøtransport og for at transportøren har mottatt eller lastet godset, 
og 
2) som betegner seg som konnossement eller inneholder en bestemmelse om at transportøren påtar 
seg bare å utlevere godset mot tilbakelevering av dokumentet.” 
(emphasis added). 
1223 WILSON, J. F., 2010, supra note 1199, p. 130. 
1224 ibid., p. 130. See also OANA, A., 2013, supra note 1199, p. 184 (“[b]etween the carrier and the third [party] 
endorsees, the bill of lading may constitute a contract of carriage and not mere evidence of its existence. Indeed, once 
endorsed for value to a third party acting in good faith, the bill of lading becomes conclusive evidence of the terms of the 
contract of carriage”). 
1225 CARR, I. & STONE, P., 2014, supra note 318, p. 173. 
1226 ibid., p. 173. 
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“Variety is what constitutes organization; uniformity is mere mechanism. 
Variety is life; uniformity is death.” 
Benjamin Constant1227 
 
“There is a paramount need not only for a national system, but also for 
international uniformity in dealings between the United States and our 
colleagues abroad.” 
Howard M. McCormack1228 
10.1 Introduction 
n order to be useful and be able to fulfill its purpose, the regulation of international 
trade in general, and maritime trade in particular, needs to ensure stability and 
certainty for legal relations. It must also take a pragmatic approach towards 
regulation, so as to create workable solutions, firmly grounded on the reality of trade, 
seeking to solve the problems that are most likely to arise in the normal course of 
business. 
Aware of the international elements that are inherent to maritime trade, the community 
of nations has sought to establish a uniform regulatory system. Be it through unification 
or harmonization, there has been a clear desire to facilitate the normal workings of 
maritime trade, creating a predictable system that applies regardless of the specific 
geographical details of a given voyage.  With this goal in mind, starting in the late 19th 
century, there have been several efforts to draft international rules that govern the 
relationship between carriers and shippers, arising in response to a fairly unregulated 
environment that, according to some, was ripe for abuse. 
                                                                  
1227 CONSTANT, B., On Uniformity, in Fontana, B. (ed.), Constant: Political Writings, 1988, p. 77. 
1228 MCCORMACK, H. M., ‘Uniformity of Maritime Law, History, and Perspective from the U.S. Point of View’, 
1998, 73 Tulane Law Review, no. 5, pp. 1546–1547. 
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10.2 A Laissez-Faire Trade 
In the beginning, bills of lading, as well as maritime trade in general, were left 
unregulated.1229 It was understood that the market could take care of itself, and so 
freedom of contract was the governing principle of the industry. The parties were able to 
determine the exact content of their contracts with virtually little or no external 
limitations.  
“Up until the early part of the last century, there was no internationally accepted 
system of minimum liability as between a carrier (not necessarily a shipowner) and 
the owner of goods carried. This meant that often onerous terms were imposed on 
shippers while a third party buyer of goods could not be certain about the extent of 
any obligations or liabilities which might be contained in a bill of lading. This could 
give rise to later unexpected and unwelcome surprises.”1230 
During this time, both in the Common Law as well as in Civilian systems, shipwoners (as 
common carriers, in the case of English and American law) were considered to be strictly 
liable for the safe transport of the cargo to its destination, as well as for the delivery to 
the designated person.1231 As STURLEY has documented, during the early 19th Century, 
“the carrier was held strictly liable for cargo damage or loss that occurred in the 
course of the conveyance unless it could prove (1) that its negligence had not 
contributed to the loss and (2) that one of the four excepted causes (act of God, act of 
public enemies, shipper's fault, or inherent vice of the goods) was responsible for the 
loss.”1232  
                                                                  
1229 MARGETSON, S. W., The History of the Hague (Visby) Rules, in M. L. Hendrikse et al. (eds.), Aspects of Maritime 
Law: Claims Under Bills of Lading, 2008, p. 6 (arguing before the issue of bills of lading became a point for debate, 
“carriage by sea was dominated by freedom of contract"). 
1230 MUKHERJEE, P. K. et al., 2013, supra note 1179, p. 331. 
1231 CRUTCHER, M. B., ‘Ocean Bill of Lading--A Study in Fossilization’, 1970, 45 Tulane Law Review, no. 4, p. 701 
(“[t]he shipowner could be considered a common carrier, under English law, and as such virtually an insurer of those 
goods, the only exceptions to his liability being loss from acts of the public enemy or acts of God. The master himself was 
liable in the same measure”). A similar view is expressed by MAGASHI, A. I. & HARUNA, A. L., ‘Revisiting Freedom of 
Contract in the Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules: Service Contracts in Disguise?’, 
2016, 24 IIUM Law Journal, no. 1, p. 237. PING-FAT defines a common carrier as “one who holds himself out as being 
prepared to carry for reward for all and sundry without reserving the right to refuse the goods tendered,” adding that 
shipowners  are “practically ‘brought under the same kind of liability as common carriers unless that liability is cut down 
by special contract’” (PING-FAT, S., Carrier's Liability Under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, 2002, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands, p. 2). 
1232 Cited in MANDELBAUM, S. R., ‘Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods 
under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions’, 1995, 23 Transportation Law Journal, no. 3, p. 474. 
See also PEACOCK, J. H., III, ‘Deviation and the Package Limitation in the Hague Rules and the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act: An Alternative Approach to the Interpretation of International Uniform Acts’, 1989, 68 Texas Law 
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In effect, this wide liability virtually made the carriers insurers of the cargo that they were 
transporting.1233 As the United States Supreme Court stated in the 1858 case of The 
Propeller Niagara: 
“Common carriers by water, like common carriers by land, in the absence of any 
legislative provisions prescribing a different rule, are also, in general, insurers, and 
liable in all events, and for every loss or damage, however occasioned, unless it 
happened by the act of God, or the public enemy, or by some other cause or accident, 
without any fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, and expressly excepted in 
the bill of lading. […] In the absence of any special agreement, his duty extends to all 
that relates to the lading, as well as the transportation and delivery of the goods; 
and for the faithful performance of those duties the ship is liable, as well as the 
master and owners.”1234 
The extent of the duties of the common carrier can be better understood by the ruling in 
the 1703 King’s Bench case of Coggs v. Bernard.1235 Here, Sir HOLT explained the 
responsibility of the carrier as follows: 
“The law charges this person thus intrusted to carry goods, against all events but 
acts of God, and of the enemies of the King. For though the force be never so great, as 
if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable. 
And this is a politick establishment, contrived by the policy of the law, for the safety 
of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs oblige them to trust these sorts of 
persons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might 
have an opportunity of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by 
                                                                                                                                                                       
fault of the shipper exempted the carrier from liability”). As ZHAO makes sure to note, however, this “strict liability” 
regime did not mean that this was a system in which there was no fault, neither in the Common nor in the Civil 
Law systems. As she notes: 
“Under common law, ‘strict’ meant high standards of duty for carriers and there were exemptions, but 
only four (i.e. "act of God, [an] act of public enemies, shipper's fault, or inherent vice [i.e. defects] of the 
goods.") Under civil law, carriers' liabilities were based on presumed fault or neglect. Accordingly, carriers 
were held to be liable for cargo claims unless they could prove damages resulting from one of four 
exemptions, or the absence of fault on the part of the carrier.” 
ZHAO, L., ‘Uniform Seaborne Cargo Regimes--A Historical Review’, 2015, 46 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, no. 2, pp. 138–139. 
1233 MANDELBAUM, S. R., 1995, supra note 1232, p. 474. See also MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, 
p. 1521 (“in the absence of any legislative provisions prescribing a different rule, [common carriers] were, essentially, 
insurers liable in all events, except for very restrictive defenses.”). 
1234 The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes [1858], 62 US, 7–35, p. 23. See also STURLEY, M. F., ‘The History of COGSA and 
the Hague Rules’, 1991, 22 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 1, p. 5 (“[t]his extensive no-fault liability, in 
an era when such liability was rare, led many to describe the carrier as an ‘insurer’ of the goods. This label, albeit 
technically incorrect, well conveys the concept that a carrier assumed broad liability for cargo under general maritime 
law”). 
1235 Coggs v. Bernard [1703], 92 E.R., 107–114. 
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combining with thieves, etc. and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner, as would 
not be possible to be discovered.”1236  
In order to avoid being exposed to massive liability, carriers increasingly relied on all-
embracing exclusion clauses.1237 These exculpatory provisions were so wide, in fact, that 
even negligence on the part of the carrier during the voyage would be completely 
exempted.1238 This was a demonstration of the position the carriers had in the market in 
comparison to that of their individual merchants, and which, in effect, allowed them to 
dictate the totality of the terms in a take-it-or-leave-it basis.1239 Despite their apparent 
unfairness, due to the prevailing understanding about freedom of contract, these 
disclaimers of liability were often enforced in both Civil as well as Common Law 
jurisdictions.1240 
A clear proof of how widespread was the use of these clauses comes from an 1889 report 
from the West of England P&I Club, and which stated: 
"[T]he Committee congratulates the members on the absence in recent years of cargo 
claims which has been brought about by the now general adoption of the negligence 
clause; the premium reduction for use of this clause is therefore discontinued."1241 
Clubs were justified in their glee. Despite holding the carriers as strictly liable, both 
English and European courts had no problem in accepting and enforcing these exclusion 
clauses.1242 In France, for example, the courts “generally admitted disclaimers of liability or 
limitation of liability clauses in bills of lading, despite protests by shippers and scholars;” other 
                                                                  
1236 ibid., p. 112. 
1237 CRUTCHER, M. B., 1970, supra note 1231, p. 702. 
1238 MAGASHI, A. I. & HARUNA, A. L., 2016, supra note 1231, p. 238. 
1239 NIKAKI, T. & SOYER, B., ‘New International Regime for Carriage of Goods by Sea: Contemporary, Certain, 
Inclusive and Efficient, or Just Another One for the Shelves’, 2012, 30 Berkeley Journal of International Law, no. 2, 
p. 303 (“[f]or decades, sea carriers-taking advantage of their superior bargaining power-insisted on the inclusion of 
clauses into contract of carriages that exempted them even from their basic common law liability”). See also LIANG, C., 
‘Bills of Lading's Freedom of Contract: With Special Reference to the Development of the International 
Legislation and to a Special Issue under the Chinese Law’, 2013 China Oceans Law Review, no. 18, p. 226 
(explaining that carriers took advantage of their strong position that granted him the freedom “to contract out as 
much of his liability towards the cargo interests as possible,” resulting in “a typical unfair contract term at modem 
times”). With a certain dramatism, MAGASHI and HARUNA illustrate the power of the carrier by noting how “the 
almighty shipowners dictated the terms in the bills of lading down the throat of the shippers who had no option but to 
swallow those incongruous terms” (MAGASHI, A. I. & HARUNA, A. L., 2016, supra note 1231, p. 238). 
1240 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 139. See also CARR, I. & STONE, P., 2014, supra note 318, p. 217, 
MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, p. 1521 and MITCHELHILL, A., 1990, supra note 1204, p. 5 (“the terms 
incorporated into the bill of lading became more difficult and harsh for the shipper, almost to the point where the 
shipowner was 'not responsible for anything apart from the collection of his freight'”). 
1241 Quoted in REYNOLDS, F., ‘The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules’, 1990, 7 
Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, p. 16. 
1242 ALLISON, S., ‘Choice of Law and Forum Clauses in Shipping Documents — Revising Section 11 of the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (CTH)’, 2014, 40 Monash University Law Review, no. 3, p. 639. 
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Civil Law countries followed suit.1243 Similarly, the courts of England, at the time the 
largest and most powerful maritime power, were generally inclined to uphold these wide 
exculpatory clauses, even if they went as far as releasing the carrier from the 
consequences of his own negligence.1244 The basic understanding of the British courts on 
this matter was that “the common carrier's liability under the common law was a default rule 
that could be displaced by an agreement to the contrary.”1245 
While carriers themselves, as well as the governments of nations with a large maritime 
industry, were satisfied with the state of affairs, the situation was different in nations 
with a majority of cargo interests. Evidently, nations devoted to exporting goods were not 
as happy about this practice since, in effect, the adherence that some courts 
demonstrated to a fairly absolutist idea of freedom of contract allowed the shipowners to 
carry the cargoes “when he liked, as he liked, and wherever he liked.”1246 Indeed, through the 
use of these exclusion clauses, shippers were left at the mercy of their carriers, often 
unable to obtain any kind of redress, as the clauses “operated totally in the carrier’s favour 
and the goods were carried entirely at the merchant’s risk.”1247 The bargaining power of the 
carriers allowed them to, in effect, conduct their trade free of almost any reasonable 
limitations.1248 
“The bills of lading became so lengthy that it became difficult to ascertain rights and 
liabilities. Even bankers were ‘in doubt as to their security when discounting drafts 
drawn against bills of lading, cargo underwriters [had] not known the risks which 
they covered when insuring goods… and carriers and shippers [were] in constant 
litigation.’ The exculpatory clauses typically included losses and damage from 
                                                                  
1243 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., ‘Uniform Law for International Transport at UNCITRAL: New Times, News Players, and 
New Rules’, 2009, 44 Texas International Law Journal, no. 3, p. 281. See also POOR, W., ‘New Code for the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea’, 1923, 33 Yale Law Journal, no. 2, p. 133. 
1244 VALDERRAMA, F. A. J., ‘Contratos de Transporte Marítimo de Mercancías: Del Harter Act Norteamericano de 
1893 a las Reglas de Rotterdam de 2008 y los Tratados de Libre Comercio de Colombia con los Estados Unidos de 
América y la Unión Europea’, 2012, 38 Revista de Derecho, pp. 112–113. In regards to the relevance of the United 
Kingdom in the development of shipping and its regulation, it is worth noting that by the 1800’s, “almost all” the 
ships that were devoted to trans-oceanic carriage were English (CRUTCHER, M. B., 1970, supra note 1231, p. 699). 
1245 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, p. 281. 
1246 FREDERICK, D. C., ‘Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking Process: 
From the Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules’, 1991, 22 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 1, pp. 82–83. 
1247 CARR, I. & STONE, P., 2014, supra note 318, p. 217. 
1248 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, pp. 139–140. See also DONOVAN, J. J., ‘The Hamburg Rules: Why a New 
Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea’, 1979, 4 Maritime Lawyer, no. 1, p. 2 (stating that “British carriers 
exploited their commercial position by inserting clauses in their bills of lading which exonerated them from liability for 
cargo damage caused by their negligence”). LIANG argues that the fact that the carrier was in a stronger bargaining 
power than the shipper came as a result of maritime ventures being, at the time, inherently dangerous, which 
limited the availability of ships conducting trade (LIANG, C., 2013, supra note 1239, p. 226). Although LIANG 
seems to limit this bargaining disparity to the past, it is hard to see why such logic cannot apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to the current landscape of the trade. 
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thieves, heat leakage, and breakage; contracts with other goods; perils of the seas; 
jettison; damage by sea water; frost; decay; collision; strikes; benefit of insurance; 
liberty to deviate; sweat and rain; rust; prolongation of the voyage; nonresponsiblity 
for marks or numbers; removal of the goods from the carrier's custody immediately 
upon discharge; limitation of value; time for notice of claims; and time for suit.”1249 
SCRUTTON referred to this as a situation in which, apparently, “the only obligation resting 
upon the fortunate shipowner is to receive the freight.”1250 As it was to be expected, such a 
liberal environment lead to enormous abuses and to “interpretative anarchy.”1251 By placing 
the risk wholly on the shippers, the carrier had little or no motivation to actually care for 
the goods, as his compensation would not be affected in case of damage.1252 
Even in countries where the disclaimers of liability were interpreted in a very narrow 
manner, the issue of the burden of proof complicated things even more for the cargo 
interests. In the United States, for example, the courts had ruled that clauses exempting 
the carrier from his own negligence were against public policy and therefore 
unenforceable; however, if the alleged damages were the result of one of the perils 
excepted in the bill of lading, then it was the merchant’s responsibility to prove that the 
damage was caused by the carrier’s negligence.1253  
“In the pre-discovery days, that burden of proof was a very real defensive weapon, 
and a source of serious difficulty for the cargo claimant. A predictable result of this 
situation was a great proliferation of oppressive exemptive clauses under which, if 
                                                                  
1249 MANDELBAUM, S. R., ‘International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and Delay: A 
U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules’, 1995, 5 Journal of Transnational 
Law & Policy, no. 1, p. 9. 
1250 POOR, W., 1923, supra note 1243, p. 133 See also STURLEY, M. F., 1991, supra note 1234, p. 10 (quoting the 
Glasgow Corn Trade Association’s complaint to the British Prime Minister, stating that the exclusion clauses 
were “so unreasonable and unjust in their terms as to exempt [the carriers] from almost every conceivable risk and 
responsibility”). 
1251 CORNEJO FULLER, E., ‘El Contrato de Transporte Bajo Conocimiento de Embarque: Norma sobre Contenedores 
y Transporte Multimodal’, 1988, 12 Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, p. 278. 
See also MAGASHI, A. I. & HARUNA, A. L., 2016, supra note 1231, pp. 236–237 (“[s]hipowners had almost unfettered 
freedom and discretion to dictate, unilaterally and unfairly, the terms of the contract of carriage. They insert every 
exemption clauses imaginable; choose exclusively the law and the forum and standard form of clauses that exempt 
liability from their obligations in the contract of carriage”). MARGETSON does not agree with the characterization of 
this situation as abusive, arguing instead that shippers simply saw the exclusion clauses as part of doing business, 
and simply placed the increased risk with their underwriters. In what could be criticized as an appeal to anecdotal 
evidence, and without providing a source for his claim, MARGETSON goes on to add that “[t]he allegation that liner 
companies abused their dominant position is further negated by the fact that carriers – particularly after the rapid 
increase in pilferage after the war began – often paid for the damages for which they were not liable under the rules of 
the bill of lading” (MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, pp. 6–7). 
1252 POOR, W., 1923, supra note 1243, p. 136. 
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the burden of proof were literally applied and the carrier could bring the cause of loss 
within one of those exemptive clauses, the damaged cargo bore the burden of proving 
that the loss resulted from the carrier's negligence. In a very significant number of 
cases, this burden was impossible for [the] cargo [interest] to bear.”1254 
By the late 19th century, as well as in the dawn of the 20th century, the diverse interests 
that operated in different nations also resulted in a variety of approaches towards the 
clauses disclaiming the liability of the carrier. While the courts of “carriers’ countries” 
would enforce them, those in “shippers’ countries” (those where cargo interests dominated) 
would declare them invalid.1255 Of course, shippers were not the only who, at the time, 
were opposing these clauses, as other parties with interests in the cargo, like bankers and 
underwriters, saw their interests threatened by them.1256 
This was clearly a problem, since the international character of maritime law requires a 
certain amount of stability and predictability for the normal conduction of the trade.1257 
Carriers and merchants needed to know that compliance with their contractual 
obligations would not be dependent on the country where the action was started, and 
that the decisions reached by a given court would be enforceable by others.1258  
“In the United States […] federal courts permitted carriers to limit their liability in 
many circumstances, but carriers could not exonerate themselves from the 
consequences of their own negligence or their failure to provide a seaworthy ship. 
Similarly, the Japanese Commercial Code invalidated agreements exonerating a 
shipowner ‘from liability for damages caused by the shipowner himself, or by the 
willful act or gross negligence of the crew or any other employee, or by the fact that 
the ship is unseaworthy.’ This conflict among major maritime nations, which became 
                                                                  
1254 YANCEY, B. W., ‘Carriage of Goods: Hague, Cogsa, Visby, and Hamburg’, 1982, 57 Tulane Law Review, no. 5, 
pp. 1239–1240. 
1255 YIANNOPOULOS, A. N., ‘Conflicts Problems in International Bills of Lading: Validity of Negligence Clauses’, 
1957, 18 Louisiana Law Review, no. 4, p. 609 See also MANDELBAUM, S. R., 1995, supra note 1232, p. 475; ZHAO, 
L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 140 and BASNAYAKE, S., ‘Introduction: Origins of the 1978 Hamburg Rules’, 1979, 
27 American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 2, p. 353 (“[b]y the end of the nineteenth century, the case-law of 
countries concerned with ocean carriage had become sharply divided; British courts gave wide effect to "freedom of 
contract," while American courts, anticipating modern ‘consumerism,’ were more skeptical of the freedom given to 
shippers by bill of lading clauses prepared by carriers”). 
1256 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 140. 
1257 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 1 (“[t]o be effective, commercial law should provide clear and 
predictable solutions to the problems that are most likely to arise in practice”). 
1258 For an illustration of this problem, See Re Missouri Steamship Company [1889], 42 Ch. D., 321–342. In this 
case, the English Court of Appeal ruled that a bill of lading containing a disclaimer of liability that would not be 
valid under American law for violating public policy should be governed by English law, since the parties would 
have intended the clause to be valid.  
  
352 
The International Regulatory Framework of Contracts of Affreightment 
more serious in the early twentieth century, meant that the general maritime law no 
longer provided a uniform risk allocation.”1259 
The increasing lack of uniformity also manifested itself in the field of private 
international law, as more and more countries started to adopt conflicts rules that would 
allow for the application of their own domestic standards to bills of lading. As 
YIANNOPOULOS notes, this represented a great problem since, as a result, the security of 
international commerce was put in jeopardy, “the negotiability of bills of lading was 
imperiled, and world trade was seriously hampered.”1260 
10.3 From the Harter Act to the Hague Rules 
As international bodies attempted to create some modicum of harmonization of the 
existing maritime law, different nations sought to regulate the way in which they dealt 
with exclusion clauses. Paradoxically, the massive differences that existed among these 
countries, and which increased the uncertainty that plagued the trade, would actually 
contribute towards its harmonization in the long run. STURLEY suggests that subjecting 
the carriers to such dissimilar regulations, increasing their risks of being held liable in 
unknown terms, increased their incentive to support an international resolution of this 
problem.1261 Although it is unlikely that this was in the minds of the wide array of 
legislators who enacted the regulations, the outcome, the push towards harmonization, 
remains the same. 
The United States was at the forefront of this effort towards domestic regulation, 
enacting its first thorough regulation in the form of the Harter Act of 1893, “the world's 
first legislative attempt to allocate the risk of loss in ocean transportation between carrier and 
cargo interests.”1262 This statute reflected the problems that cargo nations were facing at 
the time, as it sought to prohibit “unreasonable clauses in bills of lading,” as well as 
                                                                  
1259 STURLEY, M. F., 1991, supra note 1234, pp. 5–6. 
1260 YIANNOPOULOS, A. N., 1957, supra note 1255, pp. 609–610. 
1261 STURLEY, M. F., 1991, supra note 1234, p. 10. 
1262 STURLEY, M. F., ‘Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments about 
Hague, Visby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence’, 1993, 24 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 
no. 1, p. 119. See also DONOVAN, J. J., 1979, supra note 1248, p. 2 (referring to the Harter Act as “one of the most 
remarkable statutes ever enacted in the field of shipping”), COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, p. 110 (calling it 
“[the] first to stir debate with respect to the contractual imbalance between shipper and carrier”), MITCHELHILL, A., 
1990, supra note 1204, p. 5 (stating that the Act represented “the first steps taken to control the situation”) and 
MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 7 (stating that in the Act “the opposition to the carrier’s freedom of 
contract was successful for the first time”). 
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“covenants against due diligence.”1263 Generally, it outlawed any clause contained in the bill 
of lading that had the effect of relieving the shipowner from liability for negligence in 
properly loading, carrying, and/or delivering the cargo.1264 It was conceived to be a 
compromise between the interests of both the shippers and the carriers, as well as a 
solution (even if only partial) to the lack of uniformity and certainty that plagued the 
American admiralty courts.1265 As a compromise, the Act made important concessions for 
both of the interested parties: 
“Carriers lost their exoneration clauses, but they gained a new list of statutorily 
approved exemptions from liability-including one relieving the shipowner from 
liability for negligence in the navigation or management of the ship, as long as the 
owner exercised due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. By adding more 
exceptions for the innocent carrier to escape liability, the Harter Act shifted the risk 
of loss for all of these cases to the innocent cargo owner. […] As the list of exceptions 
to liability for the innocent carrier grows, the scheme approaches a fault-liability 
scheme, under which only a culpable carrier will bear any risk of loss.”1266 
The Harter Act was, in the words of TETLEY, a “great achievement of American maritime law”. 
It brought positive changes to the shipping business, as it sought to balance an often 
extremely imbalanced situation.1267 In fact, its influence was felt in all corners of the 
world, as other nations with significant cargo interests passed similar (if not identical) 
regulations.1268 This was the case in, for example, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 
countries that exported large quantities of raw material and which, despite being British 
dominions, felt their shippers were not being treated fairly by the carrier interests 
                                                                  
1263 EVANS, I. L., ‘The Harter Act and Its Limitations’, 1910, 8 Michigan Law Review, no. 8, pp. 638–639. See also 
MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 8 (“[t]he major consequence of the Harter Act was the banning [...] of 
clauses which implied a negligence clause for commercial errors”). 
1264 CRUTCHER, M. B., 1970, supra note 1231, p. 710. 
1265 MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, p. 1521 (arguing that the Harter Act was “conceded by all to be a 
compromise between the shipping and cargo interests,” as well as “at best, a partial resolution and, at times, a rather 
unsatisfactory one,” since it did not go as far as any of the interested parties wanted) See also SWEENEY, J. C., 
‘Happy Birthday, Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on Its 100th Anniversary’, 1993, 24 Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce, no. 1, p. 41. 
1266 HICKS, J. K., ‘What Should We Do with the Fire Defense, Late in the Evening’, 2004, 83 Texas Law Review, 
no. 4, p. 1234. 
1267 TETLEY, W., ‘Reform of Carriage of Goods-The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA'99’, 2003, 28 Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal, no. 1, p. 23. 
1268 See ENRÍQUEZ, D., 2008, supra note 1161, p. 85 (“the international repercussions of the Harter Act did not take 
long, and within three decades of its entry into force international maritime rules had taken it as a basis for their 
development”) and ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 142 (noting that several countries “followed the U.S. and 
unilaterally enacted domestic legislation governing exoneration clauses in bills of lading,” including Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and French Morocco). 
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present in England.1269 Similar legislation was, at the time, expected to be enacted in other 
nations as well, including France, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Iceland and South Africa.1270 In order to avoid even more disunity and disorganizations, 
something had to be done. 
The success that the United States reached in reaching a compromise in its internal 
legislation between the interests of carriers and shippers, allowed the country to take the 
lead in the move towards international uniformity.1271 Additionally, the United Kingdom, 
traditionally a carriers’ nation, aware of the problems that were appearing as a result of 
the lack of uniformity, also took a leading role in pushing for a new uniform system, also 
due to increasing pressure from its dominions.1272  
As the move towards uniformity increased its momentum, the international community 
recognized that any regulation that allowed international trade to flourish would need to 
accommodate two purposes: “(i) flexibility to allocate risks in line with their commercial 
needs, and, (ii) prevention of abuse and protection for the parties in a weaker bargaining 
position.”1273 This would allow for a regulatory system in which  
“the entire risk should not be assumed by either carrier or shipper […] The first 
alternative destroys freedom of contract and places insurable risks on the shipowner 
which can more conveniently be borne, or placed with underwriters, by the shipper; 
the second too greatly diminishes the carrier's incentive to exercise care.”1274 
                                                                  
1269 SWEENEY, J. C., 1993, supra note 1265, p. 30. See also POOR, W., 1923, supra note 1243, p. 134 and 
MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, p. 1523. 
1270 STURLEY, M. F., 1991, supra note 1234, pp. 17–18. 
1271 YIANNOPOULOS, A. N., 1957, supra note 1255, p. 610 See also YANCEY, B. W., 1982, supra note 1254, p. 1242 
(“[t]he United States was one of, if not the, prime motivating force in the drafting of this Convention”) and POOR, W., 
1923, supra note 1243, p. 134 (arguing that the Hague Rules are “a set of conditions regulating the carriage of goods 
by sea, based in principle on the Harter Act”). 
1272 STURLEY, M. F., 1991, supra note 1234, p. 18. See also MITCHELHILL, A., 1990, supra note 1204, p. 6 and 
MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 8. 
1273 NIKAKI, T. & SOYER, B., 2012, supra note 1239, p. 303. 
1274 POOR, W., 1923, supra note 1243, p. 136. Insurance was a very important topic on the road to securing an 
international regulation, and some have even argued that the issue of disclaimers of liability was relevant to the 
insurers more than to the shippers themselves. As MARGETSON explained: 
“Shippers showed themselves to be ‘indifferent’ to exoneration clauses. During the discussion [of the 
Hague Rules] on the negligence clause, De Faynal, the Advocate General at the French Supreme Court, 
argued that there was no question of a battle between carriers and shippers. The question was merely who 
should pay the insurance premium. 
When shippers intervened in the discussion about the [Hague] Rules, they did so mainly at the insistence 
of their underwriters. Hill summarized it as follows. ‘[T]he whole object of the cargo interest in pressing 
for these rules is to make a bill of lading a really sound creditable document for the purpose of getting 
credit from the bankers, insurance from the underwriters, and generally making it as negotiable as 
possible.’” 
MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, pp. 2–3. 
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It was within this framework, after discussions had been conducted between “the principal 
shipowners, underwriters and insurance interests, shippers’ representatives and leading bankers 
of maritime nations,” that in 1921 the International Law Association adopted a set of rules 
drafted by the Comité Maritime International (CMI).1275 These Rules, which were greatly 
inspired by the Harter Act, and after some amendments, were later submitted to the 
International Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law, and signed on August 25, 1924 as 
the "International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of 
Lading,” also known as the Hague Rules.1276 
The main goal of the Hague Rules was the establishment of a uniform system of liability 
for the carriage of goods by sea.1277 The goal was to increase certainty by clearly and 
carefully defining the responsibilities of all the parties to the contract, namely the 
carriers, shippers, bankers, and underwriters. As POOR argued in 1923: 
“It is to be hoped that they will be adopted, and thereby uniformity secured, so that 
any person interested in a shipment may know his rights and liabilities without the 
necessity of reading a long and complicated document, and possibly taking legal 
advice thereon.”1278 
The result of this uniformity would then allow costs to go down, particularly those of 
insurance, since insurers would be able to calculate their risks more accurately by 
identifying potential liabilities.1279 This would be the result of the significant change 
brought by the Hague Rules, as they would prevent the carrier from being able to contract 
out of certain responsibilities regarding the cargo.  
Just like the Harter Act, the Hague Rules were a compromise between the interests of the 
shippers and the carriers.1280 On the one hand, they attempted to do away with the 
                                                                  
1275 MITCHELHILL, A., 1990, supra note 1204, p. 6. 
1276 On the influence of the Harter Act, See VALDERRAMA, F. A. J., 2012, supra note 1244, pp. 113–114 and 
MITCHELHILL, A., 1990, supra note 1204, p. 6. On the enactment of the Hague Rules, See YANCEY, B. W., 1982, 
supra note 1254, p. 1242 and MOORE, J. C., ‘The Hamburg Rules’, 1978, 10 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, no. 1, p. 2. 
1277 PEACOCK, J. H., III, 1989, supra note 1232, p. 982. See also MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, 
p. 1522. 
1278 POOR, W., 1923, supra note 1243, p. 140. 
1279 PEACOCK, J. H., III, 1989, supra note 1232, p. 984. 
1280 TETLEY, W., ‘Per Package Limitation and Containers under the Hague Rules, Visby & Uncitral’, 1977, 4 
Dalhousie Law Journal, no. 3, p. 685 See also CORNEJO FULLER, E., 1988, supra note 1251, p. 280 (“[c]ommentators 
have said that the Hague Rules were a compromise between the interests of the carriers and those of the users or 
shippers”) and POOR, W., 1923, supra note 1243, p. 140 (“[t]he [Hague] Rules are to a certain extent the result of 
compromise between the various interests”). ZHAO attributes the success of the Hague Rules to the fact that they 
were not truly governmental efforts, and that they were instead the product of “private sectional interests”  who 
were thus in a better position to understand the needs of the trade (ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, pp. 149–
150). This compromise meant, among other things, that even though freedom of contract was restricted (to 
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practice of carriers to exclude all liability, establishing a mandatory minimum “per 
package”.1281 On the other, however, carriers were protected by this limitation of liability, 
several exemptions, and a very favorable 1-year time bar period.1282 As TETLEY explained: 
“The purpose of the per package limitation is the same as that of the Rules generally, 
i.e. to retain a proper balance between the rights and responsibilities of the carrier 
on the one hand, and the rights and responsibilities of the claimant on the other. The 
per package limitation is part of the bargain between carriers and shippers. Non-
responsibility clauses are no longer valid and a certain standard of care is imposed on 
carriers. In return carriers benefit from a maximum per package limitation.”1283 
The existence of this compromise, and which, to an extent, allowed for the interests of 
both carriers and shippers to be taken into consideration, allowed for the rules to be 
quickly ratified by some of the leading maritime nations in the world, including the 
United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, Canada, India 
and several others.1284 Although the United States had been a proponent of the rules 
during their preparation, they were only incorporated into American law, with some 
modifications, in 1936 in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (US COGSA).1285 With the 
enactment of the Hague Rules, as well as their incorporation into the domestic legal 
systems of several nations, “the modern era of the law of bills of lading” had begun.1286 
10.4 The Hague-Visby Rules1287 
Even though by 1938 “substantially all the world’s maritime trading nations” had adopted 
the Hague Rules, they were far from perfect.1288 The passage of time and the development 
of new industry practices made it clear that an update was necessary.1289 Issues like the 
amount and interpretation of the package limitation established in the rules, their 
applicability being limited only to bills of lading that had been issued in a contracting 
                                                                                                                                                                       
situation, for example, in the case of charterparties and of shipments where a bill of lading was not issued 
(BERLINGIERI, F., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 831). 
1281 MITCHELHILL, A., 1990, supra note 1204, p. 6. 
1282 REYNOLDS, F., 1990, supra note 1241, p. 18. 
1283 TETLEY, W., 1977, supra note 1280, p. 686. 
1284 YANCEY, B. W., 1982, supra note 1254, p. 1242. 
1285 ibid., p. 1243. 
1286 AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, §2. 
1287 Since several aspects of the Hague Rules remained unchanged after the Visby amendments, we will use the 
term “Hague (Visby) Rules” when we are making a comment that can apply to both the original as well as the 
amended rules. If we are only referring to the Visby version, however, we will speak of “Hague-Visby Rules.” 
1288 ibid., §2. See also MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, p. 1525 (“[t]he Hague Rules gained the 
commitment of the majority of the world's shipping by […] 1938”). 
1289 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 2. 
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state, as well as the problems associated with the increasing shift towards containerized 
cargo, lead to demands for change.1290  
Fundamental in the need for a change was the so-called “container revolution,” and which 
dramatically changed maritime trade, shedding light on some of the most outdated parts 
of the existing regulations.1291 Under the Hague Rules, for example, the limitations of 
liability were built around “packages,” limiting the liability of the carrier to “100 pounds 
sterling” per package (or USD 500 in the US COGSA).1292 As YATES noted, “this mode of 
transport rendered ridiculous the per package limitation in the original Hague Rules, with the 
package being the sealed container.”1293 This was a massive problem, dealing with the 
reading that such an important provision should receive, and which could not have been 
predicted by the original drafters. 
“Little did the legislators dream that […] a container revolution in which 
mechanized containerships equipped with removable cargo holds called ‘containers’ 
for pre-stowage of cargo would take the place of the traditional cargo freighter and 
manual piece-by-piece stowage of cargo. And little did they dream that certain judges 
in the containerization era would virtually exonerate steamship companies for cargo 
loss in applying their legislation designed to protect the consignees from the carriers' 
contracts of adhesion.”1294 
Together with other issues, the growing dissatisfaction with the Hague Rules lead to the 
adoption of a protocol being added to them in 1968, forming what is now known as the 
                                                                  
1290 AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, §2. See also MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, p. 1525 
(blaming some the growing dissatisfaction with the Hague Rules on the lack of uniformity in their 
interpretation). 
1291 Attempting to illustrate the extent of the changes brought forward by the use of containers in the carriage of 
cargo, CRUTCHER explains how “[o]ne of our containerships and its workings would astound a citizen of 1897, perhaps 
as much so as a diesel locomotive or one of our freeways or even an airplane” (CRUTCHER, M. B., 1970, supra note 1231, 
p. 698).  For further comments on the container revolution, See TETLEY, W., 1977, supra note 1280, pp. 698–699; 
and STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 10. 
1292 HETHERINGTON, S., 2014, supra note 1177, p. 169. See also TETLEY, W., 1977, supra note 1280, p. 685. Other 
limitations included 500 Canadian Dollars under the Canadian COGSA, and 2,000 francs under French law. On 
the value of “100 pound sterling” as gold, an issue that later affected the usefulness of the original text of the 
Hague Rules, See, generally, TETLEY, W., ‘Package & Kilo Limitations and the Hague, Hague/Visby and Hamburg 
Rules & Gold’, 1995, 26 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 1. 
1293 Quoted in MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 13. See also MENDELSOHN, A. I., 1992, supra note 5, 
p. 31 and ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 155.  
1294 SIMON, S., ‘Container Law: A Recent Reappraisal’, 1976, 8 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 4, 
p. 489. It is worth noting that problems arising from the interpretation of “package” continue to this day, often 
leading to clearly unfair results. In 1999, for example, the Federal Court of Australia ruled that a yacht 
transported under a bill of lading incorporating US COGSA amounted to a single package or “customary freight 
unit.” Since the yacht had suffered damages amounting to a total loss during the voyage, the Court ruled that the 
claimants were only entitled to receive $500 USD (out a $65000 USD yacht), the package limitation established 
in the US COGSA (HETHERINGTON, S., 2014, supra note 1177, p. 171). 
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Hague-Visby Rules.1295 Significantly, this new version allowed for the determination of the 
transport units to adapt to the new forms of carriage, based on “whatever is enumerated in 
the bill of lading” to be considered as the article of transport.1296 Additionally, the rules now 
also contained a provision allowing for the limitation to be calculated as either 10,000 
francs per package or 30 francs per kilo, whichever was higher, and which represented an 
increase from the Hague Rules.1297 The Protocol also included the possibility of extending 
the protection of the Rules to the servants and agents of the carrier, extended the time 
that the cargo interests had to file suit against the person liable under the rules, and 
ensured that the regime of the Rules could not be avoided by means of claiming in tort 
instead of contract.1298 
A further change occurred in 1979, in what has come to be known as the “SDR Protocol of 
1979,” and in which the unit of calculation for the package limitation was changed to 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR), as defined by the IMF.1299 The SDR being used as a “unit of 
account” came as a result of the IMF having abandoned the gold standard, and is 
determined based on a weighed average value of several major currencies. It provided a 
more stable way of determining value than gold, which was then relegated to being merely 
a commodity (albeit an expensive one) of fluctuating market value.1300 Although 
seemingly a small change, this represented a significant improvement in the maritime 
rules, as it made them no longer susceptible to become effectively useless as a result of 
issues like monetary devaluation, and avoided problems resulting from currency 
exchange.1301  
To this day, the Hague-Visby rules remain the most often-encountered regime in cargo 
claims. They have been ratified, acceded to, or adopted by some of the most powerful 
                                                                  
1295 COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, p. 110 (“Following the period of decolonisation and the subsequent creation 
of new sovereign states, this issue [of contractual imbalances] became prominent in the industry and further work was 
required to accommodate for these new, underdeveloped States' interests”). For some of the other concerns that lead 
to the Visby protocol, See YANCEY, B. W., 1982, supra note 1254, p. 1247.  
1296 MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 13. 
1297 YANCEY, B. W., 1982, supra note 1254, p. 1248. 
1298 See LAMONT-BLACK, S., ‘Transporting goods in the EU: an interplay of international, European and national 
law’, 2010, 11 ERA Forum, no. 1, p. 94 and ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, pp. 156–157. 
1299 LAMONT-BLACK, S., 2010, supra note 1298, pp. 94–95.  
1300 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 12. 
1301 MANDELBAUM, S. R., 1995, supra note 1232, pp. 481–482 (noting that the adoption of the SDR Protocol was 
done “to account for currency exchange imbalances”). On some of the difficulties arising as a result of the SDR 
Protocol, and which lead to it being limited exclusively to the Hague-Visby Rules, in order to avoid arbitrary 
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maritime nations in the world.1302 They continue to provide, therefore, a relatively 
uniform legal regime for the large majority of international shipments.1303 
10.5 The Hamburg Rules 
Parallel to the momentum that lead to the Visby amendments, new nations were rising, 
each of them with their own economic powers. These new players were the result of the 
massive economic changes brought about by the devastation of World War II, the ending 
of the great colonial powers, and the shift in the power over maritime trade, previously 
held by only a handful of maritime nations.1304 As much progress as the Hague-Visby 
Rules had represented for the legal framework of the maritime trade, it was far from 
enough to placate the calls for change made by these new developing nations.1305 Indeed, 
they had emerged to encounter an economic system based on principles that had been 
formulated well before this massive global changes had occurred, and thus did not take 
them into account.1306 
There was a perception that the existing framework did not only benefit developed 
nations and industries, but that it actually hindered the economic growth of developing 
nations.1307 As SWEENEY explained: 
“Dissatisfaction of the developing world stems essentially from the belief that the 
operation of traditional maritime law (along with other aspects of international 
                                                                  
1302 YANCEY, B. W., 1982, supra note 1254, p. 1249. See also MARGETSON, N. J., The System of Liability of Articles III 
and IV of the Hague (Visby) Rules, 2008, Paris Legal Publishers, Zutphen, the Netherlands, p. 21 (“[the Hague-
Visby Rules are] the regime most often encountered”), STURLEY, M. F., ‘United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law's Transport Law Project: An Interim View of a Work in Progress, The’, 2003, 39 Texas 
International Law Journal, no. 1, p. 66 (calling the Hague-Visby Rules “the dominant convention for the international 
carriage of goods by sea”), AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, §2 calling the Hague-Visby Rules “the 
predominant legal code for the international carriage of goods by sea”); STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, 
p. 12 (stating that these Rules “remain in force – in one form or another and by one method or another – in countries 
representing approximately two-thirds of the world trade”); ENRÍQUEZ, D., 2008, supra note 1161, p. 87 (referring to 
the Hague (Visby) Rules, “for better or worse,” and “despite the criticisms that we might make against them” as “the 
true authentic international regulation of the international carriage of goods by sea”); and NIKAKI, T. & SOYER, B., 
2012, supra note 1239, p. 304 (“[p]resently, the most prominent regime that governs a large majority of international 
shipments is an amended version of the original Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules”). 
1303 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 1. 
1304 FREDERICK, D. C., 1991, supra note 1246, p. 98.  
1305 FORCE, R., ‘Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules: Much Ado About (?)’, 1995, 70 
Tulane Law Review, 6 Part A, p. 2052. See also ENRÍQUEZ, D., 2008, supra note 1161, p. 89 
1306 FREDERICK, D. C., 1991, supra note 1246, p. 98. 
1307 MUKHERJEE, P. K. et al., 2013, supra note 1179, p. 333 (“[t]he Hamburg Rules came about as a result of pressure 
[…] by developing countries whose representatives questioned the basis of earlier international provisions and their 
suitability in terms of the needs of developing economies”). 
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trade law) impairs the balance of payments position of developing states so as to 
insure continued poverty and perpetual under-development in an industrial age.”1308 
Although these views had plenty of critics coming from supporters of the Hague (Visby) 
Rules, the point made by these developing nations is fairly clear to see. 1309 Until they 
themselves became maritime powers, they would be dependent upon the services 
provided by the already powerful maritime countries. These services would, in turn, be 
provided on the basis of rules that had been drafted without their participation. The 
existing rules were therefore seen not only as instruments created without their 
participation, but also as “a product of a carrier-dominated process.”1310  
It was argued, for example, that the existing rules “did not strike a fair balance between the 
interests of shippers and shipowners.”1311 Also, the compromises that had been struck in the 
Hague-Visby Rules were seen by these actors as "already slanted too much in favor of 
carriers,” with the caps on liability dramatically tipping the balance in favor of the 
carriers.1312 What is more, it placed a series of duties on the owners of the goods to insure 
against contingencies not contemplated in the bills of lading, for which the existing Rules 
did not make carrier responsible, and which could easily represent a prohibitive cost for 
the developing world.1313 In particular, the Hague (Visby) Rules were seen as leaning in 
favor of the carriers for allowing them to negate their liabilities for the negligence of their 
servants or their agents in the navigation of the ship, an unparalleled provision in trade 
law.1314 In fact, as ESTRELLA FARIA noted, at the time the prevailing view was that  
                                                                  
1308 SWEENEY, J. C., ‘The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part I)’, 1975, 7 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce, p. 73. 
1309 YU & LI refer to the argument put forward by UNCTAD that the existing system “benefitted developed countries 
at the expense of developing countries” as “farfetched” ( YU, X. & LI, T., ‘A Legal Analysis of the Provisions of Volume 
Contract under Rotterdam Rules’, 2012, 7 Frontiers of Law in China, no. 4, p. 587). 
1310 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, p. 297. 
1311 BASNAYAKE, S., 1979, supra note 1255, p. 354. Writing in 1971 SASOON noted how, in comparison with other 
modes of transportation, “cargo is at a considerable disadvantage, when it is transported by sea rather than by land or 
air. In other words, the sea carrier (owner or charterer)' enjoys rights and immunities far more extensive than those 
afforded the rail, road or air carrier of international shipments” (SASSOON, D. M., ‘Liability for the International 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Some Comparisons’, 1971, 3 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 
no. 4, p. 759). Clearly, beyond any political motivations that might have lead to the drafting of the Hamburg 
Rules, there were significant problems that needed to be addressed in regards to the liability of the carrier. 
1312 DONOVAN, J. J., 1979, supra note 1248, pp. 3–4 See also HESKETH, D., ‘Weaknesses in the Supply Chain: Who 
Packed the Box?’, 2010, 4 World Customs Journal, no. 2, p. 7 (“the Hague-Visby Rules promote far greater bargaining 
power by the carrier over the shipper”). 
1313 FREDERICK, D. C., 1991, supra note 1246, p. 99. See also AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, §2. 
1314 SOOKSRIPAISARNKIT, P., 2014, supra note 318, p. 310. REYNOLDS explains the opposition against this provision 
arguing that the view was that this was “an old-fashioned exception dating back to sailing vessels and days when 
maritime ventures were hazardous” and which had little to no justification in modern maritime ventures 
(REYNOLDS, F., 1990, supra note 1241, p. 28). In regards to this defense being “unparalleled” in other types of 




The International Regulatory Framework of Contracts of Affreightment 
“whatever historical reasons had existed for protecting the carrier from liability for 
the consequences of acts of the master or crew, they were no longer justified in light 
of modern means of communication available to help navigation. In fact, there had 
been growing opposition to the nautical fault defense since the Hague Rules were 
adopted. Courts in many countries became clearly hostile to the nautical fault 
defense, as it was inconsistent with the general principle of vicarious liability of 
masters for the acts of their servants. As a result, the courts started to impose 
conditions to the exercise of this defense to the extent that one might wonder 
whether there was still any practical room left for nautical fault. Even the Warsaw 
Convention, which originally contained a defense of negligent navigation for cargo 
damage, had been amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955 to eliminate the defense 
for air carriers.”1315 
The demands made by the developing nations were heard by the United Nations, which 
recommended UNCITRAL considered it a priority to draft an international shipping 
legislation. A 1969 United Nations report explained the feeling that motivated this 
action: 
“[R]epresentatives [of developing countries] stated that present-day legislation in 
the field reflected, in many respects, an earlier economic phase of society, as well as 
attitudes and practices which seemed unduly to favour ship-owners at the expense of 
shippers. They also observed that the developing countries were particularly 
interested in legislation on ... standard clauses in bills of lading, and the limitations 
on the ship-owner's liability resulting from exemption clauses. Some delegations 
expressed the opinion that international shipping legislation is a priority topic that 
provides UNCITRAL with the best opportunity of contributing to a change in the 
status quo and the creation of more just and equitable conditions for the developing 
nations in the field of international trade.”1316 
This lead, in 1978, to the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
also  known as the Hamburg Rules. This convention was drafted by UNCITRAL, “in an 
effort to resolve problems which had arisen in fifty years of experience under the Hague Rules, 
and which would not hinder the growth and development of international trade.”1317 These 
rules offer a more extensive regulation of the liability of the carrier, being more than 
                                                                                                                                                                       
management of the ship, “maritime transport became more akin to transport by other modes” (See RAMBERG, J., 
‘Global Unification of Transport Law: A Hopeless Task’, 2009, 27 Penn State International Law Review, 3 & 4, 
p. 852). On this issue, it seems fair to say that, in general, regarding the exemptions of liability allowed by the 
Hague-Visby Rules, there was a common perception (some might argue, a common misconception) that the 
convention had been “‘dictated’ by the most powerful states” (MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 1). 
1315 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, pp. 298–299. 
1316 Cited in WERTH, D. A., ‘The Hamburg Rules Revisited - A Look at U.S. Options’, 1991, 22 Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce, no. 1, p. 64. 
1317 DONOVAN, J. J., 1979, supra note 1248, p. 1. 
  
362 
The International Regulatory Framework of Contracts of Affreightment 
twice the size of the Hague-Visby Rules, combining some its rules with those established 
in the CMR and Warsaw Rules on road and air carriage, respectively.1318  
Unlike the Visby Protocol, which had simply amended the Hague Rules, the Hamburg 
Rules sought to completely overhaul the existing regulation by establishing a completely 
new regime (although, of course, based in the existing system).1319 They addressed the 
issues that had been raised by the developing countries, such as the time bar period for 
claims, jurisdiction, burden of proof, and responsibility for navigational mistakes, and 
which had not been satisfactorily covered in previous regulatory attempts.1320 
Additionally, they dramatically shortened the list of defenses available to the carrier.1321 
Besides the political and social motivations behind the Hamburg Rules, they also sought 
to remedy the lack of uniformity in maritime trade, as the Hague-Visby regime had failed 
to be incorporated equally in all countries, and also left some issues unregulated. Indeed, 
“[w]hereas Hague-Visby is considered to provide basic rules of liability to the industry, Hamburg 
was to provide a complete, uniform guide to carriage of goods relationships.”1322 The desire of 
the drafters of the Hamburg Rules to create a new system, however, fell short of its goal, 
as the rules failed to create any significant impact in the practice of international 
shipping.1323 
While the Hague (Visby) Rules had been, at their core, the product of non-governmental 
actors, the Hamburg Rules were inherently political.1324 As such, their drafting often saw 
the negotiating parties coming to standstills, unable to reach acceptable compromises for 
their respective interests, as they frequently represented a clash between political ideas, 
more than commercial interests.1325 These disputes were “solved” by what TETLEY referred 
to as a “compromise by drafting,” that is resorting to ambiguous language that could be read 
in a number of ways.1326 In essence, the approach was to defer conflicts “linguistically 
through ambiguous language that reflected the inability of the drafters to agree on a clear 
                                                                  
1318 ENRÍQUEZ, D., 2008, supra note 1161, p. 91. 
1319 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 12. 
1320 WERTH, D. A., 1991, supra note 1316, pp. 65–66. The changes were not exactly met with universal support; in 
fact, some saw the end of the excuse for navigational errors as a grave mistake that would “provide fertile fields for 
litigation of factual questions” (MOORE, J. C., 1978, supra note 1276, p. 5). See also VALDERRAMA, F. J., 2015, supra 
note 1184, pp. 533–534 (“the Hamburg Rules respond to completely different conditions [compared to the Hague-
Visby Rules]. Within the international organizations like UNCITRAL, the grievances and interests of developing 
countries strongly manifest themselves, seeking more balance in transport”). 
1321 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, p. 298. 
1322 COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, p. 111. 
1323 ibid., p. 111. 
1324 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 157. 
1325 ibid., p. 159. 
1326 CHANDLER [III], G. F., ‘A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules’, 1984, 15 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 2, p. 236. 
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position.”1327 This resulted in a level of ambiguity that, in effect, threatened the uniform 
application of the rules, as “disagreement on the wording of disputed clauses were all too 
frequently settled by making the wording capable of interpretation favoring each of the 
disagreeing parties.”1328 These political problems were also exacerbated by the fact that, 
since every country received a vote in UNCITRAL, the Hamburg Rules represented the 
views of the majority of countries belonging to a political bloc that, at the same time, 
represented only a minority of the shipping world.1329  
While the developing countries pushing for the Hamburg Rules saw them as a triumph, 
shipowners and their insurers did not.1330 Indeed, while their supporters saw them as 
inherently fairer than the Hague (Visby) regime, their detractors saw them as a threat to 
maritime trade.1331 Critics argued that adopting these rules would lead to an increase in 
freight rates, to the detriment of those same shippers that were supposedly being 
protected by the Hamburg Rules.1332 They also argued that the liability regime established 
in the rules approached a “strict liability” system, as it presumed the fault of the 
carrier.1333 To the credit of the drafters of the Hamburg Rules, however, and regardless of 
other criticisms that they might deserve, the carriers’ claim that premiums and freight 
                                                                  
1327 FREDERICK, D. C., 1991, supra note 1246, p. 105. 
1328 CHANDLER [III], G. F., ‘After Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go from Here?’, 1993, 
24 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 1, p. 45. 
1329 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 159 (“the draft Hamburg Rules reflected the majority political wishes, even 
though the political bloc of developing countries represented a commercial minority”). 
1330 See, for example, MOORE, J. C., 1978, supra note 1276, p. 11, ENRÍQUEZ, D., 2008, supra note 1161, p. 92 and 
LEE, E. S., ‘The Changing Liability System of Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the Enforcement 
of the Hamburg Rules’, 2002, 15 Transnational Lawyer, no. 2, p. 241 (“[t]he Hamburg Rules have the potential to 
change not only the price of insurance relevant to international trade, but also the insurance- purchasing behavior 
involved in international trade”). 
1331 VALDERRAMA, F. A. J., 2012, supra note 1244, p. 119. Proponents of the Hamburg Rules argued that the 
Hague Rules were unfair, with the Visby amendments working as a “mere facelifting,” one that had only become 
necessary because the Hague Rules “were being exploited more to evade liability than to anchor responsibility” 
(YANCEY, B. W., 1982, supra note 1254, pp. 1250–1251). See also MAGASHI, A. I. & HARUNA, A. L., 2016, supra 
note 1231, p. 244 (also calling the Visby amendments “a mere face-lift to the Hague Rules,” arguing that “the form 
and structure of the original rules remained unchanged”). 
1332 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, p. 301. See also ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 160 (noting 
that detractors of the Hamburg Rules “argued they had imposed on them commercially unreasonable levels of liability 
by a political instrument, and this would inevitably cause increased freight rates, damaging shippers' interests”) and 
CHANDLER [III], G. F., 1984, supra note 1326, p. 237 (“[t]he Hamburg Rules were created to cut overall shipping costs, 
particularly for the developing countries, but as pointed out above, they might well raise costs”). In all fairness, it 
should be noted that arguing that regulations would increase freight rates was not unique to the process of 
enacting the Hamburg Rules, as the same threat was made when the Harter Act was passed, as well as, as we have 
seen before, any regulation whatsoever in virtually any type of market activity. In 1923, for example, POOR noted 
how shipowners “retorted that if they were compelled to bear increased risks they must be compensated by increased 
freight rates. Such shipowners as are subject to the Harter Act, or similar statutes, have complained of their inability 
freely to contract with their shippers” (POOR, W., 1923, supra note 1243, p. 134). 
1333 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, p. 299 See also ENRÍQUEZ, D., 2008, supra note 1161, pp. 91–92 
(arguing that the Hamburg Rules adopted a “system of presumed fault”). 
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rates would go up has not actually materialized. What is more, even though the threat of 
higher costs of freights and premiums has been repeated as a mantra for years, there is a 
“striking absence of empirical support for either proposition.”1334  
Perhaps a more significant criticism, and a problem that might have actually doomed the 
Hamburg Rules to failure, comes from the environment in which they were drafted. As we 
have seen, the rules were inherently “political” (and were criticized as such), inferior to 
the “commercial” compromise that had been reached in the Hague (Visby) Rules. This 
complaint certainly has merits, since not only have the proponents of the rules 
themselves conceded that they were drafted in a fairly confrontational setting, but also 
their very history shows that they rose up as a result of political concessions (whether 
justified or not) towards the developing world.1335 By prioritizing the needs of the 
developing world, and lacking official commercial delegates, the Hamburg Rules “led to 
political compromises rather than economic bargaining.”1336 As sympathetic as we might be 
towards the plight of the developing world, regulating maritime trade without listening to 
the participants of that trade is not the ideal route. For comparison, it has been argued 
that the reason why the Hague-Visby Rules achieved their success was, in large measure, 
due to the fact that they were “based on commercial practicality.”1337 As Lord Justice ROSKILL 
argued during the discussion of the Hamburg Rules: 
"Those who propose them do not, with all respect, seem to me to be asking the only 
relevant question- Is this change necessary to a better working result in practice? 
[…] One begins to suspect, rightly or wrongly, that other influences were at work 
and that these proposals emanate from some who have no practical experience in 
how well the Hague Rules have worked over the last fifty years. Once again I venture 
to repeat, has anyone counted the cost of these changes if they are made?"1338 
The evidence seems to show that the Hamburg Rules, in their attempt to please the 
underprivileged, failed to properly take into account the need to obtain the collaboration 
of the carriers. Clearly, carriers and their interests are an essential part of maritime 
carriage, and tackling a uniform regulatory system without taking them into 
consideration can never render positive results. Since the Harter Act, maritime 
regulations and reforms have always been the result of commercial compromises; the 
                                                                  
1334 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, p. 301.  
1335 ibid., p. 300 (“[e]ven the more moderate commentators of the Hamburg Rules - who did not fail to recognize how 
much of the Hague Rules and the Visby Protocol had been retained by the Hamburg Rules-described the climate of the 
negotiations as a confrontation between those who saw in the Hague Rules ‘a set of principles to be defended in whole 
and, when the whole was lost, in each part,’ and those-the actual majority-for whom they were ‘a dragon to be slain’”).  
1336 FREDERICK, D. C., 1991, supra note 1246, p. 105 See also CHANDLER [III], G. F., 1993, supra note 1328, p. 44 
(“the core problem is that the Hamburg Rules were produced without real commercial compromise”). 
1337 MOORE, J. C., 1978, supra note 1276, p. 2. 
1338 ibid., p. 5. 
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acceptance of the Hamburg Rules was certainly affected by not taking this into 
account.1339 
For all the good intentions that were behind the Hamburg Rules, they simply did not 
succeed in achieving the level of adhesion that their proponents hoped for. To date, only 
thirty-four nations have ratified the Hamburg Rules, none of them being a powerful 
player in the maritime trade.1340 As one author explained: 
“The list of countries that have adopted the Hamburg Rules shows that their 
importance for international sea-trade is minor. Not only are they few in number; 
but nine of them are landlocked and not even one of four is an industrialized country. 
Statistics show that the part of the world sea-trade covered by the 1978 [Hamburg 
Rules] Convention is at present less than 5% and there seems to be no clear upwards 
trend… Chile seems to be… the only important trading and shipping country that 
has adopted the Hamburg Rules.”1341 
It has been suggested that this lack of success is due to the fact that, as we have explained 
before, the Hamburg Rules are seen “to favor cargo interests rather than the interests of 
carriers.”1342 Although exactly how pro-cargo the Hamburg Rules are is up for debate, what 
is certain is that by the mid-1990’s it had become evident that the ambitious goals that 
informed the Hamburg Rules  would simply not be achieved.1343  
It is worth noting that although it is true that the Hamburg Rules did not end up covering 
such a significant part of global maritime trade, they did have some degree of influence 
beyond those that ratified it. The Chinese Maritime Code, for example, took some articles 
                                                                  
1339 CHANDLER [III], G. F., 1993, supra note 1328, pp. 44–45 (stating that “each of the rules were reached through 
commercial compromise”). 
1340 PALLARES, L. S., ‘Brief Approach to the Rotterdam Rules: Between Hope and Disappointment, A’, 2011, 42 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 3, pp. 454–455 (noting that the Hamburg Rules were ratified “by only 
a small number of states that, furthermore, have little weight in international shipping”).  A complete list of ratifying 
states is available on the UNCITRAL website, available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html (last accessed February 
24, 2016). In 1995, MANDELBAUM perfectly illustrated the lack of success of the Hamburg Rules noting that “[t]o 
date only 22 states have adopted the Hamburg Rules, 98 of which seven are land-locked states having no ports, and all 
22 states, as a group, represent only a very small portion of U.S. trade. These 22 nations are not  major shipping powers, 
and are concerned mostly with protection for their imports and exports” (MANDELBAUM, S. R., 1995, supra note 1232, 
pp. 483–484 Although, at the time of this writing, the number of ratifying states has increased, they still 
represent “only a small proportion of international trade,” with over a third of them being land-locked (STURLEY, M. 
F., 2003, supra note 1302, p. 66). 
1341 MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 15. 
1342 GRIGGS, P. J. S., 2003, supra note 1159, p. 195. See also LIANG, C., 2013, supra note 1239, p. 228 (explaining 
that with the Hamburg Rules, “the pendulum swung drastically further towards the cargo interests”). 
1343 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., ‘Uniform Law and Functional Equivalence: Diverting Paths or Stops along the Same 
Road - Thoughts on a New International Regime for Transport Documents’, 2011, 2 Elon Law Review, no. 1, p. 14. 
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from the Hamburg Rules, such as those relating to the Himalaya Clause.1344 Similarly, 
Scandinavian nations, although they did not ratify the Hamburg Rules (though they were 
all signatories), were greatly influenced by them in the drafting of the Nordic Maritime 
Code of 1994 (“NMC94”). 
“‘Whilst Scandinavian countries maintain that they remain signatories to and 
appliers of the Hague (Visby) Rules, their leaning towards Hamburg has long been 
known and this new Code makes it even more obvious.’ Although it cannot be 
concluded that this statute is in conflict with the HVR, but ‘it has seized upon every 
point where Hague-Visby allowed freedom of contract and removed that freedom 
with a Hamburg solution’”1345 
These examples of how the Hamburg Rules influenced some non-ratifying nations 
highlights an important consequence of the lack of harmonization. A patchwork of 
solutions ends up being in force, with every jurisdiction following its own rules or 
interpretations thereof, as well as adopting whatever part of the rules they think are the 
best. It is precisely this problem that, together with a clear need for reform, lead the 
international community to, once again, try to develop a uniform system.1346 
10.6 The Rotterdam Rules 
As we have seen, the Hague (Visby) and Hamburg regimes failed to achieve complete 
acceptance. As a result, different nations started to enact their own rules to govern trade, 
mixing and matching provisions from all the existing systems.1347 Several countries 
inserted Hamburg Rules provisions into their own legislations, sometimes combining 
them with parts of the Hague (Visby) Rules.1348 This situation produced what some 
authors have referred to as a “Tower of Babel,” where different systems are applicable at 
the same time, and where even countries that apply the same systems do so in different 
manners.1349 Even among countries who were parties to the Hague (Visby) Rules, the 
landscape was (and continues to be) grim and confusing: 
                                                                  
1344 XU, L., China’s Approach Toward International Conventions: The Impact of the Hamburg Rules on the Maritime 
Code of the PRC, LLM Thesis, August, 2008, p. 21. 
1345 MARGETSON, S. W., 2008, supra note 1229, p. 16. 
1346 DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, p. 445 (stating that although in England the Hague-Visby Rules are “the 
central code defining the rights and obligations” in carriage contracts, on an international level they “have long 
seemed ripe for reform and probably replacement”). 
1347 FAGHFOURI, M., ‘International Regulation of Liability for Multimodal Transport’, 2006, 5 WMU Journal of 
Maritime Affairs, no. 1, p. 101 For a similar overview, See LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, pp. 292–294. 
1348 ESTRELLA FARIA, J. A., 2009, supra note 1243, p. 302. See also ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 162. 
1349 PALLARES, L. S., 2011, supra note 1340, pp. 453–454. 
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“The reason is to be found in the fact that, despite their initial widespread 
acceptance, they were modified by two protocols: firstly, on February 23rd, 1968, by 
the so-called Visby Rules and, secondly, on December 21st, 1979. These protocols 
were opened to signature not only by the parties who had ratified the Brussels 
Convention, but also -in order to achieve a wider acceptance of the text- by other 
states, the signature and ratification of which would produce the accession to the 
Rules as a whole. 
As a consequence, states can be found where the Hague Rules are in force in their 
original version, while others apply the so-called Hague-Visby Rules (those that have 
ratified the Protocol of 1968) or, like Spain, the Hague- Visby Rules as amended by 
the 1979 Protocol.”1350 
The lack of uniformity and the resulting uncertainty created a demand for a new system 
that would remedy the situation.1351 For this purpose, the CMI “initiated efforts to bridge 
the gap between the old system represented by the Hague and the Hague/Visby Rules and the 
new system evidenced by the Hamburg Rules.”1352 While the old system was seen by some as 
too favorable for the carriers, the new system was seen by others as too favorable for the 
shippers. There was, therefore, a need to reach a new compromise that would allow these 
differences to be surmounted. What is more, critics argued that even though the almost 
100 years of application of the Hague (Visby) Rules had allowed for a substantial body of 
case law to overcome their structural deficiencies, this “cannot change the fact that the 
system and some of the principles of the Hague Rules are outdated and remain barely adequate 
in the modem environment of international trade and transportation.”1353 Once again, the 
need for reform was clear. Though the reasons that led to this move for reform are many, 
                                                                  
1350 ibid., p. 454. For other coexisting rules and regulations adding to the confusion See FRESNEDO DE AGUIRRE, C., 
‘The Rotterdam Rules from the Perspective of a Country that is a Consumer of Shipping Services’, 2009, 14 
Uniform Law Review, no. 4, p. 869 (mentioning, in addition to the Hague (Visby) and Hamburg regimes, “the 1889 
Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Law, the 1940 Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial 
Navigation Law and the 1928 Bustamante Code”). 
1351 NIKAKI, T. & SOYER, B., 2012, supra note 1239, p. 304 See also MUKHERJEE, P. K. et al., 2013, supra note 1179, 
p. 334 (“concerns began to emerge about the perceived diversity of cargo liability regimes across the world. The position 
might not have been quite as bleak as it appeared on paper but, nevertheless, the different [regulatory] arrangements 
[…]suggest that the objective of a single international regime had been lost”) and CARLSON, M. H., ‘U.S. Participation 
in Private International Law Negotiations: Why the UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea Is Important to the United States’, 2009, 44 Texas International Law 
Journal, no. 3, p. 270 (“[j]ust about everybody agrees that the world needs a new carriage of goods regime”). 
1352 RAMBERG, J., 2009, supra note 1314, p. 852. 
1353 ZIEGLER, A. V., ‘The Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, 2008, 44 Texas International Law Journal, no. 3, 
p. 331. See also NIKAKI, T., ‘The Carrier's Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know’, 2010, 35 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal, no. 1, p. 3 (noting that already by 1996 the need for a new modern international 
convention on maritime trade had been “evident for a long time”) and STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, 
p. 14 (stating that at the time the CMI commenced negotiations, it was clear that “the Hague-Visby Rules had 
grown out-of-date,” and that the Hamburg Rules were “only slightly more modern”). 
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the increase importance of multimodal transport of containerized cargo, the narrow 
applicability of the Hague (Visby) regime, and the perception that this regime was 
disproportionately favorable to the carrier, have been singled out as some of the most 
important.1354 
This new attempt by the CMI and UNCITRAL resulted in the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, commonly 
known as The Rotterdam Rules. The first and most important aim of the Rotterdam Rules 
was uniformity, hoping to supersede the Hague (Visby) and Hamburg Rules, and become 
the standard.1355 As explained by José María ALCÁNTARA, one of the councilors at the CMI: 
“At first the initiative of the CMI sought to overcome, through a new international 
Convention, the fragmentation, if not atomization, created by the convergence of the 
Hague Rules, Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, regional accords, and national 
variations. In other words, the objective was no other than international 
uniformity.” 1356 
Indeed, as the General Assembly of the United Nations made clear in its Resolution 
adopting the text of the Rotterdam Rules and calling for their adoption: 
“Convinced that the adoption of uniform rules to modernize and harmonize the 
rules that govern the international carriage of goods involving a sea leg would 
enhance legal certainty, improve efficiency and commercial predictability in the 
international carriage of goods and reduce legal obstacles to the flow of international 
trade among all States, 
Believing that the adoption of uniform rules to govern international contracts of 
carriage wholly or partly by sea will promote legal certainty, improve the efficiency 
of international carriage of goods and facilitate new access opportunities for 
previously remote parties and markets, thus playing a fundamental role in 
promoting trade and economic development, both domestically and 
internationally.”1357 
                                                                  
1354 DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, pp. 445–446. 
1355 See ANDERSON, V., ‘A Critical Assessment of the Rotterdam Rules' Potential to be Ratified, in Light of the 
Proposed Multimodal Transportation System and the Proposed Changes to the Obligations and Liability of the 
Carrier’, 2015, 5 Southampton Student Law Review, no. 1, pp. 19–20 and COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, 
p. 110. 
1356 ALCÁNTARA, J. M., La Convención de NN.UU. sobre Transporte de Mercancías Total o Parcialmente por Mar: Un 
Instrumento Neocon sobre Responsabilidad del Porteador. XIII Congreso de Derecho Marítimo, Montevideo, 10-
12 November, 2008, p. 2. See also LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 294 (referring to the current regulatory 
system as “a highly fragmented one”). 
1357 UN General Assembly, Resolution 63/122, December 11, 2008 (emphasis in the original).  
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In addition to uniformity, the Rotterdam Rules also had as their goal the modernization 
of the regulatory framework, in order to make it compatible with the needs of the 
maritime trade in the 21st Century.1358 Fundamental among these needs were updating 
the existing rules to reflect the increasing reliance on electronic documents and, most of 
all, the growing importance of door-to-door transport, something that the Hamburg 
Rules had failed to do (having expanded the Hague-Visby tackle-to-tackle coverage only to 
port-to-port) despite having been drafted well into the “container revolution”.1359 Aware 
of these new necessities, particularly in the field of containerized cargo, the Rotterdam 
Rules went beyond the limits established in the previous regulatory bodies, extending its 
applicability not only to the maritime portion of the carriage, but to “the different modes of 
transport to allow for door-to-door movement under a single contract of carriage.”1360  
Unlike the Hague (Visby) and the Hamburg Rules, the Rotterdam Rules depart from the 
traditional “liability-driven” framework, aiming instead to be “a harmonizing instrument 
regulating nearly the entire contractual relationship between parties to a contract of 
carriage.”1361 In other words, the Rotterdam Rules are not concerned exclusively with the 
liability of the carrier, but instead with the whole process of the carriage.1362 This change 
was the result of the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules not merely aiming to simply 
“update” the Hague (Visby) regime, seeking instead to create a new system that, although 
learned from the mistakes of its predecessors, went well beyond their previous 
                                                                  
1358 ORTIZ, R. I., ‘What Changes in International Transport Law after the Rotterdam Rules’, 2009, 14 Uniform Law 
Review, no. 4, p. 894 (“the Convention is a product of its times and offers a number of innovative solutions to a wide 
range of contemporary problems encountered in the carriage of good wholly or partly by sea”). See also PEJOVIĆ, č., 
Article 47(2) of the Rotterdam Rules: The Solution of Old Problems or a New Confusion?, in Basedow, J. et al. (eds.), 
The Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs 2011-2013, 2015, p. 178 (arguing that the “innovative approach” of the 
Rotterdam Rules “was probably motivated by the need to adjust the international regime governing the carriage of 
goods by sea in such a way as to cope with various modern developments, such as the increased importance of container 
transport, logistics and electronic commerce”). 
1359 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 13. 
1360 LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 294. Comparatively, the Hague (Visby) rules are “tackle-to-tackle,” 
while the Hamburg Rules are limited to “port-to-port” carriage, methods that have progressively become 
“insufficient for current practical needs” (ÜNAN, S., The Scope of Application of the Rotterdam Rules and Freedom of 
Contract, in Güner-Özbek, M. D. (ed.), The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of 
Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea: An appraisal of the "Rotterdam Rules", 2011, p. 88). See also RECALDE CASTELLS, A., 
Reflections on Spain’s Decision to Ratify the Rotterdam Rules, in Basedow, J. et al. (eds.), The Hamburg Lectures on 
Maritime Affairs 2011-2013, 2015, p. 48 (“[the goal of the Rotterdam Rules] was not merely adapting the [Hague-
Visby] or [Hamburg Rules], but to include new topics and to regulate the entire contract for carriage of goods by sea”). 
1361 ZIEGLER, A. V., 2008, supra note 1353, p. 331. 
1362 See LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 295 (noting that, according to their supporters, the Rotterdam 
Rules are intended “to do much more than merely expand the existing liability regime”) and CARLSON, M. H., ‘U.S. 
Participation in Private International Law Negotiations: Why the UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea Is Important to the United States’, 2008, 44 Texas 
International Law Journal, no. 3, p. 270 (arguing that the Rotterdam Rules “will make the process of transporting 
goods by sea across international boundaries simpler, more efficient, and less costly”). 
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constraints.1363 This ambitious character of the Rotterdam Rules is also responsible for 
their complexity and length, with some commentators referring to them as “one of the 
most complex regulatory bodies ever known.”1364 
Perhaps one of the most revolutionary elements contained in the Rotterdam Rules is the 
fact that they are not limited to the sea portion of the carriage. Unlike their predecessors, 
the Rotterdam Rules introduced a regime for multimodal transport, extending the period 
of liability of the carrier (under certain circumstances) even to the non-sea legs of the 
carriage.1365 Although this is not a completely new development (some courts had already 
used the Hague-Visby Rules have to govern the liability of the carrier when the sea 
portion was “the prevailing route”), there were plenty of cases where the liability regimes 
applicable were split depending on the exact portion of the carriage in question.1366 It was 
in order to prevent illogical or nonsensical results that one of the most important aims of 
the Rules was to establish this “globalized, uniform and modern regime for regulating the 
rights and obligations of stakeholders in the maritime industry, with a single contract of carriage 
from door to door.”1367 
Additionally, the Rotterdam Rules aimed at achieving a larger degree of balance that had 
previously existed in the regulatory framework of maritime carriage. Fundamental among 
these changes was the elimination of the exception of liability established for navigational 
faults;1368 the extension of the obligation of the carrier to provide a seaworthy ship during 
the whole voyage, and not only at the beginning;1369 a significant increase in the package 
limitation, establishing it at 3 SDR per kilo of cargo; and the extension of the time allowed 
                                                                  
1363 CARBONE, S. M. & LA MATTINA, A., Uniform International Law on the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Recent Trends 
Toward a Multimodal Perspective, in Boschiero, N. et al. (eds.), International Courts and the Development of 
International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves, 2013, p. 826. 
1364 ALCÁNTARA, J. M., supra note 1356, p. 2. See also MUKHERJEE, P. K. et al., 2013, supra note 1179, p. 335. 
1365 CARBONE, S. M. & LA MATTINA, A., 2013, supra note 1363, p. 828. 
1366 ibid., p. 828. 
1367 URIBE, M. A. et al., ‘Transport Facilitation from the Perspective of the Rotterdam Rules’, 2010, 283 Bulletin 
FAL, no. 2, p. 4. 
1368 As we saw in regards to the Hamburg Rules, the navigational fault exception included in the Hague (Visby) 
Rules had become quite controversial in the second part of the 20th Century. It appeared as an exceptional 
favour granted to the carriers, seemingly going against the interests of the shippers. Indeed, no similar exception 
exists since 1955 for any other form of carriage, “in recognition of the developments in navigational technology.” As 
such, maintaining this exception represented an anachronistic practice of the maritime industry (ANDERSON, V., 
2015, supra note 1355, p. 25). 
1369 Limiting the obligation of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy only “before and at the beginning of the 
voyage” had created a problem that, according to some, placed the shipper in a disadvantageous position. Under 
the Hague (Visby) regime, a shipper was often left to rely only on the obligation of the carrier to “properly care for 
the cargo” when damages occurred during the voyage, even if these were the result of unseaworthiness that arose 
after the ship started on her voyage. Since the carrier will often be excused under the exceptions to liability 
included under Article 4(2) of the Hague (Visby) Rules, limiting the seaworthiness obligation to the 
commencement of the voyage thus placed the shipper “in a vulnerable position” (ibid., p. 23). 
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for filing claims for cargo damage to 2 years, among others. At the same time that they 
increased the responsibilities of the carrier, however, the Rotterdam Rules also 
established some new obligations for the shippers, for example in regards to their 
responsibility for shipping hazardous cargo.1370 This supposed balance in the duties of 
both parties has made some supporters argue that even though the Rules are not in effect 
yet, nothing should stop the parties from simply incorporating them into their 
agreements.  
“Whilst local laws may give effect to regimes that predate the Rotterdam Rules, it is 
hard to see why parties would seek to rely on those older regimes when by private 
contract they have agreed to another regime, especially when there would be 
provisions that are beneficial. For shippers and consignees, there are clearly benefits 
in having higher package limitations, the ability to sue for delay, and an absence of 
nautical fault being a defence to a carrier. For carriers, the benefits include a clearer 
responsibility on shippers and certainty insofar as the applicable liability regime is 
concerned. Further, it may be unlikely that carriers would take advantage of more 
beneficial limitations in the country in which proceedings take place if they have 
taken the step of incorporating the less beneficial regime into their contract.”1371 
Clearly, the Rotterdam Rules are an ambitious project. This is hardly a disputed fact, as 
even some their drafters have openly referred to them as “much broader, more detailed and 
technically ambitious” than its predecessors.1372 Ironically, for all of their good intentions, 
and the enormous efforts involved in their making, the complexity and extension of the 
Rotterdam Rules might be responsible for their lack of success in obtaining the necessary 
ratifications.1373 Indeed, a case has been made that “the longer and more complex a document 
the less likely it is that national governments will embrace it.”1374 Although the size alone of 
the Rotterdam Rules is impressive (they contain 96 articles, compared to the 16, 17 and 
34 and in the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, respectively), that is hardly their 
only structural problem.  
                                                                  
1370 KHALID, N. & SUPPIAH, R., ‘The Rotterdam Rules: Catalyst for trade or cumbersome convention?’, 2010, 37 
Maritime Policy & Management, no. 4, p. 449. 
1371 HETHERINGTON, S., 2014, supra note 1177, p. 172. 
1372 RECALDE CASTELLS, A., 2015, supra note 1360, p. 50. See also PEJOVIĆ, č., 2015, supra note 1358, p. 177 
(referring to the approach taken by the Rotterdam Rules as “ambitious and innovative”) and COLDWELL, R., 2014, 
supra note 1197, p. 112 (calling the Rotterdam Rules “more complex than past shipping treaties; a likely product of 
the law seeking to meet the commercial expectations of the industry”). 
1373 See ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 167 (arguing that the Rotterdam Rules are “too ambitious” to regulate 
multimodal transport, something that would keep them from “being widely ratified as global, uniform rules”) and 
COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, p. 112 (stating that, in general, “greater complexity is likely to discourage 
States from ratification”). 
1374 GRIGGS, P. J. S., 2003, supra note 1159, p. 203. 
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“More concerning is their dense drafting and complex structure, brimming with 
references to other precepts in the same text (more than 200), as well as exceptions, 
and exceptions to exceptions (the case of Article 13 is significant). These 
characteristics complicate the understanding of the Convention, which may lead to 
an increase in litigation costs and damage legal certainty due to the unpredictability 
of court decisions.”1375 
In addition to the above, even if they were to be ratified, the use that the Rotterdam Rules 
make of new terminology, as well as the fact that they regulate previously unregulated 
aspects of commerce, will require a significant amount of time to pass before even a 
modicum of certainty is achieved, as the ramifications of the new rules become clear 
through practice.1376  A significant body of court decisions will be essential for this 
process, as only then will the market learn how the convention can be applied.1377  
As of this writing, the entry into force of the Rotterdam Rules (whether in the near or 
distant future) seems, to say the least, unlikely. Although 25 countries signed the 
convention, only 3 (Togo, Spain and Congo) have ratified it.1378   
                                                                  
1375 RECALDE CASTELLS, A., 2015, supra note 1360, p. 50. 
1376 VALDERRAMA, F. A. J., 2012, supra note 1244, p. 131 (noting that although it is a positive thing that the 
Rotterdam Rules try to reflect the new realities and necessities of maritime transportation, their complexity and 
extension create problems for their interpretation and application). As BERLINGIERI noted in regards to 
harmonization and unification, 
“interpretation is not a process which can be carried out hurriedly: it requires time; it requires that the 
provisions which need interpretation be tested many times against the reality of the commercial life. 
Therefore, an interpretation made once and for all by the legislature at the time of the ratification of a 
convention, when probably very little experience exists in other countries on the practical application of its 
provisions, and certainly no experience exists in the State in question, is very dangerous. It may lead to 
results which may adversely affect uniformity.” 
BERLINGIERI, F., ‘Uniformity in Maritime Law and Implementation of International Conventions’, 1987, 18 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 3, p. 318. 
1377 RECALDE CASTELLS, A., 2015, supra note 1360, p. 67. See also COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, p. 112 
(“States are cautious of the unknown in circumstances where the exercise of sovereignty over national industry is 
threatened by international law”). 
1378 HETHERINGTON, S., 2014, supra note 1177, p. 171 (also noting that although some countries are interested in 
moving towards ratifying the Rotterdam Rules, they are “awaiting developments in the United States”). While some 
countries, like Australia and New Zealand, have expressed their reluctance to even sign the Rotterdam Rules, 
others, like Germany, the United Kingdom, China and India, have expressed “their tentative intentions” towards 
an eventual signature and ratification (COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, p. 112). 
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10.7 The Current Regulatory Landscape  
Albert LILAR, former president of the CMI once said:  
“The history of maritime law bears the stamp of a constant search for stability and 
security in the relations between the men who commit themselves and their 
belongings to the capricious and indomitable sea. Since time immemorial, the 
postulate which has inspired all the approaches to the problem has implied the 
establishment of a uniform law.”1379 
Despite the undisputed importance that uniformity has for those in the maritime trade, 
the current situation is anything but harmonious. Indeed, as Judge HAIGHT explained, 
“[a]lthough there is widespread recognition of the value of international uniformity in [the] law 
governing the carriage of goods by sea, there is little uniformity to be found at the moment.”1380  
HETHERINGTON offers a good demonstration of the current landscape of confusion and 
lack of uniformity by reproducing a clause paramount included in a bill of lading for the 
carriage of cargo from China to Australia: 
“Clause Paramount  
(a) The Hague Rules contained in the International Convention for the Unification 
of certain rules relating to Bills of Lading, dated Brussels the 25h August 1924 as 
enacted in the country of shipment, shall apply to this contract. When no such 
enactment is in force in the country of shipment, the corresponding legislation of the 
country of destination shall apply, but in respect to which no such enactments are 
compulsorily applicable, the terms of the said convention shall apply. 
(b) Trades where Hague-Visby Rules apply  
In trades where the International Brussels Convention 1924 as amended by the 
Protocol signed at Brussels on February 23rd 1968-the Hague-Visby Rules-apply 
compulsorily, the provisions of the respective legislation shall apply to this bill of 
lading.”1381 
As the above clause shows, even without setting foot in a court of law, trade is affected by 
a lack of unity in regulations. Contracts themselves become even more complex, as they 
permit the existence of parallel legal regimes governing them, with the carriers always 
seeking the one that will be the most favorable. 
                                                                  
1379 Quoted in HETHERINGTON, S., 2014, supra note 1177, p. 165. 
1380 Quoted in MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, p. 1526. 
1381 HETHERINGTON, S., 2014, supra note 1177, pp. 172–173 
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There is little doubt that the harmonization of maritime law is not merely a desirable 
goal, but also a necessity for the trade.1382 Indeed, those involved in maritime commerce 
need to know that the law applicable to their business, wherever it is that they trade, will 
be largely the same.1383 Harmonization would not only benefit the participants of this 
market, but also the consumers that, in the end, are the true beneficiaries of the free and 
constant movement of goods around the world.  
“Knowing in advance the rules that will apply to determine who is liable and for how 
much allows parties to make rational, efficient decisions about contract terms and 
insurance. If there is uniformity, each party involved in a transaction will know at 
the outset what its liability (or possible recovery) will be if there is a dispute, no 
matter where the dispute is resolved. Predictability and certainty will reduce 
transaction costs and minimize litigation. Ultimately, the consumer will benefit 
from lower prices.”1384 
The international character that is inherent to this trade can create such enormous 
difficulties that a single, unified regime appears like a panacea. This might explain why, 
historically, conventions on maritime matters were among the earliest international 
agreements.1385 As a matter of fact, the international carriage of goods by sea might the 
commercial activity that has received “the most attention from governments, 
intergovernmental international organizations and trade organizations.”1386  
In general, outside of maritime attorneys, nobody benefits, and no greater public interest 
is served, from a situation in which different regulatory systems are in constant “battle,” 
nor by the proliferation of a plethora of domestic systems internally regulating the 
trade.1387 While it is undeniable that the international community, as well as the 
                                                                  
1382 CARLSON, M. H., 2008, supra note 1362, p. 270 (arguing that uniformity of the rules is so important, that it 
“probably matters more than the substance of those rules”). 
1383 See MCCORMACK, H. M., 1998, supra note 1228, p. 1483 (“[s]hipowners and merchants alike need to know what 
their rights and obligations are when their ships and goods are in foreign waters. This is made easier if their rights and 
obligations are the same the whole world over”) and GRIGGS, P. J. S., 2003, supra note 1159, p. 192 (“those involved 
in the world of maritime trade need to know that wherever they trade the applicable law will, by and large, be the 
same”). 
1384 CARLSON, M. H., 2008, supra note 1362, p. 270. See also PAULSEN, G. W., 1982, supra note 1188, p. 1066 
(arguing that “[i]nternational [u]nification is a natural requirement of the maritime law,” since maritime law often 
creates complex transactions between participants in different countries, thus giving rise to conflicts between 
their respective domestic legislations, and which cannot “be solved by adopting common principles of private 
international laws”). 
1385 MASON, A., ‘Harmonization of Maritime Laws and the Impact of International Law on Australasian Maritime 
Law’, 1999, 14 Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, no. 1, p. 2. 
1386 RODRÍGUEZ FERNÁNDEZ, M., ‘La Interpretación e Integración de los Instrumentos de Derecho Comercial 
Internacional: El Caso de las Reglas de Rotterdam’, 2013, 12 Revista E-mercatoria, no. 2, p. 151. 
1387 RAMBERG, J., ‘Unification of the Law of International Freight Forwarding’, 1998, 3 Uniform Law Review, no. 1, 
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participants in the maritime market, would see an enormous benefit in a unified system, 
the fact remains that, at the moment,  such an idea is a utopia, the stuff of dreams.1388  
“Parties affected by the current regime lament the lack of uniformity of the existing 
rules which they say fail to adequately take into account the modern transport 
practices including containerization, multimodal transport, and the use of electronic 
data interchange (EDI). Under the current regime of the carriage of goods by sea, the 
shippers and carriers do not have the benefit of a binding and balanced universal 
regime to support the operation of contracts of carriage involving various modes of 
transport.”1389 
As we have seen, these are issues that were taken into consideration in the drafting of the 
Rotterdam Rules, as they aimed to cover the perceived gaps that existed in the 
regulations.1390 They were drafted at a time when there was a clear awareness of the fact 
that the regulatory situation, “with multiple international regimes and unique regional and 
national laws competing to govern the carriage of goods by sea,” was completely 
unsatisfactory.1391 Their awareness of the problem, however, has not been enough to help 
them obtain the necessary support to enter into force.  What is more, even if they were to 
enter into force, unless they are ratified by a large majority of maritime nations, they will 
only serve as just one more system, one more “standard” that hoped to the be only 
one.1392  
                                                                                                                                                                       
Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, obviously adversely affects the mission of international uniformity in this 
area”). 
1388 MATTEUCCI, M., ‘The History of Unidroit and the Methods of Unification’, 1973, 66 Law Library Journal, no. 3, 
p. 289 (referring to ideas such as a supranational code as “more utopian than realistic”).  
1389 KHALID, N. & SUPPIAH, R., 2010, supra note 1370, p. 448. 
1390 PEJOVIĆ, č., 2015, supra note 1358, p. 178 (“[the Rotterdam Rules have] the ambitious goal of restoring the 
uniformity of the law governing the international carriage of goods by sea”). 
1391 STURLEY, M. F. et al., 2010, supra note 1166, p. 13. 
1392 Without a hint of irony, CARLSON urges the ratification of the Rotterdam Rules stating:  
“Just about everybody agrees that the world needs a new carriage of goods regime. The two main problems 
with the current regimes-including the 1924 Hague Rules (in use in the United States and a few other 
countries), the 1968 Hague-Visby Rules (in use by most of our major trading partners), and the 1978 
Hamburg Rules (in force, but rejected by most major maritime and commercial powers)- are that they are 
outmoded and there are too many of them.” 
Although she is right in regards to the current landscape, looking at a situation in which there are too many 
coexisting legal systems and assume that the solution will be to create a new one is rather naive (CARLSON, M. H., 
2008, supra note 1362, p. 270). Furthermore, as of 2016 the Rotterdam Rules have only been ratified by 3 
countries (Congo, Spain and Togo). This landscape can hardly leave us hopeful about their entry into force, 
especially when we consider that, based on Article 94 of the Rotterdam Rules, they will only enter into force until 
one year after the 20th ratification. As some authors have explained: 
“The US State Department completed its own consideration of the new Convention in June 2013, but 
there seems to have been little progress since in the process of Senate approval for ratification by the 
President. Although various world-wide and European industry bodies are enthusiastic about ratification 
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Despite the ambitious and admirable goals of unifying the law, the history of the 
regulations that exist in the maritime field show that unification attempts do not 
necessarily lead to harmony. Since there are so many different interests at play, the only 
way in which approval has been obtained has been through compromises that often go 
against the legal certainty that they allegedly seek to achieve.1393 The Hamburg Rules are a 
good example of this since, as we have already mentioned, their language was left 
deliberately ambiguous in order to give opposing sides the illusion that their position was 
the one being adopted.1394 This will continue to be the case as long as harmonization 
efforts follow political agendas instead of commercial necessities.1395 As one author 
explained: 
 “Those who strive to achieve a uniform maritime law, nationally and 
internationally, seek to have the people of the maritime community -shipowners, 
cargo owners, insurers, lenders, furnishers of supplies, salvors- ‘be of one language 
and of one speech,’ so that rights and obligations may be certain and predictable. […] 
And progress in achieving uniformity has been made from time to time throughout 
history. But it seems that whenever the maritime world begins to achieve one legal 
language, so that the tower of a uniform maritime law starts to arise, some force 
confounds that language, and scatters the maritime community upon the face of all 
the earth, so that uniformity, having taken two steps forward, then takes one step 
back.”1396 
The interplay of different interests is perhaps one the biggest challenges to unification 
and, in the case of maritime law, the largest source of conflict. The different participants 
of the trade want to ensure that whatever regulation enters into force benefits them, and 
places their interests at the forefront. As a result, it will often be the case that a given 
                                                                                                                                                                       
and in the European Commission, so that ratification by EU states is uncertain. Without the imprimatur 
of both the United States and the EU states, it seems unlikely that the requisite 20 ratifications will be 
obtained.” 
 AIKENS, R. et al., 2016, supra note 1192, 1.59. 
1393 STEPHAN, P. B., ‘The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law’, 1999, 39 
Virginia Journal of International Law, no. 3, p. 788 (“International unification instruments display a strong tendency 
either to compromise legal certainty or to advance the agendas of interest groups”). 
1394 CHANDLER [III], G. F., 1993, supra note 1328, p. 45. 
1395 In his rather damning analysis of the Hamburg Rules, GOLDIE explains that the ambiguities contained in them 
mean that even if they were “universally adopted they would be applied in different ways in different countries,” 
among other reasons, due to the “drafting deficiencies” present in them (GOLDIE, C. W. H., ‘Effect of the Hamburg 
Rules on Shipowners' Liability Insurance’, 1993, 24 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 1, p. 111). 
Although he also recognizes that different forums will also apply the Hague (Visby) Rules differently, this does 
not seem to come as a result of drafting deficiencies, but rather of differences in their respective internal rules 
(ibid., pp. 111–112). 
1396 HAIGHT, C. S., JR., ‘Babel Afloat: Some Reflections on Uniformity in Maritime Law’, 1997, 28 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 2, p. 190. 
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framework will be opposed “for reasons of expedience and because of the economic interests 
defended by particular sectors [and] not because of any particular legal problems.”1397 This 
makes, of course, the process of harmonization and unification very difficult, if not 
downright impossible, as it quickly becomes clear that it will be more about placating and 
balancing political and economic interests than about seeking appropriate legal solutions 
to existing legal and commercial problems.1398 
On the topic of the unification of private law, EVANS has stated: 
“[T]he whole unification process might be likened to an attempt to dismantle the 
Tower of Babel. If this linguistic analogy may seem far-fetched, it is worth recalling 
that one of the most eminent commercial law judges in the English High Court, Mr. 
Justice Hobhouse, has gone on record as referring to the utopian ideals underlying 
uniformity as a concept and has compared them to those which gave rise to the 
movement for the adoption of Esperanto as a universal language.”1399 
EVANS’ position is tough, but accurate. Just like Esperanto failed to gain any significant 
traction to become a universal language, it seems unlikely that any of the existing 
conventions, whether those in force or those waiting for ratification, will achieve the 
universal support that their drafters hoped for. On the contrary, every new set of rules 
creates a new standard that is then added to a trade already full of possible standards. 
While the intentions of the drafters of these rules are laudable, it is worth asking whether 
it is useful to simply add more possible regulatory systems, hoping that new attempts will 
receive the approval they so desperately need, even in the face of every past failure to 
achieve that.  
To make matters worse, and as much as we might recognize the good intentions behind 
those seeking uniformity in maritime law, we cannot overlook the fact that such attempts 
can backfire. The United States represents a good case study of this situation, particularly 
their failure to ratify the Visby amendments to the Hague Rules. Indeed, as has been well 
documented, it was the American cargo interests who, for years, opposed the ratification 
of these amendments, worried that they might delay the ratification of the Hamburg 
Rules, and which they saw as more beneficial to their interests.1400 Conversely, the 
shipowners that had originally opposed the Visby amendments, changed their position 
                                                                  
1397 FRESNEDO DE AGUIRRE, C., 2009, supra note 1350, p. 870. 
1398 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 170. The supporters of the Rotterdam Rules lauded as “a compromise 
between the various interest groups, which actively participated in the drafting process,” differentiating them from the 
“political compromises” that existed in the Hamburg regime (See GROBARČÍKOVÁ, A. & SOSEDOVÁ, J., ‘Carrier’s 
liability under the international conventions for the carriage of goods by sea’, 2014, 9 Transport Problems, no. 3, 
p. 77). Needless to say that this alleged compromise has not been enough to allow them to enter into force. 
1399 EVANS, M., ‘Uniform Law: A Bridge Too Far’, 1995, 3 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
pp. 146–147. 
1400 MENDELSOHN, A. I., 1992, supra note 5, p. 30. 
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and supported their ratification once they saw the changes that the Hamburg Rules would 
bring.1401 As a result, with other groups opposing both the Visby amendments and the 
Hamburg Rules, and unable to see any political gain in making a final choice in such a 
technical field, both the US Government and the US Congress were unwilling to commit 
to either Visby or Hamburg.1402 This left the United States in a very complex situation, as  
“U.S. law now differs from the law in any Hague-Visby country, any Hamburg 
country, and even any other country that still follows the unamended Hague Rules. 
Unless something is done, the United States will neither enjoy the benefits of 
uniform law in this area nor play a role in developing a new internationally uniform 
regime.”1403 
This is not merely an anecdote, but a cautionary tale. It highlights the real possibility of 
new regulatory frameworks threatening the ratification of the ones that already exist. 
Simply adding more possible rules to the maritime field (or, for that matter, to any other) 
means that no single regulation will ever become the only one, something that threatens 
the stated goal of harmonization. Nobody benefits from a system where regulatory 
uncertainty becomes the norm.1404  
All of the above problems have lead to a situation in which, without taking into 
consideration the lex mercatoria that also governs part of the trade, what can currently be 
called the “international regulatory framework” of maritime law is, to say the least, 
extremely complex. It is, primarily, “a patchwork of competing and outdated multilateral 
conventions,” including the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules, 
together with “national and regional alternatives [that] now supplement or partially supersede 
those long-established regimes in some parts of the world.”1405 Clearly, the landscape is fairly 
                                                                  
1401 ibid., pp. 52–53. 
1402 STURLEY, M. F., ‘Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea’, 1995, 26 Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce, no. 1, p. 569. 
1403 ibid., p. 570. While the regulatory framework in the United States continues to be the same, it should be 
noted that they did play a very important role, for better or worse, in the development of the Rotterdam Rules. 
1404 Writing in 1999, TETLEY argued that the failure of UNCITRAL (responsible for the Hamburg Rules) and the 
CMI (responsible for the Hague(Visby) Rules) to update their rules and make them “compatible with one another” 
was directly responsible for the lack of international uniformity affecting the trade (TETLEY, W., ‘Proposed New 
United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law, The’, 
1999, 30 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 4, p. 614). 
1405 YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, pp. 583–584. See also RODRÍGUEZ FERNÁNDEZ, M., 2013, supra note 
1386, pp. 153–154 (enumerating some of the co-existing regulatory systems) and TETLEY, W., 1999, supra note 
1404, p. 596 (arguing that the failure to reach uniformity or consensus makes “many shipping nations” to go off 
“on their own” and to adopt “non-uniform changes to their national carriage of goods by sea laws”).  
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grim, as the international carriage of goods by sea, which was “at one time among the 
world’s most uniform of all international laws,” suffers from significant fragmentation.1406 
This fragmented landscape is made more complex by the ever-present threat of conflict of 
laws, not only between different States, but also between them and, on the one hand, the 
international regulation of the trade, and, on the other, the lex maritima (often preferred 
by the merchants, though not by the courts).1407 In the end, determining what law will 
apply to a given case might end up being as difficult as predicting the result of a coin toss.  
                                                                  
1406 ibid., p. 596. See also YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, p. 585 (referring to the current situation as 
“chaotic”). 
1407 TETLEY, W., 1998, supra note 1173, p. 322. 
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“After the war I could neither work in a city nor lead the dull life of a 




he history of the regulation of maritime law shows that, at least from the late part 
of the 19th century, there has been a certain consensus on the fact that allowing 
unfettered freedom of contract in this area would be counterproductive. Having 
learned from the history of the trade, starting with the Harter Act and the Hague 
Rules, and all the way down to the Rotterdam Rules, regulations have aimed at restricting 
the freedom of contract enjoyed by the parties to carriage contracts, by means of 
imposing mandatory minimum levels of liability for the carriers.1409 The reason behind 
these restrictions has been to somehow temper the clear imbalance that has traditionally 
existed between carriers and cargo owners, and which, as we have seen, traditionally 
worked to the detriment of the latter.1410  
As MENDELSOHN has explained, “if there ever was an area wholly and totally lacking in that 
elusive objective of freedom of choice, not to mention equality of bargaining power, it is the area 
of ocean bills of lading.”1411 This situation is the result of an explicit desire on the part of the 
regulators who, through different rules, have expressly recognized that that the parties to 
these contracts are often imbalanced in their bargaining power. Indeed, if anything, the 
                                                                  
1408 GERBAULT, A., The Fight of the Firecrest, 1926, H.F.G Witherby, p. 231 
1409 ZHAO, L., ‘The Limited Scope of Seaborne Cargo Liability Regime: New Political–Economic Environments in 
the 21st Century’, 2016 Maritime Policy & Management, pp. 1–2. 
1410 MASON, A., 1999, supra note 1385, p. 3. See also YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, p. 585 (“the storyline is 
mainly focused on the debate surrounding the contractual imbalance between carrier and shipper due to the contract of 
carriage”). 
1411 MENDELSOHN, A. I., 1970, supra note 1126, p. 663. 
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fact that shippers are often in a much weaker position than the carriers has virtually 
become a dogma.1412  
11.2 Bargaining Power and Bills of lading 
When a shipper wants to conclude a contract to carry cargo to another port, he will soon 
find out that the terms that are offered to him are rather one-sided, and that these terms 
are basically the same across all carriers. If he goes ahead with the agreement, the shipper 
will then receive a large contract, full of fine-print terms regulating every aspect of the 
voyage, often excusing the carrier from as many variables as possible, and leaving the 
shipper to assume most of the losses. 
“Prominent admiralty lawyers, at the behest of shipowners, spend weeks drafting 
and revising these multi-paragraphed monsters. They are indeed the work of artists 
skilled in the arcane and archaic sciences. Shippers, on the other hand, are given 
absolutely no choice when they seek to ship their goods. If they reject the bill of 
lading of shipowner X, they will find that shipowner Y's standard form bill is equally 
microscopic and equally if not more adverse to shippers' interests.”1413 
In the end, the only real decision that the shipper will be able to make will be whether or 
not to ship his cargo. Nothing more, nothing less. Several courts have been aware of this 
problem, as it also manifests itself in other means of carriage. Already in 1873, for 
example, in a case dealing with railroad transport, the United States Supreme Court had 
recognized that situations like these were not conducive for freedom of contract, and 
that, as a result, some degree of regulation was necessary. As the Court stated: 
“The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality. The latter is only 
one individual of a million. He cannot afford to haggle, or stand out and seek redress 
in the courts. His business will not admit such a course. He prefers, rather, to accept 
any bill of lading, or sign any paper the carrier presents; often, indeed, without 
knowing what the one or the other contains. In most cases he has no alternative but 
to do this or abandon his business.[…] 
The business [of carriage] is almost concentrated in a few powerful corporations, 
whose position in the body politic enables them to control it. They do, in fact, control 
it, and impose such conditions upon travel and transportation as they see fit, which 
the public is compelled to accept. These circumstances furnish an additional 
argument, if any were needed, to show that the conditions imposed by common 
                                                                  
1412 Regarding the Harter Act, CRUTCHER notes how it effectively sought to “limit the freedom of contract which the 
shipowner and shipper had previously enjoyed” (CRUTCHER, M. B., 1970, supra note 1231, p. 710). 
1413 MENDELSOHN, A. I., 1970, supra note 1126, p. 663. 
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carriers ought not to be adverse (to say the least) to the dictates of public policy and 
morality.”1414 
Recognizing this risky situation, in which only a few providers of a service were able to 
dictate whatever draconian terms they wished, has been at the core of the regulation of 
maritime trade, both domestically and internationally. The Hague Rules themselves had 
been based on the premise that “carriers have far greater bargaining power than shippers,” 
and so they were designed precisely “to protect the interests of the shippers by imposing a 
minimum level of obligations [on the carrier].”1415 As we have seen, similar rationales would 
later motivate the drafting of the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules, both of which 
attempted to “update” the regulation of the carriage of goods by sea, in the aims of 
ensuring balance and fairness in the relation between shipowners and carriers, on the one 
side, and cargo owners, on the other. 
Domestic regulations on the carriage of goods by sea have also, largely, taken bargaining 
power into consideration. In the United States, for example, the Harter Act of 1893, 
dealing with the liability of carriers, was largely “aimed at protecting the American industry 
(at that time mainly shippers) from the English shipping industry.”1416 Later, a similar 
reasoning was also behind the adoption of the US COGSA, which implemented the Hague 
Rules in American Law. Indeed, the US COGSA “had as its central purpose the avoidance of 
adhesion contracts, providing protection for the shipper against the inequality in bargaining 
power”.1417 Specifically, its rules regarding limitations of liability were enacted “to restrain 
the superior bargaining power wielded by carriers over shippers; [their] purpose was to set 
                                                                  
1414 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood [1873], 84 US, 357–384, p. 379. 
1415 VAN DEN BERGH, R., Regulation and Economics, 2012, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 509. See also 
MAGASHI, A. I. & HARUNA, A. L., 2016, supra note 1231, p. 242 (referring to the Hague Rules as aiming to “abridge 
the unfettered freedom enjoyed by the shipowners”). 
1416 ZIEGLER, A. V., The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies 
and Research, in Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International Relations (ed.), Le Droit 
International des Transports Maritimes 1999, p. 106. See also MAGASHI, A. I. & HARUNA, A. L., 2016, supra note 
1231, p. 239 (stating the Harter Act aimed to “address the unfettered freedom enjoyed by shipwoners”).  
1417 Standard Electrica, SA v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische [1967], 375 F. 2d, 943–948, p. 945. BEALE has a different 
view of this, arguing that the Hague Rules (and, therefore, US COGSA) were “needed in part because shippers 
sending small quantities of goods under bill of lading contracts did not find it worthwhile to haggle over the terms of the 
bill” (BEALE, H., ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’, 1986, 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1, p. 133). His point 
seems to be that bargaining power disparities in contracts are not necessarily a problem, and that even the fact 
that certain terms appear all over the market are not a sign of unfairness. He even goes to add that “if sufficient 
buyers protest, businesses may find it worthwhile to alter the standard terms to capture their custom-they may offer a 
'two tier' service, or (to save administrative cost) simply offer better terms to everyone at a slightly higher price” (ibid., 
p. 134). This shows a flawed understanding of the market, particularly in the case of maritime law, where we 
know for a fact that the pleas of the cargo interests to obtain better terms did not obtain any real changes until 
regulatory action was taken. This is simply the consequence of a market in which the service in question has no 
real substitutes, meaning that the shippers cannot simply boycott carriers altogether, since they do need to send 
their products overseas.  
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reasonable limitations on liability so as to prohibit carriers from contracting out of liability”.1418 
In the words of GILMORE and BLACK, this regulation allowed the parties  
“a freedom of contracting out of its terms, but only in the direction of increasing the 
shipowner's liabilities, and never in the direction of diminishing them. This apparent 
onesidedness is a commonsense recognition of the inequality in bargaining power 
which both Harter and COGSA were designed to redress, and of the fact that one of 
the great objectives of both Acts is to prevent the impairment of the value and 
negotiability of the ocean bill of lading.”1419 
In general, whenever maritime trade is regulated, the sentiment has been that “the ocean 
carrier enjoys greater bargaining power than ocean shipper/cargo owner and as such this 
inherent bias needs to be off-set in order to protect the latter against the ocean carrier.”1420 It is 
this often enormous difference between the bargaining power of the parties that has 
motivated the regulation of the trade.  
The stark contrast between the power of the carrier and the power of the shipper has 
traditionally been such, that some go as far as practically seeing the latter as a consumer. 
Indeed, as SIMON put forward, the US COGSA provisions on package limitation (which 
were, to an extent, those contained in the Hague Rules), “could be described as an early 
consumer protection law.”1421 While certainly not consumers in the traditional sense, 
shippers do often find themselves in a similar situation, at least in comparison to the 
power of the carriers. Like consumers, they are often rather powerless actors who, in a 
market full of other shippers, must deal with a reduced number of carriers, most of them 
offering similar pro-carrier terms, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Although the landscape has changed, concerns in regards to the power of the parties 
continue to be relevant in the drafting of maritime rules. Indeed, even though the level of 
power held by carriers at the time of the Harter Act or the Hague Rules has certainly 
decreased, it is still a matter of concern for the regulators. If we look at the Rotterdam 
Rules, for example, it seems undeniable that the debate surrounding their liability 
                                                                  
1418 LEARY, M., ‘Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: Edging Towards a Workable Container Solution’, 
2003, 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, no. 1, p. 193. 
1419 Cited in the dissenting opinion of Justice STEVENS in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, SA v. M/V Sky Reefer [1995], 
515 US, 528–556, p. 547. 
1420 KHOURY, A. H., ‘Of Trucks, Trains & Ships: Relative Liability in Multimodal Shipping’, 2015, 14 Richmond 
Journal of Global Law and Business, no. 1, p. 51. See also MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., ‘A Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Volume Contract Concept under the Rotterdam Rules: Selected Issues in Perspective’, 2009, 40 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 4, p. 581 (“[s]ince the time of the Harter Act the debate on contractual 
imbalance has revolved around the need to protect cargo interests by certain mandatory minimum liability rules for the 
carrier”). 
1421 SIMON, S., 1976, supra note 1294, p. 489. Similarly, SWEENEY uses the same language to refer to the Harter 
Act, calling it “one of the first consumer protection acts” ( SWEENEY, J. C., 1993, supra note 1265, p. 1).  
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provisions was shaped by “the contractual imbalance between carrier and shipper due to the 
unequal bargaining power.”1422 
Although, as we have seen, acknowledging the contractual imbalance in bills of lading 
appears to be part of conventional wisdom, the courts often treat bills of lading as if, by 
their very nature, they were balanced and fair agreements. This appears to be an example 
of cognitive dissonance, as we find courts applying norms that were created to address 
bargaining power disparities, treating those contracts as if no disparities existed. 
“For all intents and purposes, English law recognises the bill of lading as an 
agreement that conforms with classical contractual principles on validity and 
enforceability, without scrutinising the bargaining reality behind such contracts.”1423 
An example of this cognitive dissonance appears in the 1974 House of Lords case of 
Schroeder Publishing v. Macaulay.1424 In this case, dealing with bargaining power disparities 
and boilerplate agreements, Lord DIPLOCK stated: 
“Standard forms of contracts are of two kinds. The first, of very ancient origin, are 
those which set out the terms upon which mercantile transactions of common 
occurrence are to be carried out. Examples are bills of lading, charterparties, 
policies of insurance, contracts of sale in the commodity markets. The standard 
clauses in these contracts have been settled over the years by negotiation by 
representatives of the commercial interests involved and have been widely adopted 
because experience has shown that they facilitate the conduct of trade. Contracts of 
these kinds affect not only the actual parties to them but also others who may have a 
commercial interest in the transactions to which they relate, as buyers or sellers, 
charterers or shipowners, insurers or bankers. If fairness or reasonableness were 
relevant to their enforceability the fact that they are widely used by parties whose 
bargaining power is fairly matched would raise a strong presumption that their 
terms are fair and reasonable.”1425 
Lord DIPLOCK’s comments on bills of lading, made merely in passing, certainly appear 
strange. This was a case decided in 1978, only 10 years after the drafting of the Hague-
Visby rules, a regulation that, as we have seen, raised the minimum liability limits for the 
carriers, due to the difficult situation of the cargo interests. Perhaps his opinion was 
                                                                  
1422 MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, pp. 580–581. See also YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 
1309, p. 586 (explaining how the purpose that “all existing international liability regimes” have in common “is to 
reduce the potential abuse in the context of contracts of adhesions, which is used where parties with unequal bargaining 
power contract with one another”). 
1423 OLAWOYIN, A. A., ‘Forum Selection Disputes under Bills of Lading in Nigeria: A Historical and Contemporary 
Perspective’, 2004, 29 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, no. 2, p. 263. 
1424 For details on the case, See p. 112.  
1425 A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay [1974], p. 1316 (emphasis added). 
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“tainted” (for lack of a better word) by England’s own interest in maintaining a laissez 
faire approach in regards to the liability of the carrier and, therefore, was reluctant to 
concede that an even playing field did not actually exist in that area.  
Stranger still are the comments that Lord DIPLOCK made on how to identify unfair 
standard form contracts, as he characterized them as those in which 
“[the terms] have not been the subject of negotiation between the parties to it, or 
approved by any organisation representing the interests of the weaker party. They 
have been dictated by that party whose bargaining power, either exercised alone or 
in conjunction with others providing similar goods or services, enables him to say: ‘If 
you want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on which they are 
obtainable. Take it or leave it. 
To be in a position to adopt this attitude towards a party desirous of entering into a 
contract to obtain goods or services provides a classic instance of superior bargaining 
power.” 
The reason why Lord DIPLOCK’s comments are so bizarre is that this is precisely the 
situation in which shippers often found (and continue to find) themselves vis à vis the 
carrier. Indeed, shippers will usually realize that all carriers offer basically the same terms, 
and that they are in no position to change them. They have to either take the terms as 
they come, or simply accept that their cargo will never leave the port.  
The fact that the parties to a carriage contract are, by and large, commercial in nature, 
seems to lead many to assume that the resulting bargain must be fair and the result of a 
thorough bargaining process. As we have seen before, however, the fact that a party is 
acting in a professional manner does not mean, in any way, shape or form, that she is 
necessarily on an even playing field with the other.  
The above notwithstanding, it is also undeniable that the current state of the market is 
not the same as what existed in the 19th century. Beyond the technological advances that 
have benefitted the trade, there have been significant changes in the power dynamics 
affecting those that participate in it. In a fairly recent article, for example, an author 
argued that: 
“The fact is that ship-owners no longer hold strong bargaining power. This is 
especially the case since the global economic downturn in late 2008 which has caused 
ship-owners to fight for trade. Shipowners who unscrupulously increase the freight 
will be sanctioned by industrial mechanism.”1426 
                                                                  
1426 SOOKSRIPAISARNKIT, P., 2014, supra note 318, p. 314. 
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Although this view seems to generalize a situation that continues to be exceptional, since 
the large majority of individual shippers continue to be much weaker than the majority of 
individual carriers, its conclusion does have some truth to it.1427 Certainly, the existence of 
a much larger number of carriers has brought as a result that no individual carrier will be 
able to be exceptionally abusive against shippers; put in a different way, what this means 
is that the market has acted as a homogenizing force in regards to both the terms and the 
price of these contracts, pushing any exceptionally abusive party out of business. What is 
more, it is also true that the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis brought forward 
significant troubles to carriers, who then found themselves in need of adjusting their 
prices to become competitive. This economic recession, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the power of the carriers was diminished as a result.  In fact, one of the results 
of the crisis was an increased concentration of the liner shipping industry in an even 
smaller number of hands.1428 With market concentration being one of the root causes of 
abusive terms, it is easy to see that the result of the economic crisis might not be as 
“positive” for shippers as we might have been led to believe. 
“As Kessler suggested, one cause of oppressive contract terms may be market 
concentration or the presence of monopoly power. If only a few sellers exist each will 
know, or quickly learn, that its behavior affects the behavior of the other sellers and 
vice versa. Joint action, arrived at tacitly or expressly, may become desirable as a 
means of increasing profits beyond the competitive levels. Where market 
concentration exists one will probably observe ‘too high’ prices (ones above the 
competitive price), shoddy or less durable goods, or oppressive contract terms 
assigning risks to buyers that might be borne by sellers were there less market 
concentration.”1429 
Of course, the existence of a highly concentrated market does not, necessarily, mean that 
there will be rampant abuses.1430 Concentration, however, does create the kind of 
opportunity that, as a rule, can lead to abusive practices. 
It is true that in the last few decades we have seen the rise of powerful cargo interests. 
Particularly when it comes to contracts involving large shippers, the power dynamics of 
                                                                  
1427 FRESNEDO DE AGUIRRE, C., 2009, supra note 1350, p. 876 (“the protection[s] of small shippers are logical and 
derive from the fact that they have little or no bargaining power”). 
1428 SAMARAS, I. & PAPADOPOULOU, E. M., The Global Financial Crisis–the Effects on the Liner Shipping Industry and 
the Newly Adopted Leading Practices, in Aidonis, D. et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the 1st Olympus International 
Conference on Supply Chains (Olympus ICSC 2010), 2010, p. 6 (noting that the 2008 crisis “has led to the increased 
concentration in the Liner Shipping Industry. This is evident from the data […] mentioning that the 50% of total 
capacity in service was provided by 16 ocean carriers in 1995, which were reduced to 11 in 2000, remained 10 in 2003 
and finally only 7 in 2008”). 
1429 KORNHAUSER, L. A., 1976, supra note 498, p. 1169.  
1430 BEALE, H., 1986, supra note 1417, p. 131 (noting that, “[e]mpirical analysis of manufacturers' guarantees has 
shown no correlation between market concentration and the use of exclusion clauses”). 
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the contracts of carriage have shifted dramatically.  In these cases, the balance of the 
bargaining power between the carrier and the cargo interest will be on the side of shipper, 
which “may result in the cargo interest dictating terms to the carrier.”1431 Compared to the 
overall trade, however, these cases remain the exception. 
11.3 Volume Contracts: The Rotterdam Approach 
11.3.1 Definition and History of the Volume Contracts Exception 
Adapting to the new realities of the market, as well as to the varying degrees of power 
being wielded by its individual players, was one of the priorities of the drafters of the 
Rotterdam Rules. The United States’ delegation, for example, in its endorsement of the 
provisions on volume contracts, stated that  
“the existing mandatory regimes were developed for a commercial context that no 
longer exists, and that they do not meet today's commercial realities. It can no longer 
be assumed that carriers always have the more powerful bargaining position vis-à-
vis shippers; nor can it be assumed that transport contracts are always adhesion 
contracts, which the shipper must take or leave.”1432 
The Rotterdam Rules offer an interesting take on the issue of party autonomy, since they 
explicitly recognize the lack of freedom of contract in bills of lading. They do this by 
expressly establishing, as an exception, the possibility of the parties to actually exercise 
their freedom of contract and deviate from the mandatory provisions contained 
therein.1433 This was a contentious issue in the discussion of the rules, as it dealt with the 
“long standing debate over contractual imbalance between carrier and shipper due to unequal 
bargaining power.”1434 
                                                                  
1431 MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, p. 594. 
1432 CARLSON, M. H., ‘U.S. Participation in the International Unification of Private Law: The Making of the 
UNCITRAL Draft Carriage of Goods by Sea Convention’, 2006, 31 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, no. 2, p. 636. The 
position presented here by the United States is in line with the traditional recognition that has existed there of 
the “uniqueness of individual contracts between shippers and carriers” ( MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra 
note 1420, p. 582). 
1433 In his analysis of volume contracts, RAFENOMANJATO seems to agree with the idea that, in general, maritime 
law does not allow for freedom of contract. He asks “[w]hat justifies the introduction of provisions allowing freedom 
of contract, provisions which represent a significant change from the existing sea carriage conventions?” 
(RAFENOMANJATO, N. M., ‘Volume Contracts Under the Rotterdam Rules: One Step Forward Or Two Steps 
Backward?’, 2013, 19 Revue Juridique Neptunus, no. 2, p. 2). 
1434 MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, p. 601. 
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Like all other maritime conventions to date, the Rotterdam Rules adopt a mandatory 
minimum of liability, so that the parties cannot agree that the carrier shall be liable for a 
lesser amount than that established in the convention, aware of the imbalanced power 
dynamics that exist in these agreements.1435 These Rules, however, adopted a novel 
method, applying special rules to so-called “volume contracts,” allowing the parties to 
depart from some of the provisions contained in the Rotterdam Rules, including those 
related to jurisdiction and minimum liability limits, as long as they fulfill the 
requirements established therein.1436 
According to article 1(2) of the Rotterdam Rules, a “volume contract” is: 
“a contract of carriage that provides for the carriage of a specified quantity of goods 
in a series of shipments during an agreed period of time. The specification of the 
quantity may include a minimum, a maximum or a certain range.” 
Despite defining volume contracts in what might appear to be a straightforward and 
simple way, some see the volume contracts exception as “the single most inexplicable part” 
of the Rotterdam Rules.1437 In fact, according to some authors, they have “no antecedents 
in preceding conventions,” something that certainly raised concerns among the 
delegates.1438 This concerns are demonstrated by the fact that, as has been reported, the 
definition and effects of volume contracts were some of “the most debated issues throughout 
the drafting process” of the Rotterdam Rules.1439 
Proponents of this exception argue that these contracts offer important benefits, since in 
them the “shippers agree to provide a minimum volume of goods over a designated period of 
time and the carrier provides rate discounts in return,” so it makes sense to allow the parties, 
                                                                  
1435 RAFENOMANJATO, N. M., 2013, supra note 1433, p. 2 (noting that “the rationale behind the establishment of an 
imperative regime by The Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules lies in the protection of the weaker party, namely the 
shipper”). 
1436 LIANG, C., 2013, supra note 1239, p. 232. See also LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 307 (“[t]he volume 
contract provision recognises that in certain cases, where commercial actors are on a reasonably level playing field in 
terms of bargaining power, contracting parties should be allowed certain contractual freedoms”). 
1437 JOHANSSON, S. O. & OLAND, B. et al., 2009, ‘A Response to the Attempt to Clarify Certain Concerns Over the 
Rotterdam Rules’, <http://www.pysdens.com/v2/material/Rotterdam%20Rules%20Summation.pdf> (last visited 
20 March 2016), p. 4. 
1438 YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, p. 585. Despite these criticisms, BRISCOE argues that volume contracts 
are not “new to the shipping industry” (BRISCOE, J. P., ‘The Rotterdam Rules: A Port in the Storm of Liability 
Limitations and the Fair Opportunity Split’, 2011, 9 Loyola Maritime Law Journal, p. 91). Although, strictly 
speaking, this is correct, such a statement might lead us to believe that there is a wide range solutions and 
regulations referring to these issues. The truth, however, is that besides the Scandinavian region, only the United 
States possesses a legal framework that even recognizes the concept (HASHMI, S., ‘The Rotterdam Rules: A 
Blessing?’, 2011, 10 Loyola Maritime Law Journal, no. 2, p. 261). 
1439 YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, p. 600. See also DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, p. 485 (stating 
that the volume contract provision “has given rise to perhaps more controversy than any other”). 
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on the basis of this quid pro quo to depart from the rules.1440 It should be noted, however, 
that the Rotterdam Rules do not mention rate discounts as part of their regulation of 
volume contracts, nor do all authors consider such discounts as an element that is 
inherent to them. In other words, and the definition provided by the Rules confirms it, 
volume contracts are determined by volume of cargo, the number of shipments, and the 
period of time related to the performance.1441 Discounts or other benefits given to the 
shipper are, therefore, not an inherent part of these contracts. 
Some might argue that the issue of discounted rates might have been considered so 
obvious that it did not need to be mentioned in the definition, since an absence of 
discounts would mean that the shipper would have no real incentive to conclude these 
agreements. The problem, however, is that since the Rotterdam Rules do not require 
discounts to qualify a series of shipments as a “volume contract,” it is certainly possible 
that savvy, powerful carriers will simply use this figure as a device to avoid the otherwise 
mandatory application of the Rules. What is more, as critics have pointed out, a case can 
be made that discounts being provided for repeated business have always existed, and 
that this, in and of itself, should not bring as a result that the liability system is changed. 
“From the most basic standpoint, if one seeks to bring back uniformity to carriage of 
goods by sea law why allow any such exemption? It is hardly unusual in terms of 
commercial trade that one should get some kind of a discount in price for volume 
whether one is trading in apples, electronics or carriage but that does not lead to a 
change in liability in respect of such contracts. The liability is related to the risks of 
the adventure, not the amount of business done. Therefore, this is a totally fallacious 
and unacceptable standpoint.”1442 
Beyond the definition provided by the Rotterdam Rules, we can also see that discounts 
are not an inherent part of these contracts under US law, where a figure similar to 
“volume contracts” exist under the moniker of “service contracts”.1443 Indeed, according to 
                                                                  
1440 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 163.  
1441 RAFENOMANJATO, N. M., 2013, supra note 1433, p. 2. See also BRISCOE, J. P., 2011, supra note 1438, p. 91 
(“[v]olume contracts are merely contracts between shippers and carriers that cover multiple shipments across a period of 
time”) and YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, p. 600 (“[a volume] contract only requires three elements that will 
make a contract of carriage into a volume contract: (a) the specification of the quantity of cargo (or a range thereof) to be 
shipped in; (b) more than one shipment throughout; (c) a specified period of time”). 
1442 JOHANSSON, S. O. & OLAND, B. et al., 2009, supra note 1437, pp. 4–5. 
1443 YIMER, G. A., ‘Adjudicatory Jurisdiction in International Carriage of Goods by Sea: Would the Rotterdam 
Rules Settle the Controversy’, 2013, 21 African Journal of International and Comparative Law, no. 3, p. 483 (“[t]he 
concept of a volume contract is used to reflect the concept of a service contract that is a very popular form of carriage of 
goods contract in the US, constituting about 90 per cent of the liner trade in the country”). The volume contracts 
exception owes a lot to the US delegation, which pushed for its inclusion, due to the fact that, under the moniker 
of “service contracts,” volume contracts (or, at least, a similar legal figure) have been part of maritime trade in 
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§ 40102 (20) of the Shipping Act of 1984, the carrier is only expected to “commit” to a 
given rate: 
“(20) SERVICE CONTRACT.—The term ‘service contract’ means a written contract, 
other than a bill of lading or receipt, between one or more shippers, on the one hand, 
and an individual ocean common carrier or an agreement between or among ocean 
common carriers, on the other, in which— 
(A) the shipper or shippers commit to providing a certain volume or portion of cargo 
over a fixed time period; and 
(B) the ocean common carrier or the agreement commits to a certain rate or rate 
schedule and a defined service level, such as assured space, transit time, port 
rotation, or similar service features.”1444 
Under the US definition, we also see the added requirement of the contract being 
contained in something “other than a bill of lading or receipt,” and which aims to exclude the 
applicability of the US COGSA rules. Indeed, since the US COGSA which, as we have seen, 
is largely based on the Hague Rules, only governs contracts of carriage evidenced by a bill 
of lading or similar document of title, if the contract of carriage is evidence by a service 
contract, then the US COGSA would not apply. This is similar to what happens with 
volume contracts and the Rotterdam Rules, since they can also have the effect of avoiding 
their application. Indeed, as the relevant part of article 80 of the Rotterdam Rules clearly 
state that “as between the carrier and the shipper, a volume contract to which this Convention 
applies may provide for greater or lesser rights, obligations and liabilities than those imposed by 
this Convention.” 
                                                                                                                                                                       
HASHMI, S., 2011, supra note 1438, p. 261 (arguing that the US delegation “was the coercive force at the 
deliberation of Working Group sessions that prompted to include volume contract in the Convention”). 
When it comes to the relation between service and volume contracts, however, it does not seem to be correct so 
simply treat them as identical. Indeed, although the similarities are numerous, it is not clear that they are the 
same. As FORCE has noted, equating the two  
“is not axiomatic, because the term ‘volume contract’ as used in the Rotterdam Rules is vague and the 
Rules provide no helpful definition. It is possible that Congress and/or the courts would simply equate 
‘volume contracts’ with ‘service contracts’ and apply the criteria that must be met to qualify as a ‘service 
contract’ to provide a workable definition for the term ‘volume contracts.’” 
FORCE, R., ‘Regal-Beloit Decision: What, if Anything, Would Happen to the Legal Regime for Multimodal 
Transport in the United States if it Adopted the Rotterdam Rules, The’, 2011, 36 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 
p. 700 (emphasis added). MUKHERJEE & BAL are more confident on this issue, as they consider the system of 
volume contracts to be “much in line with the present liner service agreements or service contracts in vogue in the US 
trades” (MUKHERJEE, P. K. et al., 2013, supra note 1179, p. 335). 
1444 As MUKHERJEE & BAL note, this definition is narrower than the one contained in the Rotterdam Rules, since 
the latter “does not require the carrier to undertake any 'defined service level' or to commit to a certain rate or rate 
schedule. Instead, volume contract is defined solely by reference to the undertakings of the shipper to provide a certain 
quantity of goods for shipment” (MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, p. 584). 
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11.3.2 The Effects of the Volume Contracts Exception 
The inclusion of special rules for volume contracts in the Rotterdam Rules was one of the 
most controversial issues during their negotiation. They were seen by some as a provision 
that “will benefit the carrier and may leave small shippers vulnerable in light of their minimal 
bargaining power.”1445   
It is this departure from the application of the Rules that has motivated many to decry 
this provision as potentially nefarious. The fear seems to be, and experience might justify 
it, that, as we have seen, a rule like this will allow shrewd carriers to leave shippers 
unprotected: 
“In theory, the […] requirements [established in the definition of volume 
contracts] should give the shipper an opportunity to negotiate a higher freight rate 
for a higher liability under the Rotterdam Rules. In reality, creative carriers will use 
contractual forms that arguably comply with the Rotterdam Rules, but without real 
negotiation. Thus the opting-out is very likely and possible.”1446 
This situation is not at all improved by the fact that the Rotterdam Rules merely speak of 
“a series of shipments,” without establishing a minimum amount. If anything, the 
definition seems to distinguish itself precisely by being vague, since it does not elaborate 
in terms of the duration of the contractual bond between the parties, the number of 
shipments, or the quantities of cargo being carried.1447 Proponents of the Rotterdam 
Rules in general, and of this provision in particular, have argued that the vagueness of the 
definition is actually a positive thing since, supposedly, requiring a specific number of 
shipments would increase uncertainty. As LANNAN explains: 
“It was not possible despite repeated efforts to insert specific numbers into the 
definition of the volume contract (for example, a minimum number of shipments) in 
order to protect small shippers, since such specific numbers or amounts would create 
uncertainty for both the shipper and the carrier in terms of predicting at the outset 
of a commercial arrangement whether they would eventually fall into the category 
defined as a volume contract.”1448 
                                                                  
1445 ANDERSON, V., 2015, supra note 1355, p. 30. See also LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 307 (“[c]oncerns 
were raised in the negotiation of these pro- visions regarding the protection of small shippers, who some thought could be 
subject to abuse”). 
1446 JOHANSSON, S. O. & OLAND, B. et al., 2009, supra note 1437, p. 5. See also MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 
2009, supra note 1420, p. 600 (stating that, according to its critics, the volume contracts exception “is 
detrimental to the interests of small shippers and opens up the possibility of abuse by their carriers”). 
1447 YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, p. 600 
1448 LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 307. 
  
393 
Party Autonomy in Contracts of Affreightment 
LANNAN’s logic on this topic is rather hard to follow, since it is not really clear how 
including, for example, a minimum number of shipments would increase uncertainty for 
the shipper. On the contrary, it would seem to be that if the Rules had established a 
minimum of shipments, it would have been possible to, on the one hand, allow parties 
who are in a long contractual relationship to profit from some of the liberties offered by 
the volume contracts exception; on the other hand, such specificity would have prevented 
parties who simply contract for just a couple of shipments to be left unprotected by 
unknowingly signing up to an adhesive volume contract. This criticism is far from new, as 
many have pointed out how this lacuna in the definition makes it just too imprecise.1449 
Indeed, it is so vague that  
“a volume contract could potentially cover almost all kinds of carriage of good by 
shipping lines falling within the scope of the convention […] this is likely to leave a 
loophole in the convention that will enable the parties to release themselves from the 
binding provisions of the instrument, which lends itself to the abuse of rights […] as 
there is no minimum quantity, period of time or frequency.”1450 
In his extensive and critical analysis of the Rotterdam Rules, DIAMOND actually sees the 
lack of specificity of the volume contracts exception as a clever workaround to introduce 
freedom of contract and unrestricted party autonomy: 
“Starting with the definition in art. 1.2, to constitute a ‘volume contract,’ the 
contract need only provide for the carriage of a specified quantity of goods in a 
‘series’ of shipments during ‘an agreed period’. It seems that, if a contract provides 
for the carriage of a quantity of goods in a ‘series’ of just two shipments in a year, it 
will fall within the definition. The term ‘volume contract’ is thus no more than a 
cover for an article whose real purpose is to allow a measure of freedom of contract 
between the carrier and the shipper.”1451 
BERLINGIERI was similarly critical of this provision. In his view, it represents a risk for the 
shipper, who is left at the mercy of the carrier, provided he “agreed” to a volume contract.  
“The need for a protection of the shipper is justified in view of the fact that the 
definition of volume contract is very wide: there is, in fact, no reference to the 
quantity of goods but only to a number of shipments, it being necessary that the 
goods be carried in ‘a series of shipments.’ Even if it is not certain that the word 
‘series’ may apply when the shipments are only two, this is probably the case. In any 
event, since no minimum quantity is required, each shipment may consist also of a 
                                                                  
1449 MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, p. 600. See also DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, 
p. 486 (“[i]t is said that, in principle, the great majority of contracts for the carriage of goods could be framed so as to fall 
within the definition of ‘volume contracts’”). 
1450 YU, X. & LI, T., 2012, supra note 1309, pp. 600–601. 
1451 DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, p. 487. 
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very small quantity of goods: for example, one contained. It appears, therefore, that 
a volume contract may be used also for the carriage of a very small quantity of goods 
or a very small number of containers, in which event, the negotiating power of the 
shipper would normally be minimal, even though it is difficult to conceive why a 
shipper of a small number of container might have an interest to enter into a volume 
contract.”1452 
Besides seeing specificity as a risk, LANNAN argues that the Rotterdam Rules protect the 
shipper from those situations in which a carrier might try to deceive him into a volume 
contract. Instead of specificity, therefore, “very strong protections for the shipper were built 
into the operative volume contract provision itself.”1453 It is argued, for example, that the 
shipper will always have an opportunity (as well as a notice of this opportunity) to refuse 
the derogations imposed by the volume contract exception, and default to the general 
rules. Indeed, according to Article 80 (2) of the Rotterdam Rules, the contract must: 
a. Contain a prominent statement mentioning that it derogates from the general 
rules. 
b. Have been individually negotiated, and prominently specify the sections that 
include the derogations. 
c. Give the shipper an opportunity, as well as notice of that opportunity, to conclude 
the contract based on the general rules, without any derogation. 
d. Not include the derogation by reference to another document, or include it as part 
of a contract of adhesion that was not subject to negotiation. 
The problem is that these protection are not really as strong as LANNAN seems to believe. 
Notices to terms, as well as opportunities to react to them, mean little to parties with no 
bargaining power.1454 If the alternative to a volume contract is simply not to ship the 
cargo, then it is hard to see how a shipper will be in a position to reject the terms offered 
by the carrier. What is more, by not having any clarity as to what it means that the 
provision must have been, “individually negotiated,” cargo interests are really left at the 
mercy of the carrier.  
                                                                  
1452 BERLINGIERI, F., International Maritime Conventions Volume I: The Carriage of Goods And Passengers by Sea, 
2014, Informa Law from Routledge, Great Britain, p. 251.  
1453 LANNAN, K., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 307. 
1454 See section 2.6 supra. 
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11.3.3 Volume Contracts and Freedom of Contract 
As one author noted, through the inclusion of the volume contracts exception, 
“the UNCITRAL Convention adopts an indirect approach in order to introduce 
freedom of contract: the mandatory nature of its rules is clearly stated with regard 
to international maritime contracts but, in parallel, it allows a specific contract - the 
volume contract - to be entered into, with the parties being free to determine the 
main features of their agreement and so to deviate from the Convention, subject 
however to some restrictions and guarantees. This is an absolute innovation. 
The Convention accordingly includes two different core regimes for international 
door-to-door and port-to-port carriage including a maritime leg: first, an ordinary 
regime entirely subject to the mandatory nature of the Convention according to its 
Article 79 and, second, the volume contract regime that confers upon the parties a 
high degree of freedom, but with some non-negotiable legal requirements.”1455 
As we have seen, the proponents of the Rotterdam Rules see this exception as a great 
success, since it allows similarly-sized players to enjoy a larger amount of freedom in their 
business.1456 There is evidence that there were demands for increased flexibility by, at 
least, sections of the industry, who sought to negotiate lower freight rates in exchange for 
a lower level of risk for the carrier.1457 From this standpoint, the volume contracts 
exception reflects this changing face of the maritime trade, as some carriers are no longer 
seen as behemoth organizations, while shippers are no longer presumed to be 
“economically weaker” than the carriers.1458  
                                                                  
1455 ORTIZ, R. I., 2009, supra note 1358, p. 896. See also STURLEY, M. F., General Principles of Transport Law and the 
Rotterdam Rules, in Güner-Özbek, M. D. (ed.), The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea: An appraisal of the "Rotterdam Rules", 2011, p. 84 (noting that the volume 
contract provision “grows out of the recognition in the Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules that some contracts in 
which the parties are more likely to have equal bargaining power (i.e., charterparties) need not be subject to the regime 
on a mandatory basis”). 
1456 KHALID, N. & SUPPIAH, R., 2010, supra note 1370, p. 449. Some commentators do not see the volume contract 
exception as necessarily enhancing freedom of contract in the trade, seeing them instead as merely a small patch 
in a convention that otherwise severely restricts them. In fact, they see them as a symptom of a trend where 
“freedom of contract is falling,” as a result of which “the pendulum will not swing back to the interests of the carrier in 
this sense for years to come” ( LIANG, C., 2013, supra note 1239, p. 234). 
1457 DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, p. 485. 
1458 ZHAO, L., 2015, supra note 1232, p. 164. See also MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, 
p. 600 (explaining that one of the arguments in favor of the volume contracts exception is that “the existing 
mandatory regimes were developed in a commercial environment that is no longer pertinent, and that they are 
inadequate to meet present day commercial needs”) and FERNÁNDEZ, A. M., ‘La Autonomía de la Voluntad en las 
Reglas de Rotterdam’, 2012 Revista de Derecho del Transporte: Terrestre, Marítimo, Aéreo y Multimodal, no. 9, p. 13 
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Critics, as we have seen, are cautious when it comes to this provision. They do not seem to 
partake in the celebratory tone demonstrated by some, and are quite skeptical of this 
supposedly “new dynamic” affecting the power of the parties. What is more, even in the 
restricted sphere in which the Rotterdam Rules allow for freedom of contract, they see 
that the landscape is so rife with potential for abuse by powerful shipowners and carriers, 
that what the volume contracts exception might do is to simply take a step back towards 
the situation that existed before the Hague Rules were enacted.1459 There is a real fear that 
what this provision would actually do is to “disadvantage smaller or less sophisticated 
shippers,” particularly those with less bargaining power than the carriers.1460 As one 
commentator noted: 
“The changed balance of the new Convention now leaves more issues to freedom of 
contract, a situation that the current Law had tried to move away from. Although 
some large shippers or break bulk cargo owners may have the bargaining power to 
negotiate favourable terms, the majority of small and medium sized shippers will be 
disadvantaged having to accept the terms of the Carriers, probably at an increased 
risk or cost to themselves. This greater risk of shipping goods, transforms into higher 
insurance, therefore greater costs of good.”1461 
As it has often been the case in discussions involving nations from all over the world, this 
was a topic that was deeply related to the political feelings of each country. In the 
negotiations that lead to the Rotterdam Rules, for example, the US delegation, who 
introduced the discussion, proposed an approach that was much more in accordance with 
free market principles, moving away from some of the protectionism that had been 
established since the Harter Act.1462 Other nations, wary of possible abuses by powerful 
carriers, opposed such a move in general, as well as volume contracts in particular, 
arguing that it was “unfair in principle to small shippers.”1463 The compromise between both 
positions is the volume contracts exception and its somewhat restricted area of 
application; an island of party autonomy in a sea of heavily regulated trade.1464 
                                                                                                                                                                       
mandatory regimes answered to a commercial reality that is no longer present, and therefore are not adequate for the 
current commercial needs”). 
1459 MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, p. 600 
1460 DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, pp. 485–486 
1461 Cited in ALCÁNTARA GONZÁLEZ, J. M., ‘The Rotterdam rules. Prelude or premonition?’, 2010, 2 Cuadernos de 
Derecho Transnacional, no. 1, p. 39 
1462 DIAMOND, A., 2009, supra note 1198, p. 486 (“the US delegation, which drew attention to the fact that much 
international trade was carried under competitively negotiated liner service contracts and proposed that […]it should be 
possible for the contracting parties expressly to agree to derogate from all or part of the instrument’s provisions”). 
1463 ibid., p. 486. 
1464 As it was noted by Mary Helen CARLSON, US delegate to the discussions on the Rotterdam Rules: 
“When the United States first proposed to the Working Group that the new convention should allow 
parties to certain types of contracts to opt out of one or more of the convention's rules, there was strong 
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11.4 Should Party Autonomy be Allowed in Maritime Trade? 
Maritime contracts are, as we have seen, often the product of imbalanced relationships. 
This is a situation in which, like in any other imbalanced contract, one of the parties has 
the power to impose his will on the other.1465 The very history of the regulation of these 
contracts makes this imbalance clear, as the reason why regulation became necessary was 
the fact that carriers were abusing their bargaining position at the expense of the 
shippers.1466 
It is the experience of witnessing the abuse of market power on the part of the carriers 
that has lead to the reluctance (if not downright refusal) on the part of many to allow 
even a modicum of contractual freedom in this realm. This is why many have opposed the 
“volume contracts” exception created by the Rotterdam Rules, and which they see as 
“reviving the chaotic freedom of contract which necessitated the creation of the Hague Rules in 
1924.”1467 Clearly, some commentators see freedom of contract in this area as a serious 
threat, to the point of its acceptance being a disaster waiting to happen: 
“Allowing such freedom on an international basis in the banking sector recently 
created a worldwide financial crisis. We could end up with the large scale 
stakeholders gaining such sufficient market power to enable them to hold the 
international supply chain to ransom. Do we really want to facilitate what happened 
in the banking world becoming a potential reality in the field of international 
transport?”1468 
                                                                                                                                                                       
more regulatory approach to trade issues, as opposed to the free-market approach the United States 
endorses. […] I think we have persuaded the Working Group that if the new convention is to be forward-
looking and able to respond to the changing needs of industry, it has to provide, along with a strong 
framework of generally applicable rules, the flexibility that the commercial parties need to be successful. 
The Working Group has tentatively agreed to a proposal that would allow ‘volume contracts,’ under 
certain conditions that would ensure that the shipper was not taken by surprise, to derogate from all but a 
few of the convention's rules.” 
CARLSON, M. H., 2006, supra note 1432, p. 636. 
1465 FERNÁNDEZ, A. M., 2012, supra note 1458, p. 12 (noting that bill of lading contracts are generally “of adhesion, 
and their clauses, which are usually printed in the back of the document, aim to limit or exclude the liability of the carrier, 
and the shipper is forced to accept them”). 
1466 ibid., p. 12 (“[t]he relation between carrier and shipper is clearly imbalanced. Any norms that aim to regulate 
maritime trade must take this into consideration. The origin of the rules on maritime carriage was the need to stop the 
abuses of the carriers”). See also ALBA, M., Déjá Vu? Maybe, Maybe Not: The Rotterdam Rules, Maritime Policy and 
Contract Law, in Xu, J. (ed.), Contemporary Marine and Maritime Policy, 2014, p. 170 (“[t]he Hague Rules were 
preceded by a conflict in the international market of sea transportation services […] essentially linked to the then 
existing asymmetries in market power between carriers and users of such services”). 
1467 ALCÁNTARA GONZÁLEZ, J. M. et al., ‘Particular Concerns with Regard to the Rotterdam Rules’, 2010, 2 
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, no. 2, p. 12. 
1468 ibid., p. 15. 
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While such stern warning could be easily dismissed as a dramatic exaggeration, it is 
important to analyze it carefully. In our view, the risk of allowing unfettered freedom, 
even in a sphere as restricted as that of volume contracts, is enormous. Its real effect, as 
we have already argued, will be to allow the parties to avoid the application of mandatory 
rules altogether, well beyond those cases that the drafters envisioned. 
While nobody denies that the market has undergone important changes, and that some 
shippers do possess the kind of power that only a few decades ago was reserved for 
carriers and owners only, the fact remains that the majority of shippers do not conform 
to that description.1469 Indeed, most shippers are not able to dicker over the terms of their 
contracts, nor do they possess the kind of market power that they would need to pressure 
the carriers to modify their business. They have to, therefore, accept whatever terms they 
are offered. If these shippers were to shop around for better terms (and, as we have seen, 
even among businesses this would be a tall order) they will find that there are no real 
alternatives, and that issues such as limitations of liability and jurisdiction clauses are the 
same all across the board. 
While it is true that nobody seems to be suggesting that protections for the shippers 
should be scrapped altogether, we should also be careful with small loopholes, like those 
allowed through the volume contracts rule. Even in this small sphere, the opportunities 
for exploitation are enormous. 
By leaving the definition of volume contracts as wide as they did, the drafters of the 
Rotterdam Rules have, in essence, opened a door that simply cannot be shut. The 
protections that they supposedly established for the shippers are so minimal and 
ineffective that, if this Convention was to one day enter into force, it is easy to predict 
that carriers will soon adapt their practices to consider as many contracts as possible as 
“volume contracts.” While supporters of the Rules see them as a tool that was included to 
benefit “sophisticated parties,” nothing in the Rules actually ensures that only the prepared 
and sophisticated will be affected by them.1470 Quite the contrary.  
                                                                  
1469 SPARKA acknowledges that there have been some changes in the makeup of the market, but argues that these 
changes do not affect the majority of participants: 
“It has been argued that despite the partly cartelized structure of maritime transport, many shippers 
today are powerful multinational companies who can meet with carriers at eye level and even dictate the 
terms of shipment. Nonetheless, at least shippers claim that only overcapacity problems during times of 
low demand may force carriers to make temporary concessions to some shippers. Whatever the bargaining 
position of large-scale shippers may be, the majority of shippers consist of businesses too small to dispute 
any clause with the liner carrier.” 
SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 14. 
1470 See, for example, BRISCOE, J. P., 2011, supra note 1438, p. 76 (arguing that the Rotterdam Rules “allow greater 
freedom for sophisticated parties to contract issues of liability"). 
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“[O]ne might have expected that the drafters of the new improved Rotterdam Rules 
would take advantage of past experience and produce an anti-avoidance provision 
that was clear, foolproof and up to date. To put it mildly, this has not been done. The 
new provisions not only retain most of the uncertainties of the old (despite taking up 
a great deal more paper); they actually add to them, not to mention introducing 
further classes of restriction on freedom of contract that seem unlikely to benefit 
either carriers or shippers, but admirably suited to lining the pockets of the lawyers 
that represent them.”1471 
The Rotterdam Rules base their protection of “potential volume shippers” on disclaimers 
and disclosures. They require the contract to, among other requirements, prominently 
display that it derogates from the Convention, as well notifying the shipper of his 
opportunity to refuse this. The drafters seem to have hoped that adding these bells and 
whistles to the agreement, including extra clauses that would provide more information 
to the shipper, will protect him.  
As we have already seen, increasing disclosure of contractual terms, as well as giving the 
adherent an “opportunity to read” does not increase the readership of the terms, let alone 
their comprehension. Commercial parties are not free of the biases or psychological 
shortcomings that affect individual people, and they too will fall prey to extensive 
contracts that, somewhere in the fine print, let them know that their rights have been 
dramatically reduced.  
“Although we know as a fact that not all business entities are in all cases 
'sophisticated', especially in regard to the legal implications of the terms they have 
agreed upon, nevertheless courts treat them as such. Perhaps this conclusion is based 
on an assumption that business people, even if they do not completely understand 
the legal implications of the terms of their agreements, have access to counsel who 
can provide that expertise during negotiations before a contract has become a legally 
binding instrument.”1472 
Just like consumers, whose protections are traditionally seen as non-waivable, small 
merchants (called by some “merchant/consumers,” due to their evident similarities to 
consumers) “do not have a meaningful opportunity to read, understand, or negotiate terms in a 
seller’s standard form.”1473 Assuming that contractual provisions would be read, and that a 
                                                                  
1471 TETTENBORN, A., Freedom of Contract and the Rotterdam Rules: Framework for Negotiation or One-Size-Fits-All?, 
in Thomas, D. R. (ed.), The Carriage of Goods by Sea Under the Rotterdam Rules, 2010, pp. 73–74. 
1472 DAVIES, M. & FORCE, R., Forum Selection Clauses in International Maritime Contracts, in Davies, M. (ed.), 
Jurisdiction and Forum Selection in International Maritime Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Force, 2005, p. 1 
1473 WARKENTINE, E. R., ‘Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and Merchant Consumers 
through Default Provisions’, 1996, 30 John Marshall Law Review, no. 1, p. 84. 
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concept as flexible as that of volume contracts in the Rotterdam Rules would not be 
abused, shows an enviable-yet-unrealistic optimism.  
“It is submitted that in theory these conditions provide substantial protections for 
small shippers, however practically they may not be able to prevent abuse of this 
new system. […] [C]arriers are likely to offer a more commercially attractive 
contract under the one that derogates from obligations and liabilities in their favour. 
[…C]arriers may reduce prices in order to get shippers to agree to derogations, an 
option that may be increasingly open to them in the more competitive market that 
will be created by the introduction of the volume contract exception.”1474 
What is more, based on the benefits that they would render for carriers, and as some 
commentators have already noted, it would only be a matter of time before virtually all 
contracts are treated as if they were volume contracts. Under the guise of liberalism and 
freedom of contract, shippers would be left unprotected.1475 In the best-case scenario, 
shippers will be offered the possibility of either accepting volume contract terms (with the 
related increase in their insurance costs), or pay a much higher freight in exchange for the 
normal mandatory liability conditions; in the worst-case scenario, however, the only 
alternative to volume contract terms will be to simply not ship anything.1476 
There is no question that trade in the 21st Century is conducted differently from how it 
was done at the time the Hague Rules were drafted. The improvement of the market 
position of some shippers, however, should not be used as a springboard towards 
deregulating the market. What is more, while an argument can be put forward to allow 
more flexibility, the merits of permitting the waving of otherwise mandatory protective 
measures are, certainly, up for debate.1477 Indeed, the carriage of goods by sea is one of the 
areas where, traditionally, it has been understood that some controls and regulations are 
                                                                  
1474 ANDERSON, V., 2015, supra note 1355, p. 31 
1475 ANDERSON is supportive of this result, arguing that “the concession of practical difficulties for small shippers are 
necessary to permit a system with improved freedom of contract” (ibid., p. 31). The problem with this logic is that it 
places freedom of contract as a desirable goal in and of itself, a sort of “freedom (of contract) for freedom(of 
contract)’s sake,” without apparently recognizing that there are plenty of areas where we have accepted that 
freedom of contract is not necessarily the best solution. 
1476 FERNÁNDEZ, A. M., 2012, supra note 1458, pp. 13–14  
1477 It is worth noting that the inclusion of the volume contracts exception also serves a more pragmatic function. 
As some have noted, its inclusion was “crucial to ensuring the ratification of the Rotterdam Rules, given that it 
appears that the United States are significantly invested in the introduction of the provision” (ANDERSON, V., 2015, 
supra note 1355, p. 31). The problem with this rationale, the veracity of which we do not dispute, is that it 
shows, once again, a convention reaching an unsatisfactory solution by means of a compromise. Even worse, in 
the aims of pleasing the United States it might have hurt any real chance of entering into force, by alienating 
those developing nations that see this provision as too dangerous.  
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required. The very way in which contracts are concluded in this area creates too many 
possibilities for abuse, and thus cannot be left unregulated.1478 As TETTENBORN explained: 
“Freedom of contract, like spread-betting, is not ideal for everyone. For nearly 100 
years no-one has doubted that one area where it has to be controlled is carriage by 
sea, the reason being the largely correct perception that if it is not then carriers will 
abuse it.”1479 
  
                                                                  
1478 FERNÁNDEZ, A. M., 2012, supra note 1458, p. 14 
1479 TETTENBORN, A., 2010, supra note 1471, p. 73 
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"Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law is the same in all 
commercial countries, yet, in each country, peculiarities exist either as to 
some of the rules or the mode of enforcing them." 
Justice Joseph P. Bradley1480 
12.1 Introduction 
s we have already seen, forum selection clauses are among the most important 
tools that are at the parties’ disposal. They allow them to minimize costs, increase 
their certainty and, generally, protect their rights in case of a dispute.  
Because of the very nature of international transactions, forum selection clauses are 
particularly relevant in that environment. In the maritime trade, for example, where 
contracts between parties from different countries, dealing with cargoes from third 
states, transported aboard ships crossing both international and national waters, the use 
forum selection clauses is simply essential.1481 In the words of SPARKA: 
“Jurisdiction and arbitration clauses are closely connected to maritime transport 
documents. Maritime trade is inherently international and choice of forum 
agreements are part of every sea carriage document, and conversely, due to the sheer 
number of these documents, a large portion of all international choice of forum 
agreements is rooted in maritime contracts. Therefore, the development of a 
coherent system for jurisdiction and arbitration clauses in maritime transport 
documents is an essential element within the larger framework of maritime 
                                                                  
1480 The Lottawanna [1874], 88 US, 558–609, p. 572 
1481 TETLEY, W., Jurisdiction Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens in the Carriage of Goods by Sea, in Davies, M. (ed.), 
Jurisdiction and Forum Selection in International Maritime Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Force, 2005, p. 183 (noting 
that it is “of major importance in maritime law, because of the mobility of ships (the usual defendant) and the fact that 
carriage by sea very often involves more than one jurisdiction”). 
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transport and is seen as the second most important issue behind achieving realistic 
limits of liability.”1482 
While the importance of these clauses is hardly up for debate, the way in which they are 
employed does occasionally raise some concerns. Indeed, even though maritime trade is 
conducted within a commercial setting, the ability of one of the parties (often the carrier) 
to impose his will upon the other raises questions as to the convenience and justice of 
establishing a blanket acceptance of these clauses. What is more, even though the 
freedom to choose a tribunal to have jurisdiction over substantive disputes in commercial 
contracts is generally upheld, different rules can apply in a maritime setting.1483 
12.2 Jurisdiction and the Carriage of Goods 
For a practicing lawyer, jurisdiction is one of the most important issues in any litigious 
matter. Once the forum is determined, the parties are able to predict the costs, 
inconvenience, and, to a lesser degree, even the outcome of the dispute. In fact, this is so 
important that once jurisdiction is determined, the parties will often “settle the case out of 
court without further litigation.”1484 
In a field like that of the carriage of goods by sea, an accurate and fast determination of 
the competent forum is essential since, almost without exception, suits dealing with cargo 
claims must be brought in a very specific, often extremely short, period of time.1485 The 
importance of jurisdiction on this matter is such that, in reality, “jurisdiction becomes the 
essential feature of the claim itself,” so that failure to act adequately can result in the loss of 
the claimant’s ability to secure his rights against the carrier. 1486  
The importance and complexity of jurisdictional issues in maritime claims are also 
exacerbated by the fact that, as VON ZIEGLER has noted, a contract of carriage, 
“at least in the civil law system, [..] is a contract to the benefit of a third party. The 
claimant, therefore, is not always the contracting party of the carrier but a mere 
third party somehow inheriting the rights of suit by way of the contract of carriage, 
whether related or not to the transfer of any transport document.  
                                                                  
1482 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 3. 
1483 BAATZ, Y., Jurisdiction and Arbritration, in Thomas, D. R. (ed.), A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea - The Rotterdam Rules: An Analysis of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea, 2009, pp. 259–260. 
1484 YIMER, G. A., 2013, supra note 1443, p. 468. 
1485 ZIEGLER, A. V., Jurisdiction and Forum Selection Clauses in a Modern Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea, in Davies, 
M. (ed.), Jurisdiction and Forum Selection in International Maritime Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Force, 2005, 
p. 85. 
1486 ibid., p. 86. 
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Thus, matters are even more complicated since one of the typical features of a 
maritime transaction is the fact that the consignee might change during the 
transactions by the on-sale of the goods while at sea. As a result, the ultimate 
claimant is, technically speaking, an 'unknown third party' at the time of the 
entering into the basic transaction. The ultimate claimant that sues for breach of 
contract by the contracting carrier must have a predictable and clear access to the 
proper court before which it is entitled to bring its claim.”1487 
Even beyond the issue of protecting the rights of third parties, there is the issue of 
applicable law, as different forums might apply different rules to a given dispute, 
drastically affecting the outcome. As we have seen, absolute harmonization of maritime 
law does not exist, so different conventions, even different versions of the same 
conventions, apply in different states. What is more, even among those countries where 
some degree of harmonization does exist, as they have adopted the same conventions, 
different forums can apply them very differently.1488 “Even with the best harmonized law,” 
writes VON ZIEGLER, “jurisdiction still may matter, because it may lead to a more favourable or 
a less favourable place for the case, depending on which side of the dispute the respective party is 
positioned.”1489 In the very candid words of STURLEY: 
“Perhaps in an ideal world the choice of forum would not affect the substantive 
result, but in the real world of legal practice the choice of forum is often the only 
issue worth litigating in a case. Once the forum issue is settled, the parties in many 
cases are able to resolve their dispute without further ado. Thus it is no surprise that 
the parties to a dispute will vigorously seek to advance their interests by trying to 
have the dispute resolved in a forum that will be sympathetic, convenient, or 
otherwise beneficial to their side.”1490 
Indeed, as some authors have noted, “the battle about jurisdiction is a surrogate for the battle 
about liability,” and this issue, that some might see as merely procedural in nature, ends 
up having consequences in the substance of the claim.1491 Because of this great 
importance of the jurisdictional issue, it is no wonder that the parties seek to ensure, 
from the very outset, that jurisdictional matters are clearly laid out and pre-determined in 
their contracts. For all of their good intentions, however, and as we have already noted, 
the hopes of ensuring predictability often clash with the reality of a still unpredictable 
jurisdiction. 
                                                                  
1487 ibid., p. 86. 
1488 ibid., pp. 87–88. See also YIMER, G. A., 2013, supra note 1443, p. 468 (noting that, beyond determining the 
applicable law over the case, “the issue of jurisdiction is important because courts often differ in their interpretation of 
the uniform conventions”). 
1489 ZIEGLER, A. V., 2005, supra note 1485, p. 88 
1490 STURLEY, M. F., 2009, supra note 1194, pp. 945–946. 
1491 DAVIES, M., 2002, supra note 783, p. 367. See also page 299 supra and accompanying footnotes. 
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12.3 Forum Selection in Maritime Law 
12.3.1 Advantages of Forum Selection in a Maritime Context 
In contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, forum selection clauses, as well as clauses 
dealing with the choice of law, are ubiquitous.1492 The very nature of the international 
maritime trade shows why jurisdictional matters can be of such great importance for the 
contractual parties, and why they so desperately try to eliminate uncertainty. While, in 
principle, any international business will seek to limit uncertainties in regards to the law 
governing the contract and the courts that will have jurisdiction over any disputes, this 
desire is particularly strong in the case of maritime trade. Due to the fact that before a 
vessel has reached her destination and unloaded the cargo, she will most likely have 
crossed many jurisdictions,  
“a carrier is often faced with the prospect of being sued in the courts of many 
different countries. All of these countries apply their own procedural law and their 
own conflict of laws rules, which may stipulate the application of one or the other 
law.”1493 
While it might be reasonable to expect the parties to a contract of carriage to be familiar 
with some of the legal provisions of the ports of loading and discharge, it would be 
ridiculous to expect them to draft their agreements taking into consideration all the legal 
systems that might, in one way or another, affect the carriage. The solution to this 
problem comes in the shape of forum selection clauses which, as we have discussed, can 
have the benefit of reducing the uncertainties associated with a given transaction. In a 
context like that of maritime carriage, it seems to be undisputed that forum selection 
clauses represent a solution to this complex situation.  
“When parties from different countries enter into an agreement, there may be an 
inherent ambiguity as to the substantive law to be applied and the appropriate 
forum for resolving disputes. Choice of law and choice of forum clauses may 
eliminate this ambiguity so that the parties can know from the outset the rules that 
will be applied in resolving their disputes and the forum in which those disputes will 
be heard.”1494 
Beyond the geographical factors that come into play when it comes to jurisdiction and the 
carriage of goods, there are several other reasons why forum selection clauses can be 
                                                                  
1492 DAVIES, M., ‘Forum Selection, Choice of Law and Mandatory Rules’, 2011 Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly, no. 2, p. 237. 
1493 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 6. 
1494 DAVIES, M. & FORCE, R., 2005, supra note 1472, p. 2. 
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essential for the parties to these contracts.  First is the fact that this trade is usually 
conducted under negotiable bills of lading, documents that can be transferred (often 
more than once) to third party cargo interests who will, in turn, assume all the rights and 
obligations contained therein. Second, in certain jurisdictions a vessel can be arrested in 
rem or in personam, not only as a way to provide security for the claim, but also to found 
jurisdiction before courts that would otherwise not be able to hear the dispute. Third, the 
trade is generally conducted under mandatory rules that provide minimum standards of 
liability and care, and from which the parties cannot depart.1495 Fourth, due to the many 
international factors that play a role in the trade, “forum shopping,” seeking the best (or 
most convenient) jurisdiction to a given claim is par for the course for maritime 
attorneys.1496 Fifth, the court before which a dispute is brought can apply different time 
bars for a given claim, forcing the counsel of the aggrieved party to make very fast 
decisions in order to protect her client’s position. 
Forum selection clauses in the maritime this field are often employed as a safety device 
against uncertainties. They even serve a role when it comes to the applicable law, since 
the parties can ensure that the forum being selected will be one that will also respect their 
choice of law. Indeed, “[o]ne of the main objectives of a choice of forum agreement is […] the 
determination of the applicable law,” as they, once again, allow the parties to prevent 
surprises in an inhospitable forum.1497  
12.3.2 Disadvantages of Forum Selection in a Maritime Context 
As we have seen, maritime contracts are shaped by the serious imbalances that are an 
almost constant part of their anatomy. As a result of the carrier’s bargaining position, he 
will often be able to impose the terms of the carriage contract on the shipper, who will in 
turn be forced to either accept them or to face the consequences of not being able to ship 
                                                                  
1495 See Chapter 10 supra. 
1496 SANCHEZ, N. I., An Historical and Multi-Jurisdictional Study of Jurisdiction Clauses in International Maritime 
Carriage contracts, 2011, Cape Town, South Africa, p. 1. According to STURLEY, the practice of forum shopping in 
maritime trade is not only commonplace but, actually, part of the tasks that a party’s legal counsel (both of the 
shipper and carrier) will engage in as part of their work: 
“Any party represented by competent counsel will engage in ‘forum shopping’ when doing so advances its 
interests, but cargo claimants and carriers have ‘shopped’ in different ways. Cargo claimants traditionally 
shop for a forum by deciding where they will bring a claim against a carrier. Carriers traditionally shop for 
a forum by inserting a choice-of-court agreement in the bill of lading or other transport document that 
governs a particular shipment. In transactions in which the parties have essentially equal bargaining 
power, which have included transactions governed by charterparties and volume contracts, the parties 
have traditionally shopped together, mutually agreeing in advance on a forum that is acceptable to both of 
them (even if it is a forum that would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the dispute).” 
STURLEY, M. F., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 946. 
1497 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 7. 
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his cargo at all. It would be prohibitively expensive for the parties, if not downright 
impossible, to negotiate every clause of every carriage contract, including the forum 
clauses, so the terms drafted by the carrier are the ones that end up being used.1498  
This lack of negotiation of the terms of the bill of lading is, more often than not, the 
source of the problems associated with forum selection in a maritime context.  Just like 
the terms of the bill of lading, the forum clause will not have been negotiated, but rather 
merely accepted on a take it or leave basis. The result of this situation is that the shipper 
will often end up obligated to appear before jurisdictions that are convenient only for the 
carrier (e.g. his main place of business).1499 
Due to the benefits that they can report to the carriers, these forum selection clauses are 
commonplace in the carriage of goods by sea. Because of this, if a party wishes to ship her 
cargo, she will have to accept that any litigation will have to be conducted wherever the 
carrier decided. The problem with this is that, in many cases, the mere prospect of 
litigating in a distant forum might be sufficient to extinguish a claim altogether. This is 
particularly true in the case of small claims (as might be the case of a cargo claim, already 
reduced by the package limitation included in the applicable conventions), when the 
added expenses and inconvenience of litigating abroad can result in the aggrieved party 
not obtaining any redress whatsoever. 
While the above issues are hardly exclusive to maritime trade since, as we have seen, 
forum selection clauses have become ubiquitous all across the board, certain 
characteristics do give them a special character. The issue of minimum liability regimes, 
for example, has led many to look at forum selection clauses as rather dangerous tools, as 
they can lead to a lowering of the liability of the carrier, be it by design or by default. As 
we have seen, different regulations have sought to prevent the liability of the carrier 
being lowered, and so avoiding that this becomes a consequence of forum selection has 
been an important concern.1500 Indeed, both on an international as well as a domestic 
                                                                  
1498 ibid., pp. 14–15 (“[c]arriers draft and issue bills of lading or other maritime transport documents and there is hardly 
a practical possibility of renegotiating the terms of contract in liner trade. Container operations in particular are largely a 
mass market offering customers very little opportunity to negotiate individual contracts”). 
1499 CORDERO ÁLVARO, C. I., ‘La Cláusula Atributiva de Jurisdicción en el Conocimiento de Embarque’, 2008, 41 
Anuario Jurídico y Económico Escurialense, p. 202. See also SMART, H., United Nations Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea: 1978 (Hamburg Rules): Explanatory Documentation, 1989, Commonwealth Secretariat, p. 27 (“[i]t has 
been the practice for the parties to stipulate in the bill of lading the place where an action may be instituted which 
invariably is selected by the carrier thus giving him the advantage to choose a place convenient for him which is usually 
his place of business without taking into consideration the inconvenience of the cargo owner whose location may be far 
away”). 
1500 YIANNOPOULOS, A. N., 1957, supra note 1255, p. 620 (arguing that if all maritime forum selection clauses 
were generally enforceable then “the carrier would be able to effect a change in the applicable law by selecting a forum, 
and thus, indirectly, succeed in limiting his liability” under the mandatory limits). 
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level, different rules have been enacted seeking to prevent the enforcement of clauses 
that would lead to an application of a lower liability standard.1501 
12.3.3 The Significance of the Maritime Forum 
In international shipping litigation, it will often be the case that a given action can be 
brought in more than one jurisdiction. Even if, exceptionally, all the possible jurisdictions 
apply the same laws, this application can be so different as to change the outcome of the 
case. Because of this, determining the forum that will hear a case is an essential 
consideration for any diligent litigant. This importance was better illustrated in a 1933 
case, where the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that  
“the choice of court may be more important than many of the express terms of the 
contract; may indeed be determinative of the outcome.”1502 
Jurisdictional issues are often a central element of international litigation. Differences in 
procedural and evidentiary rules can have such a significant impact on a given case, 
affecting the litigation from beginning to end, that the outcome of a case might end up 
being determined by those procedural issues, and not by the substantive merits. 
“Therefore, procedural laws that are applicable notwithstanding the involvement of 
a foreign element in the case have a considerable impact on the parties' decision 
where to litigate. The impact of evidence rules on the outcome of the case is not 
difficult to appreciate, only the different attitudes courts hold towards discovery 
tells us a lot about its significance for the parties. Furthermore, litigation costs, the 
possibility of enforcing the judgment and the obligations to employ local lawyers are 
important elements that affect the parties' choice of forum. In brief, the issue of 
jurisdiction is important for the parties as it tells them which way the wind of 
winning the case is blowing and the range of costs involved in the given 
litigation.”1503 
What is more, and as we have already mentioned, different forums will often apply laws, 
even the same “uniform” laws, in different ways. In a field like that of shipping, where the 
determination of liability is at the forefront of regulatory efforts, failure to secure an 
amicable jurisdiction can be the difference between a claimant obtaining redress or, 
effectively, being left hanging out to dry.  
This perception is more than a mere guess, as the available evidence on the topic clearly 
shows how significant jurisdiction can be. In the United States, for example, a survey 
                                                                  
1501 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 12. 
1502 United States M. & S. Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske A. Og A. Line [1933], 65 F. 2d, 392–394, p. 393. 
1503 YIMER, G. A., 2013, supra note 1443, pp. 468–469. 
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conducted among “the counsel of record on each side of every reported post-Sky Reefer case” by 
DAVIES and FORCE, shows exactly the consequences that forum selection clauses have in 
regards to the substantive dispute.1504 Having asked about the outcome of cases in which 
a US court had dismissed an action brought in violation of a forum selection clause, they 
noted how  
“[o]verall, the responses to our survey show overwhelmingly that is unrealistic to 
assume that the plaintiff's claim will be pursued in the foreign forum if it is 
dismissed or stayed from the US court. In only four of the 34 cases about which we 
received responses (or 11.8%) were any steps taken to bring the case before the 
chosen foreign forum. In one of those four cases, the case was settled 'soon after' 
proceedings had been instituted in the foreign forum; in another, the claim was held 
by the foreign forum to be time-barred. Thus, only two of the 34 cases (or 5.9%) 
proceeded to resolution in the forum designated in the forum selection clause. The 
large majority of cases (24 out of the 34, or 70.6%) settled or were discontinued 
after dismissal in the United States, and when there was a settlement, it was almost 
always settlement at a discount. In half of the cases (17 of the 34 cases, or 50%), we 
know that no steps were taken to bring the case before the chosen foreign forum 
[…]”1505 
Although the authors of this survey acknowledge that its statistical significance is dubious 
at best, it is better than the mere collection of anecdotal evidence that had shaped the 
discourse so far.1506 What is more, relying on information provided by counsel that 
actively participated in the cases, they were able to truly grasp the effects that 
enforcement of a forum selection clause can have after the dismissal can happen, 
registering whether or not further actions were taken at the contractual forum. 
12.4 The Regulation of Maritime Forum Selection 
Even before the Hague Rules had been enacted, many were already raising alarm about 
the risk of allowing jurisdiction clauses in this imbalanced market. As a result, countries 
that had passed domestic regulations of maritime carriage often took an unfavorable view 
                                                                  
1504 On the Sky Reefer, See page 419 infra. 
1505 DAVIES, M. & FORCE, R., 2005, supra note 1472, p. 11. 
1506 As the authors themselves noted: 
“We do not suggest that this was a statistically reliable survey. For example, we did not compare the 
answers we received with a similar cohort of non-maritime cases, nor was it possible to perform a 
regression analysis on the answers we received. Nevertheless, the survey is a considerable improvement on 
purely anecdotal evidence that Sky Reefer dismissal or stay often brings the litigation to an end, which is 
all that has been available before now.” 
ibid., p. 8. 
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of such contractual terms. In the United States, for example, even though the Harter Act 
did not cover jurisdictional issues, the courts quickly realized that forum selection could 
be used as a way to avoid the application of the mandatory rules that it contained.1507 
Because of this, courts held that such clauses would be void and of no effect, since 
allowing vessels to avoid the jurisdiction of the American courts by stipulation would be 
against public policy.1508 Other countries did not leave the interpretation of these terms to 
the courts, and specifically invalidated forum selection clauses in their domestic maritime 
regulation.  
The Australian experience on this issue is quite interesting, as it evidences the 
motivations behind the reluctance to accepting forum selection clauses. According to 
section 6 of the Australian Sea-Carriage of Goods Act of 1904: 
“All parties to any bill of lading or document relating to the carriage of goods from 
any place in Australia to any place outside Australia shall be deemed to have 
intended to contract according to the laws in force at the place of shipment, and any 
stipulation or agreement to the contrary, or purporting to oust or lessen the 
jurisdiction of the Courts of the Commonwealth or of a State in respect of the bill of 
lading or document, shall be illegal, null and void, and of no effect.” 
Even though this Act was based on the Harter Act, it went beyond its constraints and 
specifically addressed the issue of jurisdiction and forum selection. If we pay attention to 
the history of this Act, we can clearly see what the intentions of the drafters were. For 
starters, the Act itself had been approved with the goal of preventing “ship-owners from 
escaping liability for their own negligence.”1509 This being the objective, the drafters were 
very sensitive to the possibility of contractual stipulations being used to thwart such goal, 
and sought to ensure that the system established in the Act would be “absolutely without a 
loophole.”1510 Aware of the fact that a forum selection clause could easily lead to a de facto 
lessening of the liability, and also of the costs that could result from enforcing such 
clauses and force the plaintiff to litigate abroad, the above cited Section 6 was adopted 
into the final text.1511 
Of course, Australia, was not alone in its reluctance to accept jurisdiction clauses in bills 
of lading. Similar provisions can also be found in the pre-Hague laws of Morocco, Canada 
and New Zealand.1512 The kind of disunity that existed on this topic, might lead one to 
                                                                  
1507 On the lack of jurisdictional rules on the Harter Act, See a MILHORN, B. L., ‘Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. 
M/V Sky Reefer: Arbitration Clauses in Bills of Lading under the Carriage of Good by Sea Act’, 1997, 30 Cornell 
International Law Journal, no. 1, p. 191. 
1508 EVANS, I. L., 1910, supra note 1263, p. 647. 
1509 ALLISON, S., 2014, supra note 1242, p. 640. 
1510 ibid., p. 641. 
1511 ibid., p. 641. 
1512 MILHORN, B. L., 1997, supra note 1507, p. 191. 
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think that this matter would have been a decisive issue at the negotiating table for a 
uniform international system. The reality, however, was the opposite. 
Even though, as we have seen, forum selection clauses can have a tremendous impact in 
the ability of the shipper to obtain redress, and despite the desire of the regulators to 
ensure that damage to the shippers is not left unrepaired, both of these ideas have not 
always made it into the international rules. Although some regulation was attempted on 
both the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules, the most important conventions on 
this topic, the Hague (Visby) Rules, contain no such provision.1513 The result of this lacuna 
has been the creation of a mishmash of interpretative solutions seeking to determine the 
validity of such clauses. Clearly, this situation has damaged the goal of uniformity that 
has informed the regulatory process, as it can lead to an avoidance of the rules by the 
contract drafters. 
12.4.1 The Hague (Visby) Rules 
Although in the period leading to the enactment of the Hague Rules there were already 
some domestic regulations that, like the already mentioned Australian Act of 1904, 
specifically addressed forum selection clauses, the Rules took a different approach. 
Indeed, by design, and likely as a result of being the compromise of several commercial 
interests, the Hague Rules deliberately omitted any regulation on jurisdictional matters (a 
situation that did not change with any of the revisions that, later, were made to the 
Hague Rules).1514 As a matter of fact, during the negotiation of the Hague Rules, the 
Argentinean delegate proposed settling this issue by recognizing the jurisdiction of the 
courts in the port of loading. The general response that he received from the conference 
was that this was a topic that was much too broad to be addressed in the convention, as it 
went way beyond their scope.1515 As Louis FRANCK, then-president of the CMI, explained: 
“I hear that it has been suggested that we should increase the burden of the proposed 
Convention and of the Rules and include such matters as jurisdiction in it .... It may 
be an abundant source of litigation, but really it is not business. But surely this is not 
                                                                  
1513 BUHLER, P. A., ‘Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses in International Contracts: A United States 
Viewpoint with Particular Reference to Maritime Contracts and Bills of Lading’, 1995, 27 The University of Miami 
Inter-American Law Review, no. 1, p. 16. 
1514 CORDERO ÁLVARO, C. I., 2008, supra note 1499, p. 201 (stating that under Hague-Visby Rules, there are no 
jurisdictional rules “based on the party autonomy principle”). Although when the Visby amendments were being 
discussed, some argued that there was “a need to set out a provision on jurisdiction,” this lead to little discussion, 
and the CMI Conference refused to recommend any such term (MANKABADY, S., Comments on the Hamburg Rules, 
in Mankabady, S. (ed.), The Hamburg Rules On The Carriage Of Goods By Sea, 1978, pp. 98–99). 
1515 Cited in STURLEY, M. F., 2009, supra note 1194, pp. 947–948. 
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a system or a problem which only arises about the negligence clauses and we cannot 
bring it in here.”1516 
It cannot be said, therefore, that the Hague Rules “failed” to cover the issue of 
jurisdiction. On the contrary, this issue was “specifically considered and dismissed by the 
drafters.”1517 Their decision was understandable since, as the Hague Rules were already a 
difficult compromise seeking to end a fairly anarchic market situation, the delegates were 
probably confident on the fact that setting out liability rules and principles would be 
enough.1518 The issue of forum selection clauses was left, therefore, to be determined 
based on the applicable national laws.1519 
In fact, it seems safe to say that, at least at first, the delegates were not wrong, since the 
application of the Hague Rules was, initially, quite uniform, so jurisdictional issues were 
not that important.1520 The consequences of not regulating the issue of jurisdiction only 
became evident (and painfully so) once this uniformity in their application ceased to exist. 
 “With the great disparity that ensued, in particular relating to the monetary 
element of the package or per kilo limitation, this situation [of tranquility] changed. 
Increasingly, it became an issue whether the Convention permitted jurisdiction 
clauses or whether such clauses violated the principles set forth in the Hague Rules, 
Article 3, r 8, because the carriers were, in fact, avoiding more stringent jurisdictions 
and escaping to cheaper fora where the applicable law itself and/or the 
interpretation of the law led to lower compensation or offered other legal or tactical 
advantages.”1521 
What this situation made evident was that contract drafters were effectively avoiding the 
application of the Rules, though this time not through the use of express exoneration 
clauses. Instead, the method of choice was the selection of a more carrier-friendly law or, 
                                                                  
1516 MILHORN, B. L., 1997, supra note 1507, pp. 191–192. 
1517 ibid., p. 192. 
1518 ZIEGLER, A. V., 2005, supra note 1485, p. 89. 
1519 GEHRINGER, A., 2000, supra note 832, p. 675. 
1520 ZIEGLER, A. V., 2005, supra note 1485, p. 89. 
1521 ibid., p. 89. Noting the disparities that exist in the application of the same Rules in different jurisdictions, 
GOLDIE stated: 
“When the Hague or Hague Visby Rules are applied, they are interpreted in different ways in different 
countries; virtually identical facts will produce wide variations in result depending on the jurisdiction, for 
example, differences in the calculation and application of the package limitation, in the burden of proof 
and in the type of evidence required to establish the exercise of due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. 
Moreover, there are a number of jurisdictions in which the Hague or Hague Visby Rules will not be applied 
because the state is not a party to the Convention and because the local law on the carriage of goods by sea 
excludes and overrides the application of the Rules when the Rules should be applied by virtue of the terms 
of the contract of carriage.” 
GOLDIE, C. W. H., 1993, supra note 1395, pp. 111–112. 
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of course, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of a country that would not apply 
the Rules at all.1522 What is more, in the Common Law, if no choice of law is present then a 
forum selection clause will often be construed as a strong indicator that the parties 
wanted the selected forum to apply its own law.1523 Through this mechanism, a savvy 
drafter could avoid the applicability of the Rules altogether.  
The absence of jurisdictional norms in the Hague (Visby) Rules had a noticeable effect in 
their ability to achieve their desired goal of uniformity and certainty. Through the 
inclusion of “jurisdiction clauses, forum shopping and the like,” it was impossible to be certain 
that a given carriage, even within an area that was otherwise governed by these Rules, 
would actually be subjected to them.1524 This was, of course, exacerbated by the fact that 
courts in different countries had a diverse range of approaches towards forum selection. 
While they were fully enforced under certain jurisdictions, others set them aside 
altogether, while others could set them aside on a discretionary basis.1525 
Maritime Forum Selection in the United States 
The United States incorporated the Hague Rules into its domestic system as the US 
COGSA, supplemented by the provisions of the Harter Act.  Through the implementation 
of the US COGSA, the application of the Harter Act was limited to domestic trade, as well 
as to foreign trade but only up to the point where the goods are loaded on the ship, as well 
as the time between discharge and delivery. Due the problems that could arise as a result 
of this mixture of systems, it is a common practice for the parties to simply extend the 
application of the US COGSA to cover both of these periods, as well as to inland and 
multimodal transport contracts. As a result, the US COGSA will govern virtually all 
shipping operations in the United States, particularly due to the fact that, unlike the 
Hague Rules which apply to shipments from a Hague Rules country, the US COGSA applies 
to both outbound as well as inbound shipments.1526  
Although it is not identical to the Hague Rules, the US COGSA maintained most of the 
original text. In regards to jurisdiction, the American instrument stayed true to the 
original, and did not include any specific rules regarding the choice of forum. As a result 
                                                                  
1522 YIANNOPOULOS, A. N., 1957, supra note 1255, p. 618 (referring to this situation in regards to the US COGSA). 
1523 ASARIOTIS, R., ‘Contracts for the Carriage of Goods by Sea and Conflict of Laws: Some Questions regarding the 
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990’, 1995, 26 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, p. 297. 
1524 SELVIG, E., ‘The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice’, 1980, 12 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce, no. 3, p. 320. 
1525 ibid., p. 322. See also STURLEY, M. F., ‘Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act’, 1996 
Houston Journal of International Law, no. 3, p. 657 (“[t]he delegates […] left the issue to national law. Some nations 
responded to this situation by enacting an explicit statute to prohibit forum selection clauses in bills of lading; other 
nations simply left the issue to be determined by general principles. Either course is consistent with the Hague Rules”). 
1526 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 24. 
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of this gap in the regulation, the issue of the validity of these clauses became a paramount 
concern.  
In the absence of a provision that expressly regulated the matter, and without prejudice 
to the occasional denial of enforcement for other reasons, the debate on forum selection 
then centered on the interpretation that should be given to US COGSA §3(8) (analogous 
to the same provision in the Hague Rules), dealing with the minimum mandatory liability. 
The question was (and continued to be) whether jurisdiction clauses should be seen as 
lessening the liability of the carrier beyond the allowed limits.1527 
According to STURLEY, there is “substantial support” in the legislative history of the US 
COGSA for the view that it was not the legislator’s intention to use the minimum liability 
limit of section 3(8) to also cover forum selection clauses.1528 A 1955 decision from the 
Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit confirms this view: 
“[T]his section does not expressly invalidate the jurisdictional agreement contained 
in the bill of lading here involved. Nor, we hold, may the Act properly be interpreted 
to invalidate such agreement. It is perhaps worth noting that the present Australian 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act does declare provisions of the sort here involved to be 
null and void. Formerly the Canadian Act did likewise. We think that if Congress had 
intended to invalidate such agreements, it would have done so in a forthright 
manner, as was done in the Canadian Act of 1910. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
contains no express grant of jurisdiction to any particular courts nor any broad 
provisions of venue […] On that account, as indeed in other respects, this case must 
be distinguished from that. Certainly the clause here involved is not one necessarily 
‘relieving the carrier or the ship from liability.’”1529 
Applying a “reasonableness” test, the Court in Muller found that the chosen Swedish 
forum, despite the added costs that the claimant might have to incur in, did not represent 
a lessening of the liability of the carrier.1530 The Court based its finding of 
                                                                  
1527 ibid., p. 154. 
1528 STURLEY, M. F., 1996, supra note 1525, p. 657. 
1529 Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd. [1955], p. 807. The clause in question read  
“Jurisdiction. Any claim against the carrier arising under this bill of lading shall be decided according to 
Swedish law, except as provided elsewhere herein, and in the Swedish courts, to the jurisdiction of which 
the carrier submits himself.” 
ibid., p. 807. 
1530 ibid., p. 807. The Court stated: 
“The appellant, in an effort to bring this case within the phrase […] § 1303(8), argues that if trial is to be 
had in Sweden it will have to undergo a substantial expense in transporting expert witnesses there to 
testify as to the market value of the lost cargo. It is urged that such an expense is a ‘lessening’ of liability 
within the meaning of the above quoted section of the Act. We note that appellant might reduce this 
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“reasonableness” on the fact that the vessel in question was built in Sweden, had Swedish 
owners, the majority of the evidence was available in Sweden, and that all of the crew 
resided in Sweden.1531  
As we have seen, at the time Muller was decided there was a general disapproval of forum 
selection clauses in American courts.1532 Because of this, and by the failure of the Muller 
Court to specifically address the general hostility towards these clauses, it did not take 
long before the courts returned to their otherwise hostile approach to forum selection.1533 
Still, it would take another 12 years before the same Court analyzed forum selection 
clauses under the light of US COGSA §3(8). This time, however, the result would be the 
exact opposite.1534 
In Indussa Corporation v. SS. Ranborg, the Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit reversed its 
previous stance in regards to US COGSA §3(8) and its relation to forum selection clauses, 
finding that the latter actually did go against the former.1535 The Court reached its 
conclusion by referencing the enormous difficulties that a court would have to endure in 
order to either “forecast the result of litigation in a foreign court or attempt other expedients to 
prevent a lessening of the plaintiff’s rights.”1536 The “reasonableness” test of Muller, 
therefore, might prove to be too complex to be actually useful. 
“We think that in upholding a clause in a bill of lading making claims for damage to 
goods shipped to or from the United States triable only in a foreign court, the Muller 
court leaned too heavily on general principles of contract law and gave insufficient 
effect to the enactments of Congress governing bills of lading for shipments to or 
from the United States. [… Although the US COGSA provisions] do not speak 
directly to a clause which simply vests a foreign court with exclusive jurisdiction, 
giving effect to such a clause is almost as objectionable as enforcing a clause 
subjecting the bill of lading to foreign law since, despite hortatory efforts, there 
                                                                                                                                                                       
not think that such possible expense, which is only incidental to the process of litigation, is enough to bring 
this jurisdictional agreement within the ban of § 1303(8).” 
1531 ibid., p. 808. See also FAHRENBACK, C. C., ‘Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer: A Change in Course: 
COGSA Does Not Invalidate Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime’, 1995, 29 Akron Law Review, p. 379. 
1532 See section 7.1 supra. 
1533 DENNING, S. M., 1970, supra note 1003, p. 29 
1534 Indussa Corporation v. S.S. Ranborg [1967], 377 F. 2d, 200–205. Although there were plenty of US COGSA 
decisions that denied the enforcement of forum selection clauses between Muller and Indussa, they generally did 
so by finding that the selected forum was unreasonable (v.gr. Sociedad Brasileira de Intercambio Comercial e 
Industrial, Ltda. v. S.S. Punta Del Este [1955], 135 F. Supp., 394–397), or applying the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens (v.gr. Carbon Black Export Inc. v. The SS Monrosa [1958], 254 F. 2d, 297). 
1535 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 154 (stating that the Court reached the decision that “Congress did intend 
to band jurisdiction clauses in bills of lading”). DENNING, S. M., 1970, supra note 1003, p. 33 (calling Indussa the first 
time in which a “forum clauses had been avoided by section 3(8) of the US COGSA”).  
1536 Indussa Corporation v. S.S. Ranborg [1967], p. 202. 
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would seem to be no way, save perhaps stipulation by the parties, that would bind 
the foreign court in its choice of applicable law.”1537 
The Indussa court was clearly concerned about the opportunity that a forum selection 
clause could give the drafter of the contract to avoid the application of the US COGSA. 
This is significant, as it echoes some of the same concerns that, later, would inform the 
move to address jurisdictional issues in both the Hamburg Rules as well as the Rotterdam 
Rules. The Indussa Court argued that through the use of forum selection clauses, the 
liability of the carrier could actually be lowered, in direct contravention of the US COGSA 
provisions:  
“From a practical standpoint, to require an American plaintiff to assert his claim 
only in a distant court lessens the liability of the carrier quite substantially, 
particularly when the claim is small. Such a clause puts ‘a high hurdle’ in the way of 
enforcing liability […] and thus is an effective means for carriers to secure 
settlements lower than if cargo could sue in a convenient forum. […] A clause making 
a claim triable only in a foreign court could almost certainly lessen liability if the law 
which the court would apply was neither the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act nor the 
Hague Rules. Even when the foreign court would apply one or the other of these 
regimes, requiring trial abroad might lessen the carrier's liability since there could be 
no assurance that it would apply them in the same way as would an American 
tribunal subject to the uniform control of the Supreme Court, and § 3(8) can well be 
read as covering a potential and not simply a demonstrable lessening of liability. 
We think that Congress Meant to invalidate any contractual provision in a bill of 
lading for a shipment to or from the United States that would prevent cargo able to 
obtain jurisdiction over a carrier in an American court from having that court 
entertain the suit and apply the substantive rules Congress had prescribed.”1538 
The Court’s ruling in Indussa is in line with the criticisms that, by then, had already been 
leveled against Muller. Indeed, many authors saw Muller as a completely flawed ruling 
which eroded the protections of the US COGSA. In their view, several elements of the Act 
demonstrated a clear zeal on the part of the legislator to prevent the “abuse of the carrier’s 
bargaining power,” and which had been ignored in Muller.1539 Especially telling among these 
elements was the fact that, unlike the Hague Rules, the US COGSA applies to both 
inbound and outbound shipments, something that, in effect, prevents a carrier from 
availing himself to less stringent regulations that might apply in any of the other 
countries that have a relation with the shipment.1540 From that perspective, enforcing a 
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forum selection clause would clearly go against the spirit of the US COGSA, by effectively 
allowing shipments that come from or to the United States, to be left outside of the scope 
of application of the Act.1541 As the critics of Muller argued, the US COGSA “makes no 
exception based upon reasonableness or availability of evidence,” the basis of the Muller 
decision, “nor is its applicability made subject to defeat by contractual agreement.”1542 
The importance of the precedent set by Indussa was enormous.1543 The Court took a very 
strict stance in regards to forum selection clauses, voiding any such clause in a bill of 
lading ruled by the US COGSA. Consequently, there was no space for the courts to look at 
the facts of each case and ponder whether the clause was reasonable or not, or whether it 
was the result of an unconscionable clause.1544  
In spite of some scathing criticisms in the legal literature, the Indussa decision became the 
law of the land for almost the next 3 decades.1545 A key criticism was that, in its 
interpretation of US COGSA, the Indussa Court had ignored the way in which the 
analogous provisions of the Hague Rules had been applied or implemented in other 
jurisdictions. In Australia and Canada, for example, the domestic implementation of the 
Hague Rules had included specific provisions denying the enforceability of forum selection 
clauses, which would imply that, unless such a provision existed, forum clauses should be 
allowed.1546 In England, the minimum liability rule of the Hague Rules had been uniformly 
interpreted as not being “sufficient to avoid choice of forum clauses.”1547 By not paying 
attention to this comparative developments, the Indussa decision might have 
demonstrated a certain degree of nationalism that did not exist in other nations’ 
approach to this issue. 
                                                                  
1541 ibid., pp. 76–77. 
1542 ibid., pp. 76–77. 
1543 DAVIS, C. M., ‘Sky Reefer: Foreign Arbitration & Litigation under COGSA’, 1995, 8 University of San Francisco 
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Since the denial of the efficacy of the forum selection clauses came as a result of them 
being seen as lowering the liability of the carrier, a major criticism against Indussa was 
that it did not seem to distinguish between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” forum 
selection. Although there were indeed times in which a carrier might seek to simply 
damage the shipper by selecting a given forum, critics argued that the Indussa decision 
had erred by assuming that all forum clauses, no matter the facts of the case, would fall 
under that category.1548 
Some of these criticisms, and which would later serve as the basis for the change in the 
case law, appear in the Indussa decision itself. It was there that, in his dissenting opinion, 
Judge MOORE planted the seeds of what would, 28 years later, change the law: 
“[I]f Congress had really intended to outlaw every agreement in a bill of lading as to 
choice of forum for litigation, understandingly and voluntarily entered into, it could, 
and undoubtedly would, have easily drafted such a clause. The forbidding of a clause 
‘lessening’ liability in COGSA is scarcely the equivalent of a rejection of the rights of 
the parties to agree upon a forum. I find it singularly inappropriate for our courts to 
say, in effect, that the courts of all other nations are so unable to dispense justice 
that, as a matter of public policy, we must protect our citizens by outlawing any 
other tribunal than our own.”1549 
The change came about in 1995 in the M/V Sky Reefer case.1550 Even though by then the 
Indussa rule continued to be “good law” in regards to bills of lading, the legal landscape 
had changed significantly since the days of Indussa. For starters, the judicial jingoism that 
had affected US courts for decades was in retreat. In fact, what once had been a long-
standing opposition to forum selection clauses, by 1995 was mostly relegated to legal 
history books. The Supreme Court had already recognized the presumptive validity of 
forum selection clauses in international commercial contracts in The Bremen, and then 
expanded its application with the Carnival Cruise decision.1551 Forum clauses in bills of 
lading governed by the US COGSA, despite the changes in the law, remained a special 
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1551 JARVIS, R. M., ‘Sending Disputes Overseas: Does a Foreign-Forum Arbitration Clause Violate the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act?’, 1995 Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, no. 6, pp. 269–270. See also TETLEY, W., 
2005, supra note 1481, p. 208 (stating that both “Bremen and Carnival Cruise paved the way” for the Sky Reefer 
decision”). It is worth noting that although Carnival Cruise dealt with a passenger contract, it has had a 
tremendous effect in commercial contracts as well, having dealt with a contract adhesion. Influenced by it, 
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case, a remained of a time when the courts were more protective of their own 
jurisdiction.1552 
The Sky Reefer dealt with a claim for the damages affecting a cargo of oranges being 
transported from Morocco to the United States. The importer (“Bacchus”) and his insurer 
(“Vimar”) filed a lawsuit in a federal district court, seeking to be compensated for the 
damages suffered by the cargo. The defendant sought to obtain a stay of proceedings, in 
an attempt to enforce an arbitration clause that submitted all disputes to an arbitral 
tribunal in Tokyo, Japan. Both the District Court as well as the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit sided with the defendants. Vimar filed a petition for certiorari with the 
Supreme Court, which was granted.1553 
In a decision that most commentators argued overruled Indussa and declared that 
jurisdiction agreements contained in a bill of lading are to be presumed valid, the 
Supreme Court sided with the defendants.1554 In its ruling, the Supreme Court addressed 
the claim put forward by the plaintiffs that enforcing the jurisdiction clause would 
represent a violation of US COGSA 3(8), making a clear separation between the liability of 
a party on the one hand, and the costs and troubles that might be associated with 
pursuing it, on the other. In the words of Justice KENNEDY, who wrote the majority 
opinion: 
“The liability that may not be lessened is ‘liability for loss or damage ... arising from 
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section.’ 
The statute thus addresses the lessening of the specific liability imposed by the Act, 
without addressing the separate question of the means and costs of enforcing that 
liability. The difference is that between explicit statutory guarantees and the 
procedure for enforcing them, between applicable liability principles and the forum 
in which they are to be vindicated. 
[…] 
Nothing in this section […]  suggests that the statute prevents the parties from 
agreeing to enforce these obligations in a particular forum. By its terms, it 
establishes certain duties and obligations, separate and apart from the mechanisms 
for their enforcement.”1555 
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Put in another way, the view of the Supreme Court in Sky Reefer was that the important 
issue is that the carrier will not be subjected to a lower liability by the selected forum. In 
other words, the costs that the claimant might have to assume in his attempt to pursue 
the claim, are of little relevance. What matters is that once the parties are before the 
tribunal in question, the liability bar is not lowered beyond what the US COGSA 
establishes. Whether or not the claimant can effectively get to that tribunal is, apparently, 
not so important.1556 As DAVIS notes, the problem here is that the Supreme Court might 
have shown quite a bit of tone deafness, presenting itself oblivious to the difficulties that 
are associated with many of these cases. 
“[I]n litigation of relatively small cargo claims in foreign fora, there is a large gulf 
between theory and practice. This gulf manifests itself in two ways. First, although 
there exists a right, there may be no way to vindicate that right in all but relatively 
large claims. Second, under COGSA, Congress granted protection to shippers and 
consignees of cargo against adhesionary provisions in bills of lading exculpating the 
carriers from liability. However, the SKY REEFER decision allows carriers, by 
adhesionary provisions in bills of lading, to prevent cargo interests from practically 
enforcing the rights granted by Congress.”1557 
Even though, strictly speaking, a forum selection clause was not before the Supreme 
Court in Sky Reefer, since the case dealt with an arbitration, the Court made sure to 
address forum selection anyway. It did so in two steps; first, the Court argued that 
arbitration clauses are “but a subset of foreign forum selection clauses in general;” then, the 
Court reasoned that since Indussa had also been applied to arbitration clauses (and that 
such an “extension would be quite defensible”), the principles laid out in Sky Reefer could also 
be applied, mutatis mutandis, to forum selection clauses.1558 
To put it mildly, Sky Reefer changed the face of the American legal system in regards to 
bills of lading. Virtually “every federal court” that has analyzed similar cases has reasoned 
that it either overruled Indussa, or that, at the very least, diminished its authority so 
much that the case became, for all intents and purposes, irrelevant.1559  
The effect of the Sky Reefer decision, the blanket acceptance of forum selection clauses in 
bills of lading, was just what the Indussa Court had wanted to prevent. What this ruling 
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created was a means for carriers to either avoid liability altogether or, at least, to be able 
to settle claims for less than what they would have had to pay had the proceedings been 
conducted in the United States.1560 It is no surprise, therefore, that since the decision was 
announced “various segments of the US maritime industry” have, unsuccessfully, tried to 
overturn it.1561 
Although under US law a party could prevent the enforcement of a jurisdiction clause if 
she could prove that it would lead to the application of a foreign law that lowers the 
liability beyond the US COGSA limits, the burden of proof established by Sky Reefer is 
quite high. The mere allegation that the foreign law “may reduce the carrier’s liability is not 
sufficient,” so the resisting party will have to prove beyond any doubt that the law of the 
forum would be damaging.1562 There must be “proof positive,” not simple speculation, that 
the foreign forum, applying its own law, “will in fact lessen the carrier’s liability beyond the 
COGSA threshold.”1563 
This is further complicated by the fact that the US COGSA has a rather low package 
limitation, as the United States has not adopted the Visby Amendments. Because of this, 
a court might limit its analysis to that number, without paying due attention to the other 
parts of the American legislation that might benefit the claimant, and which are harder to 
calculate in monetary terms.1564 
Forum Selection in England 
The draft convention that would later become the Hague Rules was given statutory effect 
in England through the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1924 (“UK COGSA24”). Although 
the draft convention would eventually be ratified after some more amendments, these 
were not incorporated into this Act.1565 Later, in 1971, after the adoption of the Visby 
Protocol to the Hague Rules, Parliament passed the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1917 
(“UK COGSA71”), repealing the 1924 Act, and incorporating the Hague-Visby Rules into 
the English legislation.1566  
                                                                  
1560 DAVIES, M., 2011, supra note 1492, p. 247. 
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1562 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 155. 
1563 TETLEY, W., 2005, supra note 1481, p. 217. 
1564 SPARKA, F., 2010, supra note 927, p. 156. 
1565 DOCKRAY, M. & THOMAS, K. R., Cases and Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 2004, Cavendish, p. 151. 
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While the United States and England took a similar approach in regards to the Hague 
Rules, incorporating them into their legislation as a domestic Act, the similarities end 
there. We must keep in mind that while the United States, before the Hague Rules, 
represented cargo interests that had felt abused by English shipwoners, and thus sought a 
more protectionist approach towards regulation, England looked at this issue from a 
completely opposite standpoint. In fact, England had only legislated this issue due to the 
mounting pressure that could be observed coming from countries that were adopting 
provisions similar to those enacted in the American Harter Act, including several British 
Dominions.1567 
The less protectionist approach that was present in England is also evident in the English 
rules on forum selection clauses which, as we have seen in previous chapters, were much 
more liberal than those in the United States.1568 This liberal approach towards forum 
selection also extended to those present in bills of lading, the validity of which was 
presumed prima facie, except in very special circumstances.1569 
English Courts first analyzed the validity of these clauses in 1927, in the Court of Appeal 
case of Maharani Woollen Mills Co. v. Anchor Line.1570 The case involved a shipment from 
Liverpool, England, to Bombay, India, under a bill of lading containing a forum selection 
clause stating that “all claims arising [from or in connection to this contract] shall be 
determined at the port of destination according to British laws.”1571  
Since the claim was brought in England, the defendants sought to stay the proceedings on 
the basis of the choice of forum clause. The plaintiffs argued that the clause was invalid 
on the basis of Article 3(8) of the UK COGSA24, as it placed the shipowner “in a much more 
favourable position than the cargo owner.”1572 The stay was granted by the trial court, and so 
the plaintiffs filed an appeal, which was dismissed. 
In dismissing the appeal, SCRUTTON L.J. specifically referred to the claim that a forum 
selection clause would lower the liability of the carrier. He was skeptical of the claim that 
a procedural issue such as this could be interpreted as affecting the substance of the 
claim.  As he stated: 
“[T]he liability of the carrier appears to me to remain exactly the same under the 
[forum selection] clause. The only difference is a question of procedure-where shall 
the law be enforced? -and I do not read any clause as to procedure as lessening 
                                                                  
1567 FRANCK, L., ‘A New Law for the Seas - An Instance of International Legislation’, 1926, 42 Law Quarterly 
Review, no. 1, p. 30. 
1568 See Chapters 7 and 8. 
1569 DENNING, S. M., 1970, supra note 1003, p. 38. 
1570 Maharani Wool Mills Co v. Anchor Line [1927-1928], 29 Lloyd's Law Reports, 169. 
1571 ibid., p. 169. 
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liability. For these reasons seeing no difficulty in the reading of the clause, and seeing 
that the cargo-owners have agreed that all claims shall be determined at the place of 
destination, it seems to be a reasonable thing to hold them to their contract and have 
the case decided at the place where all the witnesses are, and where the plaintiffs 
themselves live.”1573 
Maharani was a very significant case since, not only did it specifically address the question 
of whether a forum selection clause would go against the protections of the Hague Rules, 
but also did so in a case where enforcing the clause effectively deprived the plaintiffs of 
any remedy. The plaintiffs had only brought the action in England because they would not 
have had enough time to do so in India before the 1-year time bar had elapsed, something 
that the Court was well aware of, and still decided to rule against them.1574  
Although decided under the UK COGSA24, Maharani applied just the same in regards to 
cases ruled by the UK COGSA71. This certainly makes sense, as the Hague-Visby Rules did 
not depart from the Hague Rules in regards to jurisdiction or its rules on lowering 
liability, so that an interpretative change was not needed by the mere adoption of the new 
rules. English Courts have, therefore, maintained themselves steadfast in their preference 
to enforce forum clauses present in bills of lading. 
While it is true that the English position is not absolute, as an English court can exercise 
its discretion to deny the enforcement of a jurisdiction clause, the exercise of such 
discretion is rarely granted.1575 In the case of forum clauses present in bills of lading 
governed by the UK COGSA, for example, the courts will, in principle, deny the 
enforcement of a clause that would lead to the application of a foreign law establishing a 
lower minimum liability standard than the Hague-Visby Rules.1576 Despite this being a 
sort of escape valve to prevent the enforcement of forum clauses, and just as it happens in 
the United States in the post-Sky Reefer era, the burden laid on the petitioner is very high. 
Not only does he need to prove that the foreign law would be less favorable than English 
law, but also that the result of the application of that foreign law would be prohibited by 
UK COGSA71.1577 
                                                                  
1573 ibid., p. 169. 
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In The Hollandia, Article 3(8) of the UK COGSA71 was applied to refuse the enforcement 
of a forum selection clause that would have submitted the dispute to Dutch Courts, under 
Dutch law. Had the clause been enforced, the liability limitation would have gone from 
approximately £11,500 in England (applying the Hague-Visby limits) to §250 in The 
Netherlands (applying the Hague limits).1578 Delivering the ruling, Lord DIPLOCK explained 
the way in which the liability provision of the Hague-Visby Rules should be read and 
understood: 
“The only sensible meaning to be given to the description of provisions in contracts of 
carriage which are rendered ‘null and void and of no effect’ by this rule is one which 
would embrace every provision in a contract of carriage which, if it were applied, 
would have the effect of lessening the carrier's liability otherwise than as provided in 
the Rules. To ascribe to it the narrow meaning […that jurisdiction clauses, being 
procedural, fall outside of its scope]  would leave it open to any shipowner to 
evade the provisions […] by the simple device of inserting in his bills of lading […] a 
clause in standard form providing as the exclusive forum for resolution of disputes 
what might aptly be described as a court of convenience, viz., one situated in a 
country which did not apply the Hague-Visby Rules or, for that matter, a country 
whose law recognised an unfettered right in a shipowner by the terms of the bill of 
lading to relieve himself from all liability for loss or damage to the goods caused by 
his own negligence, fault or breach of contract.”1579 
Although The Hollandia might create the impression that it seeks to override forum 
selection clauses with Article 3(8), this is not accurate. The decision itself confirms that 
there is a presumptive validity of these clauses, limiting the overriding effect of Article 
3(8) to those cases in which, as we said before, the possible outcome of the dispute in the 
chosen forum will lead to a result that violates the provisions of the Hague-Visby 
Rules.1580  
The narrowness of The Hollandia is demonstrated by the way in which subsequent 
decisions have interpreted it. In The Benarty, for example, a stay was granted due to the 
existence of a forum selection clause designating Indonesia, even though Indonesia 
applied the Hague Rules. Since in this case the charterer had waived his right to rely on 
the package limitations of the Hague Rules, accepting instead the Hague-Visby 
limitations, the Court did not find that the choice represented a violation of Article 3(8). 
This decision was reached in spite of the fact that even though the charterer would be 
held accountable based on the liability limitations of the Hague-Visby Rules, he still 
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retained his right to rely on the Indonesian rules on tonnage limitations, and which 
allowed him to obtain a significant benefit from litigating in that forum. Since Article 3(8) 
only prohibits a lessening of liability “otherwise than as provided,” however, and that 
tonnage limitations are allowed under Article 8, the Court saw no problem in staying the 
English action.1581 
Just as it happened in Maharani, the plaintiff’s ability to obtain redress in the chosen 
forum was severely limited (or downright eliminated) by the enforcement of the 
jurisdiction clause in The Benarty.1582 Although its reputation as an inherently carrier-
friendly jurisdiction might be somehow exaggerated, since exceptions to the enforcement 
of forum clauses do exist, it is clear that, by and large, English courts do tend to take a 
rather favorable approach towards such contractual terms.1583 
Are the Hague (Visby) Rules Opposed to Forum Selection? 
Before analyzing the question of whether the Hague (Visby) Rules do allow for forum 
selection clauses, we first must address a philosophical issue. This goes beyond the 
positions that have been adopted in the United States, England and elsewhere, and 
actually touches upon the goals that the Hague (Visby) Rules system sought to achieve. 
From the Harter Act onwards, the purpose of maritime rules has been to protect cargo 
interests. The need for this protection comes from the fact that, as we have seen, most of 
the time they will find themselves in a weaker position than the carriers, effectively being 
at the mercy of the terms that are placed in front of them. The need for this protection is 
evident when we consider how most, if not all, bills of lading are adhesive contracts. In 
most bill of lading cases, the only freedom of choice enjoyed by the adhering party is no 
more than “the freedom to ship or not to ship.”1584 If this was not the case, if there was not a 
manifest imbalance, the free market, and not regulation, would be able to reach an 
equilibrium.1585  
This difficult situation in which cargo interests can find themselves forces the courts to 
carefully analyze the terms of the contracts. They must ensure that the clauses 
themselves are not, directly or indirectly, lowering the protections established in favor of 
the cargo interests. Article 3(8) of the Hague (Visby) Rules is clear in this respect, 
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invalidating “not only direct but also indirect attempts to lessen the carrier’s liability.”1586 It is 
clear, therefore, that the issue is not limited to clauses affecting the substance of the 
liability provisions, but also those that, “indirectly,” will end up affecting such liability. 
When it comes to forum selection clauses, the question then becomes whether the mere 
inclusion of a forum selection clause always represents a lowering of the liability and 
therefore should be deemed as null and void, whether these clauses should be considered 
prima facie valid, or whether there is some room for nuance. 
In his 1970 criticism of the American Indussa decision, DENNING explained that the 
reluctance to accept forum selection clauses made sense during “the anarchy which gave 
birth to the Harter Act and eventually to the Convention of 1924.”1587 He added, however, 
that maintaining that position made no sense in a time when there were no “irrevocable 
conflicts between nations as to the substantive law governing bills of lading.”1588 The Hague 
Rules he argued, had attempted to standardize the law, and, for the most part, that goal 
had been fulfilled. Even if there were some “marginal differences” in interpretation, these 
were the kind of “minute differences” that should not be addressed by resorting to Article 
3(8).1589 Trying to drive his point home, DENNING finally adds: 
“The Indussa hostility to foreign courts and foreign law might have been appropriate 
in the bad old days before the Hague Convention when the substantive law on bills 
of lading in America differed radically from most other countries. The hostility is 
difficult to understand, now that the law in most countries is substantially the 
same.”1590 
Today, 46 years later, it is hard to overestimate exactly how wrong the author’s words 
would seem in only a few years. It is not only that the Hague Rules have been modified 
through the Visby and the SDR Protocols, but also that those amendments have not been 
adopted by all the Hague Rules countries, and that there are even significant differences 
in the interpretation that is given to the same regulations in different jurisdictions. This, 
the existence of the competing Hamburg Rules (and, maybe one day, the Rotterdam 
Rules), and the many “unique” domestic systems that were the product of a mix-and-
match process, shows that, at least to a degree, the chaotic uncertainty that DENNING 
thought was long gone in 1970, is actually alive and well in 2016.  
What is more, there is certainly a benefit for those who use forum selection clauses in 
their contracts, as it is shown by the fact that they use forum selection clauses in their 
contracts. Clearly, if the effects of the law in all the Hague (Visby) Rules was as 
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harmonious as defenders of jurisdiction clauses might have us believe, then there would 
be no reason to use these clauses at all. Their widespread use, however, tells us otherwise. 
The benefit that is perceived by the carriers is, in all likelihood, perceived at the expense 
of the cargo interests. 
As the American and English decisions that we have analyzed show, there seems to be a 
generalized reluctance to see “procedural” issues, like those of a forum selection clause, 
having an effect on the liability. SCRUTTON L.J. himself made this clear in his ruling in 
Maharani, where he unequivocally stated that he did not see “any clause as to procedure as 
lessening liability.”1591 This school of thought is not really correct since, for starters, choice 
of forum clauses affect not only the procedural aspects of the case, but also its substantive 
result, to the point that they are often “the only issue worth litigating” in a case.1592 What is 
more, it is important to remember that the enforcement of a forum selection clause will 
bring as a consequence that the procedural rules of the selected forum will come into play. 
These rules will have a very significant impact on the case since, as some authors have 
argued, the very outcome of the litigation depends mainly on procedural rules.1593 From 
this perspective, simply dismissing the effects that a “clause as to procedure” might have is, 
clearly, the wrong way to go. 
A few exceptions notwithstanding, courts have not seen the added costs of litigation in 
the chosen forum as affecting the liability of the carrier in the terms of Article 3(8).1594 Sky 
Reefer, for example, rejected this idea altogether, stating that it would be “unwieldy and 
unsupported by the terms or policy” of the Hague (Visby) Rules “to require courts to proceed 
case by case to tally the costs and burdens to particular plaintiffs in light of their means, the size 
of their claims, and the relative burden on the carrier.”1595 This logic exhibited in Sky Reefer is 
far from unique, as it is also echoed in English decisions. It is, however, problematic, as it 
seems to be saying that although the right of the claimants to seek relief exists, he may 
have to find himself collecting money to be able to afford pursuing his claim in a foreign 
forum. And yet, those added costs, which will obviously hurt his bottom line after his 
eventual recovery, are seen by the courts as not having any relevance in the enforceability 
of the jurisdiction clause. 
One author has noted how even though it is true that the expenses associated with 
litigating in a foreign forum are not, in themselves, a lessening of the liability, they do 
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provide the carrier with the means by which he will be able to lessen this liability 
substantially. 
“Suppose, for example, a shipper has damages in the sum of one thousand dollars. It 
can readily be seen that the expense of transporting expert witnesses to the foreign 
jurisdiction, or even of taking depositions from such witnesses for use in the 
litigation, might well preclude an action on the claim, however valid. The aggregate 
liability of the carrier is thus lessened by the total value of the claims so 
eliminated.”1596 
The very strict requirement established by English and American courts to prove that a 
given forum selection clause “lessens” the liability of the carrier seems, to us, ill-advised. 
It begins from a position that seems amnesic in regards to the reasons why Article 3(8) 
exists at all. This article, as well as the rules that contain it, exists only as a result of the 
enormous bargaining power of the carriers compared to that of the cargo interests, and of 
the fact that carriage contracts, by their very nature, are rife with potential for abuse. 
Maritime trade has been regulated in a way that has made some authors draw parallels 
between these regulations and consumer protection law.1597 Fundamental among these 
similarities is the weak situation of the adhering party, who is forced to accept whatever 
terms the dominant party offers. Because of this, looking at forum selection clauses that 
are present in bills of lading as merely the result of the free bargain of the parties is 
mistaken.  
The fact that we, for example, establish minimum warranty periods for consumer 
products and mandatory minimum liability limits for bills of lading, shows that there is a 
consensus on the fact that the parties to these contracts cannot agree on everything. Just 
as it might be possible to assume that a bill of lading in which the shipper agreed to a 
lower liability limit for the carrier, was not the result of a free bargain, a similar 
conclusion can often be drawn in the case of forum selection clauses. While there might 
be some shippers that overshadow the carriers in regards to their bargaining power, and 
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who are more than happy to accept lower liability limits or to litigate in distant forums in 
exchange for a significantly lower freight, regulations cannot be enacted, let alone 
interpreted, based on outliers.  
As DAVIES has noted, the virtually indiscriminate enforcement of forum selection clauses 
will often have the effect of “completely insulating the carrier from liability.”1598 Seeing that 
impunity was precisely what the Hague (Visby) Rules were set to prevent, the courts 
should not merely rubberstamp the carriers’ efforts to that effect. 
As we will now see, these are concerns that have plagued the international community for 
a long time. Because of this, there have been attempts to rein in the ability of the carriers 
to choose a forum. These attempts, however, have not proven to be successful. 
12.4.2 The Hamburg Rules 
By the time the Hamburg Rules were being debated, the effects of forum selection clauses 
in bills of lading was already evident.1599 As the UNCTAD reported at the time, the 
motivation behind including jurisdictional provisions in the Hamburg Rules was the 
consequence of the broad consensus aimed at protecting “the shipper against onerous 
jurisdiction clauses in bills of lading.”1600 The report also showed a significant empathy to the 
needs of those shippers who, as a result of a forum clause, would find themselves forced 
to bring their claims “in the place where he [the carrier] does business, which may be far away 
from the claimant's location."1601 
The diverse interests that came into play during the drafting of the Hamburg Rules made 
clear what were their positions on this matter. The contrast between the developing and 
the developed world on this issue became quite evident. 
“[R]epresentatives of most developing countries expressed their view that the 
Hamburg Rules should restrict the enforceability of forum selection agreements. The 
reason for this was that most developing countries did not have a shipping fleet to 
import and export their goods. Rather, they relied on foreign flag vessels. These 
countries were therefore interested in protecting all consignees whether shippers or 
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consignees. On the other hand, countries that carried most of their goods on their 
own ships, favored rules allowing forum selection agreements.”1602 
Four possible ways to address the jurisdiction issue were proposed. First, there were those 
who argued that the Hamburg Rules should not contain any jurisdictional rules 
whatsoever, and that regulation on this topic should be left to the laws of each individual 
state. Second, there were those who wanted the regulation to simply declare all 
jurisdiction clauses to be null and void. Third, some suggested that the Hamburg Rules 
should expressly validate forum selection clauses. Fourth, and this was the position that 
finally manifested itself in the definitive text, some proposed that the Rules should 
provide specific alternative jurisdictions.1603  
Jurisdiction Provisions under the Hamburg Rules 
The Hamburg Rules regulate the issue of jurisdiction in Article 21, providing different 
forum alternatives. The plaintiff is given the right to decide in which of these alternative 
forums he wishes to commence proceedings.  
1. The principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the habitual residence of the 
defendant (article 21 (1)a).  
2. The place where the contract was made provided that the defendant has there a place of 
business, branch or agency through which the contract was made. (article 21 (1)b).  
3. The port of loading or the port of discharge (article 21 (1)c). 
4. Any additional place designated for that purpose in the contract of carriage by sea (article 
21 (1)d). 
5. In the courts of any port or place in a Contracting State at which the carrying vessel or any 
other vessel of the same ownership may have been arrested in accordance with applicable 
rules of the law of that State and of international law. However, in such a case, at the 
petition of the defendant, the claimant must remove the action, at his choice, to one of the 
jurisdictions referred to above for the determination of the claim, but before such removal 
the defendant must furnish security sufficient to ensure payment of any judgement that 
may subsequently be awarded to the claimant in the action. The court of the port or the 
place of the arrest will also determine all questions relating to the sufficiency or otherwise 
of the security (article 21 (2)a and 21 (2)b) 
6. Any place agreed upon by the parties after a claim under the contract of carriage by sea has 
arisen (article 21 (5)).  
It is worth noting that although under article 21(d) forum selection clauses are valid, the 
Rules severely limit their effects. They do this by leaving the chosen court as only a 
possibility for the claimant as to where to begin proceedings, still having the possibility of, 
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instead, commencing proceedings in any of the other possible forums. Although an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause will not be deemed invalid, the effect of its exclusivity will be 
denied, leaving the clause, as we have seen, with only an “optional effect.”1604 
The above notwithstanding, authors like SPARKA have argued that a cautious carrier could 
manage to maintain the exclusive character of the clause, by acting himself as the 
plaintiff. Indeed, since the Hamburg Rules leave the choice of jurisdiction to “the plaintiff,” 
the carrier could bring an action of non-liability in the contractual forum, seeking 
afterwards to prevent the shipper from commencing proceedings elsewhere based on the 
litis pendens rules established in Art. 21 (4).1605 This view, however, is contested, with 
authors like BLAS SIMONE arguing that the carrier cannot use a declaratory action in order 
to secure the chosen forum.1606 
Justifying the Hamburg Jurisdiction 
The approach taken by the Hamburg Rules in regards to jurisdiction is a manifestation of 
the preference that, for a number of reasons, these Rules give to the interests of the 
shippers. As such, even though there was awareness of the fact that a choice in regards to 
the forum will certainly represent and inconvenience for one of the parties, the Hamburg 
Rules shifted the power that would have traditionally resided on the vessel’s interests, to 
the cargo interests or his insurer. This shifting of the power dynamics has been justified 
by some as a fair solution, taking into consideration the already imbalanced contractual 
relation that dominates the sea carriage of goods.  
“In most cases this [power shift in the Hamburg Rules] is a more equitable 
distribution of power as it is more likely that the carrier will have business 
connections in the jurisdiction selected by the consignee than the reverse, and the 
carrier's mobility enables him to produce evidence where necessary in foreign 
jurisdictions more readily than could the consignee. More importantly, at least one 
of the parties to the dispute will be an underwriter, and although he too can be 
inconvenienced by an adverse selection of forum he does have two distinct 
advantages. First, he is able to spread the inducement to settle a particular case by 
reason of an adverse forum throughout his insurance business. Secondly, the 
insurance market for particular traffic routes tends to concentrate in commercial 
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centres such that the plaintiff's and defendant's choice of venue are likely to 
coincide.”1607 
If we take into consideration that forum selection clauses have, at their core, 
predictability as one of their main objectives, some might argue that the Hamburg Rules, 
at least when it comes to jurisdiction, do not seem to get in the way of achieving it. After 
all, by establishing from the very beginning a set of acceptable forums, the Rules allow the 
carrier to take such issue into consideration at the time of setting his prices. According to 
SMART, for example: 
“The retention of the place designated in the contract of carriage as one of the places 
where an action can be instituted still provides the carrier with an escape channel 
which he can use to his advantage. However, with the introduction of a wide variety 
of jurisdictions which are convenient for the cargo owner and which are now 
expressly laid down, it is hoped that in the event of a prior agreement with respect to 
jurisdiction the shipper should be able to negotiate favourably with the carrier. For 
practical purposes, the cargo owner is usually the plaintiff and the wide range of 
jurisdictions proffered by the Hamburg Convention now affords him the opportunity 
to choose a suitable place convenient for him which at the same time is fair to the 
carrier. Such a place can be the port of loading or the port of discharge to which both 
parties have an easy access since they are related to the carriage of the goods in 
question. In order to safeguard against a claimant selecting a place which suits his 
own convenience and which is not one of the jurisdictions specified in the 
Convention, Article 21(3) and 22(5) enact that an action or arbitration proceedings 
cannot be instituted in a jurisdiction which is not covered by the Convention.”1608 
SMART’s ideas in this regard are not very convincing. If the forum selection does not have 
an exclusive character, then any sort of bargain that the parties make in that regard is, to 
say the least, pointless. In fact, there would be a clear incentive for the shippers to 
negotiate a forum selection clause that benefits the carrier, in order to obtain a deduction 
in freight, safe in the knowledge that he would not be forced to actually start proceedings 
there.  
Something similar happens when it comes to the issue of predictability. Although in 
theory a carrier might be able to take into account the costs associated with litigating in 
most of the possible forums, in reality such exercise would be impossible. Let us imagine, 
for example, a Russian carrier transporting cargo belonging to a South African shipper, 
from Felixtowe, England, to Laem Chabang, Thailand, under a bill of lading containing a 
forum selection clause designating the courts of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, as the 
                                                                  
1607 W. O'HARE, C., ‘Cargo Dispute Resolution and the Hamburg Rules’, 1980, 29 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 2-3, p. 227. 
1608 SMART, H., 1989, supra note 1499, pp. 27–28. 
  
434 
Forum Selection Clauses in Bills of Lading 
competent forum, with a choice of law clause selecting English Law, with the contract 
having been made in Barcelona, Spain, at the carrier’s agency. It would be impossible for 
this carrier to take into consideration the costs of litigating in all of the relevant forums at 
the time of setting his rates, as there will be extreme fluctuations between them. The 
costs of litigating in every one of these possible competent forums is so different, as are 
the associated expenses that come with it, that having a rational estimate before the bill 
of lading is prepared would be unthinkable.  
Since the drafters of the Hamburg Rules acknowledged that the Rules seek to protect the 
shipper from the carrier, perhaps it is futile to come up with explanations as to how their 
jurisdictional rules benefit both parties equally.  We should not forget that the Hamburg 
Rules (like the Hague (Visby) Rules before them) are, in essence, a protectionist scheme 
designed to restore balance. As such, the jurisdictional rules do not need to also benefit 
the carriers, as their very purpose is to offset the power that the carriers already possess.  
Of course, philosophical or pragmatic justifications aside, there are plenty of detractors of 
the approach adopted by the Hamburg Rules towards forum selection.  MUKHERJEE, for 
example, sees article 21 as perhaps one of the most important reasons that lead to the 
abject failure of the Rules. 
“Such provisions [on jurisdiction] were […] inconsistent with arrangements which 
have functioned successfully over the years whereby claimants, wherever located, 
normally expect to receive compensation direct from their insurers leaving any 
recourse action to be pursued by underwriters through a single jurisdiction, usually 
in a carrier’s domicile. This was, perhaps, a significant reason for the failure of the 
Rules to gain acceptance.”1609 
While we might disagree with MUKHERJEE’s conclusions, particularly in regards to what he 
seems to perceive as a fair and normal state of affairs regarding jurisdiction clauses, his 
final observation is true. The Hamburg Rules have, indeed, failed to gain widespread 
acceptance and, as such, they have had a rather restricted sphere of influence. 
The (Restricted) Impact of the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Hamburg Rules in the Developed 
World 
While we certainly concede that the Hamburg Rules failed to achieve any significant 
degree of acceptance in terms of ratifications, this does not mean that they have not had 
any impact. In addition to the countries that ratified and incorporated them into their 
own legislation, some countries have adopted some (or even most) of the Hamburg Rules 
provisions, thus producing a de facto extension of their influence.1610 And so, even though, 
                                                                  
1609 MUKHERJEE, P. K. et al., 2013, supra note 1179, p. 334. 
1610 TETLEY, W., 2005, supra note 1481, p. 186. 
  
435 
Forum Selection Clauses in Bills of Lading 
with the exception of Chile, no important trading country has ratified the Hamburg 
Rules, they also had an impact in the Scandinavian countries, which adapted their NMC94 
to have it “aligned with the Hamburg Rules as far as possible without having to derogate from 
the Hague-Visby Convention.”1611 As a result of this, we find in Section 310 of the NMC94 a 
provision that incorporates the jurisdictional section of the Hamburg Rules.1612 
It is important to note that although the jurisdiction rules of the NMC94 are similar to 
those of the Hamburg Rules, there are some significant differences, dealing with both the 
scope of application of the NMC94, as well as with the place of the Nordic countries 
within the European Union. 
1. The NMC94 rules apply only to shipments where either the port of loading or the 
agreed/actual port of discharge, is located in Denmark, Finland, Norway or 
Sweden.1613 
2. Its jurisdictional rules do not apply if they violate the provisions of the Brussels 
Convention of 1968 (which binds Denmark) or the Lugano Convention of 1988. 
In both of these cases, the conventions establish the domicile of the defendant as 
the main criterion for jurisdiction.1614 
The Nordic Countries notwithstanding, it is undeniable that the Hamburg Rules did not 
succeed. Not only were they unable to replace the Hague (Visby) regime, but also did not, 
in any way, affect the manner in which forum selection clauses are interpreted. As ÖZDEL 
noted, almost in passing, the limitations that the Hamburg Rules established in this 
sphere “have never become a great concern” for those who use forum selection clauses in 
contracts evidenced by bills of lading.1615 
12.4.3 The Rotterdam Rules 
The Complex Road of Compromise Towards Regulation 
Like the Hamburg Rules before them, the Rotterdam Rules also took on the ambitious 
challenge of addressing the issue of forum selection. It did so after a significant debate 
among the negotiating parties, who were divided between those who saw the regulation 
of jurisdiction as “indispensable,” and those who argued that the topic should not be 
addressed at all.1616 It was well known that the jurisdictional provisions of the Hamburg 
                                                                  
1611 FALKANGER, T. et al., 2011, supra note 1172, p. 281. 
1612 Although the NMC94 is largely the same in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, some differences in 
numbering exist. For the purposes of our work, we will use the Norwegian version. 
1613 TETLEY, W., 2005, supra note 1481, p. 186. 
1614 ibid., pp. 186–187. 
1615 ÖZDEL, M., 2016, supra note 1580, pp. 164–165. 
1616 STURLEY, M. F., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 950. 
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Rules had contributed to their very limited ratification, and so the delegates were 
skeptical as to whether including this section would be a good idea.1617 Furthermore, each 
nation had to promote the interests of its own industries and lobbies, leading to a clear 
divide being drawn between the different sectors of the trade.1618 
“At one extreme, nations and industry groups sympathetic to carrier interests, along 
with nations commonly selected in choice-of-court and arbitration agreements, 
argued that the Convention should include no provision on jurisdiction or arbitration 
(except, perhaps, one that routinely enforced choice-of-court and arbitration 
agreements). Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom was a prominent member of this 
coalition. At the other extreme, nations and industry groups sympathetic to cargo 
interests, along with nations that regulate jurisdiction and arbitration domestically 
or as parties to the Hamburg Rules, insisted that the Convention should follow the 
example of the Hamburg Rules to protect a cargo claimant's ability to seek recovery 
in a reasonable forum of its choice (notwithstanding a choice-of-court or arbitration 
agreement). Between these two extremes, a number of nations sought a more 
balanced compromise between cargo and carrier interests. Because the United States 
had been forced to forge a compromise position among its domestic interests, it was a 
leading advocate of the compromise approach during the UNCITRAL 
negotiations.”1619 
The situation was also exacerbated by the internal rules of the European Union since only 
the European Commission, not the individual Member States, had the competence to 
regulate jurisdiction. The opposite happened in the case of arbitration, where the 
European Commission had no competence whatsoever, so the individual Member States 
were free to negotiate at will. And so, on the one hand, European nations were 
represented in the talks about jurisdiction by an entity that was not present during the 
negotiations of the “substantive” parts of the convention, while the arbitration talks were 
attended by nations that were not present during the discussion of the jurisdiction 
                                                                  
1617 YIMER, G. A., 2013, supra note 1443, p. 477. 
1618 ibid., p. 478. 
1619 STURLEY, M. F., 2009, supra note 1194, pp. 950–951. It is worth noting that the compromise advocated by 
the United States had, as its starting point, the goal of overruling the Sky Reefer decision (SCHOENBAUM, T., An 
Evaluation of the Rotterdam Rules, in Basedow, J. et al. (eds.), The Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs 2011-2013, 
2015, p. 40). On Sky Reefer, See page 419 supra. Since the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules, and on light of the 
adoption of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, the European Commission has questioned whether the mandatory 
jurisdictional regime established in the Rotterdam Rules would even be needed in regards to inter-European 
relationships. The fact that the Rotterdam Rules, unlike the Brussels I (recast) regulation, do not address the 
issue of lis alibi pendens, or the related matter of “torpedo” actions, further lessens the chances that the EU would 
become part of the Rotterdam Rules’ jurisdictional regime ( COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, pp. 113–114). 
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provisions. This difficulty led to the Rotterdam Rules regulating arbitration and 
jurisdiction as two separate subjects.1620 
Just like the Rotterdam Rules themselves, the jurisdictional provisions contained in them 
are very complex.1621 This was the result of the difficulties that existed in the negotiation, 
and which led to a “somewhat tortured outcome,” made up of “detailed and confusing” 
provisions on jurisdiction and arbitration.1622 This is not at all surprising, as little more 
can be expected from a compromise reached by such dissimilar partners. 
One of the ways in which the Rotterdam Rules sought to ease the concerns of the nations 
that opposed the regulation of jurisdiction, or which thought that it would violate the 
freedom of contract of the parties if the use of forum clauses was restricted, was by 
making the sections on jurisdiction and arbitration optional for ratifying nations, who 
would have to expressly declare that they wished to be bound by them.1623 This 
represented the “broadest compromise possible,” and appeared as the only solution to a 
situation in which it had “proved impossible to achieve consensus on any compromise 
solution.”1624 We will return to this issue later on.1625 
Jurisdictional Provisions in the Rotterdam Rules 
The Rotterdam Rules devote the entirety of Chapter 14 to the issue of jurisdiction. Article 
66 establishes the courts that will have jurisdiction over the conflicts arising from bill of 
lading disputes, while Article 67 regulates forum selection clauses. Articles 68 to 74 deal 
procedural matters such as arrest, consolidation of actions, and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.  
According to Article 66, unless the bill of lading contains an exclusive choice of court 
agreement, or the parties have agreed, after the dispute has arisen, to grant jurisdiction to a 
                                                                  
1620 STURLEY, M. F., 2009, supra note 1194, p. 951. 
1621 COLDWELL, R., 2014, supra note 1197, p. 112. 
1622 SCHOENBAUM, T., 2015, supra note 1619, p. 40. 
1623 Under Article 74, the provisions of Chapter 14 will only bind “contracting States that declare in accordance with 
article 91 that they will be bound by them.” An analogous provision in regards to Chapter 15 (on arbitration) 
appears in Article 78. According to Article 91, these declarations can be done “at any time,” and can also be 
revoked “at any time.” It further establishes that if the declaration is done at the time of signature “are subject to 
confirmation upon ratification, acceptance or approval.” Since no similar rule is established in regards to declaration 
done at any other time, it can be concluded that such confirmation is therefore not needed in those cases ( YIMER, 
G. A., 2013, supra note 1443, p. 478). 
The reason why the Rotterdam Rules adopted an “opt-in” procedure regarding jurisdiction, as opposed to “opt-
out,” was that European Member States would have to obtain permission from the European Commission to 
ratify the Rules if they included the jurisdiction provisions by default. Conversely, this permission would not be 
required if the Rules were ratified without the jurisdictional provisions ( STURLEY, M. F., 2009, supra note 1194, 
pp. 952–953 
1624 ibid., p. 946 
1625 See page 442 infra. 
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specific court, the claimant has the alternative to commence proceedings against the 
carrier in a “competent court” of any of the places mentioned therein. By “competent 
court,” the Rotterdam Rules are not only referring to a court that has competence 
according to its local laws. Indeed, according to Article 1(30), when they speak of a 
“competent court,” what the Rules are referring to is 
 “a court in a Contracting State that, according to the rules on the internal allocation 
of jurisdiction among the courts of that State, may exercise jurisdiction over the 
dispute.” 
This is a very important provision, as the options that the plaintiff has in terms of 
jurisdiction, are limited to courts in contracting states. This represents a big difference 
from the similar provisions that existed in the Hamburg Rules, where Article 21 did not 
establish a similar requirement.1626 
The competent courts that are listed under article 66 of the Rotterdam Rules are:  
1. The domicile of the carrier; 
2. The place of receipt agreed in the contract of carriage; 
3. The place of delivery agreed in the contract of carriage; or 
4. The port where the goods are initially loaded on a ship or the port where the 
goods are finally discharged from a ship; or 
5. In a competent court or courts designated by an agreement between the shipper 
and the carrier for the purpose of deciding claims against the carrier that may 
arise under the Rotterdam Rules. 
To facilitate their comprehension, we will analyze these separately. 
 The Domicile of the Carrier 
Article 1(29) defines domicile as: “(a) a place where a company or other legal person or 
association of natural or legal persons has its (i) statutory seat or place of incorporation or 
central registered office, whichever is applicable, (ii) central administration or (iii) principal 
place of business, and (b) the habitual residence of a natural person.” It is worth noting that 
the Rotterdam Rules use “whichever is applicable” in the definition of the domicile of legal 
persons. It does so in order to accommodate the many ways in which different legal 
systems might determine nationality for legal persons.1627 
 
                                                                  
1626  TARMAN, Z. D., Jurisdiction and Arbitration Under the Rotterdam Rules, in Güner-Özbek, M. D. (ed.), The United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea: An appraisal of the 
"Rotterdam Rules", 2011, p. 272. On the Hamburg Rules’ jurisdiction provisions, See section 12.4.2 supra. 
1627 ibid., p. 272. 
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 The Place of Receipt / Delivery of the Goods Agreed in the Contract of Carriage 
Unlike the Hague (Visby) Rules and the Hamburg Rules, which covered tackle-to-tackle and 
port-to-port carriage, respectively, the Rotterdam Roles are a door-to-door convention, 
applying also to the non-maritime parts of the carriage. Because of this, the places of 
receipt and delivery of the goods can (although not necessarily) be different from the 
places of loading and discharging. If it is a carriage from a sea port to another sea port, 
“receipt” and “loading,” on the one hand, and “delivery” and “discharge,” on the other, will 
be the same. If, however, carriage was to commence via road, with only then being the 
goods loaded on the ship, carried to another port where they are discharged, loaded into 
trucks, and finally delivered to the consignee inland, then the places will be different. 
It is worth noting that the Rotterdam Rules make a mention of the places of receipt and 
delivery “agreed in the contract of carriage.” By doing so, the Rules place an emphasis in the 
importance of the contract, so that if the carrier was to, for example, deliver the goods in 
the wrong place, the claimant would still be able to pursue his liability on the courts of the 
place mentioned in the contract.1628  
 Port of Loading and Discharge 
During the discussion of the Rules, the delegates argued whether, due to the fact that this 
was a door-to-door convention, it was inappropriate to maintain the ports as basis for 
jurisdiction. UNCITRAL opted to, finally, maintain them in the list of competent courts, 
reasoning that most damages tend to occur during handling at the ports of loading or 
discharge. Furthermore, all related parties, witnesses and other means of evidence will, as 
a rule, be available at these places. Furthermore, it will usually be the only place where the 
plaintiff will be able to proceed against both the carrier and the maritime performing 
party with a single action1629 
It is important to note that in this provision the Rotterdam Rules only refer to the ports 
where the goods are “initially loaded” and “finally discharged.” What this means is that if 
                                                                  
1628 ibid., pp. 273–274. 
1629 ibid., pp. 274–275. In Article 1(6) and (7), the Rotterdam Rules refer to the issue of the “performing parties” 
as follows: 
“6. (a) “Performing party” means a person other than the carrier that performs or undertakes to perform 
any of the carrier’s obligations under a contract of carriage with respect to the receipt, loading, handling, 
stowage, carriage, care, unloading or delivery of the goods, to the extent that such person acts, either 
directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or control. 
(b) “Performing party” does not include any person that is retained, directly or indirectly, by a shipper, by 
a documentary shipper, by the controlling party or by the consignee instead of by the carrier. 
7. “Maritime performing party” means a performing party to the extent that it performs or undertakes to 
perform any of the carrier’s obligations during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port of 
loading of a ship and their departure from the port of discharge of a ship. An inland carrier is a maritime 
performing party only if it performs or undertakes to perform its services exclusively within a port area.” 
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there is transshipment during the voyage, the ports at which such transshipment occurs 
will not have jurisdiction on the basis of Article 66. 
 The Place Designated by the Parties in a Choice of Court Agreement. 
The issue of forum selection in the Rotterdam Rules, its rules and exceptions, is rather 
extensive. Because of this, we will deal with it in a separate section. 
Forum Selection under the Rotterdam Rules 
 Default Forum Selection Rules for Ordinary Liner Contracts1630 
Seeking to protect weaker parties from oppressive forum selection clauses, the Rotterdam 
Rules greatly restrict the ability of the parties in liner contracts to select a forum.1631 Just 
as the Hamburg Rules before them, the Rotterdam Rules treat forum selection clauses as 
non-exclusive by default. Only exceptionally will a forum selection clause be construed as 
exclusive. Furthermore, in its provisions on forum selection, the Rotterdam Rules go to 
great lengths to limit the leeway that the parties have in their choice. 
According to article 66(b), the claimant can start proceedings against the carrier in “a 
competent court or courts” designated for that purpose in the contract. By using the term 
“competent court,” the Rotterdam Rules once again seek to ensure their applicability to the 
conflict, by establishing that the designated court must be in a contracting state. As we 
have seen, one of the most serious problems associated with this type of clauses is that 
they can lead to the chosen forum applying a law that deviates from the mandatory 
liability provisions. By limiting the choice to contracting states, the Rotterdam Rules 
prevent such possibility. 
When it comes to forum choices made after the dispute has arisen, the Rotterdam Rules 
show a much higher flexibility, allowing the parties to designate “any competent court.” 
                                                                  
1630 Article 1(3) of the Rotterdam Rules defines “liner transportation” as “a transportation service that is offered to 
the public through publication or similar means and includes transportation by ships operating on a regular schedule 
between specified ports in accordance with publicly available timetables of sailing dates.” Conversely, “non-liner 
transportation” appears in Article 1(4) as a catch-all concept, being defined as “any transportation that is not liner 
transportation”. While the Rotterdam Rules will, as a rule, apply to liner contracts (except for charterparties and 
contracts for the use of the ship or a part thereon, in accordance to Article 6), it will generally not apply to non-
liner transportation. 
It is important to note that, for the purposes of this section, when we use the term “ordinary liner contracts,” we 
are not using it as opposed to “non-liner” contracts. We use it instead to refer to those contracts where the 
drafters considered that the contractual imbalances were such, that special care was required in their regulation 
in order to prevent abuses. On the opposite end of the spectrum, “volume contracts” (See section 11.3 supra) are 
those for which the drafters thought there was less of a need for statutory protection (YIMER, G. A., 2013, supra 
note 1443, p. 481). 
1631 ibid., p. 481. 
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Although this provision, included in Article 72, is not completely clear as to whether this 
choice would be exclusive, the lack of an express prohibition to that extent seems to 
suggest that in this case exclusivity would be allowed.1632  
 Special Rules for Volume Contracts  
As part of the compromise of diverse interests that finally resulted in the Rotterdam 
Rules, a higher degree of freedom of contract was allowed in regards to the so-called 
“volume contracts.”1633 This also applies in regards to forums selection, where exclusive 
choice of court agreements are allowed under Article 67(a), provided they comply with 
two requirements: 
a. The forum selection, contained in a volume contract that clearly designates the 
names and addressed of the parties, must have been either: 
i. Individually negotiated; or 
ii. Contain a prominent statement that the contract contains an exclusive 
choice of forum, and specify the section where it is contained. 
b. The forum selection must clearly designate the courts of a contracting State or 
one or more specific courts of a contracting State. 
Even in the presence of a valid exclusive forum selection clause in a volume contract, the 
Rotterdam Rules have moderated their effects by limiting the choice. Indeed, once again 
we see that the drafters have only allowed the choice to be made to courts located in 
countries that are parties to the Rotterdam Rules. 
When it comes to third parties, the Rules have also moderated the effects of the exclusive 
forum selection clauses present in volume contracts. In these cases (v.gr. those relating 
parties to whom the bill of lading is transferred, insurers subrogating the insured in his 
rights, etc.), the third party will only be bound if the forum selection complies with the 
requirements of Article 67(2). These are: 
a. That the court is in one of the places mentioned under Article 66(a).1634 
b. That the forum clause is contained in the transport document or electronic 
transport record itself. 
c. That the third party to the contract is given “timely and adequate notice” of the 
choice court, and of the fact that this choice is exclusive. 
                                                                  
1632 ibid., p. 482. See also CACHARD, O., ‘Jurisdictional Issues in the Rotterdam Rules: Balance of Interests or Legal 
Paternalism?’, 2010, 2 European Journal of Commercial Contract Law, no. 1, p. 2 (stating that in these cases the 
exclusive forum clause is given “full effect” since, at that time “the so-called weak party is deemed to have the 
opportunity to consider the effects of the clause.” As a consequence of his new situation, “he no longer deserves 
protection”). 
1633 See section 11.3 supra. 
1634 See page 438 supra. 
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d. That the law of the chosen court recognizes the enforceability of exclusive 
forum choices. 
Since it is understood that the third party may not be in the same situation as the party 
that concluded the volume contract, it is understandable that some moderation is 
exercised when it comes to them being bound by them. In this case, the Rules maintain 
some of the protection established in favor of the cargo interests, only allowing the 
enforcement of the exclusive forum selection clauses if they designate one of the forums 
that the Rotterdam Rules already consider adequate.  
It is interesting to note that mere “notice” to the third party is required in regards to the 
exclusive forum selection, and not “consent,” as it is required in Article 80 regarding the 
effect of the volume contracts on third parties. The record on this issue seems to show 
that the view was that since forum selection was “a procedural matter” (unlike the 
substantive terms that the parties can deviate from in a volume contract), a mere notice 
should be enough.1635  
The Optional Character of Chapter 14 
The problems with Chapter 14 are further complicated by the decision taken by the 
drafters to make its application optional. The drafters hoped that by doing this they 
would encourage more nations to ratify the Rotterdam Rules, “and to do so quickly.”1636 In 
hindsight, considering that after 7 years only 3 nations have ratified the convention, the 
rationale for this opt-in procedure seems flimsy at best. Furthermore, this procedure 
seems to go against one of the main objectives of the Rotterdam Rules, which was to 
achieve uniformity in the regulation of maritime carriage. By making the jurisdictional 
provisions optional, the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules seem to have almost accepted 
the fact that such uniformity would not be achieved. What is more, they seem to have 
enacted a convention that, by design, even if it was to be adopted by 100% of the existing 
Nation states, would still allow for significant divergence in application and 
interpretation, as well as in regards to liability, due to fact that the existence of parallel 
jurisdictional rules would be par for the course. 
The logic behind the inclusion of Chapters 14 and 15 (which is also optional) is hard to 
understand. In fact, the only reason why it was possible to include them in the final text 
of the convention was the opt-in provisions included in articles 74 and 78.1637 This fact 
                                                                  
1635 TARMAN, Z. D., 2011, supra note 1626, p. 278. On the inconvenience of seeing forum selection as “merely” 
procedural, See, generally, section 12.3.3. On the futility of “notices”, See, v.gr. section 2.7 above. 
1636 BAATZ, Y., ‘Jurisdiction and Arbitration in Multimodal Transport’, 2012, 36 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 
no. 2, p. 654. 
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alone speaks volumes as to the likelihood of these provisions ever being adopted by a 
significant number of countries, and thus raises the question as to why did the drafters 
even bother including them. 
At best, it can be said that the optional character of Chapters 14 and 15 shows that the 
goal of harmonization does not extend to jurisdictional issues.1638 At worst, it shows a lack 
of foresight on the part of the drafters who were willing to compromise on such an 
important part of the convention, despite there being no real benefits to it, as the 
convention continues to be far from being anywhere close entering into force. Being a 
system that seeks uniformity, yet seems to be built to create divergence, it is not 
surprising that “few states” are expected to opt-in to these sections of the Rules.1639  
Analyzing the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Rotterdam Rules  
As reasonable as compromises might be, in the case of the Rotterdam Rules it was the zeal 
demonstrated in achieving this compromise that was as one of their biggest flaws. The 
reason for this being that, in their attempt to please everyone, the Rotterdam Rules might 
have, in effect, gone against those who they wanted to protect. 
While the jurisdictional provisions contained in Article 66 do represent a significant 
protection for the cargo interests, this is severely undermined by the exception created by 
volume contracts. As we have already seen, the lack of precision with which volume 
contracts were regulated, has opened a door that is wide enough to allow “approximately 
90 per cent of the liner trade” to be labeled as the product of “volume contracts.”1640 If that 
is the case, then the effect of Chapter 14 of the Rotterdam Rules will be to legitimize 
“disadvantageous jurisdiction provisions” that will, in the end, simply make legal action more 
expensive.1641  
Considering that the current situation is also one in which weak parties are often 
victimized by onerous choice of court clauses, one could argue that adopting the 
Rotterdam Rules would not actually make things worse. What is more, one might even 
argue that the Rotterdam Rules might make things better, assuming the abuse of the 
volume contract provisions do not materialize. This train of thought, however, is not 
satisfactory. Why should any country with significant cargo interests adopt a system that, 
in the best-case scenario, and assuming its flaws are not exploited, might render a benefit?  
It is worth noting that, despite the many criticisms that have been raised by cargo 
interests, criticism has also come from the other side. Some authors, for example, have 
                                                                  
1638 ALCÁNTARA GONZÁLEZ, J. M., 2010, supra note 1461, p. 40. 
1639 MUKHERJEE, P. K. et al., 2013, supra note 1179, p. 336. 
1640 MUKHERJEE, P. K. & BAL, A. B., 2009, supra note 1420, p. 601 
1641 ibid., p. 601. 
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argued that the very strict limits that are placed on the parties’ ability to select a forum in 
ordinary liner contracts represent an irrational and unjustified restriction that, in effect, 
“limits the shipping market from functioning by itself.”1642 Following this line of thought, 
CACHARD has argued that these limits simply adopt an unjustifiably pro-cargo position, 
without there being any legal basis to do so. 
“[I]t is crystal clear that the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules contemplated a 
category of contracts defined by the disparity of economic power between the parties 
more than by a legal classification. Recital 6 of the Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly clearly supports this view: ‘Noting that shippers and carriers do 
not have the benefit of binding and balanced universal regime …’. The question is 
then how the balance of interests can be reached in liner trade contracts as regards 
jurisdiction. In jurisdiction matters, the balance of interests means that the 
substance and effectiveness of the parties’ rights should not depend on only one of 
them. How is the balance between the carrier, usually in the position of defendant, 
and the cargo interests, usually in the position of plaintiff to be shifted? If we move 
from a situation extremely favourable to the carrier to the opposite situation 
extremely favourable to the cargo interests, a balance has not been reached. A legal 
bias has then been substituted for an economic bias. This would be an example of 
what economists call ‘perfectionism’ or ‘legal paternalism’.”1643 
It is worth noting that here we find ourselves, once again, dealing with the philosophical 
question of whether legal paternalism is always bad. If we assume that maritime contracts 
are balanced and the product of a normal, free bargain, then, certainly, paternalism would 
be wrong. If, on the other hand, we look at contracts of carriage as imbalanced 
agreements in which the will of the carrier can be imposed on the cargo interests, then 
“paternalism” or “protectionism” would be warranted.  
Considering that, as we have seen, forum selection clauses in maritime contracts are 
common enough to be endemic, and that the majority of liner contracts are between small 
shippers and large carriers, protection is necessary. One cannot be blind to the fact that 
some of the imbalanced system that made regulation of maritime trade necessary 
continues to exist. This imbalance sometimes manifests itself, as we have already seen, in 
the inclusion of forum selection clauses that, in enforced, can hurt the ability of the cargo 
interests to obtain redress.  
There is no question that the limits established by the Rotterdam Rules in regards to 
jurisdiction are a step in the right direction. The problem is that, as good as that single 
step might have been, the door that was left open for abuse, and the optional character of 
the jurisdictional rules, represent, at the very least, two steps back. 
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"There may be said to be two classes of people in the world; those who 
constantly divide the people of the world into two classes and those who 
do not."  
Robert Benchley.1644 
 
“The truth is, that the law is always approach, and never reaching, 
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and 
it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not yet 
been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent when it 
ceases to grow. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes1645 
12.5 Freedom of Contract and Commercial Parties 
f our analysis has made something clear, it is that assumptions as to bargaining 
power have been the cause of many bad regulations. It seems to be that many look at 
the marketplace with a certain optimism that leads them to see equality where only 
disparities exist. 
The analysis that we have put forward makes it clear that it is a mistake to look at the 
market as if it was made up of consumers and commercial parties, with the former being 
seen as eternally weak, while the latter are perceived as inherently powerful. What this 
shortsighted view produces is a  legal system where those parties that do not fit the mold 
will find themselves victimized not only by their contracting parties, but by an 
oversimplified regulatory system that does not take their needs into account.1646 
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In a recent report calling for the reform of the Australian Unfair Contract Terms Act, the 
Queensland Law Society stated: 
“It is self-evident that the majority of small businesses do not have the same level of 
bargaining power as larger businesses ... extending the unfair contract terms 
protections to small businesses merely improves access to justice for another group 
that has been identified as being at risk, or alternatively marginalised as a result of 
diminished access to justice.”1647 
Indeed, since the traditional dichotomy that the law uses in its analysis, between 
consumers and businesses, does not account for small commercial parties, they end up 
falling awkwardly somewhere in-between. They are not as weak as a consumer, but they 
are absolutely not powerful enough to compete in the big leagues. What is more, as a 
result of being treated as “businesses,” these small firms will be expected to engage in the 
type of behaviors that would be unthinkable for a small commercial entity.  
“Ordinarily, contract law deems large and small businesses as one and the same thus 
relegating the smallest of businesses to the 'arms-length' category of commercial 
transactions. Such a distinction disregards the business's size or the education and 
experience of the proprietors" and assumes that all businesses are better resourced 
and informed than consumers. Thus, businesses are presumed to bargain on an equal 
footing with each other; businesses do not need the protection of consumer-style 
laws because businesspeople can protect their own interests.”1648 
Certainly, we can agree on the fact that courts should not help parties, commercial or 
otherwise, to escape from bad bargains they made themselves. The problem lies on the 
those situations in which one of the parties was taken advantage of by the other. As much 
as we would like to think otherwise, this is something that also happens between 
companies. Because of this, instead of establishing strict categories in which to divide 
contractual parties, or to simply dismiss commercial parties as unworthy of protection, a 
more casuistic approach would be better.  
Be it a large commercial enterprise or a small business, in the end decisions will often be 
made by an individual, a single, human person, susceptible of suffering the same biases 
and affected by the same shortcomings that affect any consumer. The problem is that 
while a large corporation might be able to set up a number of checks to prevent these 
problems from manifesting themselves, for example by relying on expert financial and 
legal advise, such an expense would be unthinkable for many smaller companies. Indeed, 
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“many small businesses simply cannot afford the accounting, financial and legal advice” that 
larger corporations might take for granted.1649 
A meaningful treatment of this problem in the legal system will require the kind of 
flexibility that, so far, has been lacking. This is, after all, a situation that arises not out of 
the categories in which a given party is placed, but instead out of the bargaining power 
the she possesses.  
Placing the emphasis on bargaining power when it comes to cases of, for example, 
unconscionability or undue influence, will allow the courts to address some of the many 
problems that a strict approach has created. At the same time, it will also allow the courts 
to ensure that, in those cases where regulation exists, the spirit of these regulations is 
respected. 
12.6 Freedom of Contract, Maritime Parties & the Forum 
In our analysis we have placed our attention on maritime carriage under bills of lading. 
This is a market where, for over a century, regulation has attempted to address the 
problems created by the bargaining power disparities that affect it. There is a consensus 
on the fact that, although outliers might exist, by and large the cargo interests will have 
less bargaining power than the carriers and shipowners. 
Our research shows that even though there is this historical awareness of the fact that 
cargo interests are at a disadvantage, courts have often proven to be less than 
sympathetic to their plight. We can find a good example of this in the way in which courts 
in both the United States and England deal with forum selection clauses. 
Despite the awareness of why the Hague (Visby) Rules were enacted, courts on both sides 
of the Atlantic seem to look at forum clauses in bills of lading as merely one more 
bargained term in a commercial contract. There is a certain tone-deafness in this 
approach, as they fail to realize that by allowing such terms to be included, they 
effectively legitimize what can easily be a way in which the carrier seeks to avoid any 
liability. This is a situation that also presents itself in other areas of the law, where forum 
selection is perceived as merely procedural, despite the well-known substantive 
consequences that it can have. 
In a 2015 article, Professor MULLENIX lamented the current state of American law when it 
came to choices of forum in consumer contracts. She argued that the system seemed too 
eager to enforce all private agreements, no matter the consequences.  
                                                                  




“The reality is that scarcely any plaintiff in the post-Zapata era who has sought to 
invalidate a forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration clause has been able to 
successfully prevail on a contract unreasonableness defense. […] The imbalance of 
equities in forum-selection clause jurisprudence should be remedied by changing the 
narrative that gives primacy to contract law and returning the conversation to that 
of jurisdictional ouster, litigation gamesmanship, and public policy concerns.”1650 
The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, about our topic. The case law on forum selection 
is so far made up of two competing narratives. One of them, the one favored by the 
courts,  sees all the parties to a contract of carriage under a bill of lading as standing on 
the same level. The other, and which is responsible for the regulations that govern the 
trade, takes the relative bargaining power of the parties into account, and sees the 









                                                                  





This research seeks to answer two questions: 
1. Should commercial parties, such as cargo interests in maritime contracts, benefit 
from a legal protectionism established in their favor? 
2. Should this legal protectionism extend to forum selection clauses? 
In order to answer these questions, an eclectic research method has been adopted, 
reviewing some essential concepts of contract law, and building from that analysis 
towards maritime contracts and forum selection. This analysis is conducted by reviewing, 
mostly, the law of the United States and England, although also reviewing, for 
comparative reasons, the law of certain Civil Law jurisdictions. Additionally, in order to 
further the understanding of the problem, some of the historical and sociological issues 
surrounding this topic are also analyzed and commented on. 
 
Chapter 1  The Inviolability of Contracts 
While it might appear counterintuitive, the idea of pacta sunt servanda, that agreements 
are to be kept, is not found in Roman law. Indeed, even though this mandatory character 
of contracts is at the core of our free market system, it is actually a rather new part of our 
legal understanding. Its origins can be traced back to the canonists who, on the basis of 
biblical rules in regards to keeping promises, elaborated a doctrine under which a moral 
imperative was linked to the fulfillment of contracts. It was on the basis of their work 
that such a concept became a part (although in different measures) of Western legal 
systems, having been incorporated into, for example, the Civil Codes of France, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Spain, as well as the Common Law. 
 
Chapter 2 Freedom of Contract and Bargaining Power 
Associated to the concept of pacta sunt servanda is that of freedom of contract, the ability of 
the parties to determine the content of their agreements without the State interfering 
with their desires. This principle, and which is also an essential element of our capitalist 
societies, has not remained static through the ages.  
A product of the Age of Enlightenment, this principle appears as a direct response to the 
deeds of the overbearing feudal State. It places the emphasis in private autonomy, in the 
fundamental rigs of individuals, seeing them as the best arbiters to determine what is 
best for them. This laissez-faire understanding of contracts became inadequate to deal 
with some of the new challenges that came as a result of a more complex market. Chief 
among these new challenges were: a) The concentration of bargaining power in a 
decreasing amount of market participants, and b) The appearance of contracts of 
adhesion.  
Since the adhering parties to a contract of adhesion are unable to modify the terms of 





became obvious that for them, “freedom” of contract was only theoretical. Although 
different measures have been adopted to attempt to combat this problem, such as 
increasing the information that must be provided to adhering parties, the results have 
not been satisfactory.  
 
Chapter 3  Repairing Contractual Imbalances 
Since bargaining power disparities often result in unfair contractual terms, some have 
suggested that the existence of these disparities should be enough to warrant contractual 
review. The problem about this approach, however, is that, in general, it is impossible to 
create a flawless method through which to measure bargaining power so as to identify 
“powerful” parties. As a result, protections have often been placed on “categories” of 
parties, such as workers and consumers, establishing certain requirements that must be 
fulfilled by their contract. Alternatively, doctrines centered around “fairness,” such as the 
doctrine of unconscionability in the Common Law, and good faith in the Civil Law, have 
been used to tackle unfair (or unconscionable) contracts.   
 
Chapter 4 Unconscionability in the Common Law 
Despite being of English origin, the doctrine of unconscionability has been virtually 
abandoned in England. It has, however, seen a resurgence in the United States, as well as 
in other Common Law countries. Through its use (v.gr. thanks to its inclusion in UCC 
section 2-302) victims of contractual unfairness have been able to obtain judicial relief 
from their contracts. In order to obtain such relief, however, the courts have established a 
rather strict approach to unconscionability, requiring evidence of both procedural 
unconscionability (i.e. that unfairness existed in concluding the contract) and substantive 
unconscionability (i.e. that the terms themselves are unfair). 
One of the shortcomings of unconscionability is that its use has often been limited to 
consumer contracts, leaving commercial parties out of its reach. This does not seem to be 
justified, as commercial parties can also be victims of the kind of unfair bargains that can 
affect any other market participant.  
 
Chapter 5 Unconscionable Contracts in the Civil Law 
One of the safety valves through which Civil Law jurisdictions have been able to tackle 
unfairness, lacking the flexibility of the Common Law, is by resorting to good faith. Often 
this enforcement of the good faith obligation is seen as an extension of the right to 
human dignity that the parties, as individuals, possess. As such, they are to be protected 
from abusive clauses that are inserted into contracts, and which represent, in and of 
themselves, a violation of the good faith duty. 
Some countries, like Germany, have gone further in the extension that they give to this 
obligation, linking it directly to the human rights of the parties, and their horizontal 
application in contractual matters. Although we contest that this approach can even be 




On the contrary, it creates the kind of uncertainties that make it a fairly dangerous tool to 
have in private law. 
 
Chapter 6 Choice of Court Agreements 
The parties to a contract, particularly those with an international element, will often go to 
great lengths to limit the uncertainty and minimize their costs. One of the tools that they 
employ to achieve this result is the insertion of forum selection clauses in their contracts, 
limiting the forums where it will be possible to start proceedings if a dispute arises.  
Although nowadays their use is accepted virtually all across the board, for a long time they 
were seen as going against public policy, by ousting courts of their jurisdiction. Although 
this debate, by and large, has been left behind, there are still concerns surrounding the 
use of these clauses. Chief among them is the possibility that they might deprive one of 
the parties of their day in court, by severely increasing their procedural costs. While 
admitting their usefulness and the benefits that they can create for the parties, the way in 
which different legal systems have attempted to prevent the most negative consequences 
of their use, varies from State to State. 
 
Chapter 7  Forum Selection in the United States 
For a long time the United States adopted what is now known as the “ouster doctrine,” 
and under which all forum selection clauses were deemed unenforceable by reasons of 
public policy. This placed the United States in a fairly difficult situation in the 
international stage, as it found itself following an antiquated approach compared to other 
developed nations. This changed with The Bremen, a 1972 Supreme Court decision that 
recognized the validity of forum selection clauses. In this case, two large international 
enterprises had agreed on a forum selection clause, and the Supreme Court did not see 
any reason why their bargain should not be respected.  
While the ruling in The Bremen seemed to limit the effects of the decision to a rather 
unique subset of contracts (i.e. thoroughly negotiated, international contracts between 
large commercial parties) the courts soon extended its application well beyond those 
confines. This expansion reached its apex with the 1991 Supreme Court decision in 
Carnival Cruise where the enforceability of a forum selection clause between a cruise 
company and an individual consumer was deemed fully enforceable. 
It is our contention that the expansion of The Bremen is bad law. It has overlooked the real 
problems associated with bargaining power disparities and, in effect, has allowed for 
“weak” parties to find themselves deprived of judicial relief. While this has affected 
consumers, its effects can also be felt in commercial contracts, where small businesses will 
also be unable to escape from an adhesive forum selection clause, regardless of the fact 





Chapter 8  Forum Selection in England 
Unlike the United States, England has traditionally shown a much more tolerant view of 
forum selection clauses. Indeed, English courts will enforce these clauses almost 
automatically, only refusing to do so in very exceptional cases. In general, the burden laid 
on the party resisting the enforcement is quite high, requiring special proof of issues such 
as the unfairness of the selected forum, or the difficulties associated with reaching it. As a 
general rule, matters like distance and costs, for example, have not been been well 
received by the courts in this regard. 
 
Chapter 9  Contracts in Maritime Law 
A part of private law (unlike the “law of the sea”) maritime law is one of the most 
harmonized segments of international law. This due to the fact that, since it affects 
commerce, there is a clear interest on the part of the international community to ensure 
that the markets operate properly.  
In the carriage of goods by sea, the exploitation of a vessel is, by and large, made through 
two types of contracts. Charterparties, contracts for the use of a ship, or part of it; and 
contracts of affreightment evidenced in bills of lading. 
Bills of lading serve three distinct purposes; first, they are a receipt for the goods that are 
being shipped aboard a vessel; second, they are the best evidence of the terms of the 
contract (without, at the same time, being the contract); and, third, they are a document 
of title, allowing the bearer to transfer them while they are still in transit by transferring 
the bill of lading via its endorsement.  As bills of lading represent the most common form 
of contracts of carriage of goods by sea, they have been the subject of several regulatory 
efforts. 
 
Chapter 10  The International Regulatory Framework of Contracts of 
Affreightment 
Starting in the late 19th Century, there has been a move to regulate contracts of 
affreightment, so as to tackle the bargaining disparities that exist between shipowners on 
the one hand, and cargo owners on the other. Due to the practice of the carriers to 
exclude any and all liabilities, a series of international regulatory bodies have been 
enacted; the Hague Rules (1918), the Visby Amendments to the Hague Rules (1979), the 
Hamburg Rules (1978), and the Rotterdam Rules (2009). Right now, the Hague-Visby 
Rules are the most often-encountered regulation, with the Hamburg Rules having been 
adopted by only a handful of minor nations, and the Rotterdam Rules still lacking the 
necessary ratifications to come into force. What these rules have sought to create is, to a 
larger or lesser extent depending on the specific body, a regulatory system on liability 
rules. 
Even among countries that have adopted the same rules, the problem is that they are 




are slightly modified when adapted into a given legal system, further eroding the goals of 
harmonization and uniformity that the international community desires. 
 
Chapter 11  Party Autonomy in Contracts of Affreightment 
Maritime carriage is characterized by a significant absence of freedom of contract. 
Although the parties are, of course, able to make decisions on many aspects of the 
contract, they are not allowed to depart from certain minimum liability standards 
imposed by the governing rules. The idea has been that the bargaining power possessed 
by the carriers is such, that allowing them to depart from these minimum standards, 
would result in them disclaiming all liability, transferring the costs to the cargo interests 
and their insurers. 
Due to the criticisms that have been leveled by some against the perceived “paternalism” 
demonstrated by the previous maritime rules, the Rotterdam Rules have created an 
alternative system. Here, parties to a “volume contract” (essentially a contract for a series 
of shipments) will be allowed to do away with these limitations. It is our position that the 
way in which the volume contracts exception was established in the Rotterdam Rules was 
inconvenient, as it is so vague that it allows virtually all contracts to fall under the 
“volume contract” exception, provided the amount of shipments is equal to, or larger 
than, two. What we contest, and the majority of commentators seems to agree, is that the 
Rotterdam Rules, in their hopes of satisfying the demands of the vessel owners, have 
created a loophole that will leave shippers unprotected and which, in our view, might 
actually prevent these rules from being adopted altogether. 
 
Chapter 12  Forum Selection Clauses in Bills of Lading 
The importance of forum selection cannot be overstated. Its relevance is such, that 
disputes as to the forum will often serve as proxies to  debates over the substantive issue. 
Evidence shows that losing a dispute over the forum will often result in a party 
abandoning a claim altogether, or settling in a less favorable way. 
Since the Hague-Visby Rules do not address the issue of jurisdiction, it has been left up to 
the courts to decide whether a forum selection clause should be allowed. In general, courts 
in England and the United States have enforced these clauses, although occasionally relief 
has been granted to parties that manage to meet the very high burden of proof required 
to demonstrate that the costs of litigating in the selected forum actually represents a 
lowering of the liability of the carrier beyond the limits established in the Rules. 
Both the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules establish rules that limit the use of 
exclusive forum selection clauses. What this means is that even in the face of such a 
clause, the claimant will still have the option to commence proceedings in other 
competent courts. This is further restricted in the case of the Rotterdam Rules, where the 
only courts that can be legitimately designated in the forum selection clause are those 




the jurisdictional provisions of the Rotterdam Rules are optional, with ratifying States 
needing to expressly accept them, 
Within the volume contract exception, the Rotterdam Rules seem to erode the 
protections of the cargo interests, by establishing that in those cases the forum selection 
clauses will be fully valid and exclusive. This erosion, however, is limited by the fact that 
only forums located in contracting States will be considered as valid.  
 
Conclusion 
Although contractual protections against bargaining power disparities have been 
traditionally established in favor of “weak” contractual parties like consumers and 
workers, they should be extended to commercial parties. The evidence presented in this 
work shows that small businesses are often left at the mercy of larger enterprises, 
suffering with the same kind of abusive contractual terms that might affect an 
unprotected consumer. 
Related to the idea of protecting small businesses, the traditional approach towards 
forum selection in commercial contracts, particularly maritime contracts of carriage, 
should be re-examined. The idea that these clauses are only procedural in nature is 
unrealistic, as the evidence demonstrates that they have a significant impact on the 
substantive rights of the parties. What is more, the costs in which a party might have to 
incur in order to comply with the terms of such a clause, might result in the proceedings 
becoming so expensive as to, in effect, lower the liability of the carrier, by forcing the 
claimant to make the kind of disbursements that would make it more fiscally efficient to 
simply not claim at all. 
The approach that has been taken so far in the international stage in regards to maritime 
contracts leaves much to be desired. The first problem is that simply flooding the 
landscape with more possible regulations will only increase uncertainty, as more possible 
standards will be available to be adopted, adapted, and transformed, by individual 
nations. Secondly, and as the Rotterdam Rules make clear, there seems to be a desire to 
loosen some of the protections established in favor of cargo interests, by allowing for 
more freedom of contract. While in principle this might be a good idea, and a serious 
debate should be had on this matter, the way in which such changes have been framed is 
far from adequate. What is more, such changes are justified by appealing to the existence 
of outlier cargo interests that possess equal or larger bargaining power than the 
shipowners, apparently not realizing that regulations should be done based on the 






Dit onderzoek beoogt twee vragen te beantwoorden: 
 
1. Dienen commerciële partijen, bijvoorbeeld partijen met belangen in de lading in 
maritieme contracten, juridische bescherming te genieten? 
2. Dient deze juridische bescherming betrekking te hebben op 
forumkeuzebedingen? 
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden is gebruik gemaakt van een eclectische 
onderzoeksmethode waarbij een aantal essentiële concepten van het contractenrecht 
worden geanalyseerd, waarna een analyse van maritieme contracten en de forumkeuze 
plaatsvindt. Deze analyse betreft voornamelijk een analyse van het recht van de 
Verenigde Staten en Engeland, hoewel daarnaast, voor rechtsvergelijkende redenen, het 
recht van een aantal Civil Law landen wordt besproken. Daarnaast worden, om het begrip 
van het probleem te bevorderen, een aantal historische en sociologische kwesties rond dit 
thema geanalyseerd en becommentarieerd.  
 
Hoofdstuk 1  De onaantastbaarheid van contracten 
Het lijkt wellicht contra-intuïtief, maar het idee van pacta sunt servanda, dat 
overeenkomsten dienen te worden nagekomen, stamt niet uit het Romeinse recht. 
Sterker nog, hoewel het dwingende karakter van overeenkomsten de kern vormt van ons 
vrije markten-systeem, behelst het eigenlijk een vrij nieuw onderdeel van ons juridisch 
begrip. De oorsprong van het begrip dateert uit de tijd van de canonisten die, op basis van 
Bijbelse regels met betrekking tot het nakomen van beloften, een doctrine ontwikkelden 
op grond waarvan een morele verplichting werd gekoppeld aan de vervulling van 
overeenkomsten. Het was op basis van hun werk dat het begrip deel uit ging maken 
(hoewel in verschillende hoedanigheden) van de Westerse rechtssystemen, door te 
worden opgenomen in bijvoorbeeld het burgerlijk wetboek van Frankrijk, Nederland, 
Duitsland en Spanje, alsmede in de Common Law.  
 
Hoofdstuk 2 Contractsvrijheid en onderhandelingspositie 
Gerelateerd aan het begrip pacta sunt servanda is de contractsvrijheid: de mogelijkheid voor 
partijen om de inhoud van hun overeenkomsten vast te stellen zonder dat de Staat zich 
inmengt in hun verlangens. Dit principe, en dat is ook een essentieel onderdeel van onze 
kapitalistische maatschappij, is door de eeuwen heen niet statisch gebleven. Dit begrip 
lijkt, als een product van de Verlichting, een reactie te zijn op de overheersende 
inmenging van de feodale staat. Dit laissez-faire  begrip van contracten was onvoldoende 
in staat om te gaan met de nieuwe uitdagingen van een meer complexe markt. De 
belangrijkste uitdagingen waren: a) de concentratie van de onderhandelingspositie en een 





Aangezien de zwakkere partij bij een adhesie-contract niet in staat is de 
contractvoorwaarden aan te passen, en dezelfde voorwaarden vaak in de gehele markt 
worden gebruikt, werd het snel duidelijk dat de term contractsvrijheid slechts theoretisch 
was. Hoewel verschillende maatregelen zijn gebruikt om dit probleem op te lossen, zoals 
het verhogen van de informatie aan deelnemende partijen, zijn de resultaten daarvan niet 
bevredigend.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 Herstel van contractevenwicht 
Aangezien verschillen in onderhandelingspositie vaak resulteren in oneerlijke 
contractvoorwaarden, hebben sommigen voorgesteld dat het bestaan van dergelijke 
geschillen voldoende zou moeten zijn om een contractuele beoordeling daarvan te 
rechtvaardigen. Het probleem van deze benadering was echter dat het over het algemeen 
onmogelijk is om een vlekkeloze methode te ontwikkelen om de onderhandelingspositie 
vast te stellen en zodoende ‘machtige’ partijen te identificeren. Als gevolg daarvan wordt 
vaak bescherming geboden aan bepaalde categorieën van partijen zoals werknemers en 
consumenten, waarbij bepaalde voorwaarden worden gesteld aan (de kwalificatie van) 
dergelijke contracten. Als alternatief zijn er doctrines ontwikkeld rondom ‘billijkheid’, 
zoals de onredelijkheids- of unconscionability-leer in de Common Law en de goede trouw in 
de Civil Law, om oneerlijke (of onredelijke) contracten aan te pakken.  
 
Hoofdstuk  4 Unconscionability (onredelijkheid) in de Common Law 
Hoewel van Engelse origine, wordt de leer van unconscionability in Engeland nauwelijks 
meer toegepast. Het is echter nieuw leven ingeblazen in de Verenigde Staten en andere 
Common Law landen.  Door gebruik te maken van deze leer (met dank aan de opname in 
sectie 2-302 UCC) zijn slachtoffers van contractuele onredelijkheid in staat om 
gerechtelijke hulp te verkrijgen bij dergelijke contracten. Om in aanmerking te komen 
voor dergelijk herstel is in de rechtspraak een vrij strikte benadering van onredelijkheid 
ontwikkeld, welke bewijs van zowel procedurele als materiële onredelijkheid vereist 
(d.w.z. dat de bepalingen zelf onredelijk zijn). Een van de tekortkomingen van de 
onredelijkheidsleer is dat zijn toepassing vaak beperkt wordt tot 
consumentenovereenkomsten, waardoor commerciële partijen buiten het bereik van deze 
leer vallen. Dit lijkt  ongerechtvaardigd, commerciële partijen kunnen immers evengoed 
slachtoffer zijn van oneerlijke onderhandelingen die betrekking kunnen hebben op elke 
andere marktdeelnemer. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 Onredelijke contracten in de Civil Law 
Een van de redenen waardoor civielrechtelijke jurisdicties in staat zijn om oneerlijkheid 
aan te pakken, zonder de flexibiliteit die geboden wordt door de Common Law, is door 
toevlucht te nemen tot de goede trouw. De handhaving van de goed trouw wordt vaak 
gezien als een verlenging van het recht op menselijke waardigheid dat de partijen, als 




die deel uitmaken van een overeenkomst en die, per se, een schending van de goede trouw 
inhouden. Sommige landen, zoals Duitsland, hanteren een uitgebreidere goede trouw 
verplichting, door de goede trouw rechtstreeks te koppelen aan de mensenrechten van 
partijen en de horizontale toepassing daarvan in contractuele zaken toe te staan. Hoewel 
ik mij afvraag of deze benadering kan worden uitgebreid naar commerciële partijen lijkt 
het geen adequaat controlesysteem. In tegendeel, het zorgt voor bepaalde onzekerheden 
die het tot een gevaarlijk instrument maken in het privaatrecht. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 Forumkeuzebedingen 
De contractspartijen, in het bijzonder waar het een contract met een internationaal 
element betreft, gaan vaak tot het uiterste om onzekerheden te beperken en kosten te 
minimaliseren. Een van de instrumenten die gebruikt worden om dit resultaat te bereiken 
is de toevoeging van een forumkeuzebeding aan hun contracten, waardoor het aantal fora 
waar het mogelijk is om een procedure te starten wordt ingeperkt. Hoewel het gebruik 
van een forumkeuzebeding tegenwoordig alom wordt toegestaan, werden deze bepalingen 
lange tijd strijdig met de openbare orde geacht doordat zij de bevoegdheid aan de rechter 
ontnamen. Hoewel dit debat over het algemeen niet langer gevoerd wordt zijn er nog 
altijd bezwaren rond het gebruik van deze bepalingen. Hierbij is het belangrijkste bezwaar 
de mogelijkheid dat de forumkeuze een van partijen mogelijk zijn toegang tot de rechter 
ontzegt, door de proceskosten aanzienlijk te verhogen.  Hoewel het nut van een 
forumkeuzebeding en de voordelen die een dergelijk beding voor partijen creëert worden 
erkent, verschilt de manier waarop men de negatieve consequenties van een dergelijk 
beding probeert tegen te gaan van staat tot staat.  
 
Hoofdstuk 7  Forumkeuze in de Verenigde Staten 
Lange tijd werd in de Verenigde Staten gebruik gemaakt van wat nu bekend staat als de 
‘ouster doctrine’ , op basis waarvan iedere forumkeuze onuitvoerbaar werd geacht wegens 
strijd met de openbare orde. Dit gebruik plaatste de Verenigde Staten in een vrij moeilijke 
positie op het internationale speelveld, aangezien gebruik gemaakt werd van een 
verouderde aanpak in vergelijking met andere ontwikkelde landen. Dit wijzigde met The 
Bremen, een beslissing van de Supreme Court uit 1972, waarin de geldigheid van 
forumkeuzebedingen werd vastgesteld. In deze zaak waren twee grote internationale 
ondernemingen een forumkeuze overeengekomen en zag de Supreme Court geen reden 
om deze keuze niet te respecteren.  
Hoewel de gevolgen van de uitspraak in The Bremen beperkt leken tot een vrij unieke 
subset van overeenkomsten (dat wil zeggen internationale contracten tussen grote 
commerciële partijen waarin grondig onderhandeld was) breidden rechterlijke instanties 
de toepassing van deze zaak snel uit buiten deze grenzen. Deze uitbreiding bereikte zijn 
hoogtepunt met de uitspraak van de Supreme Court in de zaak Carnival Cruise in 1991 
waarin de geldigheid van een forumkeuzebeding tussen een cruise bedrijf een individuele 




Naar mijn mening is een dergelijke uitbreiding van de uitspraak in The Bremen ongewenst. 
Daarbij worden de werkelijke problemen met betrekking tot verschillen in 
onderhandelingspositie over het hoofd gezien hetgeen ervoor heeft gezorgd dat voor 
‘zwakke’ partijen de toegang tot de rechter aanzienlijk wordt bemoeilijkt. Hoewel dit 
primair consumenten heeft getroffen, heeft de genoemde uitbreiding ook gevolgen voor 
commerciële partijen, doordat kleine partijen niet in staat zijn om te ontkomen aan een 
forumkeuzebeding in een adhesie-contract, ongeacht het feit dat er geen werkelijke 
onderhandeling (of zelfs de mogelijkheid van een dergelijke onderhandeling) over de 
invoeging van een forumkeuzebeding heeft plaatsgevonden.   
 
Hoofdstuk 8  Forumkeuze in Engeland 
In tegenstelling tot de Verenigde Staten heeft Engeland traditioneel veel meel tolerantie 
getoond ten aanzien van forumkeuzebedingen. Engelse rechtbanken zullen deze bedingen 
vrijwel direct handhaven; handhavingsweigeringen komen slechts voor in zeer 
uitzonderlijke gevallen voor. Over het algemeen is de bewijslast die rust op de partij die 
zich verzet tegen de toepassing van een forumkeuzebeding vrij hoog, waarbij in het 
bijzonder bewijs van zaken als de onredelijkheid van het geselecteerde forum of de 
moeilijkheden ten aanzien van het bereiken van het forum gevraagd wordt.  Over het 
algemeen worden zaken zoals bijvoorbeeld afstand en kosten in dit kader niet goed 
ontvangen door de rechter. 
 
Hoofdstuk  9  Contracten in het maritieme recht 
Als onderdeel van het privaatrecht (anders dan het zeerecht) is het maritieme recht een 
van de meest geharmoniseerde segmenten van internationaal recht. Dit is te wijten aan 
het feit dat, aangezien het betrekking heeft op handel, de internationale gemeenschap een 
duidelijk belang heeft in de goede werking van markten.  
Met betrekking tot goederenvervoer over zee, vindt de exploitatie van een schip 
grotendeels plaats op basis van twee soorten contracten: charterparties, contracten voor 
het gebruik van een schip, of een deel daarvan; en bevrachtingscontracten blijkend uit een 
cognossement. Het doel van een cognossement is drieledig: allereerst geldt het als 
ontvangstbewijs voor de goederen die per schip worden vervoerd; ten tweede vormt het 
beste bewijs van de contractvoorwaarden (zonder, tegelijkertijd, het contract te zijn); en, 
ten derde, vormt het een titel die de drager, door overdracht van het cognossement, het 
recht geeft de goederen over te dragen terwijl deze nog op doorreis zijn. Aangezien het 
cognossement de meest gangbare vorm van contracten met betrekking tot 
goederenvervoer over zee vertegenwoordigt is deze het onderwerp geweest van 





Hoofdstuk 10  Het internationaal regelgevende kader van 
bevrachtingscontracten 
Vanaf de late 19e eeuw is er gepoogd bevrachtingscontracten te reguleren om tegemoet te 
komen aan de verschillen in onderhandelingspositie die bestaan tussen de 
scheepseigenaren aan de ene hand en de vrachteigenaren aan de andere. Om tegenwicht 
te bieden aan het gebruik onder vervoerders om alle aansprakelijkheid uit te sluiten, zijn 
een aantal internationale regelingen in het leven geroepen:  de Hague Rules (1918), de 
Visby Amendments to the Hague Rules (1979), de Hamburg Rules (1978) en de Rotterdam 
Rules (2009). Tegenwoordig vertegenwoordigen de Hague-Visby Rules de meest gebruikte 
regeling; de Hamburg Rules zijn slechts door een handvol kleine staten aangenomen en bij 
de Rotterdam Rules ontbreken de ratificaties die vereist zijn voor inwerkingtreding. Wat 
deze regelingen beoogden te creëren is, in meer of mindere mate, afhankelijk van de 
specifieke regeling, regelgeving met betrekking tot aansprakelijkheid.  
Zelfs tussen landen die dezelfde regels toepassen bestaat het probleem dat deze 
regelgeving vaak op verschillende wijze(n) wordt toegepast. Bovendien komt het vaak 
voor dat een bepaalde regeling binnen een bepaald rechtssysteem, enigszins is aangepast 
hetgeen verder afbreuk doet aan de doelstelling van harmonisatie en uniformiteit die 
gewenst wordt door de internationale gemeenschap. 
 
Hoofdstuk 11  Partijautonomie binnen bevrachtingscontracten 
Het rechtsgebied van zeevervoer wordt gekarakteriseerd door een significante 
afwezigheid van contractsvrijheid. Hoewel de partijen, natuurlijk, in staat zijn om 
beslissingen te maken over vele aspecten van hun contract, is het hen niet toegestaan om 
af te wijken van bepaalde normen betreffende minimumaansprakelijkheid in de geldende 
regels. Het idee is dat de onderhandelingspositie van de vervoerder zo sterk is, dat het 
toestaan van een afwijking van deze minimumnormen zou resulteren in een algehele 
uitsluiting van aansprakelijkheid, waarbij de kosten worden overgedragen aan diegenen 
met belangen in de lading en hun verzekeraars.  
Door de kritiek die door sommigen wordt geuit tegen het vermeende ‘paternalisme’ van 
de vorige maritieme regelingen, is door de Rotterdam Rules een alternatief systeem 
gecreëerd. Onder de Rotterdam Rules is het partijen bij een ‘volume contact’ (feitelijk een 
contract voor een reeks van zendingen) toegestaan om af te wijken van deze beperkingen. 
Ik ben van mening dat de manier waarop de exceptie voor volume contracten in de 
Rotterdam Rules is opgesteld bezwaarlijk is; het is dermate onbestemd dat vrijwel alle 
contracten onder de ‘volume contract’-exceptie vallen, zolang het aantal zendingen groter 
dan of gelijk is aan twee. Wat ik stel, en waar de meerderheid van commentatoren mee in 
lijkt te stemmen, is dat de Rotterdam Rules, door te voldoen aan de eisen van de 
scheepseigenaren een lacune hebben gecreëerd die de bevrachters onbeschermd zal laten 






Hoofdstuk 12  Forumkeuzebeding in een cognossement 
Het belang van een forumkeuze kan niet worden overschat. De relevantie daarvan is 
zodanig dat geschillen betreffende het forum vaak een graadmeter vormen voor het 
verloop van het materiële geschil. Het blijkt dat het verlies van een geschil over het forum 
er vaak voor zal zorgen dat een partij afstand doet van zijn vordering of dat het geschil op 
een minder gunstige manier wordt beslecht.  
Aangezien de Hague-Visby Rules de kwestie van internationale bevoegdheid niet 
behandelen is het aan de rechter om te bepalen of een forumkeuzebeding wordt 
toegestaan. In het algemeen kunnen dergelijke bedingen in Engeland en de Verenigde 
Staten worden afgedwongen, hoewel het partijen in sommige gevallen gelukt is aan de 
zware bewijslast te voldoen en aan te tonen dat de kosten van het procederen in de 
geselecteerde forum feitelijk resulteren in een verlaging van de aansprakelijkheid van de 
vervoerder buiten de limieten die gesteld worden in de Rules.  
Zowel de Hamburg Rules als de Rotterdam Rules bevatten regels die het gebruik van 
exclusieve forumkeuzebedingen inperken. Dit betekent dat de eiser ondanks het bestaan 
van een forumkeuze de optie heeft om een procedure voor een andere bevoegde rechter te 
starten. Dit wordt verder aan banden gelegd door de Rotterdam Rules, waar alleen een 
forumkeuze kan worden uitgebracht voor een staat die partij is bij de Rotterdam Rules. 
Daarbij dient evenwel te worden opgemerkt dat de bevoegdheidsbepalingen uit de 
Rotterdam Rules van optionele aard zijn; ratificerende staten dienen deze bepalingen 
uitdrukkelijk te aanvaarden.  
Waar het de uitzondering voor volume contracten betreft lijken de Rotterdam Rules de 
bescherming van partijen met een belang in de lading aan te tasten, door vast te stellen 
dat forumkeuzebedingen in dergelijke contracten volledig geldig en exclusief zijn. Deze 
aantasten wordt echter beperkt doordat alleen een keuze voor de rechter van een 
verdragsluitende staat als geldig zal worden ervaren. 
 
Conclusie 
Hoewel contractuele bescherming tegen verschillen in onderhandelingspositie 
traditioneel worden opgesteld ten behoeve van ‘zwakke’ contractspartijen zoals 
consumenten en werknemers, dient deze bescherming uitgebreid te worden tot 
commerciële partijen. Dit werk levert bewijs voor de stelling dat kleine ondernemingen 
vaak worden overgelaten aan de genade van grotere ondernemingen, waarbij zij met 
dezelfde onredelijke contractvoorwaarden te kampen hebben als de onbeschermde 
consument.  
In het licht van het idee van de bescherming van kleine ondernemingen dient de 
traditionele benadering van de forumkeuze in commerciële contracten, in het bijzonder 
contracten betreffende goederenvervoer over zee, te worden herzien. Het idee dat deze 
bepalingen slechts van procedurele aard zijn is onrealistisch, aangezien er duidelijk bewijs 
is dat deze bepalingen een significante impact hebben op de materiële rechten van 




komen aan de voorwaarden van een dergelijk beding zodanig zijn dat de procedure vaak 
zo duur wordt dat deze in feite resulteert in een verlaging van de aansprakelijkheid van de 
vervoerder door de eiser te dwingen zodanige uitgaven te doen dat het financieel 
efficiënter is om geen vordering in te dienen. 
De aanpak die tot dusver op het internationale toneel is genomen met betrekking tot 
maritieme contracten laat veel te wensen over. Het eerste probleem is dat het creëren van 
meer en alternatieve regelingen enkel aanleiding zal geven tot meer onzekerheid, 
naarmate er meer normen beschikbaar zijn om te worden aangenomen, aangepast en 
getransformeerd door individuele landen. Ten tweede, hetgeen blijkt uit de Rotterdam 
Rules, bestaat de wens om de bescherming van de partijen met een belang in de lading te 
bepreken door een grotere contractsvrijheid toe te staan.  Hoewel dit in principe een goed 
idee zou kunnen zijn dient hierover een serieus debat plaats te vinden, de manier waarop 
de wijzigingen tot dusver zijn vormgegeven is verre van voldoende. Dergelijke wijzigingen 
worden gerechtvaardigd door een beroep te doen op het bestaan van (een uitzonderlijke 
groep) partijen met een belang in de lading die een gelijke of betere 
onderhandelingspositie hebben dan de scheepseigenaren, waarbij men zich blijkbaar niet 
heeft gerealiseerd dat regelingen dienen te worden gebaseerd op de gemiddelde partijen 
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